

Achtergrond

Afmaak

Joegoslavië^u

Z-B

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> FOOLS' CRUSADE
>
> Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions
>
> by Diana Johnstone
>
> Book Excerpt
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> Cover photo of Fools' Crusade: Smoke over Zvezdara, Belgrade, April
> 1999, by Andrija Ilic
> Diana Johnstone, FOOLS' CRUSADE Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions,
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> [Ed. note: This excerpt -- the full introduction of the book, p. 1-14,
> MRP edition -- is published by permission of the author and publishers. We
> have kept the European punctuation; in addition, we have made use of Java
> Script for the notes so that they appear in a bullet when readers slide
> their
> mouse pointer over the note#. Readers who do not have Java enabled in
> their
> browser can click on the note# and they will be transferred to the notes
> that are also appended to the bottom of this excerpt.]
>
> Introduction
>
> TURNING POINTS
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> At the end of November 1999, an important new movement against
> "globalization" emerged in massive protests against the World Trade
> Organization meeting in Seattle. Strangely enough, only months earlier,
> when NATO launched its first aggressive war by bombing Yugoslavia, there
> had
> been remarkably little protest. Yet NATO's violent advance into southeast
> Europe was precisely related to the globalization process opposed in
> Seattle.
> Few seemed to grasp the connection. Was it really plausible that
> overwhelming military power was being wielded more benevolently than
> overwhelming economic power? Or that the two were not in some way promoting
> the same interests and the same "world order"?

- >
- > Apparently, many people on the left, who would normally defend peace and justice, were fooled or confused by the claim that the "Kosovo war" was waged for purely humanitarian reasons. The altruistic pretensions of NATO's Kosovo war served to gain public acceptance of war as the appropriate instrument of policy. This opened the way for the United States, in the
- > wake of 11 September 2001, to attack Afghanistan as the opening phase of a new, long-term "war against terrorism".
- >
- > The bombing of Yugoslavia marked a turning point in the expansion of U.S. military hegemony. For the first time, a European country was subjected to the type of U.S. intervention usually reserved for Central America. It also marked the end of Germany's postwar inhibition about foreign military intervention, and saw Germans returning to the scene of Nazi crimes with a clear conscience. For the first time, NATO abandoned its defensive posture and attacked a country that posed no threat to its member states, outside the NATO treaty area, and without seeking UN Security Council authorization.
- > International law was circumvented in the name of an alleged higher moral imperative. A precedent was set. When the United States subsequently arrogated the right to bomb and invade Afghanistan on moral grounds, its NATO allies could only meekly offer to tag along. In a world with no more legal barriers to might proclaiming itself right, there was nothing to stop a U.S. president from using military force to crush every conceivable adversary.
- >
- > For all its dubious origins, the 1991 Gulf war against Iraq was waged against a militarized single-party dictatorship, condemned by the United Nations for invading another country. And yet, remarkably, the war against Yugoslavia aroused less public protest than the war against Iraq.
- (1) A significant difference was that the war against Yugoslavia was waged by the political center-left. The NATO governments were mostly led by liberals and "Third Way" social democrats. The attack on Serbia was endorsed by politicians and intellectuals identified with the left, who exhorted the public to believe that the United States and its allies no longer made war to advance selfish interests, but might be coaxed into using their overwhelming military might to protect innocent victims from evil dictators.
- > This caused considerable confusion in the very segments of public opinion that would normally be expected to oppose war. In most Western countries, only a few drastically weakened fragments of left-wing movements and isolated individuals still remembered that humanitarian intervention, far from being the harbinger of a brave new century, was the standard pretext for all the Western imperialist conquests of the past. The left was too confused, feeble, or isolated to provide a vigorous challenge to the official claim that the NATO war against Yugoslavia marked a new era in global morality. On the contrary, much of the most pertinent challenge came from right-wing analysts, whose minds were kept relatively clear,

either

- > by awareness of traditional realpolitik or by libertarian suspicion of official propaganda. Not since the Socialist Parties of Europe rallied to their
- > governments' war programs in 1914 has the left opposition to war collapsed so ignominiously and with such good conscience.

> WAR REHABILITATED

- >
- > The message that war was once again an acceptable instrument of politics was all the more resounding in that it was delivered by center-left governments composed of those very political parties -- Social Democrats and Greens which in the 1980s had attained a large measure of ideological hegemony
- > within their generation in both Eastern and Western Europe by holding out the promise of a peaceful world. On the eve of the Soviet implosion, there was talk of a "peace dividend" in the form of resources that could henceforth be diverted from military production to meeting social needs.
- >
- > With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the big Western peace movements of the 1980s seemed to consider that their job was done. Because the period of superpower stand-off had been called the Cold War, the expectation was widespread that ending it would bring a new era of peace and disarmament.
- >
- > This turned out to be a brief mirage. A decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. military spending again resumed its upward spiral, "Star Wars" was back on the agenda, Washington was pressuring its allies to spend more on armaments, NATO was expanding eastwards, and the United States was using military diplomacy to gain influence across the southernmost tier of the former Soviet Union.
- >
- > Recently rewarded with a peerage and the post of NATO Secretary General for his incomparable performance as British defense secretary during the Kosovo conflict, former Labour Party disarmament advocate George Robertson declared on 2 December 1999: "The time for a peace dividend is over because there is no permanent peace in Europe or elsewhere." This acceptance of war was
- > couched in moral terms: war was not only inevitable, it was good. NATO had taken it upon itself to overrule the postwar international legal order set up around the United Nations and decree unilaterally that war was no longer the scourge of mankind, the worst of all "humanitarian catastrophes",
- > but rather, when employed by enlightened Western powers, the proper means to
- > protect "human rights" and punish the wicked. The last war of the twentieth century was a promise of more war in the century to come. That promise was fulfilled with a vengeance with the attack on Afghanistan and President Bush's vow to pursue war against "evil", with no end in sight.
- >
- > "During the Cold War, we would not have gotten ourselves involved in a dispute like the one in Kosovo", one commentator observed.(2) "In the days when the Soviet Union contained us, power realities would have kept

the

> U.S. from interfering. It is because we are now free to indulge in backing up

> our ideals and sympathies with cruise missiles that we are there." In

> choosing to get involved, without any obligation to do so, and in disregard of

> the UN Charter and international law, "the United States is not serving any

> particular interest of its own. It is acting out of altruism. This is a

> new kind of approach to the use of power in world politics. It was called

> for by a line of U.S. presidents, from Wilson to Bush to Clinton, who consider

> this to be a new era in world politics, in which the rules have changed."

>

> In Kosovo, wrote a mainstream American columnist, the United States and

> its allies "intervened without UN authorization, in violation of Serbian

> sovereignty and probably of international law". But this was nothing to

> be "hung up" about, since "Sometimes the only way to stop bad men from

> doing bad things is with force. Lawyers won't get the job done."

Washington

> Post/International Herald Tribune, 20 June 2000.(3) The scenario is

> straight out of a classic Western movie: "bad men" must be stopped from doing

> "bad things", presumably by "good men" -- and women, of course. A "new era in world politics"? Or the same old story?

>

> THE HUMANITARIAN ILLUSION

>

> For years, a chorus of non-governmental organizations and commentators

> reproached the United Nations, Europe, and the U.S. government for

> failing to take action, which came to be understood as military action. As

a

> result, NATO intervention appeared to be a response to public demand.

NATO's 1999 war was presented to the public as a happy ending to the serial drama of Yugoslavia as recounted by the media throughout the previous decade.

> Many significant factors were systematically ignored. Other elements,

> sometimes distorted and sometimes simply untrue, were constantly repeated.

The result was a collective fiction told and retold, written and rewritten, by very

> many people, including reporters under pressure to meet deadlines,

> editors further simplifying the story for readers assumed to be both ignorant

> and impatient, paid propagandists and public relations officers,

> pontificating commentators, prejudiced editorialists, ambitious politicians, outright liars -- as well as by talented opportunists and conformists sensitive

> to the direction the wind was blowing and the buttered side of the bread.

> Endlessly repeated, this collective fiction has become a formidable myth

> perpetuated by the powerful institutions and individuals whose own

> credibility is at stake in its maintenance. The fictional saga of

> Yugoslavia in the 1990s goes something like this:

>

> "Yugoslavia was a "prison of peoples" where the Serbs oppressed all the

> others. It was destroyed by the rise of an evil leader, Slobodan

- > Milosevic, who set out to create a "Greater Serbia" by eliminating other peoples in a process called "ethnic cleansing". Those other peoples sought to escape,
- > by creating their own independent states. The Yugoslav army, actually
- > Serbian, invaded them. In Bosnia, the invading Serbs tried to drive out the
- > Muslims, who wanted to perpetuate an exemplary multi-ethnic society. The Serb
- > ethnic cleansing killed 200,000 unarmed Muslims while the international
- > community looked on and even prevented the Muslims from arming in self-defense. At Srebrenica, the United Nations allowed the Serbs to commit genocide.
- > Only U.S. bombing forced Milosevic to come to the negotiating table at Dayton.
- > The resulting agreement brought peace and democracy to multi-ethnic Bosnia.
- > However, the international community had failed to save the Albanian majority in Kosovo from apartheid. In 1998 Madeleine Albright warned that NATO must intervene to keep Milosevic from "doing in Kosovo what he could no longer get away with in Bosnia" Washington Post, 18 April 1999;
- p.
- > A1).(4) In January 1999 Serbian security forces massacred defenseless civilians
- > in the Kosovo village of Racak, awakening the NATO governments to the need to act to stop genocide. After the turning point of Racak, the Serbs were summoned to peace negotiations in Rambouillet, in France. Milosevic stubbornly refused to negotiate. NATO had no choice but to start bombing Yugoslavia. Masses of Albanians were deliberately driven out according to a preconceived plan called "Operation Horseshoe". Finally, Milosevic gave
- > in, and NATO liberated the Kosovars from their oppressors. Conclusion: from
- > now on, humanitarian intervention constitutes a principal mission for NATO,
- > as the military arm of an international community henceforth committed to protection of human rights. Almost everything about this tale is false.
- > Unfortunately, disproving falsehoods, especially established falsehoods, is a hard task. What has been repeated over and over becomes "obviously true".
- > Very many facts challenging the dominant myth have been reported by news agencies. But such reports are not the ones that major mainstream media highlight. They mostly end up in the wastebaskets of editorial rooms or deleted from computer screens. Those who have believed and helped spread such belief by public advocacy cannot easily reverse themselves. The collective fiction creates its own collective defense. Once the Yugoslav imbroglio was dramatized as a new version of the Nazi Holocaust, any effort to return to reality was stigmatized as the equivalent of "Holocaust
- > denial", and critics were dismissed as "revisionists" and
- > "negationists", comparable to apologists for Nazi crimes."
- >
- > GLOBALIZATION AS U.S. HEGEMONY
- >
- > The economic and institutional factors that animated the Cold War in the
- >

- > United States remained as vigorous as ever after the collapse of the
- > Soviet Union. More so, in fact. The military-industrial complex was intact and
- > triumphant. It no longer had to counter domestic fears that an arms race
- > could lead to war with the other nuclear superpower. While one
- > superpower, exhausted, dropped out of the arms race, the other looked
- > ahead to unlimited opportunities. In the words of Madeleine Albright,
- > "What's the point of
- > having this superb military ... if we can't use it?" My American
- > Journey, Random House, New York, 1995, p. 576.(5) The use of military
- > power had to be justified, however. There was to be no "conversion" of
- > military industry to production of civilian goods. The only conversion was
- > ideological: the
- > identification of new enemies and threats.
- >
- > With the Soviet communist challenge to the capitalist system lying in
- > ruins, U.S. leaders had no reason to accept the sort of "historic
- > compromise"
- > with socialism apparently imagined by the discarded transition leader
- > Mikhail
- > Gorbachev and various European social democrats. Soviet-style political
- > command of the economy had been discredited by incompetence, corruption,
- > and the absence of democratic control or even availability of accurate
- > information. The former Soviet Bloc countries became "transition"
- > countries, as they scrambled to learn how to play the liberal capitalist
- > game. A
- > minority of well-placed individuals made fortunes. Millions of people in
- > the former Soviet Bloc lost their jobs as well as security as basic social
- > services disintegrated. Hindustan Times, 26 October 2000.(6)
- >
- > The elimination of the Soviet system was seen as the triumph of a single
- > dominant model of social, political, and economic organization, imposed
- > by the United States. The uncontested hegemony of the U.S. model is the
- > meaning of "globalization" as it is being carried out by Western
- > transnational
- > corporations, supported by "this superb military".
- >
- > Globalization has meant worldwide empowerment of the transnational
- > private sphere, dominated by ever more powerful corporations, financial
- > institutions, and wealthy individuals. (7) The function of government is
- > reduced to creating conditions favorable to private investment. This is
- > accomplished by deregulation, privatization of public service, and
- > cutbacks in public spending for social welfare. Every activity must offer
- > prospects for competitive return on investment capital or be abandoned.
- > Throughout the world, government policies are judged, approved, or condemned
- > decisively not by their populations but by "the markets", meaning the
- > financial
- > markets, movements of investment capital outside all political control.
- > Foreign
- > investors rather than domestic voters decide policy.
- >
- > As the ability of nation-states to protect the interests of their
- > citizens
- > declines, the importance of citizenship diminishes in turn. The
- > democratic process is unable to provide citizens with the protection they

- > reformist government of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953. Control of
- > the fruit plantations was the reason why the CIA engineered the overthrow of
- > the reformist government of Guatemala in 1954. The communist threat was an
- > all-purpose ideological excuse.
- >
- > In Vietnam, the United States failed in its most ambitious project: to
- > impose a Western-style, Catholic-led satellite regime on the territory
- > of an Asian nation whose population was already fully mobilized to liberate
- > itself from a century of colonial oppression. The project failed ignominiously.
- >
- > Nevertheless, the destruction wrought by bombs, napalm, and chemical
- > defoliants, followed by economic sanctions and a cynical alliance with
- > China, prevented Vietnam from emerging as an attractive alternative
- > model of development. After the semi-failure in Vietnam, a shift took place,
- > toward a mixture of edifying rhetoric and destructive action. The great lesson of
- > Vietnam drawn by American strategists was that it was easier to arm a
- > guerrilla movement than to combat one, and easier to destroy an
- > unfriendly state than to build a friendly one. Nation-building was abandoned in
- > favor of destruction pure and simple. The following period was marked by the
- > use of every possible means to sabotage undesirable regimes: criminal
- > mercenaries, drug traffickers, obscurantist religious fanatics. Jonas
- > Savimbi in Angola, the Contras in Nicaragua, death squads throughout
- > Latin America, even Pol Pot after his defeat by the Vietnamese benefited from
- > more or less covert aid from the CIA, while American diplomats preached the
- > gospel of human rights to the world. The chef d'oeuvre of that policy of
- > destruction was undoubtedly the use of Islamic mujahidins in Afghanistan
- > to entrap the Soviet Union -- the declared goal of Jimmy Carter's openly
- > cynical advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski. The Great Chessboard: American
- > Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1997.(8)
- >
- > Gorbachev was already in power and seeking an historic compromise with
- > the West and a way out of Afghanistan when the United States dramatically
- > reinforced the mujahidin in 1986 by supplying them with Stinger missiles
- > able to shoot down Soviet planes. The only U.S. aim was to humiliate the
- > Soviets as much as possible, afterwards abandoning Afghanistan to chaos
- > and misery, and at the mercy of obscurantist tribal warlords.
- >
- > Between Democratic and Republican administrations there is no
- > fundamental difference, even though the Democrats often prefer to stress
- > positive and ambitious goals such as "nation-building" and "human rights".
- > Republicans tend to stress national interests and threats from enemies:
- > communists, the Evil Empire and, starting with Reagan, the "war against terrorism".
- > Presidents come and go but the continuity of U.S. policy is ensured by a
- > small elite of policy-makers who remain outside party politics -- and
- > often outside public view. An influential member of this foreign policy

need to

- > earn a decent living, stay healthy, and educate their children. In
- > compensation, group identities of all kinds offer the prospect of mutual assistance, protection, or at least solace to populations struggling to cope with
- > changes beyond their control. People turn to identity groups --
- > national, religious, "ethnic", etc. -- for protection. It is surely not by chance
- > that in the post-communist era one of the most successful forms of
- > socioeconomic organization has been the cross-border Mafia, based on national or ethnic loyalty.
- >
- > Meanwhile, regulatory functions are transferred to a new international
- > bureaucracy, totally outside any democratic process. Globalization is
- > advanced institutionally by such bodies as the International Monetary
- > Fund and the World Trade Organization, which set the rules and arbitrate
- > between the dominant economic powers. These institutions severely limit the
- > power of governments to protect public interests, whether citizens' welfare or
- > the environment, from the demands of private business. The stalled
- > "Multilateral Agreement on Investment" (MAI) would go even further in shifting vital political decision-making power to the private sector, acting in
- > obscure, non-elected bureaucratic tribunals.
- >
- > CONVERSION OF THE THREAT
- >
- > In a mono-polar world, a "threat" is anything that might weaken the
- > hegemony of the single superpower. Under President George W. Bush, this has been made explicit. However, the main thrust of U.S. foreign policy has been
- > essentially the same for over half a century. The gist is that the
- > liberal capitalist model favored by the United States is the only permissible
- > model for future development. Large parts of the world may lag far behind, but
- > there must be no viable attractive alternative. Chaos is preferable to
- > the wrong kind of order. Elimination of any viable alternative model of
- > economic development is the essence of "globalization", just as it was the
- > prime
- > motive for the protracted war against communism. Communism was only one
- > form of the basic, intolerable alternative: a government of a sovereign state
- > determined to control its own resources and markets. The existence of
- > the communist "threat" was an ideological asset to the United States, which
- > could use certain aspects of the Soviet system, notably its harsh
- > repression of political dissent, as the justification for its own intervention,
- > even in places such as Central America where U.S. intervention was already the
- > rule before communism existed. Control of oil resources, not "communism", was
- > the reason why the CIA engineered the military overthrow of the bourgeois

- > establishment is Morton Abramowitz, whose career has involved him with
- > both the Afghan mujahidin and Kosovo Albanian rebels. In 1986, as assistant
- > secretary of state for intelligence and research in the Reagan
- > administration, Abramowitz helped arrange delivery of the Stinger
- > missiles.
- > The collapse of the Soviet Union obliged U.S. policy-makers to redefine
- > the "threat" justifying foreign intervention. The "war on terrorism",
- > launched by President Reagan in the early 1980s, was suffering by the end
- > of the
- > decade from a dearth of active terrorists. As president of the Carnegie
- > Endowment for International Peace in the early 1990s, Abramowitz headed
- > a project to develop a new U.S. foreign policy for the post-Cold War era.
- > The American Spectator, June 1999. Roberts, a writer and television
- > producer, was asked in February 1992 to design a publicity campaign to
- > gain public support for the Carnegie Endowment's commission. In this
- > connection he
- > was invited to attend closed-door meetings of the commission, which
- > organized its work to influence the next Democratic president, whoever he
- > might
- > be. (9)
- > Rather than simply identifying "threats", especially at a time when few
- > threats could be seen, a successful new policy needed to combine
- > promotion of U.S. interests with proclamation of American "ideals".
- >
- > "American ideals and self-interest merge when the United States supports
- > the spread of democracy around the globe -- or what we prefer to call
- > 'limited' constitutional democracy, meaning rule by a government that has
- > been
- > legitimized by free elections", was the conclusion of the Carnegie
- > experts, summed up in the Endowment's 1992 publication Self-Determination
- > in the New World Order. "The vision of a 'new world order' since 1990 has
- > been a
- > world with one superpower -- the United States -- in which the rule of law
- >
- > supplants the rule of the jungle, disputes are settled peacefully,
- > aggression is firmly met by collective resistance, and all people are
- > justly> treated." This future "rule of law" is not to be confused with
- > existing
- > international law. Rather, it will be developed under U.S. influence.
- > "International law -- as it always has done -- will respond and adjust
- > to the behavior of nations and the actions of multilateral institutions."
- > (10)
- > A major feature of this "new world order" will be the weakening, even
- > the destruction, of national sovereignty, the basis of existing
- > international law. The sovereignty of the single superpower cannot be
- > seriously
- > challenged, but for other nations, the concept may be outdated.
- >
- > The sovereign nation is being broken down subtly by the pressures of
- > economic globalization. It may also be undermined from within, by
- > domestic insurgencies. In the post-Cold War world, the Carnegie Endowment
- > study noted, "groups within states are staking claims to independence,
- > greater
- > autonomy, or the overthrow of an existing government, all in the name of

> self-determination". In regard to these conflicts, "American interests
 > and ideals compel a more active role." This may go so far as military
 > intervention when self-determination claims or internal repression of
 > such claims lead to "humanitarian calamities". (11) In the future, the
 > authors announced in 1992, "humanitarian interventions will become
 increasingly
 > unavoidable". The United States will have the final word as to when and
 > how to intervene. "The United States should seek to build a consensus
 within
 > regional and international organizations for its position, but should
 > not sacrifice its own judgment and principles if such a consensus fails to
 > materialize."

> This text is significant because it expressed the vision of precisely
 > the people who later led the United States and NATO into the Kosovo war.
 The selected experts included Richard Holbrooke and Madeleine Albright,
 > among others, who were to become senior officials in the Clinton
 > administration.

> One of the two co-authors of Self-Determination in the New World Order,
 > David Scheffer, became Albright's special ambassador for war crimes
 > issues.

> The other, Morton Halperin, served as the State Department policy
 > planning director, offering advice on war with Serbia. Another participant
 in the

> Carnegie project, Leon Fuerth, former Vice President Al Gore's foreign
 > policy expert, was put in charge of administering sanctions against
 > Serbia.

> Abramowitz continued to act from behind the scenes as an eminence grise
 > for Albright. He helped found the high-level International Crisis Group, a
 > chief policy designer for Bosnia and Kosovo. He was omnipresent behind the
 > scenes of the Kosovo drama, both in making policy and in shaping elite
 > business, government, and media opinion. He acted as an advisor to the
 Kosovo

> Albanian delegation at the Rambouillet talks, whose programmed breakdown
 provided the pretext for NATO bombing.

> The same group of advisors that theorized military intervention for
 > "humanitarian" reasons went on to make it happen. Events in Kosovo were
 > influenced and interpreted to fit the pattern of a "humanitarian
 > calamity"

> requiring U.S. military intervention. Perhaps this was sincere, in line
 > with

> the psychological tendency to see, in an obscure field of vision,
 > whatever one expects to see. One way or another, the prophets fulfilled
 their own prophecy.

> The relationship between Afghanistan in 1979 and Kosovo in 1999 is
 > uncanny.

> In both cases, out in front there was the discourse on human rights, and
 > in the background, drug traffickers, retrograde clan warlords, and even
 > Osama bin Laden. It is noteworthy that until the 11 September attacks, the
 > United States had consistently chosen to ally with the most obscurantist
 > fundamentalist Islamic fanatics, whose center is Saudi Arabia, against
 > nationalist secular governments. Islamic fundamentalism is compatible

- > with U.S. globalization in that it cares nothing for national boundaries and
- > does not threaten to establish national governments that can serve as a
- > progressive model of alternative development. The plight of Afghan women
- > was of no concern to the Western champions of "human rights" so long as the
- > enemy was the Soviet Union, whose support of the education of girls and
- > women incurred the murderous wrath of the U.S.-backed "freedom
- > fighters".
- >
- > Osama bin Laden belongs to the same category of enemies as the former
- > Panama strongman Manuel Noriega: discarded assets. After being used to
- serve
- > U.S. aims, they turned out to have aims of their own. But a superpower can
- > use almost everything. The war against discarded assets provides an
- > opportunity to strike moral poses against the crimes formerly tolerated or
- > encouraged by the United States in its fight against the other category of
- enemies: potential alternatives.
- >
- > In a way, Yugoslavia became an enemy both as a discarded asset and as a
- > potential alternative. When the Soviet Bloc collapsed, non-aligned
- > Yugoslavia lost its value to the West as a strategic asset. As a
- > nominally socialist country with considerable Third World relationships
- thanks to
- > its leading role in the Non-Aligned Movement, Yugoslavia could be seen as
- a
- > potential alternative model. If the country held together, it might
- > stand in the way of Western plans for the region. Perhaps the potential
- Yugoslav
- > "threat" was an illusion. But its disintegration settled the matter, and
- > destroying the country provided a useful exercise for future operations.
- >
- > HUMANITARIAN MISSIONARIES
- >
- > The United States had intervened aggressively abroad before there was a
- > "communist threat" and would continue to do so afterwards. Both
- > imperialism and anti-imperialism existed over a century ago, before there
- were any communist parties. But in the 1990s, much of what remained of the
- left
- > had forgotten the critique of imperialism, abandoned all critical scrutiny
- > of geostrategic realpolitik, and focused on moral and ideological issues
- > related to "identity politics". No Logo, Flamingo, London, 2000, pp.
- > 121-4.(12) With no clear economic policy of their own, left-wing parties
- > were reduced to providing the "human face" for neoliberalism. This took
- > the form of receptiveness to cultural diversity and opposition to racism.
- In
- > Western Europe, a Eurocentric campaign celebrating "human rights" was
- > used to discredit "Third Worldism". The adversary was no longer social
- > injustice caused by unchecked economic power, but evil caused by bad
- people who adopted wrong ideas. The catch was that this approach, applied to
- > foreign countries, can all too easily be used to justify intervention,
- leading
- > back to imperialism at its most aggressive.
- >
- > The exclusive focus on moral and humanitarian issues, with an emphasis

- > on victims, was fostered by a certain privatization of progressive activism
 - > during the last quarter of the twentieth century. As political parties
 - > and mass movements declined, single-issue movements grew. These in turn
 - > engendered non-governmental organizations (NGOs) taking the form of
 - > small (or in some cases large) businesses using advertising to "sell" their
 - > good works to donors, whether private or public. The requirements of
 - > fund-raising favor consensual causes with immediate emotional appeal.
- Moreover, while NGOs may benefit from the aura of relative innocence related to being "non-governmental", all of them are by no means strictly
- > "non-governmental".
 - > Many depend on contracts from governments. Some ostensible "NGOs" are
 - > set up by governments to intervene in the political affairs of other countries.

- >
- > An important example is the National Endowment for Democracy. Created in
- > 1983 by the Reagan administration, the NED receives an annual tax-exempt
- > appropriation from the Congress, and funds citizens of foreign nations
- > working to make their countries more "democratic" according to American
- > "free market" standards. In Yugoslavia, the NED generously funded
- > Albanian separatists in Kosovo and the anti-Milosevic opposition in
- > Serbia. Human Rights Watch, closely linked to U.S. policy-making, repeatedly
- > launched
- > inflammatory and unsubstantiated accusations against the Yugoslav
- > government. Internationally active humanitarian NGOs were in the
- > forefront of the demand for "humanitarian intervention". The fact that the
- > calls
- > for military intervention seem to come initially not from any government
- > but
- > from private voices of conscience in the media, in humanitarian NGOs,
- > and in policy advisory groups helps preserve the illusion that eventual
- > military action must be a disinterested response to moral imperatives.

Suspicion

- > of governments contributes to the credibility of these private entities,
- > which, however, may be less open than government agencies to public
- > scrutiny or democratic decision-making. Operating across borders, some
- > charitable
- > groups tend to perceive national sovereignty as little more than an
- > obstacle to
- > their own operations. Based in the rich NATO countries, operating in
- > poorer countries, the direction of their intervention is the same as that
- > of
- > NATO, acting as policeman of the new world order. Such NGOs risk playing a
- > role similar to that played in the past by Christian missionaries, as both
- > a
- > pretext and justification for military expeditions and imperialist
- > conquests. (13) When, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Kosovo, military
- > intervention leads to an international protectorate, Western NGOs are
- > granted a prominent role in local administration and receive a large
- > share of public and private donations.

- >
- > Such are some of the factors that contributed to a readiness on the part
- > of the public in general and the left in particular to accept, even to
- > demand, NATO military intervention in Yugoslavia. The notion that the end

of the Cold War had saved the world from the danger of war, that democracy was

> victorious, and that only a little more effort was needed to rid the world of "evil", distorted the ability to understand what was really happening

> in Yugoslavia and what was really at stake.

>

>

> ABOUT THIS BOOK

>

> The purpose of this book is to provide information and analysis to dispute the belief that NATO intervention in Yugoslavia was beneficial.

This

> requires calling attention to aspects of the Yugoslav crisis and conflicts that are either distorted or neglected in mainstream commentary.

The

> objective is not to recount the whole story (impossible in a book of this length), but to put the story in perspective. The inevitable selectivity

> may be reproached as evidence of a "pro-Serb" bias. Inasmuch as the dominant

> mainstream bias has been blatantly anti-Serb, this is unavoidable in an effort to recover a fair balance. However, for what it is worth, I can state at the outset that I am not "for" or "against" any people as such.

All

> peoples have their own variants, their own ways of expressing human qualities and weaknesses. I am "pro-Serb" only if that means that I consider the Serbs to be human beings like everybody else, neither better nor

> worse.

> I have no personal connection with any party to the Yugoslav conflicts.

> The only thing that may have inspired a special sympathy for Serbs is the fact that they have been subjected in recent years to an altogether extraordinary campaign of racist calumny by commentators and politicians in NATO countries. The slander of an entire people is an injustice for which there is no court of appeal other than public opinion.

>

> My main thesis is that the intervention of the NATO powers in Yugoslavia, far from being a last-minute rescue, was from the start a major driving factor in the tragic course of events. At best, the Great Powers

> intruded with all the helpfulness of bulls in a china shop. At worst, they deliberately stirred up fear and hatred in order to serve their own interests. Because of the constant interplay of past and present events in the Balkans, I have chosen an order that is not strictly chronological.

> Thus in the first two chapters, I plunge into the most burning issues: first,

> the responsibility for the wars of disintegration, and second, the question

> of criminal justice. In the third chapter, I describe the differences

> between various forms of nationalism within Yugoslavia. The fourth chapter is

> devoted primarily to the role of Germany. The fifth chapter analyzes the

> interplay between the Albanian nationalist movement in Kosovo and the Western powers, leading to NATO military intervention. In the final

- > chapter, I draw attention to factors putting the Yugoslav events into the context
- > of ongoing world conflicts.
- >
- >
- > Diana Johnstone, FOOLS' CRUSADE Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions, Monthly Review Press, New York, N.Y, 2002; ISBN 1-58367-084-X, and Pluto Press, London, U.K., Sept. 2002; ISBN 0745319505.
- >
- > The book can be ordered on-line directly from Monthly Review Press at, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/storefrnt.htm>.
- > It can also be ordered on-line directly from Pluto Press at, https://secure.metronet.co.uk/pluto/cgi-bin/web_store/web_store.cgi?sc_query_subject=International%20Studies.
- >
- > Š Š Š Š Š Š
- >
- > Notes
- >
- > 1. The military action against Iraq aroused widespread opposition, even if the protests were muted by mainstream media. There was the beginning of a strong anti-war movement in the United States itself nipped in the bud only by the extremely rapid announcement that the war was over. Thereafter, however, the United States and its British ally managed to go on bombing Iraq for years without arousing serious domestic opposition.
- >
- > 2. David Fromkin, Kosovo Crossing: American Ideals Meet Reality on the Balkan Battle fields, The Free Press, New York, 1999, pp.164-5.
- >
- > 3. Fred Hiatt, "A Standing War Crimes Tribunal Could Do Harm", Washington Post/International Herald Tribune, 20 June 2000.
- >
- > 4. On 7 March 1998, Madeleine Albright told Italian prime minister Lamberto Dini: "We are not going to stand by and watch the Serbian authorities do in Kosovo what they can no longer get away with doing in Bosnia" (Barton Gellman, "The Path to Crisis: How the United States and Allies Went to War", Washington Post, 18 April 1999; p. A1).
- >
- > 5. In 1993, when General Colin Powell questioned the usefulness of air strikes against Bosnian Serbs, Albright, then U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, retorted angrily: "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" Colin Powell, My American Journey, Random House, New York, 1995, p. 576.
- >
- > 6. A report presented to President Vladimir Putin in October 2000 by Russian health minister Yury Shevchenko showed that Russia's population shrank by more than half a million people in the first eight months of

- > the
- > year, the steepest drop ever during peacetime. According to the study,
- > Russians were dying younger and having fewer children due to rising
- > rates of poverty, illness, stress, alcoholism, civil conflict, and
- > industrial
- > accidents. Drug abuse and sexually-transmitted diseases also contributed
- > to the drastic decline of male life expectancy from 64 years in the 1980s
- > to less than 59 years. The birth rate of 1.17 children per Russian woman
- > was far below the 2.5 rate required to maintain the population. Shevchenko
- > told a press conference: "The Russian nation is literally dying out." Fred
- > Weir, "Russia May Soon be Empty of People", Hindustan Times, 26 October
- > 2000.
- >
- > 7. A study entitled "Top 200: The Rise of Corporate Global Power",
- > released
- > in January 2001 by the Washington-based Institute for Policy Studies,
- > confirmed that the balance of global economic power has shifted from
- > governments to corporate boardrooms. The study, based on a comparison of
- >
- > corporate sales and gross domestic product, showed that 51 of the
- > largest
- > 100 economies in the world are corporations, not countries. As an
- > example,
- > General Motors Corporation has more economic power than Denmark, IBM is
- > bigger than Singapore, and Sony is bigger than Pakistan.
- >
- > 8. Interviewed by the French weekly Le Nouvel Observateur, 12 January
- > 1998,
- > Zbigniew Brzezinski revealed that the "official version" of history,
- > according to which the CIA began to aid the mujahidin in 1980 after the
- > Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan, was false. In reality, months earlier,
- > on 3
- > July 1979, President Carter signed the first directive on clandestine
- > aid to
- > the Islamic rebels opposed to the pro-Soviet government in Kabul. At the
- >
- > time, Brzezinski said he had explained to Carter that this would trigger
- >
- > Soviet military intervention. That secret operation was "an excellent
- > idea"
- > because it sucked the Russians into the "Afghan trap", Brzezinski
- > concluded.
- > The former presidential National Security advisor made these revelations
- > in
- > Paris apparently as part of the promotion of the French edition of his
- > book,
- > The Great Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives,
- >
- > Basic Books, New York, 1997.
- >
- > 9. John B. Roberts II, "Roots of Allied Farce", The American Spectator,
- >
- > June 1999. Roberts, a writer and television producer, was asked in
- > February
- > 1992 to design a publicity campaign to gain public support for the

> Carnegie

> Endowment's commission. In this connection he was invited to attend
> closed-door meetings of the commission, which organized its work to
> influence the next Democratic president, whoever he might be.

>

> 10. Morton H. Halperin and David J. Scheffer, with Patricia L. Small,
> Self-Determination in the New World Order, Carnegie Endowment for
> International Peace, 1992, Washington, D.C., p. 3.

>

> 11. Ibid., p. 108.

>

> 12. See the retrospective critique of the inward-looking campus left of
> the

> early 1990s by Naomi Klein: "In this new globalized context, the
> victories

> of identity politics have amounted to a rearranging of the furniture
> while

> the house burned down." No Logo, Flamingo, London, 2000, pp. 121-4.

>

> 13. It is fair to note that in the last half of the twentieth century,

> a

> number of Catholic missionaries risked their lives to take the side of
> the

> poor victims of U.S. imperialism in Latin America. There is a permanent
> tension between humanitarian organizations and the powers that use them

> as a

> pretext for intervention.

>

>

> Diana Johnstone is a widely-published essayist and columnist who has
> written

> extensively on European and international politics. She is the author of
> The

> Politics of Euromissiles: Europe's Role in America's World (Verso,
> 1985).

> Her writings have been published in many publications such as New Left
> Review, In These Times, The Nation, Counterpunch, and Covert Action

> Quarterly. This excerpt is published with the kind authorization of the
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- > <http://www.swans.com/library/art9/herman10.html>
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- > SWANS, Monday, May 26, 2003
- >
- > Diana Johnstone On The Balkan Wars
- >
- > by Edward S. Herman
- >
- > Diana Johnstone, FOOLS' CRUSADE Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions,
- > Monthly Review Press, New York, N.Y, 2002; ISBN 1-58367-084-X. \$19.95
- > paper;
- > 288 pp.
- >
- > Diana Johnstone's Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions
- >
- > (Monthly Review Press, 2002) is essential reading for anybody who wants
- > to understand the causes, effects, and rights-and-wrongs of the Balkan
- wars
- > of the past dozen years. The book should be priority reading for leftists,
- > many of whom have been carried along by a NATO-power party line and
- > propaganda barrage, believing that this was one case where Western
- intervention was well-intentioned and had beneficial results. An inference
- from this
- > misconception, by "cruise missile leftists" and others, is that
- > imperialism can be constructive and its power projections must be
- evaluated on their merits, case by case. But that the Western intervention
- in the Balkans
- > constitutes a valid special case is false; the conventional and obvious
- > truths on the Balkan wars that sustain such a view disintegrate on close
- > inspection.
- >
- > Johnstone provides that close inspection, with impressive results. It is
- > a pleasure to watch her dismantle the claims and expose the methods of
- > David Rieff, a literary and media favorite, as well as Roy Gutman, John
- Burns,
- > and David Rohde, three reporters whose close adherence to the party line
- in
- > Bosnia was rewarded with the Pulitzer prize -- all fueling the
- > "humanitarian bombing" bandwagon. While critics of the party line risk
- being tagged and dismissed as apologists for the Serbs, even the most
- fervent partisan of
- > an idealized "Bosnia" and campaigner for NATO military intervention such
- as
- > Rieff, or the novice journalist Rohde, who wrote on Srebrenica in a
- > semi-fictional mode, with U.S. intelligence guidance, has never had to
- > fear being criticized as an apologist for the Muslims or NATO. Michael
- > Ignatieff, another media favorite, acknowledges the help he has received
- from U.S. officials like Richard Holbrooke, General Wesley Clark and former
- > Tribunal prosecutor Louise Arbour, and Rieff lauded him for his "close
- relations"
- > with these "important figures in the West's political and military
- > leadership." (1)

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- >
- > The widespread acceptance of the official connections, open advocacy,
- > and spectacular bias displayed by these authors has rested in part on the
- > usual media and intellectual community subservience to official policy
- > positions, but it was also a result of the rapid and thoroughgoing
- demonization of
- > the Serbs as the "new Nazis" or "last of the Communists." Given that NATO
- > was good, combatting evil, the close relationship with officials was not
- > seen as involving any conflict of interest or compromise with objectivity;
- they
- > were all on the same "team" -- a phalanx seeking justice. Thus even the
- > uncritical conduiting of anti-Serb propaganda -- including unverified
- > rumors and outright disinformation -- was not only acceptable, it was
- capable
- > of yielding journalistic honors.
- >
- > On the other hand, any attempt to counter the official/media team's
- > claims and supposed evidence was quickly interpreted as apologetics. This
- is
- > hardly new. In each U.S. war critics of U.S. policy are charged with being
- > apologists for the demonized enemy -- Ho Chi Minh and communism; Pol
- > Pot; Saddam Hussein; Arafat; Daniel Ortega; Bin Laden, etc. The
- demonization
- > of Milosevic was in accord with longstanding practice, and the charge of
- > apologist for challenging the official line on the demon was inevitable
- > for a forceful challenger. What is perhaps exceptional has been the
- > extensive acceptance of the party line among people on the left, with,
- among
- > others, Christopher Hitchens, (2) Ian Williams and the editors of The
- Nation in
- > its grip. In These Times rejected first hand reporting from Kosovo by
- > Johnstone, their longtime European Editor, when it diverged from the line
- of their
- > more recent correspondent, Paul Hockenos, whose connections with the
- > establishment included a stint as the spokesperson and media officer for
- > the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to
- > Bosnia-Herzegovina, acting as an occupying power in northern
- > Bosnia-Herzegovina, and an affiliation with the American Academy in
- > Berlin, whose chairman and co-chairman are Richard Holbrooke and Henry
- > Kissinger.
- > (3)
- >
- > What makes the double standard in treatment of Johnstone and the
- > "journalists of attachment" especially laughable is that Johnstone is a
- > serious investigative journalist, very knowledgeable about Balkan
- > history and politics, whose work in Fools' Crusade sets a standard in cool
- > examination of issues that is several grades higher than that in Rieff,
- > Gutman, Rohde, Burns (and for that matter, Ignatieff, Timothy Garton
- > Ash, Noel Malcolm, Hitchens, Williams, and Hockenos). On issue after issue
- > she discusses both the evidence and counter-evidence, weighs them, gives
- > them a historical and political context, and comes to an assessment, which
- is
- > sometimes that the verifiable evidence doesn't support a clear
- > conclusion.
- > She does this convincingly, and in the process lays waste to the

- > established version.
- >
- > For example, Johnstone notes that in late September, 1991, some 120
- > Serbs in the Croatian town of Gospic were abducted and massacred in what
- > Croatian human rights activists called the first major massacre of civilians
- > in
- > the Yugoslav civil wars. Although this was clearly designed to frighten
- > the
- > Serbs into moving, the term "ethnic cleansing" was only taken up by the
- > Western media months later in reference to Serb treatment of Muslims in
- > Bosnia. The Gospic slaughter was barely noticed, and only hit the news
- > in 1997 when a disgruntled former policeman, Miro Bajramovic went public,
- > claiming that the Gospic massacre was done on orders from the Croatian
- > Interior Ministry to spread terror among the Serbs. Bajramovic was
- > quickly imprisoned in Croatia and tortured, and no moves were taken to
- > deal with> the> crimes he named either within Croatia or by the
- > International Criminal
- > Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTY, or Tribunal).
- >
- > Shortly thereafter three other Croatian soldiers risked their lives to
- > take videotapes and documents on this massacre to the Hague, but the
- > Tribunal
- > refused to offer them protection; one was murdered, the others fled
- > Gospic, and while Tribunal prosecutor Carla Del Ponte insisted that the
- > Tribunal
- > must have priority over Serb courts in dealing with Serbs, she waived
- > priority in dealing with Croats. Thus, nothing was done regarding Gospic
- > except the harassment, torture and killing of witnesses. (4)
- >
- > One of the Croatian officers leading the attacks on Serbs, an Albanian,
- > Agim Ceku, was subsequently trained by "retired" U.S. army officers on
- > contract to Croatia, and he helped command "Operation Storm" in 1995, in
- > which hundreds of Serb civilians were killed and Krajina was ethnically
- > cleansed of several hundred thousand Serbs in what was probably the
- > largest
- > single ethnic cleansing operation in the Balkan wars. Ceku later returned
- > to
- > Kosovo to join the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and worked with them
- > during the 1999 bombing war. Ceku has not only never been indicted by the
- > Tribunal, in January 2000 he was sworn in by NATO's proconsul in Kosovo,
- > Bernard Kouchner, as chief of the "Kosovo Protection Corps," the new look
- > KLA.
- >
- > You may not have heard of Gospic or Ceku, and Nasir Oric is also not a
- > name
- > featured by Rieff, the media, or the Tribunal. Arkan is a more familiar
- > name. Arkan was a Serb paramilitary leader, eventually indicted by the
- > Tribunal, just as NATO started to bomb Yugoslavia in March 1999, no
- > doubt coincidentally providing exemplary public relations service to NATO.
- > Nasir Oric was a Bosnian Muslim officer operating out of Srebrenica, from
- > which "safe haven" Oric ventured out to attack nearby Serb villages,
- > burning
- > homes and killing over a thousand Serbs between May 1992 and January 1994.
- > Oric even invited Western reporters to his apartment to see his "war
- > trophies":

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- > videocassettes showing cut-off Serb heads, burnt houses, and piles of
- > corpses. (5)
- >
- > You thought that Srebrenica was a "safe haven" only for civilians and
- > that it could hardly be a UN cover for Bosnian Muslim military operations?
- > You were misinformed. (6) You hadn't heard of the 1992 pushing out of
- > Serbs
- > from Srebrenica and the multiyear attacks on nearby Serb towns and
- > massacres
- > that preceded the Srebrenica massacre (discussed further below)? In fact,
- > it
- > has been an absolute rule of Rieff et al./media reporting on the Bosnian
- > conflict to present evidence of Serb violence in vacuo, suppressing
- > evidence of prior violence against Serbs, thereby falsely suggesting that
- > Serbs
- > were never responding but only initiated violence (this applies to
- > Vukovar,
- > Mostar, Tuzla, Gorazde, and many other towns). (7)
- >
- > You hadn't heard of Nasir Oric and can't understand why he has never
- > been indicted by the Tribunal although doing the same sort of thing as
- > Arkan,
- > but perhaps on a somewhat larger scale? It is not puzzling at all if you
- > realize that the "phalanx" I mentioned above which includes Rieff et al.,
- > the
- > media, and the Tribunal, also includes the NATO powers and is serving
- > their
- > ends, which did not include justice (see below).
- >
- > Johnstone provides many examples of how the phalanx twisted facts for
- > political ends, including an extensive and compelling analysis of the
- > various non-proofs of "systematic rape" as Serb policy. (8) But the
- > choicest morsel showing how the propaganda system works was the Nazi-style
- > "death camp" with its picture of the "thin man" Fikret Alic behind barbed
- > wire.
- > As Johnstone notes, the Bosnian Muslims and Croatians also had prison
- > camps
- > during the Bosnian wars, but Radovan Karadzic, the "indicted war
- > criminal," was not as smart as they were -- he allowed the Western media
- > to visit his camps.
- >
- > It is now well established as truth, if not permitted to surface in the
- > mainstream media, that: (1) the thin man was not behind barbed wire --
- > the
- > barbed wire was around a small unused compound from which the
- > photographers
- > from Britain's Independent Television Network took their pictures; (2)
- > he was not even in a prison camp, let alone a death camp, but was in
- > transit through a refugee center, on his way to exile in Scandinavia; (3)
- > the
- > thinness of Fikret Alic was not typical of people in the camp, but was
- > highlighted to fit the "Auschwitz" image.
- >
- > Nevertheless, "in August 1992, the 'thin man behind barbed wire' photos
- > made

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- > the tour of the front pages of virtually every tabloid newspaper in the
- > Western world and appeared on the cover of Time, Newsweek, and other
- > mass circulation magazines." (9) The U.S. proposal for a war crimes tribunal
- > followed in the same month, and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel,
- > featuring the evidence of the "thin man" photo, made it clear that the
- > Tribunal's function was to prosecute Serbs, who were ethnic cleansing
- > "to achieve their national goals in Bosnia-Herzegovina [which] is genocide."
- >
- > This was only one of many frauds based on disinformation, but it was a
- > major one, helping make the Serbs-as- Nazis a given for the phalanx and much
- > of the Western public.
- >
- > Milosevic Started It All
- >
- > Central to the party line of NATO and the phalanx has been the theme
- > that Milosevic is the demon who started it all by his nationalist quest for a
- > "Greater Serbia" and his (and Serbia's) view that non-Serbs "had no
- > place in their country, and even no right to live" (Clinton). According to David
- > Rieff, Milosevic "had quite correctly been described by U.S. officials
- > ...as the architect of the catastrophe," (10) and Tim Judah referred to
- > Milosevic's responsibility for wars in "Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia,
- > Kosovo: four wars since 1991 and the result of these terrible conflicts, which
- > began with the slogan 'All Serbs in One State' is the cruelest of ironies."
- > (11)
- >
- > On its face this perspective seems simple-minded, and is even referred
- > to by
- > a more sophisticated analyst than Rieff or Judah, Lenard Cohen, a bit
- > sardonically, as the "paradise lost/loathsome leaders perspective" on
- > history. (12) Johnstone's book destroys this party line by a convincing
- > analysis of the dynamics of the conflict observable in the actions and
- > interests of all the parties involved, extending even to expatriate
- > lobbying
- > groups of the Croatians and Albanians.
- >
- > In her enlightening chapter on Germany, Johnstone describes its
- > hostility to Serbia and contacts with Croatian émigré groups long before
- > the arrival of Milosevic. Germany had attacked Serbia during World War I and
- > then again under the Nazis; whereas the Croatians and Kosovo Albanians had
- > been
- > German allies. Germany under the Nazis had regularly used the gambit of
- > siding
- > with "ethnic minorities" as a means of weakening rival or target states,
- > and
- > with
- > the death of the Soviet Union and the end of Western support of a
- > unified and independent Yugoslavia, and German reunification, Germany
- > renewed that gambit as it aimed to consolidate its power in Eastern Europe.

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Geschichtliches
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- > Germany encouraged the unilateral secession of Slovenia and Croatia and
- > pressured her Maastricht allies to go along with supporting this secession,
- > although it was unnegotiated and in violation of international law.
- >
- > At the same time as the Europeans encouraged the secession of Slovenia
- > and
- > Croatia, and the United States threatened Yugoslavia if it tried to
- > maintain its borders by use of its army, the NATO alliance failed to deal
- > with
- > the threat to the stranded minorities in the seceding territories. The
- > EU-appointed Badinter commission even announced in November 1991 that
- > Yugoslavia was "in a process of dissolution," which helped accelerate
- > the dissolution; and by giving recognition to the artificial boundaries of
- > the "Republics," while refusing to consider the demands of the large
- > groups
- > within those Republics that wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, Badinter
- > provided
- > an ideal formula for producing ethnic warfare. This was not Milosevic
- > causing trouble, it was the Germans and other NATO powers who encouraged
- > dissolution without offering any constructive solution to minority
- > demands
- > (Johnstone discusses some of the ignored possibilities).
- >
- > Their obvious bias against the Serbs, and encouragement to the national
- > groups opposed to the Serbs, also maximized the threat to peace, as it
- > made
- > the Serbs justly suspicious of NATO intentions and encouraged the other
- > groups to resist a negotiated settlement and provoke the Serbs into
- > actions
- > that would increase NATO intervention on their behalf. This was
- > dramatically
- > evident in Bosnia, where the European powers arranged for an
- > independence
- > vote in 1992, despite the fact that the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution
- > required that such a vote be taken only upon agreement among the
- > republic's
- > three "constituent peoples" (Muslims, Croats and Serbs). The Bosnian
- > Serbs
- > boycotted this election, and the creation of this artificial and badly
- > divided state assured war and ethnic cleansing. This again was a
- > catastrophic decision made by the NATO powers, not by Milosevic.
- >
- > Johnstone has an extensive discussion of the brutal historical
- > background of
- > Bosnia-Herzegovina (and Croatia), which had been the scene of massive
- > inter-group crimes during World War II. (13) She also demonstrates
- > clearly
- > that Bosnia was no multiethnic paradise upset by Serb violence, in the
- > myth
- > perpetrated by Rieff et al. and the NATO media. Johnstone points out
- > that
- > even as early as December 1990, in elections in Bosnia the nationalist
- > parties won easily, capturing 90 percent of the votes, suggesting
- > something

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- > other than a non-nationalistic society. She also provides solid evidence
- >
- > that Alija Izetbegovic, the Muslim leader of Bosnia in the war years,
- > was a
- > committed believer in an Islamic -- not a multiethnic -- state, and a
- > man
- > who regarded Turkey as too advanced and modernist, preferring Pakistan
- > as
- > his Islamic model. The thousands of Mujahidden fighters, including Al
- > Qaeda
- > militants, that he welcomed to fight for his cause, and the massive aid
- > given him by Saudi Arabia, were not supplied in the cause of
- > multi-ethnicity.
- >
- > Johnstone shows that with U.S. aid and encouragement Izetbegovic fought
- > any settlement that would result in autonomy for the major national
- groups.
- > He, like the KLA, realized that he could pursue a maximalist strategy by
- > getting the more-than-willing United States to support him both
- diplomatically
- > and, > increasingly, by military means. Milosevic, and to a lesser extent
- the
- > Bosnian Serbs, were repeatedly willing to sign compromise agreements,
- > but Izetbegovic repeatedly refused, with U.S. support -- most importantly,
- > in> the case of the "Lisbon Accord" of March 1992, which was signed by all
- > three parties, but from which Izetbegovic withdrew, on U.S. advice.
- Milosevic
- > also
- > supported the Owen-Vance plan of 1992, vetoed by the Bosnian Serbs, to
- > Milosevic's disgust. This diplomatic history is well documented in Lord
- > David Owen's memoir, Balkan Odyssey, which is why this Britisher's work
- > is
- > not well regarded by the party liners. Richard Holbrooke acknowledges
- > Milosevic's efforts to save the Dayton accord from Izetbegovic's
- > foot-dragging, and the 1995 U.S. bombing of Bosnian Serbs may have been
- > part
- > of the price paid to get Izetbegovic, not Milosevic, to negotiate at
- > Dayton.
- > (14)
- >
- > Johnstone's detailed account of Croatia stresses the genocidal behavior
- > of
- > the Croats toward the Serbs in World War II; the long-standing backing
- > of
- > the nationalist movement in Croatia by Germany, Austria, and the
- > Vatican;
- > the importance of the Croatian lobby in the United States and elsewhere
- > in
- > mobilizing support for their breakaway from Yugoslavia; and Croatia's
- > skilled propaganda efforts, helped along by their employment of public
- > relations firm Ruder Finn. "News" about Croatia and its victimization by
- >
- > Serbia flowed from Zagreb and Ruder Finn. Quite independently of
- > Milosevic
- > the Croatian nationalists, led by Franjo Tudjman from 1990, were clearly

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- >
- > aiming at a "Greater Croatia" that would include a part of Bosnia, as
- > well
- > as the Serb-inhabited Krajina area. As convincingly described by
- > Johnstone,
- > it was a masterpiece of effective propaganda that Croatia's war in
- > Bosnia
- > and expulsion of a quarter million Serbs from Krajina (with active U.S.
- > assistance) was portrayed in the West not as part of a quest for a
- > Greater
- > Croatia, but as a resistance to Milosevic's striving for a Greater
- > Serbia.
- >
- > According to Clinton and mainstream commentary, Milosevic's drive for a
- > Greater Serbia and nationalism was demonstrated by his inflammatory
- > nationalistic speeches of 1987 and 1989. This is a perfect illustration
- > of
- > the profound role of disinformation in the demonization process. The two
- >
- > famous speeches DENOUNCE nationalism: Milosevic actually said that
- > "Yugoslavia is a multinational community, and it can survive only on
- > condition of full equality of all nations that live in it." Nothing in
- > the
- > two speeches contradicts this sentiment.
- >
- > In dispelling the "myth" of Milosevic, Johnstone hardly puts him on a
- > pedestal. He was an opportunistic politician, "whose 'ambiguity' allowed
- > him
- > to win elections, but not to unite the Serbs." Milosevic gained
- > popularity
- > by condemning both Serbian nationalism and Communist bureaucracy, and by
- >
- > promising economic reforms in line with the demands of the Western
- > financial
- > community. In Johnstone's view, Milosevic can be regarded as a criminal
- > "if
- > using criminals to do dirty tasks makes him a criminal," but on this
- > count
- > he was "no more [guilty] (or rather less) than the late President
- > Tudjman of
- > Croatia or President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia, widely regarded as a
- > saint." He was less a nationalist than Tudjman and Izetbegovic, and
- > claims
- > that he had "dehumanizing beliefs" and an "eliminationist project" are
- > taken
- > out of the whole cloth. (15)
- >
- > Milosevic's alleged pursuit of a Greater Serbia was also a misreading of
- > his
- > actual policies, which were, first, to prevent the disintegration of
- > Yugoslavia, and second, as that disintegration occurred to protect the
- > Serb
- > minorities in the new states and allow them either to remain in
- > Yugoslavia
- > or obtain autonomy in the new rump states. In fact, he was considered by

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- > the
- > Bosnian Serbs and Krajina victims of Operation Storm to be a sell-out,
- > eager
- > to bargain away their interests in exchange for a possible lifting of
- > sanctions on Yugoslavia. He did support the Bosnian Serbs, sporadically,
- > but
- > it is rarely mentioned that all the NATO powers and Saudi Arabia and Al
- > Qaeda were supporting the Bosnian Muslims (and Croatia was supporting
- > its
- > allies in Bosnia).
- >
- > So Milosevic was guilty of pursuing a Greater Serbia by trying to
- > prevent
- > the dissolution of Yugoslavia and feebly seeking to give stranded and
- > threatened Serb populations protection! His "war" against Slovenia --
- > one of
- > those "terrible conflicts" Tim Judah attributes to Milosevic -- was a
- > half-hearted ten-day effort to prevent an illegal secession of that
- > Republic, quickly terminated with minimal (and mainly Yugoslav army)
- > casualties. Meanwhile, Tudjman, quite openly seeking a Greater Croatia,
- > and
- > Izetbegovic, trying to leverage U.S. and other NATO hostility to
- > Yugoslavia
- > into a means of compelling unwanted Greater Muslim rule in Bosnia, were
- > just
- > victims of the bad man! This is Orwell written into mainstream truth.
- >
- > The same is true of the Kosovo struggle. There is no question but that
- > Milosevic's crackdown in 1989 was brutal, and that police and army
- > actions
- > against the KLA in later years were sometimes ruthless, but the phalanx
- > has
- > ignored a number of key facts. One is that Kosovo was largely run by
- > Albanians before 1989, and the first target of the 1989 crackdown was
- > the
- > old bureaucracy run by Albanian communists. Second, under their rule it
- > was
- > Serbs who were discriminated against and driven out of Kosovo. In the
- > 1980s
- > and earlier Kosovo Albanian nationalists were openly engaging in "ethnic
- >
- > cleansing" in the interests of a homogenous Albanian state, and in the
- > 1990s
- > the movement became strictly irredentist, aiming not at reform but exit
- > from
- > Yugoslavia. The movement's leaders were also more openly interested in a
- >
- > "Greater Albania." As in the case of the Izetbegovic faction of the
- > Bosnian
- > Muslims, the KLA soon saw that by provocation and effective propaganda
- > it
- > would be possible to get NATO to serve as its military arm.
- >
- > Johnstone describes the Yugoslav efforts to compromise and give the
- > Albanians greater autonomy, and she notes the complete failure of the

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- > powers to seek any kind of mediated solution (including a division of
- > the
- > Kosovo territory). The war engineered by the KLA and United States then
- > ensued, with disastrous results. In Kosovo it produced great
- > destruction, an
- > immense flight of refugees, with thousands of casualties and a fresh
- > injection of hatred on all sides that contradicted the alleged NATO aim
- > of
- > producing a genuine multiethnic community. This was followed by a
- > massive
- > ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Roma, Turks and Jews by the NATO-supported
- > KLA,
- > and Kosovo was left "without a legal system, ruled by illegal structures
- > of
- > the Kosovo Liberation Army and very often by competing mafias" (quoting
- > Jiri
- > Dienstbier, UN human rights rapporteur in Kosovo). Under NATO auspices,
- > and
- > helped along by leaders of Albania, a new advance was made in the aim of
- > a
- > "Greater Albania" in Macedonia and possibly elsewhere. Finally, Serbia
- > was
- > very badly damaged by the war, reduced to penury and dependency,
- > conflict
- > ridden and with a sham democracy in place.
- >
- > Of course, there was Srebrenica. But since so much in this establishment
- >
- > Balkan story consists of lies and half-truths, is it possible that the
- > establishment version of this story is also misleading? Johnstone
- > examines
- > the various sources and finds considerable uncertainty regarding two
- > issues:
- > the number of victims, and the motives of the combatants. (16) It is
- > true
- > that 199 bodies were found bound or blindfolded following the Bosnian
- > Serb
- > occupation of the town in July 1995, almost surely slaughtered by the
- > Bosnian Serb attackers. But what about the alleged 8,000 killed? The
- > figure
- > of 8,000 seems to have been arrived at by adding a Red Cross estimate of
- >
- > 3,000 that "witnesses" said were detained by the Bosnian Serbs to the
- > figure
- > of 5,000 who the Red Cross said "fled Srebrenica, some of whom reached
- > Central Bosnia." Although there was no reason from this accounting to
- > add
- > the 5,000 as killed, this became conventional truth. The Bosnian Muslims
- >
- > shrewdly refused to tell the Red Cross how many had survived, helping
- > suggest that they were all dead.
- >
- > Six years later, Tribunal forensic teams had uncovered 2,361 bodies in
- > this

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- > region of heavy fighting, many almost surely fallen soldiers on both
- > sides.
- > Recall also that the United States had engaged in intensive satellite
- > imaging of this area, and Madeleine Albright had even promised to keep
- > watching to see if the Bosnian Serbs disturbed the graves. But she never
- >
- > produced for public view any satellite photo showing bodies being
- > deposited
- > in or removed from graves.
- >
- > As to motive for the killings that took place, it is interesting that
- > the
- > significant killings (and expulsions) of Serbs (and Roma) in (and from)
- > Kosovo after the NATO takeover were regularly treated in the West as
- > "revenge," whereas the killings in and around Srebrenica, plausibly
- > attributable to Bosnian Serb anger at the prior murderous operations of
- > Nasir Oric against Serbs in the Srebrenica vicinity, were not "revenge"
- > but
- > "genocide" in the Western system of double standards. As noted, this
- > rests
- > in good part on the blackout of the prior events associated with Nasir
- > Oric
- > and his Bosnian Muslim forces.
- >
- > Johnstone has a devastating account of the work of the International
- > Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, showing its political origin,
- > purpose and service, as well as its violation of all Western judicial
- > norms
- > (including its use of "indictments" to condemn and ostracize without
- > trial).
- > Among many other points featured is the fact that the Tribunal has only
- > sought to establish responsibility at the top for Serbs, never for
- > Croatian
- > or Bosnian Muslim leaders. Johnstone also notes the unwillingness to
- > indict
- > any NATO personnel or officials for readily documented war crimes. She
- > also
- > points out that the indictment of Milosevic on May 27, 1999, based on
- > unverified information provided by U.S. intelligence one day earlier,
- > was
- > needed by NATO to cover over its intensifying bombing of Serbian
- > civilian
- > sites, in straightforward violation of international law. As Clinton
- > said,
- > "The indictment confirms that our war is just," but it much more clearly
- >
- > confirmed that the Tribunal was a political, not a judicial institution.
- >
- > A further illustration is afforded in her enlightening account of the
- > novel
- > "hearing" on the Karadzic case in July 1996, where the Tribunal
- > innovated a
- > judicial rule whereby Karadzic's attorney was not allowed to offer a
- > defense
- > of his client; he could merely observe. The main evidence of Karadzic's

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- > "genocidal intent" was a phrase he uttered in 1991 while calling on
- > Izetbegovic to recognize the Bosnian Serbs desire to remain in
- > Yugoslavia,
- > saying that "do not think that you will not perhaps make the Muslim
- > people
- > disappear, because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is a
- > war --
- > How will you prevent everyone from being killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina?"
- > Although this muddled sentence issued in the heat of debate could be
- > interpreted as a warning of the dangers of war, and comparable
- > statements
- > were made by Izetbegovic and many others, this was presented by the
- > Tribunal
- > as serious evidence of genocidal intent.
- >
- > Johnstone contends that the United States was a participant in the
- > Balkan
- > wars for a number of reasons, including the desire to maintain its role
- > as
- > leader of NATO and to help provide it with a function on its 50th
- > anniversary year (celebrated in the midst of the 78-day bombing war in
- > April
- > 1999); if Germany and others were going to intervene in Yugoslavia, the
- > United States would have to enter and play its role, and incidentally
- > show
- > that in the use of force it was still champion. The United States was
- > also
- > helping itself in its Bosnian intervention by demonstrating its
- > willingness
- > to aid Muslims, contradicting its image as anti-Muslim, and solidifying
- > its
- > relationship with Turkey and other Muslim countries helping in the
- > Bosnian
- > war. It was also positioning itself for further advances in the region
- > with
- > a major military base in Kosovo and new clients in an area of increasing
- >
- > interest with links to the Caspian basin. The humanitarian motive was
- > contradicted by inherent implausibility and by the nature and
- > inhumanitarian
- > results of the U.S. and NATO intervention.
- >
- > All-in-all the United States did well from its intervention, but the
- > people
- > of the area did poorly. The policies of it and its European allies were
- > primary causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the failure to manage
- > any
- > split peaceably. Their intervention was not "too late," but early,
- > destructive, and well designed to encourage the ethnic cleansing that
- > followed. Subsequently, they failed to mediate the conflict in Kosovo
- > and
- > collaborated with the KLA in producing a highly destructive war,
- > followed by
- > an occupation in which REAL ethnic cleansing took place, with NATO
- > acquiescence and even cooperation. Bosnia and Kosovo are under colonial

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- > occupation. The remnant Yugoslavia, once a vibrant and truly multiethnic
- >
- > state, is poor, crowded with refugees, dependent on a hostile West,
- > conflict-ridden, and rudderless. The Balkans are neither stable nor
- > free;
- > their future as NATO clients does not look promising.
- >
- > Diana Johnstone has written up this story in a readable, scholarly, and
- > convincing way that I have been able to summarize all to briefly here.
- > It is
- > an important book, especially for a left that has been confused by the
- > outpourings of a very powerful propaganda system.
- >
- >
- >
- > Diana Johnstone, FOOLS' CRUSADE Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions,
- > Monthly Review Press, New York, N.Y, 2002; ISBN 1-58367-084-X, and Pluto
- >
- > Press, London, U.K., Sept. 2002; ISBN 0745319505.
- >
- > The book can be ordered on-line directly from Monthly Review Press at,
- > <http://www.monthlyreview.org/storefnt.htm>.
- > It can also be ordered on-line directly from Pluto Press at,
- >
- > [https://secure.metronet.co.uk/pluto/cgi-bin/web_store/web_store.cgi?sc_query](https://secure.metronet.co.uk/pluto/cgi-bin/web_store/web_store.cgi?sc_query_subject=International%20Studies)
- > [_subject=International%20Studies.](https://secure.metronet.co.uk/pluto/cgi-bin/web_store/web_store.cgi?sc_query_subject=International%20Studies)
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- > Š Š Š Š Š Š
- >
- > Notes
- >
- > 1. David Rieff, "Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond," Los Angeles Times,
- > September 3, 2000; Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond
- > (New
- > York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), p. 6.
- >
- > 2. Christopher Hitchens is properly referred to as an ex-leftist, who
- > is
- > now a reliable apologist for imperial wars. However, his furiously
- > anti-Serb
- > and pro-Bosnian Muslim and pro-NATO war biases date back to the early
- > 1990s
- > when he joined the "Potemkin Sarejevo" groupies in a new cult idealizing
- > and
- > misreading the facts on Izetbegovic and the allegedly multiethnic
- > paradise
- > now being upset by the Serbs. For an excellent account, Johnstone,
- > Fools'
- > Crusade, pp. 40-64.
- >
- > 3. See my Open Letter Reply to Paul Hockenos and In These Times on
- > Their
- > Coverage of the Balkans: <http://www.zmag.org/openhermanitt.htm>
- >
- > 4. Johnstone, pp. 27-32.

- >
- > 5. John Pomfret reported on Nasi Oric's trophies in a unique article on
 - >
 - > "Weapons, Cash and Chaos Lend Clout to Srebrenica's Tough Guy,"
 - > Washington
 - > Post, February 16, 1994.
- > 6. Johnstone, p. 110.
- >
- > 7. Among the sources on this point, providing documentation that
 - > included
 - > numerous personal affidavits, all ignored by Rieff et al. and the
 - > Western
 - > media: S. Dabic et al., "Persecution of Serbs And Ethnic Cleansing in
 - > Croatia 1991-1998, Documents and Testimonies," Serbian Council
 - > Information
 - > Center, Belgrade, 1998; "Memorandum on War Crimes and Crimes and Genocide
 - > in
 - > Eastern Bosnia (Communes of Bratunac, Skelani and Srebrenica) Committed
 - > Against the Serbian Population From April 1992 to April 1993," sent by
 - > Ambassador Dragomir Djokic to the General Assembly and Security Council,
 - >
 - > June 2, 1993; Milovoje Ivanisevic, "Expulsion of the Serbs From Bosnia
 - > and
 - > Herzegovina, 1992-1995," Edition WARS, Book II, Belgrade, 2000. See also
 - >
 - > Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic
 - > Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, New York: M. E.
 - > Sharpe,
 - > 1999), pp. 178-180; Raymond K. Kent, "Contextualizing Hate: The Hague
 - > Tribunal, the Clinton Administration and the Serbs":
 - > http://www.beograd.com/nato/texts/english/c/contextualizing_hate.html
 - >
- > 8. Johnstone, pp. 78-90.
- >
- > 9. Ibid., p. 73.
- >
- > 10. David Rieff, "A New Age of Liberal Imperialism," World Policy
- > Journal,
- > Summer 1999.
- >
- > 11. Tim Judah, "Is Milosevic Planning Another Balkan War?," Scotland on
- >
- > Sunday, March 19, 2000.
- >
- > 12. Lenard Cohen, "Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan
- > Milosevic" (Boulder. Col.: Westview Press, 2001), p. 380.
- >
- > 13. Johnstone, pp. 23-32, 144-156.
- >
- > 14. Ibid., pp. 60-61.
- >
- > 15. Ibid., pp. 16-23.
- >
- > 16. Ibid., pp. 109-118.
- >

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- > <http://www.swans.com/library/art9/lproy04.html>
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- > SWANS, Monday, May 26, 2003
- >
- > Diana Johnstone's Fools' Crusade
- >
- > A Book Review by Louis Proyect
- >
- > Diana Johnstone, FOOLS' CRUSADE Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions,
- > Monthly Review Press, New York, N.Y, 2002; ISBN 1-58367-084-X. \$19.95
- > paper;
- > 288 pp.
- >
- > INTRODUCTION
- >
- > On December 8th 2002, George Packer wrote the following in a New York
- > Times
- > Magazine article titled "The Liberal Quandary Over Iraq":
- >
- > "Why there is no organized liberal opposition to the war?
- >
- > "The answer to this question involves an interesting history, and it
- > sheds
- > light on the difficulties now confronting American liberals. The history
- >
- > goes back 10 years, when a war broke out in the middle of Europe. This
- > war
- > changed the way many American liberals, particularly liberal
- > intellectuals,
- > saw their country. Bosnia turned these liberals into hawks. People who
- > from
- > Vietnam on had never met an American military involvement they liked
- > were
- > now calling for U.S. air strikes to defend a multiethnic democracy
- > against

- > Serbian ethnic aggression. Suddenly the model was no longer Vietnam, it
- > was
- > World War II -- armed American power was all that stood in the way of
- > genocide. Without the cold war to distort the debate, and with the
- > inspiring
- > example of the East bloc revolutions of 1989 still fresh, a number of
- > liberal intellectuals in this country had a new idea. These writers and
- > academics wanted to use American military power to serve goals like
- > human
- > rights and democracy -- especially when it was clear that nobody else
- > would
- > do it."
- >
- > If George Packer's assertion is true, and I believe it is, then it
- > becomes
- > necessary to revisit the Yugoslavia events in the light of everything
- > that
- > has transpired over the past decade. As we move inexorably toward
- > permanent
- > warfare, naked imperialist rule and growing repression at home, the
- > "turn"
- > on the part of a broad sector of the left -- symbolized by Christopher
- > Hitchens's mutation -- needs to be examined with a cold, clinical eye.
- > The
- > "humanitarian intervention" themes that were first raised on behalf of
- > Bosnia crop up repeatedly. Not only were they used as an excuse to make
- > war
- > in the Balkans on two occasions, they have been used twice in Iraq as
- > well.
- > There are never-ending supplies of evil dictators, who are either the
- > next
- > Hitler or the next Stalin or a combination of the two, to unite the
- > American
- > people in Orwellian "hate minutes."
- >
- > In the latest variation on this theme, some of the USA's highest profile
- >
- > leftists have lent their names to two petitions that basically support
- > their
- > country's right to fund and organize a counter-revolutionary movement in
- >
- > Cuba. The same kind of narcissism that allowed one signatory, Susan
- > Sontag,
- > to call for the bombing of Yugoslavia is now displaced to Cuba. One
- > wonders
- > how long it will take for her and her son David Rieff to demand a US
- > military rescue in Cuba.
- >
- > In the introduction to "Fool's Crusade", Johnstone puts forward the
- > standard
- > liberal narrative of Yugoslavia:
- >
- >>>Yugoslavia was a "prison of peoples" where the Serbs oppressed all the
- >
- >>>others. It was destroyed by the rise of an evil leader, Slobodan

>>>Milosevic, who set out to create a "Greater Serbia" by eliminating
 > other
 >>>peoples in a process called "ethnic cleansing". Those other peoples
 > sought
 >>>to escape, by creating their own independent states. The Yugoslav
 > army,
 >>>actually Serbian, invaded them. In Bosnia, the invading Serbs tried to
 >
 >>>drive out the Muslims, who wanted to perpetuate an exemplary
 > multi-ethnic
 >>>society. The Serb ethnic cleansing killed 200,000 unarmed Muslims
 > while
 >>>the international community looked on and even prevented the Muslims
 > from
 >>>arming in self-defense. At Srebrenica, the United Nations allowed the
 >>>Serbs to commit genocide. Only U.S. bombing forced Milosevic to come
 > to
 >>>the negotiating table at Dayton. The resulting agreement brought peace
 > and
 >>>democracy to multi-ethnic Bosnia. However, the international community
 > had
 >>>failed to save the Albanian majority in Kosovo from apartheid. In 1998
 >
 >>>Madeleine Albright warned that NATO must intervene to keep Milosevic
 > from
 >>>"doing in Kosovo what he could no longer get away with in Bosnia". In
 >>>January 1999, Serbian security forces massacred defenseless civilians
 > in
 >>>the Kosovo village of Racak, awakening the NATO governments to the
 > need to
 >>>act to stop genocide. After the turning point of Racak, the Serbs were
 >
 >>>summoned to peace negotiations in Rambouillet, in France. Milosevic
 >>>stubbornly refused to negotiate. NATO had no choice but to start
 > bombing
 >>>Yugoslavia. Masses of Albanians were deliberately driven out according
 > to
 >>>a preconceived plan called "Operation Horseshoe". Finally, Milosevic
 > gave
 >>>in, and NATO liberated the Kosovars from their oppressors. Conclusion:
 >
 >>>from now on, humanitarian intervention constitutes a principal mission
 > for
 >>>NATO, as the military arm of an international community henceforth
 >>>committed to protection of human rights.<<
 >
 > After presenting this version of what took place, Johnstone says,
 > "Almost
 > everything about this tale is false." When much of the left was cheering
 > the
 > NATO war on Yugoslavia, another large section gave credence to the false
 >
 > story while drawing the line at intervention. For example, shortly after
 > the
 > government of Yugoslavia was overthrown by violent, rightwing gangs,

- > Noam
- > Chomsky compared this to the overthrow of South Africa's Apartheid
- > system.
- > It therefore comes as no surprise that he would have the same kind of
- > myopia
- > when it comes to Cuba.
- >
- > Johnstone identifies a sharp disjunction between the movement against
- > globalization that took shape in the 1990s and a widespread failure to
- > see
- > how that very process was at the root of the Balkans wars and the
- > immiseration that has followed in its footsteps. It is easy for
- > activists to
- > respond to Chiapas; it was much harder to break through the propaganda
- > and
- > mystification over Yugoslavia where defense of the right of the Serb
- > peoples
- > to live in peace became tantamount to Holocaust denial.
- >
- > Johnstone writes:
- >
- >>>The sovereign nation is being broken down subtly by the pressures of
- >>>economic globalization. It may also be undermined from within, by
- > domestic
- >>>insurgencies. In the post-Cold War world, the Carnegie Endowment study
- >
- >>>noted, "groups within states are staking claims to independence,
- > greater
- >>>autonomy, or the overthrow of an existing government, all in the name
- > of
- >>>self-determination." In regard to these conflicts, "American interests
- > and
- >>>ideals compel a more active role." This may go so far as military
- >>>intervention when self-determination claims or internal repression of
- > such
- >>>claims lead to "humanitarian calamities." In the future, the authors
- >>>announced in 1992, "humanitarian interventions will become
- > increasingly
- >>>unavoidable." The United States will have the final word as to when
- > and
- >>>how to intervene. "The United States should seek to build a consensus
- >>>within regional and international organizations for its position, but
- >>>should not sacrifice its own judgment and principles if such a
- > consensus
- >>>fails to materialize."<<
- >
- > Indeed, just as WWI was launched in part to stop Hun atrocities, so are
- > the
- > wars of the last 10 years or so framed in terms of saving lives and
- > upholding democracy. Unless the left learns how to distinguish between
- > government propaganda and the true aims of an ever more aggressive
- > imperialism, we will be useless. Diana Johnstone's book is a very good
- > place
- > to start.
- >

> CHAPTER ONE -- The Yugoslav Guinea Pig

- > Here Johnstone poses the question: "How did the Serbs go from being the heroic little people who stood up to empires and Nazis in defense of freedom, to being the 'new Nazis', pariahs of the Western world?"
- > The answer first of all requires that attention be paid to the underlying economic pressure that drove all Yugoslavs to desperate measures, including the Serbs. When the USSR began to collapse at the end of the 1980s, Yugoslavia was no longer needed as a kind of pro-Western counterweight to the Kremlin. With easy access to cheap credit cut off, the country began to succumb to a debt crisis of the sort that was ravaging most of the developing world. Long devoid of any serious commitment to revolutionary politics, the central government responded not by challenging imperialism, but by cutting jobs and social services. The economic crisis had the effect of eroding the social order and heightening nationalist resentment, particularly among the Croats.
- > Although Franjo Tudjman had been a life-long CP functionary, he found it easy to remold himself as a nationalist when running for president of Croatia in 1990, especially since this earned him the support of the émigré community, including remnants of the fascist Ustashe movement. After his election, Serbs -- who made up 12 percent of Croatia's population -- were probably alarmed to see the Ustashe flag flown unabashedly in public once again. As a corollary to this symbolic display, the Tudjman administration began to fire Serb government employees and encourage violent attacks on people and property.
- > After the Serbs began to resist these encroachments, the western press responded by characterizing it as expansionism directed from Belgrade.
- > As Malcolm X once said, the victim was turned into the criminal.
- > In September of 1991, over 120 Serbs living in the town of Gaspic were abducted from their homes and murdered. It was an act calculated to have the same effect among Serbs as the Deir Yassin massacre in Palestine. They would no longer be safe in Croatia. Croatian human rights activists told Johnstone

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- > in 1996 that this was the first major massacre of civilians in the
- > Yugoslav
- > civil wars. Unlike Srebrenica or Racak, Gaspic never became part of the
- > litany of atrocities in the western news media or journals of
- > "conscience."
- >
- > In 1997 a disgruntled Croatian ex-cop named Miro Bajramovic decided to
- > tell
- > the world what really happened in Gaspic. He said that the Croatian
- > Interior
- > Ministry sent paramilitaries to spread terror among the region's 9,000
- > Serbs. Johnstone quotes him as follows:
- >
- > "The order for Gaspic was to perform ethnic cleansing, so we killed
- > directors of post offices and hospitals, restaurant owners and many
- > other
- > Serbs. Executions were performed by shooting at point-blank range. We
- > did
- > not have much time. The orders from headquarters were to reduce the
- > percentage of Serbs in Gaspic."
- >
- > The International Criminal Tribunal (ICT), which went to all sorts of
- > lengths to bring Milosevic to justice, has been lackadaisical about
- > Croatian
- > war crimes. After some of the Croatian soldiers who committed war crimes
- > at
- > Gaspic came forward to present testimony to the ICT, they were not given
- >
- > adequate protection even after receiving daily death threats and having
- > their cars firebombed. One of them, Milan Levar, was murdered by an
- > explosion in the front yard of his Gaspic home.
- >
- > In June of 1999 Croatian courts acquitted 6 soldiers of war crimes
- > committed
- > at Gaspic, including Bajramovic. In light of this, it is highly
- > revealing
- > that the chief Tribunal prosecutor Carla Del Ponte has decided that
- > Croatian
- > courts can render justice in the prosecution of war crimes. Alas, this
- > has
- > been the pattern all along. When Serbs react to murder, they are charged
- >
- > with "aggression."
- >
- > After the secession of Croatia and Slovenia, it was only a matter of
- > time
- > before Bosnia-Herzegovina would be torn apart by the same
- > contradictions. In
- > all of the regions where Serbs were a minority, they saw their survival
- > as a
- > function of the continuation of the Yugoslav republic and protection by
- > the
- > federal army. Whenever they pressed forward in this manner, they were
- > regarded as "expansionist" or worse.
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- >> From the very beginning, the USA tilted toward the Bosnian Muslim
- > faction.
- > In a highly enlightening review of the power politics behind this
- > foreign
- > policy initiative, Johnstone explains it in terms of developing ties to
- > Turkey and oil-producing regimes in the Middle East. In addition, she
- > provides some insights into class formation in Bosnia that go against
- > the
- > conventional thinking of Muslims as an oppressed nationality. Most of
- > the
- > high-profile Muslim politicians, including Izetbegovic, were scions of
- > the
- > families that enjoyed elite privileges during centuries of Ottoman rule.
- > In
- > elite circles in Washington and London, they were considered more
- > reliably
- > anti-communist than the Bosnian Serb descendants of downtrodden
- > peasants.
- >
- > While the State Department was developing a policy based on such
- > bottom-line
- > calculations, a number of intellectuals were already beginning to
- > develop
- > what Johnstone rightly calls "the Bosnia cult." They developed a
- > romanticized version of Bosnian Islam that once again turned the Serbs
- > into
- > the "bad guys".
- >
- > Susan Sontag's son David Rieff wrote that "Bosnia was and always will be
- > a
- > just cause" in the same fashion that people once wrote about the Spanish
- >
- > Civil War. For an entire generation of 60s radicals, the fight for
- > Bosnia
- > became a fight against fascism and genocide. In countries like France
- > that
- > were grappling with a sullen and resentful Islamic population driven to
- > emigration by economic crisis, the sight of gentle, blue-eyed Bosnian
- > Muslims playing musical instruments was comforting. They were "like us."
- >
- > "Multicultural" Sarajevo became a test tube for the kind of integration
- > that
- > was largely impossible in Western Europe, where skinheads had begun to
- > victimize their own Muslim citizens. If France or Great Britain could
- > not be
- > made safe for Muslims, then military force could surely impose tolerance
- > on
- > a Balkan nation.
- >
- > Unfortunately, "multicultural" Bosnia was largely a myth. By 1992,
- > Croatian
- > militias had already driven Serbs out of Herzegovina in an early act of
- > ethnic cleansing that once again was largely ignored by the western
- > media.
- > As for Izetbegovic, the darling of Rieff and other western progressives,

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- > he
- > was under no illusions. In a 1994 speech, he said, "Multicultural
- > togetherness is all very well, but -- may I say it openly -- it is a
- > lie! We
- > cannot lie to our people or deceive the public. The soldier in combat is
- > not
- > dying for a multinational coexistence..."
- >
- > Somehow, Izetbegovic's statement and the arrival of 5,000 former
- > Afghanistan
- > fighters in Bosnia escaped Rieff's attention, who continued to press for
- >
- > military action in order to prevent "genocide" in Bosnia. The Serbs were
- >
- > compared not only to the Nazis, but to the Khmer Rouge as well. In the
- > course of his agitation for an imperialist rescue, he kept repeating the
- >
- > unverified figure of 200,000 dead Muslims. Former State Department
- > official
- > George Kenney finally tracked it down to Bosnian information minister
- > Senada
- > Kreso, who first circulated the figure -- hardly an unbiased source.
- > Afterwards Kenney tried to come up with a more reliable amount, based on
- > the
- > Red Cross and other less politicized sources. For instance, a
- > Stockholm-based research institute estimated that there were between 30
- > and
- > 50 thousand casualties during the course of the civil war, but this
- > included
- > all sides. After concluding his survey, Kenney observed:
- >
- > "In the words of the writer David Rieff, 'Bosnia became our Spain',
- > though
- > not for political reasons, which is what he meant, but rather because
- > too
- > many journalists dreamed self-aggrandizing dreams of becoming another
- > Hemingway."
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- > CHAPTER TWO -- Moral Dualism in a Multicultural World
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- > This seeks to explain how the Yugoslavia wars became cast in Manichean
- > terms, with the Serbs representing darkness and evil and all their
- > adversaries as goodness and light. This requires her to examine in some
- > detail the role of the media in fabricating three key elements of a
- > narrative that would effectively condemn the Serbs as the Nazis of our
- > era:
- > concentration camps in Bosnia and rape as a political tool.
- >
- > The question of concentration camps in Bosnia became hugely
- > controversial
- > after Living Marxism magazine (LM) ran an exposé in 1997 that charged an
- > ITN
- > television team from Great Britain supervised by Penny Marshall with
- > using

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- > falsified footage. Using an image of an emaciated Muslim "prisoner"
- > named
- > Fikret Alic behind barbed wire, the reporters claimed that this amounted
- > to
- > a new Auschwitz. Among the British reporters was Nation Magazine
- > contributor
- > and anti-Cuba petition signer Ian Williams, who was working for
- > England's
- > Channel Four at the time. This is also the same Ian Williams who told
- > radicals in the audience at a recent Socialist Scholars Conference panel
- > on
- > Orwell, including me, that "Wait until the war starts, then you'll see
- > all
- > those WMD's that Saddam has stashed away."
- >
- > The caption for story number 17 in Project Censored top 25 stories in
- > 1999
- > was "U.S. Media Promotes Biased Coverage of Bosnia". For documentation,
- > the
- > project included the LM article as well as Diana Johnstone's "Seeing
- > Yugoslavia Through a Dark Glass" that appeared originally in Covert
- > Action
- > Quarterly. (http://www.covertaction.org/full_text_frameset_65_01.htm)
- >
- > Attempts to find the Deichmann article on the Internet will be in vain,
- > since a libel decision against LM initiated by Marshall and Williams in
- > a
- > British court resulted not only in the quashing of Deichmann's article
- > but
- > in the liquidation of LM itself. In claiming that barbed wire did not
- > surround Fikret Alic but rather a nearby tool shed, Deichmann went
- > against
- > the grain of prevailing liberal opinion in Europe. He paid dearly for
- > this,
- > but nowhere near as much as the Serb people.
- >
- > Leaving aside the question of whether Fikret Alic was behind or in front
- > of
- > some barbed wire, the real issue was how this image was used to drive
- > home
- > the message that the Serbs were running concentration camps throughout
- > Bosnia on a scale not seen since Hitler. The simple truth is that by the
- >
- > summer of 1992 all sides in the civil war -- Serb, Muslim and Croat --
- > were
- > setting up prison camps for people they considered threats to their
- > territorial control. According to the International Red Cross, in the
- > autumn
- > of 1992 a total of 2,692 civilians were being held in 25 detention
- > centers.
- > Of these, Bosnian Serbs held 1,203 detainees in 8 camps. The Muslims
- > held
- > 1,061 captives and the Croats 428. This hardly amounts to Auschwitz, by
- > any
- > stretch of the imagination.

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- > In January and February 1993, the French-based Médecins du Monde used
- > the
- > ITN pictures as part of a vast publicity campaign costing \$2 million
- > that
- > resulted in the distribution of 300,000 posters throughout France. Half
- > of
- > them showed Milosevic side by side with Hitler, accompanied by the
- > caption,
- > "Speeches about ethnic cleansing, does that remind you of anything?"
- > Bernard
- > Kouchner, former head of Médecins sans Frontières, was an ex-CP'er who
- > became an outspoken advocate of "humanitarian interventions." His
- > tireless
- > efforts on behalf of NATO beneficence earned him the top spot as UN
- > administrator of Kosovo in 1999.
- >
- > It didn't take long for the US press to exploit these themes themselves.
- >
- > Pulitzer Prizes were awarded to reporters who could come up with the
- > most
- > grizzly Serb atrocity tale. First on line at the trough were Newsday's
- > Roy
- > Gutman and the New York Times's John Burns who won a joint award in
- > 1993.
- > David Rohde of The Christian Science Monitor picked up his Pulitzer in
- > 1995.
- > All of them filed reports that were riddled with the kinds of errors
- > that
- > got Jayson Blair fired from the newspaper of record on May 11, 2003. In
- > retrospect, it seems that the Big Lie on behalf of the imperialist
- > crusade
- > against the Serbs was certain to enhance one's journalistic career
- > rather
- > than torpedo it.
- >
- > Rohde got his award for "discovering" a mass grave near Srebrenica. Not
- > speaking a word of Serbo-Croat, he told his readers that he found what
- > amounted to a smoking gun: a human femur and tibia scattered among the
- > area
- > delineated within US satellite photos. How did he find this needle in a
- > haystack? Like the New York Times's Judith Miller, he tells us that a
- > little
- > birdie told him: "I had the locations of the graves marked on a
- > map... which
- > I got from a US intelligence source."
- >
- > In addition to writing propaganda about Serb "death camps," Gutman
- > specialized in the rape as political weapon story. On August 9, 1992 he
- > filed a story titled "Bosnia Rape Horror" that relied on the testimony
- > of a
- > single 16-year-old girl that supposedly was repeated in the "tens of
- > thousands". Gutman also relied on the information provided by Jadranka
- > Cigelj, whom he described in Newsday as a "lawyer and political
- > activist."

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- > Cigelj supposedly witnessed nightly beatings and rape at a Serb prison
- > camp
- > in Omarska.
- >
- > Gutman conveniently omitted the exact character of Cigelj's political
- > activism. Johnstone points out that "Cigelj was a vice president of
- > Croatian
- > president Franjo Tudjman's ruling nationalist party, the Croatian
- > Democratic
- > Community (HDZ) and was in charge of the Zagreb office of the Croatia
- > Information Center (CIC), a wartime propaganda agency funded by the same
- >
- > right-wing Croatian émigré groups that backed Tudjman. The primary
- > source
- > for reports of rape in Bosnia was Cigelj's CIC and associated women's
- > groups, which sent 'piles of testimony to Western women and to the
- > press'."
- > She adds:
- >
- > "The CIC benefited from a close connection with the 'International
- > Gesellschaft fur Menschenrechte' (International Association for Human
- > Rights, IGfM), a far right propaganda institute set up in 1981 as a
- > continuation of the Association of Russian Solidarists, an expatriate
- > group
- > which worked for the Nazis and the Croatian fascist Ustashe regime
- > during
- > World War II. In the 1980s, this organization led a propaganda campaign
- > against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, accusing them of running camps
- > where
- > opponents were tortured, raped, and murdered on a massive scale."
- >
- > This did not prevent Cigelj from becoming a feminist heroine. She was
- > feted
- > by Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and Women Make Movies in a
- > 25
- > city tour that featured a documentary "Calling the Ghosts: A Story of
- > Rape,
- > War and Women."
- >
- > In response to all of the atrocity stories flowing out of Bosnia, the
- > United
- > Nations launched an investigation that unsurprisingly corroborated the
- > lurid
- > reports penned by Gutman and others. The original president of the
- > committee
- > was Frits Kalshoven, professor of humanitarian international law at the
- > University of Leiden in Germany. An Egyptian-American named Mahmoud
- > Cherif
- > Bassiouni, whose sympathy for the Muslims was obvious, replaced him.
- > Notwithstanding the propaganda consensus that Serbs were using mass rape
- > as
- > a political weapon, Kalshoven concluded:
- >
- > "Terms like 'genocide' came all too easily from the mouths of people
- > like

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- > Bassiouni, an American professor of law, who had to establish a
- > reputation
- > and to work on fund-raising. In my opinion these terms were way out of
- > line.
- > 'Genocidal rape' is utter nonsense. 'Genocide' means extermination, and
- > it
- > is of course impossible to exterminate people and make them pregnant at
- > the
- > same time. It is a propaganda term which was used against the Serbs
- > right
- > from the start, but I have never found any indication that rape was
- > committed systematically by any of the parties -- and I understand by
- > 'systematically', on orders from the top."

> CHAPTER THREE -- Comparative Nationalisms

- > In this chapter Diana Johnstone deals with the national question. For
- > many
- > Marxists, especially those from a Trotskyist tradition, Milosevic was
- > another Stalin trampling on the rights of oppressed nationalities.
- > Backing
- > the independence of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and -- finally
- > --
- > Kosovo became a litmus test for Leninists. The Militant newspaper, for
- > example, described Kosovo as being under the thumb of chauvinist
- > overlords
- > in much the same fashion as Puerto Ricans being dominated by the USA:
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- > "In the Yugoslav constitution of 1946, Kosovo was given only limited
- > regional autonomy. Although important gains were made in the area of
- > language and education, the key area of internal security and all
- > managerial
- > appointments were to be controlled from Belgrade. Using the pretext of
- > suppressing Albanian irredentism, longtime chief of the Federal Police
- > Alexander Rankovic, ordered police pressure on Albanians to emigrate.
- > Between 1954 and 1957 some 195,000 Albanians left for Turkey."
- >
- > To say the least, The Militant's characterization of the Titoist system
- > as
- > heavy-handed Stalinist centralism not only falsifies the way the system
- > worked but what drove the secessionist impulses of the 1980s and 90s.
- > While
- > Tito was bureaucratic, he was not a centralizer. He continually resorted
- > to
- > methods of decentralization, including "workers' self-management" in the
- >
- > economic sphere. Closely related to this policy was a tendency to
- > strengthen
- > the powers of the constituent republics and autonomous regions against
- > the
- > central Federal government. Both of these "radical" practices eventually
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- > contributed to the implosion of the nation. As soon as the economic
- > benefits

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- > afforded by a special relationship to imperialism began to unwind, the
- > various components of Yugoslavia began to flee a sinking ship. When
- > Lenin
- > spoke in favor of national self-determination, he had socialism in mind.
- > The
- > fracturing of Yugoslavia has done nothing except strengthen capitalism.
- > This
- > is something the Marxist left has to come to terms with at last.
- >
- > The first republic to bolt from Yugoslavia was Slovenia, which had been
- > seduced by the capitalist charms of its neighbors immediately to the
- > west,
- > especially Austria and Italy. Johnstone cites an increasing affinity
- > between
- > Slovenian intellectuals and Western European leftists, whose attention
- > was
- > being drawn increasingly to German Green type issues such as
- > disarmament,
- > feminism, human rights and the environment. In this changing climate,
- > opposition to Belgrade's power, especially its army, was seen as a
- > vanguard
- > of democratic progress in the spirit of a renewed "civil society." The
- > old
- > Titoist vision of workers' self-management and trans-national solidarity
- > had
- > gone out of fashion.
- >
- > The Slovenian intelligentsia, who defined their agenda in the pages of
- > Mladina (Youth), were as recognizably "one of us" to the Western
- > Europeans
- > as the blue-eyed Bosnian Muslims. In article after article, they
- > lambasted
- > the Yugoslav army which was suppressing "democratic civil society." The
- > hero
- > of the anti-army movement was Janez Jansa, a leader of the "Alliance of
- > Socialist Youth of Slovenia," who was pushing to "modernize" the
- > organization by dropping the word "socialist" from its name. After Jansa
- > was
- > arrested for stealing a secret military document that purportedly
- > detailed
- > plans to contain a domestic uprising, he became an icon to the German
- > peace
- > movement.
- >
- > Jansa's defenders saw the conflict as a simple one of democratic
- > modernization versus conservative repression. A closer examination would
- >
- > reveal a different reality. The Slovenian modernizers sought to be freed
- >
- > from the constraints of the federal state. With only 8 percent of the
- > population, they contributed 20 percent of the federal budget.
- > Slovenia's
- > deliverance would come through the free market and improved job
- > opportunities for college-educated urban professionals. Ironically, this
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- > milieu resented the money being "wasted" on Kosovo and regarded all of
- > the
- > Eastern peoples of Yugoslavia, either Albanian or Serbs as unwelcome
- > country
- > cousins. In June 1991, Dr. Peter Tancig, the Slovenian minister of
- > science,
- > send out a mass e-mail to the world's scientists that tried to explain
- > the
- > "mess" in Yugoslavia. One on side was a "typical violent and crooked
- > oriental-bizantine [sic] heritage, best exemplified by Serbia and
- > Montenegro." On the other side was a "more humble and diligent
- > western-catholic tradition."
- >
- > Fast-forwarding a couple of years we discover that Janez Jansa, the
- > darling
- > of the German peace movement, had gone through a remarkable
- > transformation
- > that would anticipate Joschka Fischer's. After the former
- > anti-militarist
- > icon became Slovenia's defense minister, he oversaw the clandestine
- > import
- > of weaponry into his country, most of which was sold illegally to
- > Croatia.
- >
- > When Croatian nationalism exploded in the 1980s, there was very little
- > to
- > inspire leftists. The modern movement saw itself as fighting for the
- > recognition of the "rights" of the medieval Kingdom of Croatia, which
- > had
- > been absorbed by Hungary in 1102. It was always torn between the Serb
- > revolutionary nationalist movement of the late 1800s and the Hapsburg
- > empire, which always sought a Slavic outpost to pursue its ambitions.
- > When
- > the Hapsburgs ended up on the losing side in WWI, it made the choice
- > easier
- > for the Croat nationalist leaders. By becoming part of the new nation of
- >
- > Yugoslavia, they would avoid the heavy reparations imposed by
- > Versailles.
- >
- > After Hitler invaded Yugoslavia, Croatia was detached from the country.
- > While it lost portions of the Adriatic coast to Italy, it was awarded
- > the
- > territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Under Ustashe rule, Croatia set out to
- > develop a racially pure state. On May 14, 1941, over 700 Serbs were
- > rounded
- > up in Glina and taken to the local Orthodox Church. After the doors were
- >
- > locked, Ustashe gunmen killed everybody inside. The total number of
- > Serbs
- > who died in such fashion will probably never be known, but it is at
- > least
- > 700,000. It is, therefore, not surprising that Serbs began to demand
- > protection from the federal government after Tudjman demonstrated an
- > affinity for the Ustashe. What is surprising, however, is the

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- > willingness of
- > some Marxists to regard this as Serb expansionism.
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- > CHAPTER FOUR -- Making of Empires
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- > If there is one continuing theme in Diana Johnstone's "Fool's Crusade,"
- > it
- > is how florid sounding phraseology about peace, civil society and human
- > rights became the cover for the first war on European soil since the
- > defeat
- > of Hitler. Ironically, the impetus for this war came from the new
- > Germany
- > itself. While cloaked in the rhetoric of NGO's, the German state's true
- > motive was expansion of its geopolitical influence over the Balkans. She
- >
- > characterizes this aptly as a singular blend of "ideals and interests"
- > --
- > and personified by the rise of Joschka Fischer, the German Green Party
- > leader.
- >
- > By 1991, when Yugoslavia began to unravel at the seams, a hate campaign
- > in
- > the German media was already in full swing. In the influential
- > Frankfurter
- > Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), editor Joann Reissmuller denounced the "the
- > Serbo-communist power called Yugoslavia", or "Belgrade Serbo-communism"
- > that
- > held a "Greater Serbian-communist knife at the throat" of the Slovenes
- > and
- > the Croats. Reissmuller's racist hysteria was often framed in terms of
- > anti-fascist rhetoric such as the time he warned the "civilized world"
- > against the Serb's "master race madness." This propaganda was written at
- >
- > exactly the time when Serbs were being massacred in Croatia under the
- > banner
- > of a crypto-Ustashist movement. The liberal Der Spiegel was not much
- > better.
- > It had a cover article on July 8, 1991 devoted to "Serb terror" and
- > depicted
- > Yugoslavia as a "prison of peoples" trying to free itself.
- >
- > Considering the Nazi massacres of Serbs during WWII, this kind of
- > demonization was appalling. One might have expected the German Greens
- > and
- > other anti-Serb leftists to be more sensitive to this kind of smear
- > campaign.
- >
- > What accounts for this monomaniacal drive to destroy Yugoslavia?
- > Johnstone
- > explains it in terms of an almost ritualistic purification for the
- > trauma
- > Germany suffered when it ended up on the losing side of two world wars.
- > Indeed, a leading policy-maker named Rupert Scholz linked the question
- > of

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- > Yugoslavia with the need "to overcome the consequences of World War I."
- > By
- > enlisting Germany on behalf of a crusade to "liberate" Yugoslavia, it
- > would
- > be possible to kill two birds with one stone. Not only would
- > humanitarian
- > ends be realized, Germany would become a "normal power" in the process.
- >
- > Johnstone identifies a peculiarity in German thinking about nation-state
- >
- > formation that can be found from Kaiser to Hitler to Joschka Fischer and
- >
- > that would explain to some degree the zeal for dismantling Yugoslavia.
- > In
- > succinct terms, the nationalist intelligentsia in Germany has a history
- > of
- > favoring states built on a racial or ethnic basis. While obviously most
- > closely associated with the Third Reich, it was first articulated in the
- >
- > waning days of WWI when Chancellor Max von Baden submitted a paper to
- > the
- > Kaiser titled "Thoughts on Ethical Imperialism." (Sounds familiar,
- > doesn't
- > it?) Von Baden saw Germany as protector of 'Randvolker' (peripheral
- > peoples)
- > in Europe. In the name of protecting the weak and the helpless, the
- > support
- > of ethnic claims in neighboring and hostile states would weaken their
- > host
- > and facilitate the spread of German influence. Of course, when those
- > 'Randvolker' are German minorities, it is all to the better.
- >
- > This policy was pursued not only by Hitler, but by the "enlightened"
- > Weimar
- > Republic that preceded it. In neighboring Poland and Denmark, 30 million
- >
- > Reichsmarks were spent to buy up real estate and businesses that were
- > ultimately used on behalf of German 'Volksgruppen' in what the Foreign
- > Ministry called 'Kampf um den Boden' (struggle for land).
- >
- > This trickle turned into a full-scale flood after Hitler took power. It
- > provided the excuse for the invasion of both Czechoslovakia and Poland,
- > as
- > well as the absorption of Alsace. In Franz Neumann's "Behemoth," a study
- > of
- > Nazism, the strategy is described as follows:
- >
- > "Nothing could be more frank. Self-determination is merely a weapon.
- > Take
- > advantage of every friction growing out of the minority problem. Stir up
- >
- > national and racial conflicts where you can. Every conflict will play
- > into
- > the hands of Germany, the new self-appointed guardian of honor, freedom,
- > and

*Geschiedenis
boek*

- > equality all over the world."
- >
- > It was not just German minorities who were "rescued" by Nazi
- > humanitarian
- > interventions. The Nazis surveyed all of Europe in pursuit of other
- > regional
- > populations that could be drawn into their orbit, including the Bretons
- > in
- > Brittany.
- >
- > Not long after the end of WWII, Germany once again took up the cause of
- > 'Volker' or small nationalities. In outfits like "The International
- > Association for the Defense of Threatened Languages and Cultures",
- > founded
- > in 1963, the oppression of Croats and Slovenes was weighed and remedies
- > considered, among which was the "right to independence" of the two
- > republics.
- >
- > Once the Berlin Wall fell and the two Germanys united, the nationalist
- > intelligentsia gained a new hearing from a newly emboldened ruling class
- >
- > anxious to reassert itself. A parliamentarian named Rupert Scholz put
- > forward some proposals in a 1995 paper titled "The Right to
- > Self-Determination and German Policy" that basically followed in the
- > volk-state tradition. Now that Germany was reunited, many "lesser"
- > nationalities could be expected to turn to the new power for support.
- > Furthermore, Germany should not shrink from "military operations on
- > behalf
- > of oppressed nationalities," especially those groaning under the Serb
- > heel.
- >
- > Just at the time German imperialism was rediscovering itself, important
- > figures in the German left were beginning to dispense with the foolish
- > pacifist illusions of their youth. Although the Green Party was devoted
- > to
- > peace, ecology, feminism and grassroots democracy, Johnstone points out
- > that
- > Joschka Fischer was not a typical Green. He was a Maoist street fighter
- > who
- > joined the Greens after the sectarian movements in Germany imploded in
- > the
- > 1980s, just as they had in the USA. As "war minister" of his
- > organization's
- > combat unit, Fischer trained his comrades in street-fighting tactics.
- > His
- > journey from ultraleftism into warmongering reformism was a
- > well-traveled
- > one, considering the path of other sixties radicals who would soon learn
- > how
- > to "work within the system."
- >
- > He was joined by Daniel Cohn-Bendit, who became famous as "Danny the
- > Red" in
- > the May-June events in France, 1968. After he moved to Frankfurt, he
- > joined

GESKIEDENIS
DOSSIËR

- > the "Realo" faction of the Greens that unlike the misty-eyed "Fundis"
- > showed
- > a readiness to compromise principles in order to win elections.
- >
- > In 1994, after the war in Bosnia took a bloody turn for the worse, the
- > German big-business press and bourgeois politicians began to call for a
- > war
- > against the Serbs. They dragged figures like Fischer and Cohn-Bendit in
- > their wake. Johnstone describes their role in the sorry march toward
- > war:
- >
- >>>The highly controversial question of German participation in military
- >>>intervention against Bosnian Serbs was a burning issue in December
- > 1994.
- >>>At that time, Chancellor Kohl was arguing that, on the one hand,
- > because
- >>>of the suffering caused to the people of Yugoslavia in World War II by
- > the
- >>>Wehrmacht, Germany should stay out; but, on the other hand, "precisely
- >
- >>>because of German history we cannot evade our responsibility" to
- >>>contribute German Tornado fighter planes to "humanitarian
- > intervention."
- >>>At that time, the Social Democrats and Greens were overwhelmingly
- > against
- >>>such intervention. The exception was Cohn-Bendit, who dismissed Green
- >>>objections as "ridiculous" and found original arguments to support
- > Kohl's
- >>>position. He claimed that the peoples of the world would revert to
- >>>nationalism if they saw that the international community was failing
- > to
- >>>defend the "little multicultural Volk" in Bosnia -- overlooking the
- >>>regrettable fact that the "multicultural Volk" was split into warring
- >>>factions unlikely to be reunited by Tornados flying to the aid of one
- >>>against another.
- >
- > At that time, Fischer was still arguing that Germany should stay out.
- > But by
- > the following August, Cohn-Bendit was able to announce that his friend
- > Joschka was "on the right path," even though he still opposed sending in
- >
- > German soldiers. But, predicted Cohn-Bendit with remarkable
- > clairvoyance,
- > "Once Fischer is foreign minister, he won't be able to maintain this
- > position." Ambition was having its effect. On 6 December 1995, the
- > historic
- > question of sending German armed forces to intervene outside the NATO
- > area
- > came before the Bundestag. By then, the Green parliamentary group was
- > split
- > on the question of sending troops into Bosnia. As Green spokesman,
- > Fischer
- > was in the early stages of the transformation that would make
- > Cohn-Bendit's
- > prediction come true. The rhetorical hinge by which Fischer led the

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- > men in a family caught in a blood feud may remain housebound for years,
- > while their women carry out the tasks necessary for survival. This
- > custom is
- > reflected in the form of the typical Albanian rural home -- a
- > wall-enclosed
- > compound, which can serve as a defensive fortress."
- >
- > On the face of it, this does not appear to be fertile soil for the
- > growth of
- > a socialist movement. Largely as a result of the failure of a coherent
- > Albanian national movement to emerge, the region became part of
- > Yugoslavia
- > after the end of WWI. Johnstone does not really try to whitewash the
- > record
- > of Belgrade's role in assimilating Kosovo and even compares it to
- > Zionism or
- > other colonialisms.
- >
- > But is it fair to judge Titoist Yugoslavia from this perspective? There
- > is a
- > tendency to view the Albanian nationality through the prism of other
- > oppressed groups such as the Kurds. For example, in a 1999 Z Magazine
- > interview, Noam Chomsky said, "Or consider Turkey, a neighbor to the
- > former
- > Yugoslavia. By a very conservative estimate, Turkish repression of Kurds
- > in
- > the 1990s falls in the category of Kosovo." Unfortunately, there seems
- > to be
- > as much forethought in this comment as there was when Chomsky added his
- > name
- > to the CPD's anti-Cuba petition.
- >
- > Turkish repression against the Kurds means first and foremost the
- > violent
- > campaign against a language. Amir Hassanpour, a leading Kurdish scholar,
- > has
- > written in "Nationalism and Language in Kurdistan":
- >
- > "Physical violence and separation from one's own family were some of the
- >
- > other methods used in Turkish schools to prevent the student from
- > speaking
- > Kurdish. Students were also punished for speaking their language outside
- > the
- > classrooms during the breaks. Boarding schools were established in 1964,
- > in
- > order to isolate students for the greater part of the year and to
- > encourage
- > them to forget their mother tongue."
- >
- > Nothing like this ever happened to Albanians in Yugoslavia. From the
- > time of
- > the birth of Tito's Yugoslavia, not only was there an attempt to raise
- > literacy levels throughout the republic, but in the native language of
- > all

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- > the peoples. Johnstone claims, "Despite a severe shortage of able to
- > provide
- > a instruction in Albanian, serious efforts were made to educate the
- > Albanians of Kosovo, including girls and women, in their own language."
- > (Her
- > source on this and many other matters of fact is Miranda Vickers's
- > excellent
- > "Between Serb and Albanian: a History of Kosovo," a reliable source
- > despite
- > Vickers's open advocacy of Albanian nationalism.)
- >
- > Also, according to an Albanian professor at Pristina University in 1981,
- >
- > "not a single national minority in the world has achieved the rights
- > that
- > the Albanian nationality enjoys in Socialist Yugoslavia." Only the
- > Hungarians in Romania and the Swedes in Finland had their own
- > universities,
- > but neither had the kind of autonomy enjoyed by the Albanians.
- >
- > To continue the false analogy with the Kurds one step further, it is
- > commonly acknowledged that the Ankara government withholds development
- > funding for the Kurdish region. However, Belgrade introduced
- > electrification, paved roads and sewages systems into Kosovo for the
- > first
- > time in its history.
- >
- > Despite such efforts, Albanian resentment grew. Even though it was
- > progressive to allow Albanians to be taught in their own language, there
- >
- > were negative side effects. Since written Albanian was a relatively new
- > phenomenon, there were no large-scale libraries in Kosovo that could
- > serve
- > education and technical advancement. Schooling in Serb would have
- > provided
- > greater access, but at the expense of nationalist resentment. Such are
- > the
- > contradictions of the national question in Yugoslavia that mattered
- > little
- > to European and North American radicals who projected their own
- > schematic
- > understandings on a poorly understood terrain.
- >
- > But no amount of affirmative action could make up for centuries of
- > underdevelopment and a retrograde paternalistic social structure.
- > Unemployment and illiteracy not only remained deeply entrenched but
- > accelerated during the financial crisis of the 1980s. When Kosovo began
- > to
- > erupt in secessionist protests, Belgrade began to crack down. Despite
- > all
- > evidence to the contrary, the confrontation was most often viewed as a
- > variation on the Turkey-Kurdish conflict.
- >
- > Once this view became popular in the world of Western NGO's, there was
- > little that Yugoslavia could do to reverse the perception, just as there

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> is
 > little that Cuba can do today to reverse the perception in this milieu
 > that
 > it is a totalitarian dungeon. The only thing one can hope for is that
 > the
 > radical movement can view such things impartially. Given the defection
 > of a
 > large part of the left into NGO liberalism, our work seems cut out for
 > us
 > today.
 >
 > The job of demonizing Yugoslavia fell to the National Endowment for
 > Democracy (NED) just as it had a decade earlier in Nicaragua. The editor
 > of
 > Kosovo's main newspaper, which had become the beneficiary of NED and
 > Soros
 > Foundation largesse, announced that Kosovo had become "the world's
 > biggest
 > non-governmental organization." With NED funding, the Council for the
 > Defense of Human Rights and Freedom circulated reports worldwide
 > condemning
 > Serb repression. Because the goal was secession, the reports had a
 > one-sided
 > character. In light of its historical record, is it of any wonder that
 > Cuba
 > would crack down on an NED inspired opposition? What is truly of wonder
 > is
 > the inability of people like Noam Chomsky to take this record into
 > account
 > before signing petitions on a half-cocked basis.
 >
 > NED funding made it possible for the Council to support a network of
 > 2,000
 > volunteers in the province while its inflammatory reports went out
 > unimpeded
 > to a score of human rights agencies and the media. Despite all this,
 > Kosovo
 > was characterized as being in the grips of a fierce repression that was
 > likened to either Hitler's or Stalin's -- or in some quarters, a
 > combination
 > of the two.
 >
 > After NATO's war began, the Council continued to be the main source of
 > "human rights abuses" in the west. It was joined by high officials of
 > the
 > German government, who felt free to make up atrocity stories of the same
 >
 > kind that marked recent media coverage of both wars in Iraq. Not only
 > did
 > defense minister Rudolf Scharping claim that a genocide was in progress
 > in
 > Kosovo, it appeared to be carried out with a relish that might have even
 >
 > shocked the Nazi high command: "it is recounted that the foetus was cut
 > out

Gelsenkirchen
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- > of the body of a dead pregnant woman in order to roast it and then put
- > it
- > back in the cut-open belly... that limbs and heads are systematically
- > cut
- > off, that sometimes they play football with heads..."
- >
- > In the aftermath of the ouster of the Serbs, the Milosevic government
- > found
- > itself the target of the same "human rights" intervention that had
- > served
- > NATO's goals in Kosovo itself. The USA openly poured money into coffers
- > of
- > rival parties, such as the one led by Zoran Djindjic, the recently
- > assassinated politician who spearheaded privatization and austerity. The
- > NED
- > lavished millions of dollars on "Otpor" (Resistance), a youth group that
- >
- > expressed no other goal except to be "normal" on western terms. When the
- >
- > west is making war and enforcing economic hardship against "abnormal"
- > forces
- > in one's country, it is no wonder that many will seek this kind of
- > normalcy.
- > In Nicaragua, this is what Reagan called "crying uncle."
- >
- > In the first round of Serb elections on September 24, 2000, Milosevic
- > failed
- > to gain re-election but his rival Kostunica failed by 2 percent to
- > achieve
- > the 50 percent required for victory. Instead of following Yugoslav law,
- > he
- > encouraged the NED-funded opposition to take to the streets in a
- > "democratic
- > revolution." In practice this meant storming and setting fire to the
- > parliament building, a so-called "symbol of the Milosevic regime."
- > Images of
- > this violent attack were depicted in an endless television loop
- > reminiscent
- > of the toppling of Saddam Hussein's statue. If this wasn't enough, a
- > gang of
- > thugs was bussed in from the town of Cacak, whose fiercely
- > anti-Communist
- > mayor Velimir Ilic openly boasted the deed and described his activists
- > as
- > "ex-parachute troops, former army and police officers as well as men who
- > had
- > fought in special forces." Some of these commandoes had undoubtedly
- > fought
- > in Croatia and Serbia, where the same kind of reckless and violent
- > behavior
- > on behalf of "ethnic cleansing" was now winning them plaudits from
- > exactly
- > the same panoply of "human rights" leftists who had urged military
- > intervention to stop Serb aggression in the first place.
- >

*Yle 2000
Dossier*

- >
- > POSTSCRIPT
- >
- > In her discussion of the Albanian lobby in the United States, Johnstone
- > makes it clear that the Balkans policy was very much a bipartisan
- > affair.
- > Although the prime mover in this lobby was a Republican named Joseph
- > DioGuardi, who was of partial Albanian descent, it also tapped into the
- > Clinton campaign through the auspices of Ilir Zherka, an
- > Albanian-American.
- > Although the Clinton campaign was anxious to court the ethnic vote, no
- > Serbs
- > were invited to apply.
- >
- > One of the most important lobbyists for the Kosovo cause, however, was a
- >
- > Croatian. Mira Radievolic Barrata, who went to work for Robert Dole in
- > 1989,
- > was credited for pushing Congress to lift the arms embargo against
- > Bosnian
- > Muslims, a key demand of Joanne Landy, Danny "the Red" Cohn-Bendit and
- > other
- > rightward-lurching members of the 1960s generation. Among Baratta's
- > biggest
- > boosters in Washington were some names that are no doubt familiar:
- > Richard
- > Perle, Paul Wolfowitz and Jeanne Kirkpatrick. Long before these
- > characters
- > had been identified as exclusively promoting Zionist interests
- > worldwide,
- > they had no problem raising support for the Muslim cause in Bosnia,
- > whose
- > field combatants included many of the same elements now demonized by the
- >
- > very same neoconservatives. As Perle himself was an adviser to the
- > Bosnian
- > Muslims in the Dayton Peace Talks, one can easily conclude that the only
- >
- > constant in all of this is dedication to US imperial interests, and not
- > to
- > any particular deity.
- >
- > Although there has been emphatic denial in establishment quarters that
- > material self-interest -- especially related to oil -- explained the
- > wars
- > against Yugoslavia and Iraq (less so in the latter case), it became very
- >
- > clear after the victory in the Balkans that long-term geopolitical
- > interests
- > were key. Nothing symbolized this more than Camp Bondsteel, a permanent
- > base
- > for US troops in Kosovo. This base dominates a strategic corridor in
- > Kosovo
- > guarding mountain passes and in close proximity to Thessalonika, a key
- > Greek

*get some details
BOSNIA*

- > port.
- >
- > Johnstone describes Camp Bondsteel as a self-sufficient high tech
- > enclave.
- > Brown and Root, a subsidiary of Halliburton, whose CEO was Dick Cheney,
- > supplies all the basics, including electricity, transport, fire
- > department,
- > etc. When George W. Bush chose to sign a bill that increased military
- > spending by 1.9 billion dollars, he chose to commemorate it at Camp
- > Bondsteel. So those who yearn for a return to the good old days of a
- > Democratic presidency might give careful consideration to the way that
- > all
- > this played out during Clinton's term in office. When it comes to
- > defending
- > US long-term imperial interests, it is strictly a bipartisan affair.
- >
- > Furthermore, if something like Camp Bondsteel and the Albanian lobby
- > represent the convergence of class interests between the two major
- > parties,
- > so does the NATO victory itself represent the affinity between Europe
- > and
- > the United States. This old boys club has been around since the 1500s
- > practically. Except for some unpleasanties in 1914 and then again in
- > 1940,
- > the imperialists have always stood on the opposite side of the
- > barricades of
- > the colonized. The Italian Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema summed up this
- >
- > relationship as follows:
- >
- > "The crisis of Kosovo created new networks of relations. For example,
- > the
- > daily teleconferences between the Foreign Ministers of five countries:
- > the
- > United States, Germany, Great Britain, France and Italy. With Kosovo, we
- >
- > entered such a group. It isn't written in any official document, but in
- > fact, around Kosovo was born a sort of Club. It's difficult to define
- > the
- > rules of membership in the noble circle of the great, there exists no
- > statute."
- >
- > Only the French foreign minister, Hubert Védrine, found himself capable
- > of
- > striking a discordant note. He warned that the bloodletting in the
- > Balkans
- > was disturbingly similar to the "civilizing mission" of nineteenth
- > century
- > French imperialists and to the "white man's burden" celebrated by
- > Rudyard
- > Kipling. It is no accident that the bourgeois intelligentsia, including
- > figures such as NYU's Niall Ferguson, has begun speaking openly of the
- > benefits of imperialism to the benighted denizens of the South.
- >
- > In a very real sense, the clock has been turned back to this period.

965 Cui hdbaris

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- > With
- > the collapse of the Soviet Union, the old justification for imperialist
- > intervention is no longer possible. Containing Communism has given way
- > to a
- > new set of rationalizations that were mobilized prior to October 1917.
- > When
- > the imperialists conducted "rescues" against the Mahdists, the Boxers or
- > the
- > Sepoys, the excuse was always about protecting innocent civilians and
- > wiping
- > out backward, atavistic revolts.
- >
- > For those who have had a hard time figuring out why such a large swath
- > of
- > the left defected into the imperialist camp, we would remind them that
- > history has a tendency to repeat itself -- hopefully not in a Victorian
- > sense.
- >
- > In a January 5, 1898 article titled "The Struggle of Social Democracy
- > and
- > the Social Revolution," Social Democratic leader Eduard Bernstein made
- > the
- > case for colonial rule over Morocco. Drawing from English socialist
- > Cunningham Graham's travel writings, Bernstein stated that there was
- > absolutely nothing admirable about Morocco. In such countries where
- > feudalism is mixed with slavery, a firm hand is necessary to drag the
- > brutes
- > into the civilized world:
- >
- > "There is a great deal of sound evidence to support the view that, in
- > the
- > present state of public opinion in Europe, the subjection of natives to
- > the
- > authority of European administration does not always entail a worsening
- > of
- > their condition, but often means the opposite. However much violence,
- > fraud,
- > and other unworthy actions accompanied the spread of European rule in
- > earlier centuries, as they often still do today, the other side of the
- > picture is that, under direct European rule, savages are without
- > exception
- > better off than they were before.
- >
- > "However much violence, fraud, and other unworthy actions accompanied
- > the
- > spread of European rule in earlier centuries, as they often still do
- > today,
- > the other side of the picture is that, under direct European rule,
- > savages
- > are without exception better off than they were before. Even before the
- > arrival of Europeans in Africa, brutal wars, robbery, and slavery were
- > not
- > unknown. Indeed, they were the regular order of the day. What was
- > unknown
- > was the degree of peace and legal protection made possible by European

*of the movement
1888-1892*

> institutions and the consequent sharp rise in food resources..."

>

> Let's be clear about the division on the left that emerged with the wars

> in

> Yugoslavia, that continued with the recently concluded war in Iraq and

> that

> now figures in the Cuba petition controversies. It is fundamentally a

> problem of what was known commonly in the Marxist movement as 'social

> patriotism'. The tendency of some leftists, especially those who enjoy

> privileged positions as trade union bureaucrats, parliamentarians,

> professors and journalists, to tail end the foreign policy initiatives

> --

> including warfare -- of their own bourgeoisie has been around since the

> earliest days of imperialism. Our task, of course, is to delineate clear

>

> class lines and mobilize working people and their allies to destroy this

>

> irrational system that threatens not only the people of the South but us

> as

> well. As Marx once said, as long as the Irish are unfree, the British

> workers cannot be free. Substitute Yugoslavia or Iraq for Ireland (still

>

> unfree) and the task remains the same.

>

>

>

> Diana Johnstone, FOOLS' CRUSADE Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions,

> Monthly Review Press, New York, N.Y, 2002; ISBN 1-58367-084-X, and Pluto

>

> Press, London, U.K., Sept. 2002; ISBN 0745319505.

>

> The book can be ordered on-line directly from Monthly Review Press at,

> <http://www.monthlyreview.org/storefnt.htm>.

> It can also be ordered on-line directly from Pluto Press at,

>

> [https://secure.metronet.co.uk/pluto/cgi-bin/web_store/web_store.cgi?sc_query](https://secure.metronet.co.uk/pluto/cgi-bin/web_store/web_store.cgi?sc_query_subject=International%20Studies)

> [_subject=International%20Studies](https://secure.metronet.co.uk/pluto/cgi-bin/web_store/web_store.cgi?sc_query_subject=International%20Studies).

>

> Š Š Š Š Š Š

>

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>

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REUTERS / DANILO KRSTANOVIC

Zwarte sneeuw in Sarajevo

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NEDERLAND 1,
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De nationale bibliotheek
(achtergrond) in Sarajevo

EEN THEATERCRITICUS vertelt in de documentaire *De bibliotheek brandt* wat hij deed toen hij eind augustus 1992 de vlammen uit de nationale bibliotheek in Sarajevo zag slaan. Rennen, zo hard hij kon, naar de studio van Radio Bosnia. Aldoor schreeuwend: 'De bibliotheek staat in brand!' Zodat binnen korte tijd iedereen op de hoogte was. Ondertussen probeerden een paar mensen te redden wat er te redden viel. Een schrale troost, bestaande uit enkele dozen boeken die in de kelder stonden opgeslagen.

Bijna honderd jaar oud was het gebouw. De trots van de stad. Tot het Servische leger het bestookte met brandbommen, een paar uur nadat de watertoevoer was afgesloten. Hoe groter de vernietiging, hoe doeltreffender. Twee dagen lang brandde de bibliotheek, met daarin ruim twee miljoen boeken. En een bibliothecarisse. In de stad sneeuwde het zwart verbrande papiersnippers.

De film *De bibliotheek brandt* is een combinatie van archief, fictie en interviews. De archiefbeelden maken de ellende van toen weer voelbaar, de wat pathetische fictieve elementen (jongetjeren in blauw licht door gangen, eindeloos brandende boeken, mistige bossen en grafzerken, alles begeleid door gedragen muziek) lijken een poëtische bedoeling te hebben, maar vooral de interviews met bij de bibliotheek betrokkenen maken duidelijk dat de Serviërs in hun opzet geslaagd zijn. De vernietiging is totaal, de schade onherstelbaar, het verdriet groot.

Herinneringen aan de bibliotheek komen bijvoorbeeld van de directeur. Staand in het skelet van de grote hal vol met puin zegt hij er de aanwezigheid van mensen en boeken nog steeds te voelen. Hij hoopt dat er op een dag genoeg geld beschikbaar zal komen om het gebouw volledig te renoveren.

De secretaresse die twintig jaar in de biblio-

theek heeft gewerkt, waande zich er een koningin in een kasteel. Een dichter kwam er graag om zich omringd te weten door kennis en een vrachtwagenchauffeur zou het verbranden van zijn eigen huis minder erg gevonden hebben.

Het gebouw, waarvan nu alleen de grootste muren nog overeind staan, begon in 1896 als stadhuis. Van 1910 tot de Eerste Wereldoorlog zetelde er het Bosnische parlement. Daarna werd het ingericht als de nationale bibliotheek waar Bosnische, katholieke, joodse, Servische en andere boeken zij aan zij stonden.

Tot de gemoederen dermate verhit waren (Karadjic vergelijkt in een oud fragment in de film de mix van Bosniërs en Serviërs als een combinatie van water en olie; mengen zal het nooit) dat niets meer aan het gedeelde verleden mocht herinneren.

Weg dus met die bibliotheek. De plek waar de ziel van de stad gehuisvest was, volgens de eerder genoemde theatercriticus. Waar datgene waarin mensen onsterfelijk zijn werd gehebergd: hun werk. Als die kunstwerken vervolgens vernietigd worden, is het eindeloze, het universele, het eeuwige voorgoed verloren. De dichter is ook verdrietig, maar ziet het iets minder zwart. Hij denkt dat de geest van een boek niet te doden is, dat die zal leven zolang er mensen zijn. De paar flarden tekst van een verbrande pagina die bij hem naar binnen waaide, heeft hij ingelijst. 'Het leek een boodschap.'

AvD

Sagittarius

Van: "Ian Johnson" <i-johnson@lineone.net>
Aan: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
Verzonden: zondag 4 mei 2003 14:02
Onderwerp: CDSM:Fw: [sorabia] Declassified Documents on

— Original Message —

From: Branka josilo-perry
To: Marbles
Sent: Saturday, May 03, 2003 5:25 PM
Subject: FW: [sorabia] Declassified Documents on Yugoslavia

For your information.

Sent: Friday, May 02, 2003 10:43 PM
Subject: [sorabia] Declassified Documents on Yugoslavia

Hey all,

just wanted to give a heads-up to those with access to the Expanded Academic ASAP (available through most University on-line library resources) databases, that the Declassified Documents Reference Section of the database (at the bottom of the page) contains very interesting material on Yugoslavia, with material ending in mid-1988. Already at this time the shifts in US policy are becoming noticeable and some interesting themes have emerged from my cursory glance at the documents:

- the priority in most documents is the emphasis on pushing through of neoliberal reforms - despite the destabilizing risks entailed - and achieving an agreement with the IMF
- the documents argue that even if there is a "nationalist backlash" against the West's attempts at imposing a new economic order on the country, that it still could control Yugoslavia - since nearly 50% of Yugoslavia's export earnings in the mid-1980s were going to service the debt! - and that an anti-Western government would be severely constrained
- the "reformist" republics of Croatia and Slovenia are championed as the keys to reform of the system
- the "passing of the Partizan generation" and the weakening of the "southern republics" is applauded as opening the way for "reformist" forces
- West German interests are seen to be growing in the region (the relevant section is three sentences long, with the middle sentence blacked-out by censors)
- a September 1987 document on US-Yugoslav talks on drug-policy - where Yugoslav officials brought up the issue of drug-money financing separatist activity in Kosovo and links to Diasporas in the US and W. Germany - is still heavily sanitized (nearly half-the document is blacked out); although there is enough in there to prove that US officials were made aware of these linkages as early as the mid-1980s
- one learns that people like Mamula - who was a key official in the JNA (and very pro-communist) - and Milosevic are identified as key anti-reform "conservatives" (i.e. not nationalists, but pro-communist officials); there is a sentiment in the US intel-documents of the era that some Yugoslav communists are becoming more "conservative" than the Soviets on many fronts
- the unprecedented wave of federation wide strikes and the relatively cordial relations between all nationalities in Yugoslavia, with the exception of inter-ethnic tensions in Kosovo (particularly emphasizes warm Serb-Croat relations), is noted
- the most recent declassified document, dated August 14, 1988 however, talks about Milosevic as a "nationalist" for adopting the Kosovo issue (the document notes that 30,000 Serbs had left the province since 1981) and argues that the issue is straining not only relations in Kosovo, but in the federation more generally
- after a Balkan Foreign Ministers meeting in Belgrade in late 1987/early 1988, the US intelligence briefing notes that "Movement in areas where there are clear differences of views, such as a Balkan nuclear and chemical weapons free zone, will be even more difficult - which should suit US interests perfectly"; the document also implicitly applauds the other foreign minister's for resisting the Greek PASOK/Socialist government's attempts to deepen Balkan integration and formalize cooperation between regional states
- Yugoslav intelligence officials are seen to be stone-walling American officials on the

whereabouts of Palestinian "terrorists" known to have transited Yugoslav territory, while US officials claim that their hands are tied in dealing with anti-Yugoslav emigre groups operating in the USA

- In a July 1987 document, one seemingly "sympathetic" US official, Rozanne Ridgeway, warns a visiting Yugoslav delegation that the Yugoslav option is losing out in Congress, since "ethnic politics" is very important to US Congressional politics and organized lobbies are working hard on discrediting support for Yugoslavia in Congress. The official argues that since Tito's passing, there has been no recognizable symbol/figure that could win sympathy for Yugoslavia and that various Yugoslav Diaspora's have been exploiting this void to press their own interests.

Anyway, thought, you'd all be interested in these bits of information. And this is only from the marginal stuff they deemed worthy to declassify.

cheers!
Kole

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Aan: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
Verzonden: vrijdag 28 maart 2003 1:34
Onderwerp: Fw: Yugoslavia Unraveled book (RGC Thomas,

— Original Message —

From: George C. Thomas
To: raju.thomas@marquette.edu
Sent: Thursday, March 27, 2003 1:27 PM
Subject: Yugoslavia Unraveled book (RGC Thomas, editor)

I would be grateful if all of you would recommend my edited book for libraries, promote it in newspapers and bulletins, and if you could invest in \$85 in ordering the book.

Here is the Website for the edited book. Click on URL below for ordering information, synopsis, and advance reviews by Robert Jensen (Texas), Barry Posen (MIT), David Binder (New York Times), Ted Galen Carpenter (CATO), Nikolaos Stavrou (Mediterranean Quarterly).

Raju

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**YUGOSLAVIA UNRAVELED:
SOVEREIGNTY, SELF-DETERMINATION, INTERVENTION**

Raju G. C. Thomas, Editor
 Lanham, Maryland: Lexington Books, January 2003

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CRIMES WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, Vojin Dabic, Ksenija Lukic**BEGINNING OF ARMED CONFLICTS AROUND VUKOVAR**

When most Serbs had already fled from Vukovar as the result of intimidation, mass arrests and liquidation's, Franjo TUDJMAN, president of the Republic of Croatia said, during his visit to this city on 24 July 1991, that he came there because he wanted to personally "assist in the resolution of conflict which broke out between six local communities which decided to barricade themselves and detached from other parts of the municipality". Then he added: "We believe that it is extremely hard to live under such circumstances and we will lend the opportunity to these citizens to open up so that we can start to live normally. Naturally, no conditions should be imposed, instead the law and constitution should be let to function and institutions of the system discharge their duties on the entire territory of Vukovar municipality."24 Though his statement seemed as an indication of readiness to political dialogue, it was extremely hypocritical, because it was delivered in the city in which Serb population was at that time systematically persecuted and enjoyed no legal protection, nor rights and liberties guaranteed by the constitution. It was the time when in Vukovar, and in most villages in Vukovar municipality under Croatian control, not a single government institution functioned, while ethnically pure Croatian police, which was in charge of protecting the citizens, did nothing to protect the harassed ethnic Serbs from the violence of Croatian armed forces and Croatian Democratic Union party militia. Serbs were more or less safe only in the mentioned "six local communities which", according to Franjo TUDJMAN, "decided to barricade themselves and detach from other parts of the municipality". With such an action, Serbs in barricaded villages jeopardized no one but owing to the fact that they self-organized and took charge of their security they remained outside the reach of the Croatian repressive apparatus. Croatian police and ZNG of the Republic in Croatia in Vukovar were not strong enough to deblock the barricaded Serb villages through an armed action and to forcibly establish the Croatian authority in them or, more precisely, to purge them from Serb population, as they had already done in Vukovar. The obstacle to this was, among other things, the fact that a strong YPA garrison was stationed in the city which could interfere in case of a Croatian assault on Serb villages and prevent the outbreak of wider confrontation. Attempting to exclude such a possibility, preparing at the same time for forcible resolution of the crisis in Vukovar municipality, Croatian armed forces, following the order of Vladimir SEKS, chairman of the Emergency Headquarters for Slavonia and Baranya, blocked the Vukovar garrison with an intention to prevent

YPA troops from exiting the barracks.

At the beginning of Croatian-Serbian confrontation in Vukovar municipality, YPA troops in the Vukovar garrison, acting upon the order of army leadership and Presidency of SW Yugoslavia, did not interfere in the conflict, but tried to act as a kind of impartial peace force. However, they were inconsistent in these efforts - for instance, they interfered on 2 May 1991 in Borovo Selo to save Croatian policemen, but stayed in the barracks when Croatian armed forces spearheaded forcible "cleansing" actions in Borovo Naselje (4 July) and Luzac (25 July) against the Serb population. Their members, with the exception of reserve troops from Vukovar, moved freely about the town even when Vukovar Serbs could practically no longer get out of their houses. The first major incident between YPA and armed members of the Croatian Democratic Union party militia occurred on 20 August 1991, when privates Dejan LAZAREVIC and Ljubo BRADULJEVIC were attacked in the Vukovar post office, where they used to come every day to pick up mail and money orders for soldiers in the barracks. Although it was a serious indication of upcoming conflicts, the garrison command and Vukovar police tried to diminish its significance. Therefore, they organized a joint investigation. Witnesses of the attack on soldiers were interrogated by a military security officer from APO 2834/1 in Belgrade and police inspector Danijel SALOPEK from the Police Administration in Vukovar. However, they did not manage to complete the investigation, because the next day Croatian armed forces blocked the Vukovar barracks. At that point the blockade had not been complete and the next few days military vehicles could exit the barracks, though only upon prior notice and approval by the Croatian police.

The new incident, which led to the first WA intervention against Croatian armed forces in Vukovar, happened on 25 August 1991, when Croatian soldiers, near their barricade on the way out of Borovo Naselje, planted an anti-tank mine under a YPA truck, the passage of which from Vukovar to Borovo Selo had been duly announced to the Croatian police. One YPA private was killed and four wounded, because after the mine exploded, Croatian troops started to shoot at them from the barricade from infantry arms. According to the report sent by Zvonimir RADOS, head of public security department in the Vukovar Police Administration, to the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Croatia in Zagreb, "immediately afterwards, a large number of tanks and armored vehicles left the barracks in Vukovar, many of which headed for Borovo Naselje where they seized control of vital positions and opened heavy fire from all available arms on the last barricade on the way to Borovo Selo". Judging by this report, Vukovar was then for a few hours under full control of YPA units, which also took possession of the road towards Bogdanovci, the only way which the Croatian armed forces could use to enter and leave the city. However, at the request of the Croatian party, cessation of hostilities and return of YPA units to the barracks was arranged. This was a trap from which they could not get loose until 18 November 1991. "The same night of 28 August 1991 at 11:15 PM", as the Police Administration in Vukovar reported to its headquarters in Zagreb, "ZNG members attacked the Vukovar garrison from infantry armament, wherefore heavy fire came in return". Fighting continued the


next day when members of the Serbian territorial defense from Borovo Selo and Trpinja for the first time joined in at the request of the Vukovar garrison command and, according to the same report, within a very short time reached "the confer of Borovo Naselje". Then the YPA command, implementing its strategy of limited involvement, which people mockingly referred to as "stop-and-go strategy", agreed a new cease-fire with the Croatian armed forces, which was maintained, along with the continued blockade of the Vukovar barracks and occasional incidents, until 14 September 1991. On that day, according to the reports of the Croatian police and testimony of Juraj NJAVRO, surgeon in the Vukovar Hospital, "the Croatian forces attacked the barracks because the tanks went out in the city and tried to join with forces stationed in the village of Neloslavci". The Croatian armed forces, thoroughly reorganized and through mobilization greatly strengthened in the meantime, did not allow the evacuation of the Vukovar barracks, thus embroiling YPA in a long and trying war for Vukovar, but using the media blamed the other party for it. Thus previously contained inter-ethnic conflict escaped any control except that by the "war lords".²⁵

Croatian warmongers, as it turned out later, have properly calculated that the war around Vukovar, even with the destruction and loss of this city, could ultimately bring them only benefits. That is why strong backup forces from Varazdin, Cakovec, Slavonski Brod, Zupanja, Nasice and Vinkovci were deployed in Vukovar, along with professional officers, colonel Mile DEDAKOVIC - "Jastreb" (i.e. Hawk) and Branko BORKOVIC - "Mladi Jastreb" (i.e. Young Hawk). Their task was to prepare the city for a long war with YPA units. Therefore, as soon as they assumed their new office on 30 August 1991, they started to organize the 204th ZNG brigade of the Republic of Croatia. This brigade, together with regular police forces and reserves, was in charge of bearing the brunt of Vukovar garrison blockade and to prevent its removal by YPA units from other garrisons which have been deployed with this intention in nearby villages (Brsadin, Negoslavci, Lipovaca, Trpinja and Borovo Selo). YPA command thought that TV footage showing kilometers-long columns of armored vehicles and artillery, broadcast all over the world for days, would discourage Croatian armed forces, cause confusion in their ranks and thus release the pressure on blocked YPA barracks in Croatian cities. What happened instead could have been reasonably anticipated - the Republic of Croatia was portrayed in the media worldwide as a helpless victim, e d to brutal attack, which ultimately rushed its intentional recognition as an independent state. This was an enormous favor done to them. In addition, skillfully taking advantage of the fact that the media attention focused on the events in and around Vukovar, the Croatian authorities, away from the eyes of international community, completed ethnic cleansing of most of the newly emerged Croatian state and expelled almost the entire Serb population from the regions unaffected by any armed conflicts. Since the media are prone to present their information in black-and-white fashion, because this simplified presentation of events is closer to the comprehension of the average people, no one had noticed that hundreds of thousands of Serbs expelled from the Republic of Croatia are the biggest sufferers in this war. The public also failed to notice that Serbs from Vukovar were the biggest victims and losers in the war nightmare around Vukovar - they

were killed on both sides of the front-line and, in addition, experienced terrible pogroms in partly surrounded city, which YPA did not want or could not capture for a long time.

Contents | Next: WAR CRIMES COMMITTED BY CROATIAN ARMED FORCES DURING ARMED CLASHES IN VUKOVAR AND VICINITY

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SELLING THE BOSNIAN MYTH TO AMERICA: BUYER BEWARE

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"One man who minds his own business is more valuable to the world than 10,000 cocksure moralists." H. L. Mencken

"The creation of a Serbian Republic within Bosnia is a victory for racist fanatics." (Anthony Lewis) "A 'political solution' in the Balkans is Orwellian diplo-speak for yielding land to Serbia that it seized by indiscriminate violence." (Albert Wohlstetter) "We should arm the victims of aggression." (William Safire)¹ This type of advocacy rhetoric regarding the Bosnian Muslim government in Sarajevo finally grew sufficiently deafening to dupe NATO into prosecuting the civil war against the Bosnian Serbs. These words stirred souls and ignited passions but frequently bore little resemblance to reality. In fact, America has not been so pathetically deceived since Robert McNamara helped to micromanage and escalate the Vietnam War while secretly lacking the intestinal fortitude to state his personal convictions of self-doubt about the enterprise to the President and nation.²

Popular perceptions pertaining to the Bosnian Muslim government (Bosniacs as they prefer to be called) have been forged by a prolific propaganda machine. A strange combination of three major spin doctors, including public relations (PR) firms in the employ of the Bosniacs, media pundits, and sympathetic elements of the State Department, have managed to manipulate illusions to further Muslim goals. Differing styles, approaches, and emphases make it difficult to discern collusion among these groups, but a degree of overlap does appear when evaluating their activities. For example, the combined emotive power of their efforts enabled them to leverage the debate in Congress where many experts (who should surely know better) supported lifting the arms embargo to help these "innocent Muslim victims" level the playing field against the Bosnian Serb Army (BSA).

Heated debates over the embargo issue transcended liberal versus conservative and hawk versus dove as the Bosniac lobby attempted to convince legislators that they risked moral and political suicide if they voted against supplying the Muslim army with guns. Recent combat developments demonstrate that the Bosniac government receives all the small arms it requires; and opinion polls reveal that most Americans care little about Bosnia and adamantly oppose deploying U.S. troops to the area other than to facilitate a UN withdrawal.³ Naturally, Bosniac supporters attempt to denigrate and dismiss these arguments intellectually while virulently attacking their proponents as harboring "pro-Serb" or even "Nazi" sympathies. Their Holocaust comparisons evoke powerful feelings and images, but in this case exist only in the fertile imaginations of

media sound bite writers.

As NATO threatens to further employ its air forces in support of achieving Muslim military goals and the U.S. teeters on the precipice of embroiling itself in another Vietnam and Somalia-type quagmire, it is time to examine some of the myths being perpetuated about this conflict. These images can then be juxtaposed with the reality on the ground. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to scrutinize the often distorted truth of this Balkan struggle and highlight the sophisticated misinformation and disinformation being foisted upon the American public by misguided "moralists" and unprofessional elements of the media; second, to explain how the U.S. arrived at the dangerous position in which it now finds itself.

Exposing the popular fallacies regarding this conflict will also demonstrate why the U.S. remains consistently out of step with its traditional allies on Bosnian issues. The Europeans are certainly not less sensitive to the Bosnian government because it is comprised primarily of Muslims as some commentators slyly imply. Rather, they evaluate the situation from different information and a more realistic historical perspective. They retain the advantages of more in-depth, professional, and probing journalism and better reporting from their embassies. Furthermore, they pay less attention to the constant propaganda themes emanating from the Bosniacs and their agents - the PR firms. Hopefully, this discussion will also assist readers in anticipating the future propaganda themes which Muslim sympathists and apologists will employ to prod America into further engaging itself in this civil war.

BOSNIAN MUSLIM GOVERNMENT PROPAGANDA

A brief examination of the role played by the PR companies which support the Bosnian Muslim disinformation campaign must necessarily precede any discussion of Bosniac propaganda. Their joint efforts have become inextricably interwoven, and it is virtually impossible to determine the lines where specific responsibilities begin and end. The wealthy Persian Gulf countries who pay the bills for these services have chosen formidable agents of influence to promote the Bosnian Muslim agenda in the West.

In a well-researched and insightful article soon to be published in *European Security*, Professor C.G. Jacobsen of Carleton University in Canada delineates the sins of Hill & Knowlton and Ruder Finn - two of the primary Wall Street PR firms involved in this elaborate charade.⁴ The former managed the highly successful Kuwaiti public relations offensive prior to Desert Storm. Its achievements included convincing the American public of the perverse fabrication that Iraqi troops had ejected Kuwaiti babies from incubators. Executives from the latter have proudly boasted of their success in co-opting significant segments of the American Jewish community to the Bosnian Muslim cause despite the intolerance for Judaism among the ruling Muslim clique in Bosnia.⁵

The successful efforts of these firms resulted in the portrayal of unilateral Serbian atrocities in such a way that future moral judgements were seriously corrupted. Ailing Serbs in Muslim prison camps were described as Muslims in Serb camps; Bosniac ethnic cleansing was ignored; statistics on mixed marriages were inflated to manipulate an image of pre-war peaceful coexistence; aid from Serbia proper was inflated or invented to force the application of trade sanctions and embargoes; BSA military advantages were falsely compared to supposed Muslim shortages; Bosniac military offensives (more frequent than BSA attacks) went deliberately unreported; mass rape charges were willfully manufactured and printed by the media; and the list continues with more odious examples which the public accepted without challenge.⁶

Questions of ethics (and possibly legality) aside, the PR companies have undeniably mounted an enormously successful propaganda campaign against the U.S. The public views Serbs as evil incarnate, and the cornucopia of disinformation that has been propagated about the Bosnian civil war would require volumes to adequately address. Consequently, only a representative sampling of the most insidious and pernicious fictions follows below.

Some of the prevailing myths concerning the Bosnian Muslim government which impartial observers should unhesitatingly question include: its effusive and whining protestations of being innocent victims; its claims of growing military competence which only requires modern heavy weapons to even the balance; rightful ownership of contested territory; and most importantly, its duplicitous proclaimed goal to establish a liberal western-style democracy for all ethnicities and religions.

Innocent Victims

The "innocent victim" ploy tugs on the world's heartstrings the most effectively. Gut-wrenching pictures of guiltless dead children who moments before being gunned down by cowardly snipers were playing in safe

vacant lots, noncombatants (women and elders) shot for merely crossing the street, people weaving between anti-sniper shields, sand bags, and protective UN vehicles merely to buy a loaf of bread. And, of course, most dastardly of all, the two mortar attacks in Sarajevo's Markale Market Square on February 5, 1994 and August 28, 1995. These attacks snuffed the lives of 68 and 37 unsuspecting people, respectively, and served as the catalyst for NATO retribution from the air in both cases. However, who must shoulder the responsibility for the mean streets of Sarajevo? Both the mortar attacks and the sniping incidents require closer examination.

In an investigative report published in the October 2, 1995 edition of *The Nation*, David Binder penned a most fascinating and thorough summary of the inconsistencies associated with these two mortar attacks. While stating that the UN "sticks by the conclusions of its inquiry" and blames the Serbs - at least in the second incident - the author nevertheless persuasively enumerated the factors which indicated that the BSA was not responsible.

Binder also notes support for his arguments from some American and Canadian specialists as well as (Russian) Colonel Andrei Demurenko, the Chief of Staff of the Sector Sarajevo peacekeeping unit. (According to an article in *The Sunday Times* (London), British and French crater analysis teams supported these same conclusions but were overruled by the UN.) No need exists to rehash all of his convincing arguments here, but primarily, they include suspicions about the firing distance, "anomalies with the (mortar) fuse," fields of observation, and trajectory difficulties.⁷

If the facts force us to confront the issue that the Muslims may have conducted these operations to obtain additional sympathy and publicity for their cause, those who know Sarajevo intimately must ask the next logical question. Given the proximity of the Markale Market Square to the Presidency (Bosniac White House), who granted permission to launch these brutal and insane attacks? Surely, it almost had to have been President Alija Izetbegovic or Vice President Ejup Ganic. Both incidents deserve a thorough investigation by the International War Crimes Tribunal.

The constant sniping incidents deserve equal scrutiny. Objective observers in Sarajevo frequently describe the abhorrent activity of snipers from both sides, but suspicions persist that the Muslims have murdered their own people when the potential existed for instant newsworthiness. Photographers have done nothing to abate this horror by their vulture-like waiting at areas vulnerable to sniping. In fact, the Bosnian government encourages this wrongheaded activity in the belief that such publicity aids its cause. Bosniac spokesmen denounce such accusations as patently false and claim that they amount only to UN excuses for its own indifferent behavior.

Anti-sniping activities conducted by the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Sarajevo, in fact, constitute quite impressive operations. Teams which perform this duty receive exceptional training from their armies and possess state-of-the-art optical aids and equipment. Employing these capabilities, the French recently to test over three years' worth of UN hunches pertaining to this issue. Their investigation "definitively" (their words) established the validity of UN suppositions that "some gunfire came from (Bosniac) Government soldiers deliberately shooting at their own civilians."⁸

The sniping incidents also demonstrate the effectiveness of internal Bosniac propaganda. Sarajevan citizens have been so firmly (and falsely) indoctrinated by their government that UNPROFOR should intervene in this war and fight it for them that on occasion they have refused to help their own victims shot in the street.⁹ Retired Canadian General Lewis Mackenzie, the first UN commander in Sarajevo, eloquently described this phenomenon in a passage of his book:

Sergeant Forest, supported by Captain Belisle, had risked his life rescuing two Muslim women who had been shot by snipers on the main road through Sarajevo. In spite of this selfless act of bravery, we (UNPROFOR) were condemned for not going back under fire to recover other victims, who had been confirmed dead by Sergeant Forest. All of this happened with the TDF (Bosniac Army) close by; yet the onlookers opted to condemn UNPROFOR officers who had just saved two lives.¹⁰

This type of peculiar behavior continues. Many soldiers from all countries who have served in Sarajevo, especially those who have performed anti-sniper missions, can relate similar experiences.

Military Competence

Another chimera advertised by the Bosniac government concerns its assertions of military competence. The perception which it attempts to present to the world portrays a well-officered professional army which only lacks modern heavy weaponry to attain success on the battlefield. While the Commander-in-Chief, General

Rasim Delic, and his subordinate commanders brashly speak of taking the fight to the Serbs, most of their troops' willingness to fight centers only on their home turf. This issue can best be termed territoriality and constitutes a major Bosniac military weakness.

The bulk of the Muslim army is derived from the old territorial defense units which were organized into "opstina" (county) brigades. Most of these units remain in the area of their original opstina and are manned by former reservists and conscript soldiers drawn from it. Their ties to the land make these troops reluctant to move from the area. Accordingly, the Muslims must rely on several mobile brigades which they have recruited from refugees who have lost their territory and now have a stronger incentive for fighting. At least one brigade is comprised of Muslims expelled from Croatia. Another unit, the 7th Muslim Brigade, has tended to attract Islamic extremists and has a reputation for aggressive behavior and an offensive spirit. The Bosniacs use these mobile brigades for major operations, but without Croat forces tying down BSA formations elsewhere, these units remain incapable of sustained success against their foes.

The Bosniacs do possess one noteworthy military advantage: their infantry. Their infantry constitutes the strongest part of their army and numbers nearly 140,000, giving them a 2:1 advantage in manpower over the BSA. While it is organized into corps and brigades, it generally appears capable of only limited battalion size operations. The Bosniac infantry has been bloodied from being forced to leave its trenches to seize terrain and has become more effective than its BSA equivalent which cannot afford substantial casualties. Nevertheless, Bosnian Muslim assertions that this advantage can offer them military success if they only obtain appropriate weaponry reflect an outlandish belief in their own propaganda.¹¹

Bosniac claims of proficient military leadership, however, rank among their most delusional fantasies. Muslim officers attain their rank not by competence and experience but rather through political and religious ties.¹² Their summer 1994 attempts to capture Route Duck, a major supply route traversing through the Ozren Mountains, remain instructive of their deficiencies.

On the basis of General Delic's continued boasting, the Muslim army attempted to conduct a two-pronged offensive on the area with their II and III Corps advancing from opposite directions. (The fact that they had never successfully coordinated anything larger than a battalion attack prior to this operation apparently had no effect on their planning.) The first battle ended in total disaster and the Bosniacs signed a cessation of hostilities agreement which required them to withdraw their forces from the Ozren salient. Using an unrelated incident in Sarajevo as a pretext for breaking this accord, they again renewed their attack with the element of surprise now decisively in their favor.

Caught by a disingenuous plan, the BSA initially lost considerable ground and was forced to evacuate over 5,000 civilians. Within two weeks, however, the Muslim supply and personnel replacement system collapsed and their offensive disintegrated. The problem revolved not only around insufficient logistic planning but incompetent terrain and battle analysis.

The Bosniacs never conducted proper reconnaissance and did not attempt to secure the necessary key terrain that dominated their attack routes. Furthermore, they consistently failed to exploit tactical successes and quickly lost the momentum. They made no apparent effort to maintain contact with BSA retreating units and suffered unnecessary casualties by having to constantly find the enemy and redefine the battle area. A classic example occurred to the southeast of the Blizna Mountain. The BSA had launched a limited counterattack to hold ground only long enough to mine it. When they withdrew, the Bosniacs assaulted through the area to reclaim it and subsequently found themselves trapped in a minefield under heavy artillery fire. Such are the exaggerated claims of military expertise.¹³

Rightful Ownership of Territory

Another persistent element of the propaganda onslaught involves legitimate ownership of land. The BSA never have "overrun, seized, or captured" 70 percent of the country as Bosniac government verbal gimmicks state. While they controlled 70 percent of the territory during much of this conflict, the BSA certainly did not possess the military manpower to overrun, seize, or capture it. The media and PR firms employ these inflammatory words only to obfuscate the pre-war situation. Due to their agrarian way of life, the Serbs formed a plurality in 64 percent of the territory at the beginning of the war while the more urbane Muslim business-oriented people resided in the cities.¹⁴

Simple historical precedent determined this situation. When the Ottoman Empire conquered the area, some Serbs and a small number of Croats converted to Islam. (The most rabid Serb and Croat nationalists consider Bosnian Muslims illegitimate mongrels.) Their reasons for this action were more economic than religious since they sought access to better jobs from their Turkish overlords. These people became the ancestors of today's

Bosnian Muslims and congregated in the cities where employment opportunities tended to hold more potential. Over the course of time, they failed to acquire the more significant land holdings of their ex-kin.

The modern-day question, though, concerns legitimacy. Does Bosnia as a sovereign state have a right to control its territory? Undeniably. Nonetheless, it must meet the minimum de facto criteria for sovereignty, and it apparently has failed to do so. Most importantly, it remains incapable of defending its own territory against Bosnian Serbs who choose to exercise their legitimate right of secession in the same manner as Bosnia seceded from Yugoslavia. Simply stated, the situation amounts to a civil war within a civil war.

Some Muslim apologists have attempted to advance the preposterous argument that this conflict should not be considered an internal affair since Bosnia has become a member of the UN. Rather, they wish to view it as a Serbian proper war of aggression. While President Milosevic of Serbia certainly aggravated the conflict with his nationalistic bombast, evidence for Serbian involvement has been fabricated or exaggerated.¹⁵ In terms of this UN membership logic, Americans might ask where our country would be today if the UN had been around in 1776 or 1861. Much to the UN's credit, it realizes that it cannot impose a solution to the Bosnian civil war - but this situation remains unacceptable to the Muslims who do not yet understand the concept that "freedom not free" and demand protection from others while promulgating their status as innocent victims and practicing their own territorial aggression.

Liberal Western-Style Democracy

The most dubious of all Bosniac claims pertains to the self-serving commercial that the government hopes to eventually establish a multiethnic liberal democratic society. Such ideals may appeal to a few members of Bosnia's ruling circle as well as to its generally secular populace, but President Izetbegovic and his cabal appear to harbor much different private intentions and goals. Poignant pleas for Western help to the contrary, his interviews for *Oslobodjenje*, the Sarajevo daily newspaper, constantly remind his audience that their best friends are "other Islamic countries." Additionally, his cocky (albeit infrequent) propensity to let down his guard has resulted in some inadvertently revealing interviews for Westerners.

Izetbegovic had been imprisoned twice for Islamic activity under Tito's communist regime. With the now almost universal hatred of Tito and his followers, the President has astutely exploited these events to his favor. His noble act of protest on behalf of religious freedom, however, does not necessarily make him a proponent for freedom of religion in his country. He has yet to renounce his "Islamic Declaration," written in 1970, which states: "There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions."¹⁶

In some areas controlled by Muslims, Croat Catholics complain that they are not permitted to attend mass. Orthodox Serbs and Jews fare no better. The Muslims loudly complain to the press that only mosques are damaged during fighting, but a simple drive through the Bosnian hinterland reveals the spurious nature of this assertion. More prominently, (even for the media to notice) a Serbian Orthodox church in Sarajevo shows obvious signs of damage from mortars and small arms fire that could only have come from the Bosniacs.¹⁷

The most visible destruction of religious landmarks has occurred in the historic Jewish cemetery in Sarajevo where some of the graves date back to the time of Columbus. Muslims have not been solely responsible for the damage here, but they perpetuate it and have become the worst offenders. A portion of the confrontation line between the BSA and the Muslim army bisects this site and low level fighting occurs almost daily. Unique marbled gravesones and crypts have been desecrated by Bosniac troops digging under and around them to establish better vantage points for firing positions. This area is completely ignored by the media except when CNN decides to add a touch of drama and feature one of their correspondents near the sight of some current firing. In this case, the cemetery usually provides an adequate backdrop.

Izetbegovic's true ambitions for Bosnia occasionally appear in his words. When an interviewer pressed him on some of Islam's strictures such as female clothing, he answered, "The west says that women in the west are free, and that women are not free in Islam. But the west makes women into advertisements, into objects. Islam respects women."¹⁸ Most Bosnian women would certainly not appreciate the meaning behind these sentiments, but Islamic dress becomes more common as more women begin to identify culturally with their past. In some areas, Mujahedin actually pay females to dress according to Islamic tradition and harass (sometimes with gun fire) those who do not.

In response to a question concerning his desire to establish Shari'a (Islamic law) in Bosnia, Izetbegovic firmly answered, "No," and then added, "But if you think about it, what is wrong with the Shari'a? Is it less humane to cut off a man's hand than to take several years from his life in prison? You cut off the hand, it is done. I don't know. I am just thinking out loud."¹⁹ His thoughts should not impart a reassuring feeling to the humanitarians

among us.

Bosniac ties to radical Islam should not be lightly dismissed. The Bosnian government enjoys closer cooperation with Iran than it would readily admit and takes great pains to preclude curiosity seekers (including UNPROFOR) from observing their partner's embassy in Sarajevo. At least through 1994, Bosnian police stood watch and sealed the road which led to the temporary location where Iranian diplomats were housed. In a twist of fate indicative of Sarajevo's ever changing fortunes, the Iranians chose a site only three blocks to the east from the very spot where Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated. A minaret stands guard at the base of the street diagonal to the city's old repository where hundreds of years of historical records have been tragically reduced to ashes. An old Turkish fort overlooks the Iranians from an adjacent hill to the southeast.

Approximately 4000 Mujahedin, supported by Iranian special operations forces, have been continually intensifying their activities in central Bosnia for more than two years. Detachments of Mujahedin have assisted in training selected Bosniac army elements and began to spearhead many tactical-level attacks against the BSA during the summer of 1994. The potential for this organization to escalate its activities remains high and could threaten regional stability despite any future agreements.²⁰

Funding for the Mujahedin has been provided by Iran and various other Islamic states with an interest in expanding extremism into Europe. International radical groups, such as Hizbollah, have also been included on the suspected list of sponsors. Bosnian government sources only grudgingly acknowledge the presence of the Mujahedin but publicly intimate that they have accepted their presence as a "necessary evil" to maintain the flow of aid from international Islamic contributors. This "aid" has been distributed in forms ranging from hard currency to clandestine arms shipments. As time progresses, these professional "holy warriors" will likely divert their attention to politicizing the Muslim population and attempting to establish an Islamic republic obedient to fundamentalist doctrine.²¹

MEDIA BIASES AND SENTIMENTS

Many journalists, who undeniably labor under dangerous and miserable conditions, deserve numerous accolades for the reporting functions they perform in Bosnia.²² Far too many others maintain no particular commitment to the truth and have permitted themselves to become pawns of the propaganda structure. (Unfortunately, due to the subject matter of this paper, those latter individuals constitute the focus group described in the remainder of this section.)

These correspondents frequently limit their time in Bosnia to short stays and fail to gain an appreciation for the true nuances at play in this war. Watching and reading their reports too often conveys the impression that they feel the pressure of competition for a voyeuristic audience against their pampered tabloid like peers (such as those who covered the O. J. Simpson trial) and try to react accordingly. This segment of the media views its job security as dependent upon obtaining thirty seconds of good video footage accompanied with appropriate sound bites from Muslim officials or their populace.

Many journalists in this vein value their protection and tend to report from a distance. At times, they even appear to be victims of a bizarre variation of the infamous "Stockholm Syndrome" as they remain safely within Bosniac army lines and depend on the government for their information as well as their safety.²³ The Bosniac government happily exploits them and complies with their requests to film and report from Muslim vantage points with the mutual philosophy between them amounting to the principle that the more suffering and destruction the better the venue.

The result, obviously, becomes tawdry reporting that panders to the Bosniac point of view and results in misleading news reports. Serb incompetence in dealing with the media only intensifies this unbalanced flow of information. (When they do permit journalists into their territory, BSA representatives usually accompany them. The media derisively refer to their escorts as "minders," but, in fact, such practices are standard with most military organizations to include the Bosnian Muslim army.)²⁴

Much of the media has become so engrossed in platitudes and their own self-fulfilling prophecies that Bosnian propaganda is now widely accepted as an article of faith, and journalists have abrogated their responsibility to verify their information, ironically, if the public decides to confer "superstar" status on one of these personalities, the problem of credibility often intensifies. When several segments of the media decided to support the absurd notion that British General Michael Rose, the former Commander of the UN forces in Bosnia, was pro-Serb, they engaged in some extremely trashy journalism.²⁵ (Absurdly, but not inconsequentially from a propaganda point of view, the U.S. ambassador also endorsed this fiction. He pointedly demonstrated his displeasure by boycotting the farewell party for General Rose at the end of his tour.) Two examples should suffice to make this point.

During a series of broadcasts in April - May 1994, the media, led primarily by Christiane Amanpour and some of her CNN colleagues, lambasted General Rose for failing to prevent Serbian aggression during the battle for Gorazde. They unabashedly emphasized that even though a British soldier serving as a Joint Commission Observer (JCO) had been killed by the Serbs during this battle and a British Sea Harrier shot down, Rose permitted the BSA to pound the city with artillery and only allowed NATO air power to conduct pinprick strikes to curb the attack.²⁶ Their sources evidently were limited to Bosnian Muslim locals who reared the loss of their homes and one dazed and confused UN military observer (UNMO).

Did these reports represent no nonsense prize winning material that vindicated the Emmy Amanpour won for Bosnia? Hardly. They were devoid of any semblance of truth and, if anything, appeared to compromise journalistic standards by failing to verify sources. As anyone who knows General Rose can attest, his reputation as an outstanding leader and soldier is well-deserved. He would not have permitted any of his troops - British, French, Malaysian, or other - to suffer any humanly preventable ignominious consequences. The media did not bother to query the Public Affairs Officer or request interviews with any of the participants who were manning the tactical operations center. Rather, they chose to rely on the reports of a single hysterical UNMO and a propagandized group of Muslim refugees. Had anyone sought the truth, they would have discovered that the events of that particular April 15th will remain vividly in the memories of many UNPROFOR personnel for years to come.

Two British JCOs were manning an Observation Post (OP) behind a Muslim position which could have been defended indefinitely. The Bosniacs, in fact, had already repelled several BSA attacks. They then realized that the British troops were behind them. In the course of the next BSA assault, the Muslim infantry unexpectedly and without reason scattered and retreated to alternate positions. Their only apparent motive to withdraw was to directly expose the JCOs to a confused BSA assault team. Serbian bullets killed one of the British soldiers and wounded the other, but responsibility lies with the Bosnian Muslims who had hoped to elicit a massive retaliatory response from NATO as punishment for the murder of noncombatant observers.

The easiest action for General Rose would have been to retaliate against the Serbs based on the preliminary data that was received - the same sort of nonsense that these journalists used for their reports. As the explanation reveals, it would also have been an egregious mistake - something that the Bosniac army clearly hoped would occur. Instead of the General being the target of the media's venom for indecisiveness, he should have been lauded for his coolness under enormous emotional and political pressure.

In many respects, Peter Jennings' ABC special report, "The Peacekeepers: How the UN Failed in Bosnia," broadcast on April 24, 1995 surpassed the unprofessionalism of these previous accounts. At least in Amanpour's case, some viewers understand her biases and can filter information appropriately. Jennings' program, however, appeared staged and edited to bolster the anchorman's image as a hard-nosed, dogged reporter.

While inherent journalistic biases work to deliberately belittle UN accomplishments, ABC's inaccuracies began with its premise to show "how the most powerful nations in the world allowed themselves to be pushed around." This telecast came an entire year after the Amanpour reports, but it aired the same tired accusations by the same discredited witnesses. As Jennings whimpered that "town by town the Serbs went killing," amateur video showed General Rose in Gorazde making the statement that the Bosniac army turned and ran because "they wanted the UN to pick up the bits." His assessment reflected the truth, but ABC placed the footage in a spot where they ludicrously believed it could be debunked. The next segment immediately showed an interview with the frenzied UNMO and others who, from their hiding place in a former bank vault, determined that a BSA offensive had been unleashed on Gorazde.

Use of home videos and an interview with the head doctor of the Gorazde hospital also attempted to refute UN's estimate of casualties during the battle. These scenes, which reflected only a few seconds of activity and very easily could have been staged, somehow were supposed to hold more credibility than extensive and impartial UN investigations of the situation. Reports from UN pilots that many medical evacuation flights from the Gorazde enclave included soldiers with minor scratches received flippant treatment. Lightly wounded combatants were not covered by an agreement negotiated between the BSA and the UN. Nonetheless, rather than worry about wounded civilians who were the intended evacuees, the Bosniac government opted to redeploy some of its forces under the cover of this operation.

Most notably, ABC offered camera time to Bosnian Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic. Realizing his opportunity to play for sympathy to an American audience, he solemnly declared that the UN wished to take Bosnia off the table - by all means.²⁷ ABC allowed this laughable assertion to pass without comment. Later in the program, when Jennings began a new diatribe about the UN failure to protect Bihać, they featured Silajdzic again demanding that General Rose launch air strikes.²⁷ The sin of omission in this case was that no one noted the

BSA conducted this operation as a counterattack to reduce previous successful gains by the Bosniac army in this sector.

One of the media's few consistencies on Bosnia happens to be its inconsistency. Military offensives, snipers, and humanitarian strife too often become news only when they apply to the Muslims. Thus, journalists are naturally drawn to such stimuli while overlooking Bosniac misdeeds as well as the UN's successful prevention of such ills by either side. The above examples represent only two of the many slanted reports which have been overly sympathetic to the Bosnian Muslim government and seem designed to prompt exaggerated reactions from viewers. Unequal treatment of either side or deliberate disregard of actual facts leads to implications of yellow journalism. As much as anyone, the media must realize that moral ambiguities abound in this civil war.

Prior to leaving this section, one additional topic begs clarification – namely, the media's gullibility in printing selective "intelligence leaks." At least twice, "unidentified high-level officials" have treated journalists to reports of mass graves around Srebrenica and elsewhere which allege that such information proves the Serbs have been guilty of 90 percent of the atrocities in this war.²⁸ Such information routinely receives additional credence from the media in that it has been derived from satellite (imagery) sources and therefore must be unimpeachable.

First of all, even the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) disputes such figures, and their data frequently invites criticism for skewing the facts in favor of the Bosniac government.²⁹ More importantly, however, these leaks play directly to the naivete of public perceptions surrounding the spy mystique. While our satellites possess some amazing capabilities, they cannot differentiate between living Serbs, Muslims, Croats – especially since no ethnic differences exist. Common sense thus dictates that they cannot distinguish ethno-religious characteristics among corpses in mass graves which have become all too common in Bosnia and Croatia. Rational and responsible journalists should necessarily cast aspersions at such hyperbole rather than citing it as convincing evidence.

THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

Quality of diplomacy as an element of national power has been recognized and embodied in political and military theory from the ancient (Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*), to the medieval (Machiavelli's *The Prince*), to the contemporary period. The latter perhaps being most notably represented in Hans Morgenthau's seminal work *Politics Among Nations*. According to Mr. Morgenthau, diplomacy constitutes the most important element of national power:

Diplomacy, one might say, is the brains of national power, as national morale is its soul. If its vision is blurred, its judgment defective, and its determination feeble, all the advantages of... (other national power elements)... will in the long run avail a nation little. (Additionally)... it is of the utmost importance that the good quality of the diplomatic service be constant. And quality is best assured by dependence upon tradition and institutions.³⁰

Judging by the aforementioned standards, American statecraft has been woefully outclassed by a novice but shrewd Bosnian Muslim government which successfully sold its image as innocent victim to a naive and sympathetic embassy staff. In fact, U.S. diplomacy arguably reached its lowest ebb since Ambassador Patrick Hurley lost China³¹ and Ambassador April Glaspie benignly, if unwittingly, gave Saddam the green light to punish Kuwait for stealing oil. At the very least, this particular ambassador's appointment demonstrated the flaws in assigning a representative with ethnic and family ties to a country which may have interests incongruous to those of the United States.

American diplomatic dilemmas vis-a-vis Bosnia can actually be traced to a failure of foresight during the time the former Yugoslavia began to disintegrate. The headlong rush by the U.S. and Germany to recognize Croatian and Bosnian sovereignty prior to their meeting the traditional requirements has yet to be adequately explained. However, the activities of the small embassy team in Sarajevo exacerbated this lack of prudence and left much to be desired. First and foremost, it must shoulder the predominance of guilt for American lack of clear thinking on Bosnian issues.

The problems first became apparent during a congressional delegation visit to Sarajevo by Senators Dole, Warner, and Diden in early June 1994. Despite repeated requests to permit a UN briefing for the three senators by the U.S. members of UNPROFOR, the ambassador's staff claimed that time was insufficient and the schedule too inflexible. Of course, the hidden agenda ensured that only the embassy point of view would be heard. This matter, however, constituted the least of the difficulties connected with this distinctive visit.

On June 5, the embassy staff apparently had arranged for the three senators to attend Sunday mass at the Heart of Jesus Cathedral with the Bosnian Croat Catholics. For whatever reason, the delegation arrived late. As Croat partisans and UNPROFUR UN personnel watched in astonishment, news crews with bright lights invaded this dimly lit medieval style church in the middle of the bishop's homily. With all eyes upon them, our culturally unattuned embassy staff led the senators to the front rows where they remained approximately ten minutes for a photo opportunity. They then departed while the bishop continued his homily.

While the ambassador undoubtedly assured our senators that their visit provided a morale boost for the Croats, it had exactly the opposite effect for the majority of them. As discussed below, the Bosnian Croats generally dislike most outsiders; but until that time, Americans were well received. However, the overt rudeness displayed by our insensitive embassy staff on that particular day ended any perceived affinity for the U.S. among that Croat crowd.

To make matters worse, rumors began to circulate among the Croat community that our official delegation brought Muslims into the cathedral. Despite occasional Bosnian propaganda to the contrary, Catholic Croats do not want Muslims in their churches any more than the religious Muslims welcome Croat Catholic or Orthodox Christians into their mosques. The corollary to the axiom that "there are no atheists in fox holes" can be stated as people in war zones tend to take their religion seriously. The Croats certainly epitomize such an example.

This congressional junket represented a worst case scenario wherein an embassy attempted to alter perceptions by limiting and controlling the parameters of the visit. It was tantamount to the proverbial frog who could only describe the world from the confines of his well. He had no realization of the sun and moon until the structures of his home had burst and forced him to expand his horizons. In this manner, as Professor Morgenthau might have stated it, the embassy staff blurred our vision and corrupted our traditions and institutions.

Diplomatic subterfuge continued when the ornate new embassy was officially dedicated on July 4, 1994 and the U.S. became a much more visible player in Sarajevo. Ambassador Victor Jackovich opened the ceremonies that day with a speech so colored with sympathy and empathy for the Muslim cause that it even evoked snickering from representatives of the Bosnian government, UNPROFUR/UN members, who thought they were performing an impartial peacekeeping mission, were left incredulous by its rhetoric.

Among other embellished statements, the ambassador declared that "fascism will pass" as he equated the symbolism of opening the embassy on the U.S. holiday to Bosnian pursuit of liberty and human rights.³² Propaganda aside, the Serbs have probably suffered more at the hands of fascists than any nationality other than the Jews. Moreover, Croats in Dugo Selo and Serbs in Turbe (to name just a few) who were previous victims of Muslim ethnic cleansing would have been delighted to provide fervent testimonials of Bosnian "pursuit" of these ideals.

Jackovich's belligerent remarks could only have been targeted against any Serbs who hoped that this ceremony would mark a new era of unbiased American retrospection. His clear intent was to signify that even if the U.S. government had not formally decided to take sides, this embassy would implement its own foreign policy. One must assume that these remarks had never been officially submitted to his superiors for approval.

The most illustrative incident concerning the former embassy's attempt to distort the truth had yet to take place. During the late afternoon of 18 September 1994, a day which had remained eerily quiet by Sarajevo standards, a major attack erupted on the northeast end of the city. A supporting action could also clearly be heard to the southwest. Anyone who had been in Sarajevo more than a few days would have quickly realized that the Bosnian Muslim army was attempting to seize BSA artillery positions. (The only alternative could have been the Serbs attacking themselves.) Due to the location of a prominent vantage point, it became possible to observe the operation as it unfolded.

As UN personnel returned to the compound to file the pertinent reports, NATO officers began calling to request appropriate bombing targets. They had been informed that "the Serbs were attacking the city." Dismayingly, other than UNPROFUR itself, the only culprit that possessed the requisite communication nodes to pass such erroneous information directly to NATO with such timeliness was the U.S. embassy. In this case, the UN managed to avert a grave miscarriage of justice; but in less climactic instances, one can only speculate on the quantity of falsified data which made its way back to Washington, D.C.

Only three logical explanations exist for this near debacle: the embassy staff was blatantly inept; embassy personnel were spending their time in Vienna (a frequent occurrence) and merely relayed to NATO the contents of a report which they had received from the Bosnian government and did not bother to verify;³³or,

they deliberately attempted to "cook" the report and disseminate disinformation. Whichever circumstance almost caused this potential catastrophe remains an open question. Regardless, all three signify inexcusable and unconscionable behavior.

By the winter of 1994, the State Department announced that Ambassador Jackovich and his staff would be replaced. Nevertheless, these personnel lingered as "lame ducks" for another few months, and their situation provided them at least one more opportunity to discredit the Serbs.

Prior to the embassy staff's departure, the BSA had begun to consistently close the Sarajevo airport with the (somewhat justified) argument that Muslim politicians were utilizing it as a base to travel abroad on Western aircraft originally earmarked to haul humanitarian aid. They could then spread their own brand of propaganda. Jackovich, realizing the Serbs would prove true to custom and react impulsively, seized the occasion to make an unprecedented announcement of his scheduled flight. Of course, the Serbs promptly closed the airport again. Secretary of State Warren Christopher was then forced to condemn this action in support of his beleaguered subordinate.

Notwithstanding the predictable foolishness of the Serbs, the ambassador had flown out of Sarajevo airport numerous times without anyone paying the slightest bit of attention. He could easily have slipped out once again by merely keeping his plans to himself. Although he may have been forced to drive the uncomfortable route to Zagreb, he undoubtedly enjoyed every minute knowing that the BSA had stupidly fallen into another PR ambush.

Despite its shortcomings, the former embassy staff should not be perceived as exclusively guilty. Its parent organization obviously gave it plenty of help. Yet no one should misconstrue the intent of the above as an unabashed frontal assault on the entire State Department and its position on Bosnia. Many fine people dedicate their professional lives to the Department of State and retain a firm grasp on reality in the Balkans. Nonetheless, they appear to be losing the internal debate as official policy strives to support the perverted notion that the Muslims really are the innocent victims which they portray themselves to be in their own propaganda. The reasons behind this facade can only be guessed.

Some Bosnia watchers theorize that strategic thinkers in the State Department regard it necessary to kowtow to oil-producing Islamic states. These nations concurrently attempt to publicly portray the Bosnian struggle in terms of the Crusades while privately paying Western PR firms to urge their governments to send troops to the Bosniac cause.³⁴ Others believe that certain well-placed egotists call the shots and derive support from dramatic media events such as the very public resignations two years ago of a few analysts who disagreed with U.S. policies toward Bosnia. (The press omitted informing the public that some of these individuals had previously secured better employment opportunities with "think tanks" sympathetic to their respective opinions.) Regardless of the truth, the salient point of the issue is that American policy lacks consistency.

Subsequent to two weeks of intensive NATO airstrikes, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke conducted his shuttle diplomacy in support of the new U.S. peace plan. While doing so, he loudly trumpeted that the West had not taken sides and the bombing was not designed to tip the military balance in favor of the Bosniacs. Simultaneously, the new ambassador to Bosnia, John Menzies, joined his counterpart in Croatia, Peter Galbraith, in congratulating the Muslim 5th Corps for "liberating" the province of Bihać. Until the success of the lightning Croat ground offensive to capture the Krajina and the NATO air attacks, this unit had spent the entire war surrounded.

When the two ambassadors were queried whether they would attempt to persuade the Muslims to halt their offensive in support of Holbrooke's initiatives, Menzies inexplicably replied, "We're not here to convey that of message."³⁵ The type of diplomatic coordination and purported pressure manifested by this example only intensifies the confusion surrounding the mixed signals of U.S. policy toward Bosnia.

BOSNIAN SERBS: THEIR OWN WORST ENEMY

Does any of the above imply that the U.S., NATO, or the UN should relent on the pressure being applied against the Bosnian Serbs? Absolutely not! The Serbs lost the propaganda war shortly after the inception of hostilities and perhaps this factor aggravated many of the atrocities they undoubtedly committed. However, the behavior and actions of some members of the BSA has been inexcusable. They need to leave their mythology behind and enter the modern world if they hope to live in peace among their neighbors.³⁶

Concurrently, American commentators should be careful about their popular penchant to condemn the Serbs as an ethnic group. Individuals have been responsible for war crimes - not the entire nation. The BSA may

have more than its fair share of brutal, boorish, and morally repugnant characters who disgust Western sensibilities, but they are no worse than their counterparts in the Bosniac military and government. Their early victories in this war, in part, made them unbearable to some Westerners whose traditional predilections reflexively support the underdog. Failure to appreciate the intricacies of this new age of informational warfare has extracted a heavy price from the Serbs for their initial combat successes.

America need not succumb to the false messages which the Bosniacs are selling. Our society must retain its perspective on all the warring factions and learn to recognize the tools of propaganda. When this conflict began, cosmopolitan Sarajevo Muslims realized the importance of both perception management and the need to disseminate their message to the world. This awareness, coupled with the expertise of their PR firms, resulted in a highly successful psychological operations campaign. Meanwhile, the more rustic Serbs proved no match for this competition. They relied on their Bolshevik slogans, recited them by rote, and were promptly dismissed by the international press. While the U.S. and its allies must continue to pursue war criminals, no one should not condemn an entire nationality for their lack of erudition and finesse.

THE CROAT CONNECTION

Other than to occasionally avail themselves of the services offered by the PR firms, the Bosnian Croats play a less significant role in the propaganda game than their sometime Muslim allies or their sponsors in Croatia proper. Croat attitudes toward their neighbors and the UN, however, will be critical to the future of real world stability in the region and thus requires some perspective. First of all, none of the recent Bosniac military successes would have been possible without the phenomenal changes which occurred in the army of Croatia proper. Even with NATO providing the appropriate air support, the Bosniac army would have remained stymied without President Franjo Tudjman's offensive to capture the Krajina. Secondly, Croat relationships probably constitute the most complicated enigma of this war. Today's alliances may mean nothing tomorrow.

Bosnian Croat disdain for both their Muslim and Serb neighbors has been adequately demonstrated by the on-again/off-again combat operations they have conducted against each other during the past four years. Degrees of animosity vary by local interests as well as relative successes and failures in integrating cooperative efforts through the Croat - Muslim Federation. The Bosnian Croats and Muslims formed this organization in March 1994, primarily at the behest of the U.S. and Germany, to provide a united front against the Serbs. Strategically, it amounted to a stroke of political genius; tactically, it suffers from substantial mistrust on both sides.

Croat antipathy for the UN manifests itself in other ways. President Tudjman emphasizes that subsequent to his army's capture of the Krajina, the UN has outlived its usefulness. He declares that he will permit the UN headquarters to remain in Zagreb but demands that UN troops depart. Bosnian Croats share many of his feelings and believe that too many countries and people exploit this war and grow rich because of it. For instance, except for the U.S. and Great Britain who decline to accept payment, the UN pays approximately one thousand dollars per month for each soldier performing a UN mission. The costs for other UN agencies can run even higher with the total estimated costs for Bosnia amounting to \$5 million per day. (The U.S. taxpayer funds almost thirty percent of this bill.)

Due in part to these realities, the Bosnian Croats refer to the UN as "Blue Pigs." Blue - to denigrate the color of UN military headgear; Pig - as a derogatory term toward the Muslims whom the Croats perceive as being favored (at least initially) by the UN. In some Bosnian Croat strongholds, such as Gornji Vakuf, UN vehicles must keep their windows up at all times. The reason for such circumstances being that younger children attempt to shoot needles through blowguns at the passengers. As white UN vehicles approach from a distance, teenagers launch into scornful mock laughter while adults simply look away in disgust.

How does the above relate to the propaganda offensive? The Bosnian Croats (even among themselves) and Croats proper do not always speak with a united voice; but the issue that transcends all others revolves around their compelling desire for Croatian unification. This situation does not bode well for the future of either the Federation or the Bosnian Government. While relations between Croats and Muslims have never been good, their deterioration seems to be accelerating. Subsequent to the Croat victory in the Krajina, the Muslims have complained that they are being treated as a "little brother."

As Bosniac propaganda attempts to underscore partnership with the Croats, it actually runs the risk of too much success. No one should underestimate Croatian and Serbian desires to unite their kinsmen and thus split Bosnia between themselves. If the Croats turn en masse against the Bosniacs, the Muslim government could be faced with a highly demoralized populace that had been propagandized to believe success was not possible without cooperation. Such events would effectively leave the Muslims without UN protection, destroy any remaining will to fight, and confine them to a small island of land around Sarajevo.³⁷

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS AND WARNINGS

As noted in the beginning of this article, Muslim apologists will condemn the above arguments as lacking sympathy for their favorite victims. Alvin and Heidi Toffler answered these types of critics best in a passage from their book *War and Anti-War*:

Some readers may confuse the absence of moralizing (about the hatefulness of war) for an absence of empathy with the victims of war. This is to assume that cries of pain and anger are enough to prevent violence. Surely there are enough cries of pain and enough anger in the world. If they were sufficient to produce peace, our problems would be over.³⁸

With these sentiments in mind, political leaders must focus on the reality of Bosnia and not the contrived issues of influence peddlers. All the groups in this country have been victims, and they all deserve our sympathy and best humanitarian efforts.

Military support for any warring faction, however, remains another matter. Such benefits should be withheld until all sides abandon their greed for more land, tire of killing each other, and permit the implementation of a just and lasting peace. Only then will it become time to separate the war criminals and treat the others with compassion. The UN arguably had been close to achieving these terms prior to the U.S. giving the green light for the Croatian Krajina offensive and the NATO bombing. Now, defeat has been seized from the jaws of victory.

Those who believe the recent Dayton negotiations and latest agreements will result in a durable peace fail to see through the veil of Bosnian Muslim schemes and propaganda. They, likewise, do not appreciate the vindictiveness and revenge factor in Balkan history. The forthcoming winter will probably do more to slow combat operations than any potential ceasefire accord, but fighting will resume in the spring. When it does, the world will have to await a new saturation point as to when the warring factions again exhaust themselves on the killing fields. In the meantime, the U.S. and its allies have renewed the debate over deploying a NATO peacekeeping force which would also train and equip the Bosniac army.

Any lull in fighting only provides the Bosniacs another smoke screen from which to provoke the Serbs. They have successfully hoodwinked NATO into engaging its air forces for their support and the next step will be an attempt to morally coerce its ground troops to recapture territory which they desire. (e.g. the Bosniac demand that Banja Luka be demilitarized while they refuse to do the same in Sarajevo.) Certainly, any decisions pertaining to the mission of deploying American ground troops must be made by elected U.S. government officials – not relegated to the Bosniacs and their PR firms or influenced by the false reports of the State Department and media.

American proclivities mistakenly insist on simplifying this conflict to one of good versus evil. Debates over training and arming the Bosniacs with deployed forces bespeak of the total misunderstanding with which the U.S. interprets this situation. Such arguments demonstrate that elements of our government continue to insist on taking sides. While Bosniac apologists applaud this potential mission, our European allies recoil in horror.

The Bosnian Muslim government certainly does not reflect the image of a liberal western-style democracy as the press misleadingly portrays it. This group remains Islamist-dominated and desperately attempts to hide its true sentiments. It is more likely to be influenced by Iran and the Mujahedin than by anyone in the West. These radical groups may remain underground or depart during NATO's deployment, but they will return later to ensure that the Bosniac population becomes properly politicized and obedient to fundamentalist doctrine. Does the U.S. really intend to add high-quality American training and weapons to this radicalism?

Our NATO allies, without bluntly stating the obvious, more realistically fear the establishment of a future base from which the Iranians can spread their fanatic ideology and orchestrate acts of terrorism. Worse, if the Russians and black market weapons dealers do not cease cooperation with Iran, Bosnia could become a strategic point for the introduction of nuclear-tipped SCUD missile systems aimed at the infidels in central Europe. In short, it could either become Europe's Cuba or Palestine.

The Muslims previously underscored to Mr. Holbrooke that they would not attend a peace conference or accept a ceasefire without an American commitment to level the battlefield. Pushed on by such ill-defined logic as that expressed by Anthony Lewis, "American instinct and values point toward the preservation of a multicultural Bosnia"³⁹(as though it ever existed), the U.S. fell for the bait. Attempts by the Bosniacs and their sympathizers to goad America and the West into fighting this civil war unfortunately began to bear fruit with the NATO bombings. In some measure, they must credit this achievement to the immensely effective PR

campaign to portray the Muslims as victims of evil aggression. They would reach their pinnacle of success, though, by maneuvering NATO forces into fighting for them on the ground. America can expect the Bosniac government to exploit troop deployments toward this end.

Ultimate success in ending the Bosnian civil war must be based on a realistic division of land. Final agreements must assign to the Bosniacs only the territory which they can militarily defend on their own – not what they feel they deserve. NATO political leaders must force the Muslims to accept and abide by a fair settlement or make it absolutely clear that the West will abandon the Bosniac cause. NATO troops can redeploy to cordon off the area, isolate it, and contain the fighting while the warring factions finish the conflict among themselves. These words may sound harsh to the unindoctrinated, but they simply mirror the fact that this war thrives on brutality and cruelty and no other recourse would remain available.⁴⁰

As the U.S. decisively intervenes by deploying troops, our strategists must understand the consequences. Assuming Bosniac propagandists replicate their past successes, American (and other NATO) forces will find themselves victims of "mission creep." This situation will sooner or later result in military objectives to acquire more territory for the Muslims. Land which they never possessed and, for the majority of Bosniac citizens, which they are not now willing to fight and die for themselves – despite the claims of Muslim political leaders who assiduously avoid the trenches.

Such a mission will certainly grow costly. Neither the Bosniac army nor the BSA possess the required proficiency to confront a well-trained modern force,⁴¹ but they can inflict numerous casualties due to the terrain and their knowledge of it. Combat operations would occur in areas where either mountainous topography or urban areas predominate. These types of terrain represent the two most casualty-intensive conditions in which ground troops must fight. Even ill-disciplined and untrained street gangs who expertly know their turf can wreak high casualties in these circumstances.

The rationale that a U.S. troop deployment will only entail peacekeeping activities must be discarded. Impartiality, an absolute requirement for these types of operations, ended when the NATO bombs fell. This next stage of involvement will not equate to the "clean" unseen war of dropping bombs from 30,000 feet against a crippled air defense system or firing Tomahawks from a safe off-shore distance. Some may choose to semantically escape the problem by calling this a peacemaking operation; but for the soldier or marine on the ground, this term just euphemistically means war with one hand tied behind your back.

U.S. troops will become targets as soon as they hit the ground. Our forces must remain cognizant of this fact and recognize the dangers inherent in a mission designed to separate warring factions. In other words, U.S. units must possess overwhelming fire power, flexibility to conduct combat operations when required, virtually unrestricted rules of engagement, and a viable mission statement. All sides should be treated equally, objectively, and, most importantly, as enemy forces. This operation will require not only striking the Serbs when events warrant but the Muslims (and possibly Croats) as well if they violate agreements.

When the Bosniacs begin to play their cynical games – and they certainly will – the U.S. response must be swift, appropriate, and unimpeded by restrictive standing orders designed by Muslim sympathists. As soon as they employ their hidden mortars in Sarajevo to induce counterbattery fires from the Serbs, these weapons and their crews should be eliminated. At the time that a Bosniac squad fires at an observation post with the hope of blaming the Serbs, it should be closed with and destroyed and its higher chain of command punished. If the Muslims continue to murder their own people for the television cameras, appropriate officials should be arrested and charged with war crimes. This situation will require combat vigilance by military units on the ground, and a willingness to stay the course of decisions on the part of elected officials back home. Any public expectations or self-perceptions of goodwill will likely dissipate quickly when confronted with the hard realities.

During the debate on lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia, several U.S. lawmakers opined that this war involves standing up for morality. They may be correct. However, the suspicious inner circle running the Bosnian Muslim government should fall far short of meeting anyone's criteria for the moral highground. All of the warring factions stand equally guilty of heinous crimes. Their villainy reflects a matter of scale and dimension – not severity. The Serbs controlled more land and people and thus expelled more of their former neighbors, but their ethnic cleansing has been exaggerated while Muslim atrocities were overlooked.

A simple analogy applies: We have three groups of murderer-rapists. Our first faction has killed nine and raped three; another has murdered five and raped two; the last has killed three and raped one. The three reprobates begin fighting among themselves. Are we therefore obligated to come to the aid of one of the two lesser miscreants because to date they have been less reprehensible? What kind of depraved moral code is that?

It remains in vogue among political scientists and policy makers to state that certain intractable problems defy a solution. Bosnia, they readily admit, falls into this category. Yet they cannot resist tampering around the fringes of the dilemma while attempting to find the elusive magic bullet which would help them to manipulate events and impose order. Any new agreement which involves arming and training the Bosniacs as well as providing them air support will convince their leadership that the war must continue. Their greed for land will only prolong the search for peace and the agony of the people.

America, in particular, must acknowledge the obvious. Forcing the UN to acquiesce and permit NATO bombing of Serb targets amounted to an act of war by anybody's definition. Irreparable mistakes, poor judgements, and Mencken's "cocksure moralists" have brought the U.S. to this unenviable point with little latitude for the future. American officials should not now squander the small amount of flexibility remaining to them. If they permit the Bosniacs and their apologists to control and formulate the debate, the American public will lose objectivity. These groups will continue to insist on defining the situation in propaganda terms based on their own sense of emotionalism. As U.S. (and indeed NATO) political leaders ponder future courses of action, they should at least phrase the moral questions precisely and appropriately: "What vital geostrategic national interests does this war jeopardize?" and "How much blood of our nineteen-year olds is this place worth?"

ENDNOTES

1. Respectively: Anthony Lewis, *New York Times*, Sept 11, 1995, p.15; Albert Wohlstetter, *Wall Street Journal*, Sept 5, 1995, p.14; William Safire, *New York Times*, Sept 21, 1995, p.23
2. See Robert S. McNamara, *In Retrospect*. New York: Random House Publishers, 1995.
3. See, for example, the USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll published in USA Today, June 8, 1995.
4. C.G. Jacobsen, "Yugoslavia's Successor Wars Reconsidered," *European Security*, (forthcoming edition) Winter, 1996.
5. See, for example, Alexander Cockburn writing in *The Nation*, May 9, 1994, p.621.
6. Jacobsen and Cockburn. Professor Jacobsen uses a line which perfectly places into perspective the false notion of an ethno-idyllic pre-war Bosnia. Describing the foibles of a previous *New York Times* Bosnian correspondent, he noted, "(He) talked of Bosnia's 1000 years of inter-ethnic and religious peace, betraying an historical ignorance so profound as to make flat earth believers look omniscient."
7. David Binder, *The Nation*, Oct 2, 1995, p.336. Mr. Binder's article concentrates primarily on the second mortar attack, but the technical factors which he notes apply equally to the first incident. Additionally, some very tough questions remain unanswered from the more devastating Feb 1994 episode. These include: Why were people herded into the area minutes before the attack?; How could a government which consistently justifies its inability to abide by short ceasefires on inadequate communications miraculously notify the press and simultaneously dispatch ambulances to the scene within minutes?; and Why did the tail fin of the mortar shell inexplicably disappear shortly after the attack? (Prior to capturing some BSA stocks during subsequent fighting, the Bosniac government was forced to handmake its mortar and artillery shells. This process meant that every tail fin was distinctive and would have provided conclusive evidence. Interestingly enough, when the initial photos of the second attack were broadcast, someone made certain that a mortar tail fin was prominently displayed in the panoramic shot.) Also see Hugh McManners, *The Sunday Times* (London), Oct 1, 1995.
8. See the excellent article on this matter by Mike O'Connor in the *New York Times*, Aug 1, 1995, p.A-5. In most cases, assessing guilt for specific sniping incidents remains problematic. The French investigation, however, set a well-laid trap for the Bosniacs.
9. UNPROFOR's mandate specifically requires "impartiality." Its mission can be summarized as follows: to establish conditions favorable to a cessation of hostilities and provide military assistance to international agencies involved in humanitarian efforts. Despite Izetbegovic's constant ranting that "UNPROFOR has no right to be neutral," the UN would not approve a mission which clearly took sides. Of course, Bosniac propagandists have successfully exploited the unfortunate choice of names (i.e. protection force) to push their agenda to both foreign and domestic audiences.

10. Lewis MacKenzie, *Peacekeeper: The Road to Sarajevo*, Harper-Collins, Toronto, 1994, p.440.
11. See John E. Sray, "The Bosnian Warring Factions: A Brief Synopsis," *Soldier-Statesman*, Fall/Winter 1994, p.7-10 for a more complete military summary of the three primary Bosnian factions.
12. Some of these officers also maintain significant connections with organized crime. The most striking example was Naser Oric, the Bosniac Commander of the Srebrenica "safe haven" prior to its fall. Oric is expected to be indicted by the International War Crimes Tribunal for killing hundreds of Serb civilians. (See Reuters 17:54 11-13-95) However, he also exploited the Muslim civilians in the enclave who worked for the UN by extorting as much as eighty percent of their income for his personal gain. He also forced them to buy their allotted quota of cigarettes in the UN-subsidized store established for the Dutch troops guarding the enclave. Oric then confiscated these and sold them on the black market. He was also a skillful propagandist. When the Muslim government once let it slip that they might consider trading Srebrenica for land around Sarajevo, Oric quickly gave a rousing speech reminiscent of some of history's best known freedom fighters about how he would not surrender his land. Of course, Oric cared little for the enclave or its people. For him, the war amounted to a simple matter of self-aggrandizement. Equally disreputable characters have attained leadership positions in Serbian ranks. Zeljko Raznjatovic, better known as Arkan, has been noted for his criminal connections and is reportedly responsible for a plethora of war crimes.
13. The press often turns a blind eye to other elements of Bosniac military propaganda. When Delic bragged that he would "break the siege of Sarajevo" and then promptly lost not only this battle but the two eastern enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica, the media bemoaned the UN failure to protect the "safe areas." The UN never possessed the military capability to defend these enclaves on the ground and NATO air power in these instances was a bluff. Accordingly, the UN never required the Bosnian Muslim army to withdraw from them. The Bosniacs understood that they were responsible for their own defense and consistently launched attacks on the BSA from these positions. When the BSA retaliated and took the enclaves, propagandists convinced the world that the UN could not accomplish its mission. Additionally, commentators do not seem to realize that the capture of these areas was never militarily necessary. The BSA could have simply starved them out whenever they wanted. Instead, the BSA sent a message of military retribution for Delic's attacks into Serb-held suburbs around Sarajevo. In a similar media oversight, the Bosniacs have long maintained a mortar in a garage adjacent to Kosevo Hospital. They occasionally fire this weapon into Serb gun positions hoping to draw counterbattery fire which would hit the hospital and generate substantial publicity. This fact is well-known around the city but conveniently not mentioned in press dispatches.
14. See, for example, the "Ethnic Majorities" maps in *The Former Yugoslavia: A Map Folio*, Central Intelligence Agency, CPAS 93-10003, April 1993, p.3
15. See, for example, Jacobsen and MacKenzie.
16. Quote taken from Cockburn's article.
17. This structure stands near the Miljacka River just two blocks from the sports complex where Katarina Witt won her olympic gold medal in 1984.
18. Brian Hall, *The Impossible Country: A Journey Through the Last Days of Yugoslavia*, David R. Godine, Boston, p.162.
19. Ibid. The government's efforts to ensure religious diversity remain suspect in other ways. UNPROFOR soldiers encountered no resistance when visiting sick children and distributing candy and small toys to them in Kosevo Hospital. When attempts were made to do the same for the orphanage, excuses became rampant as to why such visits should be postponed. Finally, one frustrated Bosnian interpreter admitted that the government denied permission because it feared some of these children may be adopted and converted to another faith. However, when the government determines that publicity is lacking, it will permit TV cameras into the orphanage for "human interest" stories.
20. See Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr., LTC John E. Sray, and Major Thomas E. Sidwell, "Foreign SOF" (Special Operations Forces), *Special Warfare*, July 1995, p.48-49. The Bosniacs sometimes attempt to use the Mujahedin as an example of the help they can receive from their fellow Muslim countries if UNPROFOR decides to withdraw. Such musings lack credibility. Middle Eastern armies are trained for combat in the desert and would not fare well in a cold mountainous climate. The Malays demonstrated their lack of discipline during an incident in which they were required to reinforce the Canadians in the Croat enclave around Kiseljak. When they were deployed to this location, they desecrated a cross and raped a 16-year old

girl within 24 hours of their arrival. They were saved only by the quick action of the Canadian commander who ordered them off line before the Croats could get to them. Pakistani "success" in Somalia led to the U.S. necessity to commit troops; and the Bangladeshis will be discussed below. The Turks perform admirably, but they remain in Bosnia to monitor the Iranians as much as to confirm their support for their Muslim co-religionists. Turkey's broader national interests would argue against a strong presence in Bosnia if the remainder of NATO disapproved.

21. Ibid.

22. Based on this author's experience in Bosnia, we have seen consistently incisive and on-target commentary from A.M. Rosenthal of the New York Times. For the least realistic analysis, read the editorials in the Wall Street Journal - some of which appear to originate directly from the fax machines of the PR firms - as well as Anthony Lewis in the New York Times. Curiously, Mr. Lewis dismissed the efficacy of air power in the desert prior to the Gulf War. Now, he advocates it as a panacea in mountainous terrain for all of Bosnia's ills.

23. The "Stockholm Syndrome" refers to the emotions experienced by hostages who fear for their own safety and begin to empathize and sometimes completely espouse the convictions of their captors. Obviously, these journalists are not being held captive, but their dependence on the Bosniac government for protection and, in some cases, spoon-fed wire service reports, results in the same attitude.

24. As an example of this inherent press bias, Radovan Karadzic, President of the self-styled Bosnian Serb Republic, was named one of the top ten enemies of the press by the Committee to Protect Journalists. According to this organization, at least thirty reporters have been killed since 1992. While no known justification exists to challenge these numbers, murder in Bosnia will continue to remain a murky subject, at best, for the near future. The organization cited no evidence to single out the Serbs in these cases. These unfortunate deaths could probably be blamed on any of the warring factions.

25. With the collusion of the media, Bosniac propagandists attempted to vilify and tarnish the hard-won reputations of every UNPROFOR commander in Sarajevo. They falsely accused General MacKenzie of having a Serbian girlfriend (he recounts this episode in his book); General Briquemont of Belgium was harangued for pacifism; and they attempted to paint General Rose as pro-Serb. If the UN ever decides to release the many letters between General Rose's Headquarters and the Bosnian Serbs, this asinine accusation will abruptly cease.

26. Most of the damage that was done at Gorazde had actually occurred almost two years prior to these events by Muslims who had conducted their own ethnic cleansing against the Serbs. For a short description of the propaganda surrounding this battle, see John E. Sray, "U.S. Policy and the Bosnian Civil War: A Time for Reevaluation," *European Security*, Summer 1995, pp.318-327. An opposing point of view can be found in an article entitled "Yellow Rose," in *The New Republic*, Dec 5, 1994, p.24-25. Joshua Muravchik, of the American Enterprise Institute, reiterated the media's theme and authored a propaganda-laden article espousing the same arguments. He not only repeats the identical tirades of old Bosniac rhetoric but attempts to sway his American audience by making the outrageous claim that General Rose was anti-American. In Muravchik's words, General Rose had "a keen desire to show the Americans who is boss" in Bosnia, and he "(seemed) to be intensifying his private war with the Americans."

27. Jennings emphasized the oft-misreported fact that the UN deployed a Bangladeshi battalion to Bihac (to replace a departing French unit) without sufficient weapons. In reality, the Germans not only provided the Bangladeshis cold weather training but also to a great extent helped outfit them. General Rose correctly and politely pointed out that Bangladesh does not supply each individual soldier with a weapon due to cost. However, rumors also persist that some of these troops sold or gave away their weapons to their fellow Muslims in the Bosniac army. By the time of their report, ABC had to have been aware of this information.

28. See, for example, the articles by Eric Schmitt in the New York Times, Aug 10, 1995, p.1 and Elizabeth Neuffer in the Boston Globe, Oct 3, 1995, p.1. The International Red Cross announced on Aug 11 that there was no evidence of the supposed mass graves in Srebrenica. Their report was largely ignored by the media.

29. Prior to Serb refugees fleeing the Krajina, UNHCR statistics listed Bosnian refugee populations resulting from ethnic cleansing as comprising 36% Serb, 20% Croat, and 44% Muslim. At worst, these figures would show that the Serbs were responsible for approximately 64% of the problem, but there is no way to accurately account for Croat vs. Muslim violence which also bears some responsibility for these disturbing numbers. Any data which alleges to prove one side or the other committed such and such a percentage of the ethnic cleansing should immediately become suspect.

30. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1965 (3d edition), pp.139 and 141.
31. see Barbara W. Tuchman, "If Mao Had Come To Washington: An Essay In Alternatives," *Foreign Affairs*, Oct 72, Vol. 1, pp. 44-64.
32. Author's personal notes and recollections of the ceremony.
33. It must be emphasized here that the embassy in Sarajevo was not guarded by U.S. Marines who traditionally perform this mission and could have transmitted reliable reports. Rather the embassy assigned this task to Bosnian Muslim gunmen who on more than one occasion denied entry to U.S. citizens. Whether the embassy staff actually condoned such behavior is unknown, but it led to questions of who was in charge.
34. One of the jokes that circulated during Desert Storm was the following: "What is the new Saudi battle hymn? Answer: Onward Christian Soldiers."
35. See the article entitled "NATO Extends Bosnia Bomb Halt" by Daniel Williams and John Pomfret in the *Washington Post*, Sept 21, 1995, p.1
36. The Serbs have always perceived themselves as martyrs - especially in preventing the spread of Islam throughout Orthodox eastern Europe. (The Croats believe they help fill this self-appointed role for Catholic western Europe.) One of the major Serbian holidays revolves around the battle of Kosovo which they lost to the Turks on June 28, 1389. When it became clear to the Serbian knights that their cause was hopeless, one of their number feigned surrender to the Turkish army while hiding a dagger in his clothing. When he was dragged in front of the Turkish sultan, he pulled out the weapon and promptly cut the Turkish leader's throat. This action had no effect on the outcome of the battle since the sultan's heir immediately took command of the well-organized and disciplined Turkish forces; but the Turks' exhibited their wrath by refusing to permit the burial of their slain foes. Instead, the corpses were left lying on the field of battle where the blackbirds could peck at their bones. To this day, a Serbian mother traditionally greets her newborn son into the world with the words: "Welcome to the world you little avenger of Kosovo." For an excellent and more complete description of these events and their mythology, see Robert D. Kaplan, *Balkan Ghosts*, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1993, p. 35-40. Lieutenant-General Ratko Mladic, commander of the BSA, often emphasizes the importance of Serbian history to his troops during his motivational talks.
37. Many Balkan observers and pseudo-military experts point to the Croatian operation in Krajina as proof of the deterioration in the Serb military. Such analysis misses the big picture. Morale and discipline problems plagued the Krajina Serb army for quite some time. President Milosevic of rump Yugoslavia ostensibly sent General Mile Mrksic, one of the top generals in the Yugoslav army, to rectify this state of affairs. He has been accused of war crimes from former operations, but he possesses a long list of impressive military credentials. Mrksic had adequate time to whip these forces into shape; but instead, to the dismay of many of these troops, he apparently gave the order to retreat without offering any significant resistance. Rather than this operation being indicative of the status of the Serb military, it adds further evidence of a deal between Tudjman and Milosevic to divide Bosnia between themselves.
38. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, Little, Brown and Company, New York, 1993, p.5.
39. Anthony Lewis, *New York Times*, Oct 9, 1995, p.17.
40. Insufficient consideration has been given to the isolation option. NATO plans to deploy 60,000 troops to this peacekeeping operation. An additional 30,000, primarily from NATO countries, already serve as UN forces in Bosnia. Rather than interposition all of these soldiers as targets between the warring factions, a NATO quarantine could be established. The suffering caused by this civil war would likely end sooner in such a situation.
41. The lack of Bosniac military skill has already been discussed. The BSA, despite General Mladic's frequent boasting and the legends surrounding its prowess for guerrilla warfare, likewise remains ill-prepared to face anything more than the Bosniacs. Even the Serbs' closest ally, the Russians, admit these deficiencies. An incident rumored to have occurred in the summer of 1994 illustrates this point. General Pavel Grachev, the Russian Minister of Defense, was meeting General Mladic to encourage him to accept the 5-Nation (U.S., Britain, Germany, France, and Russia) Contact Group Plan to end the fighting and divide the land. Mladic was disinclined and noted in typical bluster: "I have captured Ribnica; I have captured Vozuca, etc." Grachev looked at Mladic and replied, "General, I have not heard of any of those places. However, I do know that if you

were forced to face a modern army, you would not last twenty minutes." The author wishes to thank David Harland and Tony Banbury for sharing this anecdote during a conversation in Sarajevo. These individuals were two of a handful of outstanding UN civilian employees who demonstrated the courage and tenacity to work directly in Bosnia where they could make a difference.

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DIANA JOHNSTONE ON THE BALKAN WARS

By Edward S. Herman

- > Diana Johnstone's Fools' Crusade: Yugoslavia, NATO and Western Delusions
- > (Monthly Review Press, 2002) is essential reading for anybody who wants to
- > understand the causes, effects, and rights-and-wrongs of the Balkan wars
- > of
- > the past dozen years. The book should be priority reading for leftists,
- > many
- > of whom have been carried along by a NATO-power party line and propaganda
- > barrage, believing that this was one case where Western intervention was
- > well-intentioned and had beneficial results. An inference from this
- > misconception, by "cruise missile leftists" and others, is that
- > imperialism
- > can be constructive and its power projections must be evaluated on their
- > merits, case by case. But that the Western intervention in the Balkans
- > constitutes a valid special case is false; the conventional and obvious
- > truths on the Balkan wars that sustain such a view disintegrate on close
- > inspection.
- >
- > Johnstone provides that close inspection, with impressive results. It is a
- > pleasure to watch her dismantle the claims and expose the methods of David
- > Rieff, a literary and media favorite, as well as Roy Gutman, John Burns,
- > and
- > David Rohde, three reporters whose close adherence to the party line in
- > Bosnia was rewarded with the Pulitzer prize-all fueling the "humanitarian
- > bombing" bandwagon. While critics of the party line risk being tagged and
- > dismissed as apologists for the Serbs, even the most fervent partisan of
- > an
- > idealized "Bosnia" and campaigner for NATO military intervention such as
- > Rieff, or the novice journalist Rohde, who wrote on Srebrenica in a
- > semi-fictional mode, with U.S. intelligence guidance, has never had to
- > fear
- > being criticized as an apologist for the Muslims or NATO. Michael
- > Ignatieff,
- > another media favorite, acknowledges the help he has received from U.S.
- > officials like Richard Holbrooke, General Wesley Clark and former Tribunal
- > prosecutor Louise Arbour, and Rieff lauded him for his "close relations"
- > with these "important figures in the West's political and military
- > leadership." [1]
- >
- > The widespread acceptance of the official connections, open advocacy, and
- > spectacular bias displayed by these authors has rested in part on the
- > usual
- > media and intellectual community subservience to official policy
- > positions,
- > but it was also a result of the rapid and thoroughgoing demonization of
- > the
- > Serbs as the "new Nazis" or "last of the Communists." Given that NATO was
- > good, combatting evil, the close relationship with officials was not seen
- > as
- > involving any conflict of interest or compromise with objectivity; they
- > were
- > all on the same "team"-a phalanx seeking justice. Thus even the uncritical
- > conducting of anti-Serb propaganda-including unverified rumors and

- outright
- > disinformation-was not only acceptable, it was capable of yielding
 - > journalistic honors.
 - >
 - > On the other hand, any attempt to counter the official/media team's claims
 - > and supposed evidence was quickly interpreted as apologetics. This is hardly
 - > new. In each U.S. war critics of U.S. policy are charged with being
 - > apologists for the demonized enemy-Ho Chi Minh and communism; Pol Pot;
 - > Saddam Hussein; Arafat; Daniel Ortega; Bin Laden, etc. The demonization of
 - > Milosevic was in accord with longstanding practice, and the charge of
 - > apologist for challenging the official line on the demon was inevitable
 - for
 - > a forceful challenger. What is perhaps exceptional has been the extensive
 - > acceptance of the party line among people on the left, with, among others,
 - > Christopher Hitchens, [2] Ian Williams and the editors of The Nation in
 - its
 - > grip. In These Times rejected first hand reporting from Kosovo by
 - Johnstone,
 - > their longtime European Editor, when it diverged from the line of their
 - more
 - > recent correspondent, Paul Hockenos, whose connections with the
 - > establishment included a stint as the spokesperson and media officer for
 - the
 - > Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission to
 - > Bosnia-Herzegovina, acting as an occupying power in northern
 - > Bosnia-Herzegovina, and an affiliation with the American Academy in
 - Berlin,
 - > whose chairman and co-chairman are Richard Holbrooke and Henry Kissinger.
 - > [3]
 - >
 - > What makes the double standard in treatment of Johnstone and the
 - > "journalists of attachment" especially laughable is that Johnstone is a
 - > serious investigative journalist, very knowledgeable about Balkan history
 - > and politics, whose work in Fools' Crusade sets a standard in cool
 - > examination of issues that is several grades higher than that in Rieff,
 - > Gutman, Rohde, Burns (and for that matter, Ignatieff, Timothy Garton Ash,
 - > Noel Malcolm, Hitchens, Williams, and Hockenos). On issue after issue she
 - > discusses both the evidence and counter-evidence, weighs them, gives them
 - a
 - > historical and political context, and comes to an assessment, which is
 - > sometimes that the verifiable evidence doesn't support a clear conclusion.
 - > She does this convincingly, and in the process lays waste to the establish
 - ed
 - > version.
 - >
 - > For example, Johnstone notes that in late September, 1991, some 120 Serbs
 - in
 - > the Croatian town of Gaspic were abducted and massacred in what Croatian
 - > human rights activists called the first major massacre of civilians in the
 - > Yugoslav civil wars. Although this was clearly designed to frighten the
 - > Serbs into moving, the term "ethnic cleansing" was only taken up by the
 - > Western media months later in reference to Serb treatment of Muslims in
 - > Bosnia. The Gaspic slaughter was barely noticed, and only hit the news in
 - > 1997 when a disgruntled former policeman, Miro Bajramovic went public,
 - > claiming that the Gaspic massacre was done on orders from the Croatian
 - > Interior Ministry to spread terror among the Serbs. Bajramovic was quickly
 - > imprisoned in Croatia and tortured, and no moves were taken to deal with
 - the
 - > crimes he named either within Croatia or by the International Criminal
 - > Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTY, or Tribunal).
 - >
 - > Shortly thereafter three other Croatian soldiers risked their lives to
 - take
 - > videotapes and documents on this massacre to the Hague, but the Tribunal

- > refused to offer them protection; one was murdered, the others fled Gaspic,
- > and while Tribunal prosecutor Carla Del Ponte insisted that the Tribunal must have priority over Serb courts in dealing with Serbs, she waived priority in dealing with Croats. Thus, nothing was done regarding Gaspic except the harassment, torture and killing of witnesses. [4]
- >
- > One of the Croatian officers leading the attacks on Serbs, an Albanian, Agim
- > Ceku, was subsequently trained by "retired" U.S. army officers on contract to Croatia, and he helped command "Operation Storm" in 1995, in which hundreds of Serb civilians were killed and Krajina was ethnically cleansed of several hundred thousand Serbs in what was probably the largest single ethnic cleansing operation in the Balkan wars. Ceku later returned to Kosovo
- > to join the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and worked with them during the 1999 bombing war. Ceku has not only never been indicted by the Tribunal, in
- > January 2000 he was sworn in by NATO's proconsul in Kosovo, Bernard Kouchner, as chief of the "Kosovo Protection Corps," the new look KLA.
- >
- > You may not have heard of Gaspic or Ceku, and Nasir Oric is also not a name
- > featured by Rieff, the media, or the Tribunal. Arkan is a more familiar name. Arkan was a Serb paramilitary leader, eventually indicted by the Tribunal, just as NATO started to bomb Yugoslavia in March 1999, no doubt coincidentally providing exemplary public relations service to NATO. Nasir Oric was a Bosnian Muslim officer operating out of Srebrenica, from which "safe haven" Oric ventured out to attack nearby Serb villages, burning homes
- > and killing over a thousand Serbs between May 1992 and January 1994. Oric even invited Western reporters to his apartment to see his "war trophies": videocassettes showing cut-off Serb heads, burnt houses, and piles of corpses. [5]
- >
- > You thought that Srebrenica was a "safe haven" only for civilians and that it could hardly be a UN cover for Bosnian Muslim military operations? You were misinformed. [6] You hadn't heard of the 1992 pushing out of Serbs from
- > Srebrenica and the multiyear attacks on nearby Serb towns and massacres that
- > preceded the Srebrenica massacre (discussed further below)? In fact, it has
- > been an absolute rule of Rieff et al./media reporting on the Bosnian conflict to present evidence of Serb violence in vacuo, suppressing evidence
- > of prior violence against Serbs, thereby falsely suggesting that Serbs were
- > never responding but only initiated violence (this applies to Vukovar, Mostar, Tuzla, Gorazde, and many other towns). [7]
- >
- > You hadn't heard of Nasir Oric and can't understand why he has never been indicted by the Tribunal although doing the same sort of thing as Arkan, but
- > perhaps on a somewhat larger scale? It is not puzzling at all if you realize
- > that the "phalanx" I mentioned above which includes Rieff et al., the media,
- > and the Tribunal, also includes the NATO powers and is serving their ends, which did not include justice (see below).
- >
- > Johnstone provides many examples of how the phalanx twisted facts for political ends, including an extensive and compelling analysis of the various non-proofs of "systematic rape" as Serb policy. [8] But the choicest

- > morsel showing how the propaganda system works was the Nazi-style "death camp" with its picture of the "thin man" Fikret Alic behind barbed wire.
- As
- > Johnstone notes, the Bosnian Muslims and Croats also had prison camps
- > during the Bosnian wars, but Radovan Karadzic, the "indicted war criminal,"
- > was not as smart as they were-he allowed the Western media to visit his
- > camps.
- >
- > It is now well established as truth, if not permitted to surface in the
- > mainstream media, that: (1) the thin man was not behind barbed wire-the
- > barbed wire was around a small unused compound from which the
- > photographers
- > from Britain's Independent Television Network took their pictures; (2) he
- > was not even in a prison camp, let alone a death camp, but was in transit
- > through a refugee center, on his way to exile in Scandinavia; (3) the
- > thinness of Fikret Alic was not typical of people in the camp, but was
- > highlighted to fit the "Auschwitz" image.
- >
- > Nevertheless, "in August 1992, the 'thin man behind barbed wire' photos
- made
- > the tour of the front pages of virtually every tabloid newspaper in the
- > Western world and appeared on the cover of Time, Newsweek, and other mass
- > circulation magazines." [9] The U.S. proposal for a war crimes tribunal
- > followed in the same month, and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel,
- > featuring the evidence of the "thin man" photo, made it clear that the
- > Tribunal's function was to prosecute Serbs, who were ethnic cleansing "to
- > achieve their national goals in Bosnia-Herzegovina [which] is genocide."
- > This was only one of many frauds based on disinformation, but it was a
- major
- > one, helping make the Serbs-as- Nazis a given for the phalanx and much of
- > the Western public.
- >
- > Milosevic Started It All
- >
- > Central to the party line of NATO and the phalanx has been the theme that
- > Milosevic is the demon who started it all by his nationalist quest for a
- > "Greater Serbia" and his (and Serbia's) view that non-Serbs "had no place
- in
- > their country, and even no right to live" (Clinton). According to David
- > Rieff, Milosevic "had quite correctly been described by U.S. officials
- ...as
- > the architect of the catastrophe," [10] and Tim Judah referred to
- > Milosevic's responsibility for wars in "Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo:
- > four wars since 1991 and the result of these terrible conflicts, which
- began
- > with the slogan 'All Serbs in One State' is the cruelest of Ironies." [11]
- >
- > On its face this perspective seems simple-minded, and is even referred to
- by
- > a more sophisticated analyst than Rieff or Judah, Lenard Cohen, a bit
- > sardonically, as the "paradise lost/loathsome leaders perspective" on
- > history. [12] Johnstone's book destroys this party line by a convincing
- > analysis of the dynamics of the conflict observable in the actions and
- > interests of all the parties involved, extending even to expatriate
- lobbying
- > groups of the Croats and Albanians.
- >
- > In her enlightening chapter on Germany, Johnstone describes its hostility
- to
- > Serbia and contacts with Croatian emigre groups long before the arrival of
- > Milosevic. Germany had attacked Serbia during World War I and then again
- > under the Nazis; whereas the Croats and Kosovo Albanians had been
- German
- > allies. Germany under the Nazis had regularly used the gambit of siding

- with
- > "ethnic minorities" as a means of weakening rival or target states, and
- with
- > the death of the Soviet Union and the end of Western support of a unified
- > and independent Yugoslavia, and German reunification, Germany renewed that
- > gambit as it aimed to consolidate its power in Eastern Europe. Germany
- > encouraged the unilateral secession of Slovenia and Croatia and pressured
- > her Maastricht allies to go along with supporting this secession, although
- > it was unnegotiated and in violation of international law.
- >
- > At the same time as the Europeans encouraged the secession of Slovenia and
- > Croatia, and the United States threatened Yugoslavia if it tried to
- maintain
- > its borders by use of its army, the NATO alliance failed to deal with the
- > threat to the stranded minorities in the seceding territories. The
- > EU-appointed Badinter commission even announced in November 1991 that
- > Yugoslavia was "in a process of dissolution," which helped accelerate the
- > dissolution; and by giving recognition to the artificial boundaries of the
- > "Republics," while refusing to consider the demands of the large groups
- > within those Republics that wanted to stay in Yugoslavia, Badinter
- provided
- > an ideal formula for producing ethnic warfare. This was not Milosevic
- > causing trouble, it was the Germans and other NATO powers who encouraged
- > dissolution without offering any constructive solution to minority demands
- > (Johnstone discusses some of the ignored possibilities).
- >
- > Their obvious bias against the Serbs, and encouragement to the national
- > groups opposed to the Serbs, also maximized the threat to peace, as it
- made
- > the Serbs justly suspicious of NATO intentions and encouraged the other
- > groups to resist a negotiated settlement and provoke the Serbs into
- actions
- > that would increase NATO intervention on their behalf. This was
- dramatically
- > evident in Bosnia, where the European powers arranged for an independence
- > vote in 1992, despite the fact that the Bosnia-Herzegovina constitution
- > required that such a vote be taken only upon agreement among the
- republic's
- > three "constituent peoples" (Muslims, Croats and Serbs). The Bosnian Serbs
- > boycotted this election, and the creation of this artificial and badly
- > divided state assured war and ethnic cleansing. This again was a
- > catastrophic decision made by the NATO powers, not by Milosevic.
- >
- > Johnstone has an extensive discussion of the brutal historical background
- of
- > Bosnia- Herzegovina (and Croatia), which had been the scene of massive
- > inter-group crimes during World War II. [13] She also demonstrates clearly
- > that Bosnia was no multiethnic paradise upset by Serb violence, in the
- myth
- > perpetrated by Rieff et al. and the NATO media. Johnstone points out that
- > even as early as December 1990, in elections in Bosnia the nationalist
- > parties won easily, capturing 90 percent of the votes, suggesting
- something
- > other than a non-nationalistic society. She also provides solid evidence
- > that Alija Izetbegovic, the Muslim leader of Bosnia in the war years, was
- a
- > committed believer in an Islamic-not a multiethnic-state, and a man who
- > regarded Turkey as too advanced and modernist, preferring Pakistan as his
- > Islamic model. The thousands of Mujahidden fighters, including Al Qaeda
- > militants, that he welcomed to fight for his cause, and the massive aid
- > given him by Saudi Arabia, were not supplied in the cause of
- > multi-ethnicity.
- >
- > Johnstone shows that with U.S. aid and encouragement Izetbegovic fought
- any

- > settlement that would result in autonomy for the major national groups.
- He,
- > like the KLA, realized that he could pursue a maximalist strategy by getting
- > the more-than-willing United States to support him both diplomatically and,
- > increasingly, by military means. Milosevic, and to a lesser extent the
- > Bosnian Serbs, were repeatedly willing to sign compromise agreements, but
- > Izetbegovic repeatedly refused, with U.S. support-most importantly, in the
- > case of the "Lisbon Accord" of March 1992, which was signed by all three
- > parties, but from which Izetbegovic withdrew, on U.S. advice. Milosevic also
- > supported the Owen-Vance plan of 1992, vetoed by the Bosnian Serbs, to
- > Milosevic's disgust. This diplomatic history is well documented in Lord
- > David Owen's memoir, *Balkan Odyssey*, which is why this Britisher's work is
- > not well regarded by the party liners. Richard Holbrooke acknowledges
- > Milosevic's efforts to save the Dayton accord from Izetbegovic's
- > foot-dragging, and the 1995 U.S. bombing of Bosnian Serbs may have been part
- > of the price paid to get Izetbegovic, not Milosevic, to negotiate at Dayton.
- > [14]
- >
- > Johnstone's detailed account of Croatia stresses the genocidal behavior of
- > the Croats toward the Serbs in World War II; the long-standing backing of
- > the nationalist movement in Croatia by Germany, Austria, and the Vatican;
- > the importance of the Croatian lobby in the United States and elsewhere in
- > mobilizing support for their breakaway from Yugoslavia; and Croatia's
- > skilled propaganda efforts, helped along by their employment of public
- > relations firm Ruder Finn. "News" about Croatia and its victimization by
- > Serbia flowed from Zagreb and Ruder Finn. Quite independently of Milosevic
- > the Croatian nationalists, led by Franjo Tudjman from 1990, were clearly
- > aiming at a "Greater Croatia" that would include a part of Bosnia, as well
- > as the Serb-inhabited Krajina area. As convincingly described by Johnstone,
- > it was a masterpiece of effective propaganda that Croatia's war in Bosnia
- > and expulsion of a quarter million Serbs from Krajina (with active U.S.
- > assistance) was portrayed in the West not as part of a quest for a Greater
- > Croatia, but as a resistance to Milosevic's striving for a Greater Serbia.
- >
- > According to Clinton and mainstream commentary, Milosevic's drive for a
- > Greater Serbia and nationalism was demonstrated by his inflammatory
- > nationalistic speeches of 1987 and 1989. This is a perfect illustration of
- > the profound role of disinformation in the demonization process. The two
- > famous speeches DENOUNCE nationalism: Milosevic actually said that
- > "Yugoslavia is a multinational community, and it can survive only on
- > condition of full equality of all nations that live in it." Nothing in the
- > two speeches contradicts this sentiment.
- >
- > In dispelling the "myth" of Milosevic, Johnstone hardly puts him on a
- > pedestal. He was an opportunistic politician, "whose 'ambiguity' allowed him
- > to win elections, but not to unite the Serbs." Milosevic gained popularity
- > by condemning both Serbian nationalism and Communist bureaucracy, and by
- > promising economic reforms in line with the demands of the Western
- financial
- > community. In Johnstone's view, Milosevic can be regarded as a criminal
- "if
- > using criminals to do dirty tasks makes him a criminal," but on this count
- > he was "no more [guilty] (or rather less) than the late President Tudjman
- of
- > Croatia or President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia, widely regarded as a
- > saint." He was less a nationalist than Tudjman and Izetbegovic, and claims
- > that he had "dehumanizing beliefs" and an "eliminationist project" are
- taken

- > out of the whole cloth. [15]
- >
- > Milosevic's alleged pursuit of a Greater Serbia was also a misreading of his
- > actual policies, which were, first, to prevent the disintegration of
- > Yugoslavia, and second, as that disintegration occurred to protect the Serb
- > minorities in the new states and allow them either to remain in Yugoslavia
- > or obtain autonomy in the new rump states. In fact, he was considered by the
- > Bosnian Serbs and Krajina victims of Operation Storm to be a sell-out,
- > eager to bargain away their interests in exchange for a possible lifting of
- > sanctions on Yugoslavia. He did support the Bosnian Serbs, sporadically, but
- > it is rarely mentioned that all the NATO powers and Saudia Arabia and Al
- > Qaeda were supporting the Bosnian Muslims (and Croatia was supporting its
- > allies in Bosnia).
- >
- > So Milosevic was guilty of pursuing a Greater Serbia by trying to prevent
- > the dissolution of Yugoslavia and feebly seeking to give stranded and
- > threatened Serb populations protection! His "war" against Slovenia-one of
- > those "terrible conflicts" Tim Judah attributes to Milosevic-was a
- > half-hearted ten-day effort to prevent an illegal secession of that
- > Republic, quickly terminated with minimal (and mainly Yugoslav army)
- > casualties. Meanwhile, Tudjman, quite openly seeking a Greater Croatia, and
- > Izetbegovic, trying to leverage U.S. and other NATO hostility to
- > Yugoslavia
- > into a means of compelling unwanted Greater Muslim rule in Bosnia, were just
- > victims of the bad man! This is Orwell written into mainstream truth.
- >
- > The same is true of the Kosovo struggle. There is no question but that
- > Milosevic's crackdown in 1989 was brutal, and that police and army actions
- > against the KLA in later years were sometimes ruthless, but the phalanx has
- > ignored a number of key facts. One is that Kosovo was largely run by
- > Albanians before 1989, and the first target of the 1989 crackdown was the
- > old bureaucracy run by Albanian communists. Second, under their rule it was
- > Serbs who were discriminated against and driven out of Kosovo. In the
- > 1980s
- > and earlier Kosovo Albanian nationalists were openly engaging in "ethnic
- > cleansing" in the interests of a homogenous Albanian state, and in the
- > 1990s
- > the movement became strictly irredendist, aiming not at reform but exit
- > from
- > Yugoslavia. The movement's leaders were also more openly interested in a
- > "Greater Albania." As in the case of the Izetbegovic faction of the
- > Bosnian
- > Muslims, the KLA soon saw that by provocation and effective propaganda it
- > would be possible to get NATO to serve as its military arm.
- >
- > Johnstone describes the Yugoslav efforts to compromise and give the
- > Albanians greater autonomy, and she notes the complete failure of the NATO
- > powers to seek any kind of mediated solution (including a division of the
- > Kosovo territory). The war engineered by the KLA and United States then
- > ensued, with disastrous results. In Kosovo it produced great destruction, an
- > immense flight of refugees, with thousands of casualties and a fresh
- > injection of hatred on all sides that contradicted the alleged NATO aim of
- > producing a genuine multiethnic community. This was followed by a massive
- > ethnic cleansing of Serbs, Roma, Turks and Jews by the NATO-supported KLA,
- > and Kosovo was left "without a legal system, ruled by illegal structures

- of
- > the Kosovo Liberation Army and very often by competing mafias" (quoting Jiri
- > Dienstbier, UN human rights rapporteur in Kosovo). Under NATO auspices, and
- > helped along by leaders of Albania, a new advance was made in the aim of a
- > "Greater Albania" in Macedonia and possibly elsewhere. Finally, Serbia was
- > very badly damaged by the war, reduced to penury and dependency, conflict
- > ridden and with a sham democracy in place.
- >
- > Of course, there was Srebrenica. But since so much in this establishment
- > Balkan story consists of lies and half-truths, is it possible that the
- > establishment version of this story is also misleading? Johnstone examines
- > the various sources and finds considerable uncertainty regarding two issues:
- > the number of victims, and the motives of the combatants. [16] It is true
- > that 199 bodies were found bound or blindfolded following the Bosnian Serb
- > occupation of the town in July 1995, almost surely slaughtered by the
- > Bosnian Serb attackers. But what about the alleged 8,000 killed? The figure
- > of 8,000 seems to have been arrived at by adding a Red Cross estimate of
- > 3,000 that "witnesses" said were detained by the Bosnian Serbs to the figure
- > of 5,000 who the Red Cross said "fled Srebrenica, some of whom reached
- > Central Bosnia." Although there was no reason from this accounting to add
- > the 5,000 as killed, this became conventional truth. The Bosnian Muslims
- > shrewdly refused to tell the Red Cross how many had survived, helping
- > suggest that they were all dead.
- >
- > Six years later, Tribunal forensic teams had uncovered 2,361 bodies in this
- > region of heavy fighting, many almost surely fallen soldiers on both sides.
- > Recall also that the United States had engaged in intensive satellite
- > imaging of this area, and Madeleine Albright had even promised to keep
- > watching to see if the Bosnian Serbs disturbed the graves. But she never
- > produced for public view any satellite photo showing bodies being deposited
- > in or removed from graves.
- >
- > As to motive for the killings that took place, it is interesting that the
- > significant killings (and expulsions) of Serbs (and Roma) in (and from)
- > Kosovo after the NATO takeover were regularly treated in the West as
- > "revenge," whereas the killings in and around Srebrenica, plausibly
- > attributable to Bosnian Serb anger at the prior murderous operations of
- > Nasir Oric against Serbs in the Srebrenica vicinity, were not "revenge" but
- > "genocide" in the Western system of double standards. As noted, this rests
- > in good part on the blackout of the prior events associated with Nasir Oric
- > and his Bosnian Muslim forces.
- >
- > Johnstone has a devastating account of the work of the International
- > Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia, showing its political origin,
- > purpose and service, as well as its violation of all Western judicial norms
- > (including its use of "indictments" to condemn and ostracize without trial).
- > Among many other points featured is the fact that the Tribunal has only
- > sought to establish responsibility at the top for Serbs, never for
- > Croatian
- > or Bosnian Muslim leaders. Johnstone also notes the unwillingness to indict
- > any NATO personnel or officials for readily documented war crimes. She also

- > points out that the indictment of Milosevic on May 27, 1999, based on
- > unverified information provided by U.S. intelligence one day earlier, was
- > needed by NATO to cover over its intensifying bombing of Serbian civilian
- > sites, in straightforward violation of international law. As Clinton said,
- > "The indictment confirms that our war is just," but it much more clearly
- > confirmed that the Tribunal was a political, not a judicial institution.
- >
- > A further illustration is afforded in her enlightening account of the
- > novel
- > "hearing" on the Karadzic case in July 1996, where the Tribunal innovated
- > a
- > judicial rule whereby Karadzic's attorney was not allowed to offer a
- > defense
- > of his client; he could merely observe. The main evidence of Karadzic's
- > "genocidal intent" was a phrase he uttered in 1991 while calling on
- > Izetbegovic to recognize the Bosnian Serbs desire to remain in Yugoslavia,
- > saying that "do not think that you will not perhaps make the Muslim people
- > disappear, because the Muslims cannot defend themselves if there is a
- > war-How will you prevent everyone from being killed in Bosnia-
- > Herzegovina?"
- > Although this muddled sentence issued in the heat of debate could be
- > interpreted as a warning of the dangers of war, and comparable statements
- > were made by Izetbegovic and many others, this was presented by the
- > Tribunal
- > as serious evidence of genocidal intent.
- >
- > Johnstone contends that the United States was a participant in the Balkan
- > wars for a number of reasons, including the desire to maintain its role as
- > leader of NATO and to help provide it with a function on its 50th
- > anniversary year (celebrated in the midst of the 78-day bombing war in
- > April
- > 1999); if Germany and others were going to intervene in Yugoslavia, the
- > United States would have to enter and play its role, and incidentally show
- > that in the use of force it was still champion. The United States was also
- > helping itself in its Bosnian intervention by demonstrating its
- > willingness
- > to aid Muslims, contradicting its image as anti-Muslim, and solidifying
- > its
- > relationship with Turkey and other Muslim countries helping in the Bosnian
- > war. It was also positioning itself for further advances in the region
- > with
- > a major military base in Kosovo and new clients in an area of increasing
- > interest with links to the Caspian basin. The humanitarian motive was
- > contradicted by inherent implausibility and by the nature and
- > inhumanitarian
- > results of the U.S. and NATO intervention.
- >
- > All-in-all the United States did well from its intervention, but the
- > people
- > of the area did poorly. The policies of it and its European allies were
- > primary causes of the breakup of Yugoslavia and the failure to manage any
- > split peaceably. Their intervention was not "too late," but early,
- > destructive, and well designed to encourage the ethnic cleansing that
- > followed. Subsequently, they failed to mediate the conflict in Kosovo and
- > collaborated with the KLA in producing a highly destructive war, followed
- > by
- > an occupation in which REAL ethnic cleansing took place, with NATO
- > acquiescence and even cooperation. Bosnia and Kosovo are under colonial
- > occupation. The remnant Yugoslavia, once a vibrant and truly multiethnic
- > state, is poor, crowded with refugees, dependent on a hostile West,
- > conflict-ridden, and rudderless. The Balkans are neither stable nor free;
- > their future as NATO clients does not look promising.
- >
- > Diana Johnstone has written up this story in a readable, scholarly, and
- > convincing way that I have been able to summarize all to briefly here. It

is

- > an important book, especially for a left that has been confused by the
- > outpourings of a very powerful propaganda system.

>

> _____

>

> Endnotes:

>

- > 1. David Rieff, "Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond," Los Angeles Times,
- > September 3, 2000; Michael Ignatieff, Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond (New
- > York: Metropolitan Books, 2000), p. 6.
- > 2. Christopher Hitchens is properly referred to as an ex-leftist, who is
- > now a reliable apologist for imperial wars. However, his furiously
- > anti-Serb
- > and pro-Bosnian Muslim and pro-NATO war biases date back to the early
- > 1990s
- > when he joined the "Potemkin Sarejevo" groupies in a new cult idealizing
- > and
- > misreading the facts on Izetbegovic and the allegedly multiethnic paradise
- > now being upset by the Serbs. For an excellent account, Johnstone, Fools'
- > Crusade, pp. 40-64.
- > 3. See my Open Letter Reply to Paul Hockenos and In These Times on Their
- > Coverage of the Balkans: <http://www.zmag.org/openhermanitt.htm>
- > 4. Johnstone, pp. 27-32.
- > 5. John Pomfret reported on Nasi Oric's trophies in a unique article on
- > "Weapons, Cash and Chaos Lend Clout to Srebrenica's Tough Guy," Washington
- > Post, February 16, 1994.
- > 6. Johnstone, p. 110.
- > 7. Among the sources on this point, providing documentation that
- > included
- > numerous personal affidavits, all ignored by Rieff et al. and the Western
- > media: S. Dabic et al., "Persecution of Serbs And Ethnic Cleansing in
- > Croatia 1991-1998, Documents and Testimonies," Serbian Council Information
- > Center, Belgrade, 1998; "Memorandum on War Crimes and Crimes and Genocide
- > in
- > Eastern Bosnia (Communes of Bratunac, Skelani and Srebrenica) Committed
- > Against the Serbian Population From April 1992 to April 1993," sent by
- > Ambassador Dragomir Djokic to the General Assembly and Security Council,
- > June 2, 1993; Milovoje Ivanisevic, "Expulsion of the Serbs From Bosnia and
- > Herzegovina, 1992-1995," Edition WARS, Book II, Belgrade, 2000. See also
- > Steven L. Burg and Paul S. Shoup, The War in Bosnia- Herzegovina: Ethnic
- > Conflict and International Intervention (Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe,
- > 1999), pp. 178-180; Raymond K. Kent, "Contextualizing Hate: The Hague
- > Tribunal, the Clinton Administration and the Serbs":
- > http://www.beograd.com/nato/texts/english/c/contextualizing_hate.html.
- > 8. Johnstone, pp. 78-90
- > 9. Ibid., p. 73.
- > 10. David Rieff, "A New Age of Liberal Imperialism," World Policy
- > Journal,
- > Summer 1999.
- > 11. Tim Judah, "Is Milosevic Planning Another Balkan War?," Scotland on
- > Sunday, March 19, 2000.
- > 12. Lenard Cohen, Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan
- > Milosevic (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 2001), p. 380.
- > 13. Johnstone, pp. 23-32, 144-156.
- > 14. Ibid., pp. 60-61
- > 15. Ibid., pp. 16-23.
- > 16. Ibid., pp. 109-118.

>

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Sagittarius

Van: "Ruza" <despot@www.dough.org>
Aan: "Nico & Neeltje" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Verzonden: donderdag 27 maart 2003 23:24
Onderwerp: Fw: [ANSWER]: SAT, APRIL 12: National March on

----- Original Message -----

From: A.N.S.W.E.R. <answer.general@action-mail.org>
To: <answer.general@action-mail.org>
Sent: Wednesday, March 26, 2003 4:41 PM
Subject: [ANSWER]: SAT, APRIL 12: National March on Washington

> SATURDAY, APRIL 12:
 > NATIONAL MARCH on WASHINGTON
 >
 > STOP THE WAR ON IRAQ!
 > Gather at 12 noon
 > March on the White House
 >
 > On Saturday, April 12, join the tens of thousands of
 > people of conscience who will surround the White House.
 > The whole world is watching to see if the people of the
 > United States can intensify the power of the anti-war
 > movement at the moment that the Bush Administration is
 > intending to slaughter tens of thousands of Iraqi people
 > and occupy their country. We urge every anti-war organizer
 > and concerned person to bring your friends, neighbors and
 > family members to this all-important mobilization on April
 > 12.
 >
 > The world is in a state of Shock and Revulsion as the
 > murderous Bush Administration follows through on its
 > promise to "Shock and Awe" the Iraqi people by dropping
 > thousands of bombs and missiles on their capital, a city
 > that is home to 4.5 million human beings. Baghdad has been
 > bombed relentlessly, terrorizing the occupants of that
 > city and of the entire country. U.S. "precision" bombs
 > have slammed into poor residential neighborhoods in
 > Baghdad and a busy shopping street. U.S. and British
 > troops are leaving a "trail of death" in their wake as
 > they invade and bomb Iraq and reporters describe charred
 > corpses littering the roads to Baghdad as well as in its
 > streets. U.S. and British forces have laid siege to Basra,
 > bombing and destroying the electrical supply to the main
 > water plant and blocking the Iraqi food distribution
 > system into Basra. The people of Basra are now starving
 > and without water; various U.N. agencies state that Basra
 > is in humanitarian crises and on the verge of a major
 > cholera outbreak and massive child mortality. This crisis
 > is caused by the U.S. attack coupled with the effect of 12
 > years of U.S.-led U.N. economic sanctions. The United
 > States government is telling the people of Basra that they
 > may only have food and water if they rise up against the

- > Iraqi government and accept the U.S. occupation.
- >
- > The Iraqi people and the U.S. GIs who have been killed and
- > wounded and are suffering are the casualties of George W.
- > Bush's unprovoked war of aggression. We extend our
- > heartfelt sympathies to the families of all those who have
- > been killed and wounded as a consequence of this illegal
- > imperialist war.
- >
- > This horrific unprovoked attack on Iraq must be understood
- > as one of the extreme terrorist acts of modern times.
- > Cruise missiles launched from submarines and aircraft
- > hundreds of miles away and 2,000 lb. bombs dropped from
- > 30,000 ft. up are the latest example of the Bush
- > administration's criminal resort to limitless violence and
- > terrorism in order to achieve its objectives of conquest
- > and occupation. The hypocrisy of the war against Iraq is
- > extreme: the most powerful military in the world waging
- > first strike war with the most advanced weapons against an
- > impoverished country on the pretext that it someday may
- > possess such weapons.
- >
- > The world has entered a new phase. The Bush Administration
- > is hell bent on world domination. The war on Iraq was
- > meant to signal that the U.S. use of raw military power
- > will be the means to create a new era of Empire. We
- > understand that the war on Iraq is only one of the fronts
- > on which the United States government is determined to
- > build a world empire. The U.S. is also waging war in
- > Colombia, training future death squads at the dreaded
- > School of the Americas/WHISC, and waging economic war
- > through the IMF, World Bank, and free trade treaties such
- > as the Free Trade Area of the Americas agreement.
- >
- > To the shock of the warmakers, their plans have ignited a
- > world movement of opposition and solidarity. In addition
- > to the well publicized demonstrations in Europe and the
- > Middle East, nearly every country in Latin America has
- > participated in massive street demonstrations and the
- > continent has nearly unanimously rejected Bush's
- > "Coalition of the Willing." For months this movement has
- > delayed and restrained the war plans for Iraq. Bush and
- > Co. have lost all legitimacy and they are isolated. The
- > people's movement has deprived them of the any threadbare
- > claim to legality.
- >
- > April 12 comes in the midst of the long-planned
- > "Mobilization Against Military and Economic Intervention
- > in Latin America and the Caribbean" organized by the Latin
- > America Solidarity Coalition (LASC). This coalition, which
- > includes some members of the A.N.S.W.E.R Steering
- > Committee, has called for a series of actions from April
- > 10- 15. In addition to converging in Washington on
- > Saturday April 12 for the mass march on the White House to
- > Stop the War on Iraq, A.N.S.W.E.R. encourages you to

- > travel to DC in time for the public opening plenary of the
- > LASC conference on Friday evening, April 11, and to stay
- > for a demonstration on Sunday, April 13 focusing on Latin
- > America Solidarity which will march to several corporate
- > and financial institutions before arriving at the World
- > Bank. Visit the LASC web page at www.lasolidarity.org for
- > full details.
- >
- > Today our hearts are filled with both anger at the war and
- > sadness for the suffering people of Iraq who are enduring
- > this unprovoked terrorist attack, and for the grieving
- > families of the sons and daughters of America who Bush has
- > sent to kill and be killed for his war of aggression and
- > conquest. But sadness and grief should be coupled with a
- > profound understanding that the sudden emergence of a new
- > global movement offers the best and only hope that the
- > U.S. government's plans for militarism, war and domination
- > -- the doctrine of endless war -- can and will be
- > overcome. In the days ahead we must intensify the struggle
- > against this cruel war.
- >
- > **WHAT YOU CAN DO:**
- >
- > * **SPREAD THE WORD!** Forward this email, and download
- > flyers, posters and stickers from the A.N.S.W.E.R. web
- > page (available by Thursday).
- >
- > * **ORGANIZE BUSES TO DC.** Let us know about transportation
- > from your city. Fill out the form at
- > <http://www.internationalanswer.org/campaigns/a12/index.html#transp>
- > (if this link does not take you directly to the form,
- > scroll down) to list your transportation plans.
- >
- > * **ENDORSE THE MOBILIZATION** at
- > <http://www.internationalanswer.org/campaigns/a12/index.html#endo>
- > (if this link does not take you directly to the form,
- > scroll down)
- >
- > -----
- >
- > **FOR MORE INFORMATION:**
- > <http://www.InternationalANSWER.org>
- > <http://www.VoteNoWar.org>
- > info@internationalanswer.org
- > New York 212-633-6646
- > Washington 202-544-3389
- > Los Angeles 213-487-2368
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- >
- > To make a tax-deductible donation, go to
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Freitagabend 1.9.2000 WDR III 19⁰⁵ - 19²⁵ u.

"Kritisches Tagebuch"

(door storing in de zender begon de uitzending iets later, en duurde tot 19³⁰ u.)

uitzending over "Kosovo" (-oorlog) -

helaas bandje iets te laat aangezet, waardoor
USA-Motivatie (dit woord ontbreekt - tekst van opge-
Kosovo-oorlog sette-bandje) uitzending als volgt:

(Belang van bezit strategischen Interesses der USA
gebied ex-Joegosl.) Satz zu den Europäischen. Hören
voor militair-steun-Constantinowitsch mit einer Analyse:

"Dats der Nord-Süd-Verkehrsweg zwischen der Euro-
päischen Union und dem territorial abgetrennten
Mitglied Griechenland und weiter in die Türkei und
den mittleren Osten größte Bedeutung hat, zeigt
schon ein Blick auf die Landkarte. Vor dem
NATO-krieg hatten die Europäer entlang dieses
politisch und wirtschaftlich wichtigen Verkehrs-
Strangs, des sogenannten Corridors zehn (10),
von Ungarn über Serbien und Mazedonien
zukunftsstrahlige Projekte geplant, zunächst sollte
Mazedonien im Süden wirtschaftlich an die Union
angebunden werden, unter anderem durch eine
250. km-lange Pipeline von Thessaloniki nach
Skopje, die Richtung Norden, geografisch logisch, nach
Serbien und Ungarn hätte weitergeführt werden
müssen.

Auch mit Serbien, damals von den UN-Sanktionen
befreit, sollten Verabredungen getroffen werden.
Doch diese Pläne widersprachen strategischen
Überlegungen in den USA: deren Optionen hatte
schon 1996 der US-Amerikanische Politikwissen-
schaffler Jean Gorreschi (Gobbeschi?) so analysiert:

"Die Süddeile Jugoslawiens sollten der Amerika-
mischen Interessen-Sphäre zufallen:
Mazedonien, das die einzige Passage von Ost
nach West und von Nord nach Süd auf dem

EU dies "qua" hulp, gespannen
voor USA-karrefje
en²) ervoor gezorgd dat
deze energie-voorraden
onder USA-beheer bleven,
en niet onder EU-beheer
zouden komen, zeker niet
onder ex-Joeg. beheer (van
Milos.)

Freitagabend 1.9.2000 WDR III 19⁰⁵ - 19²⁵ u.

1.

"Kritisches Tagebuch"

(dort Störung in de sender, begon de uitzending iets later, en duurde tot 19³⁰ u.)

uitzending over "Kosovo" (-oorlog) - helaas bandje iets te laat aangeset, waardoor deel van voorwoord ontbreekt - tekst van opgemomen (op cassette-bandje) uitzending als volgt:

"----- Und die strategischen Interessen der USA rücken in Gegensatz zu den Europäischen. Hören Sie Wladimir Constantinowitsch mit einer Analyse:

"Dass der Nord-Süd-Verkehrsweg zwischen der Europäischen Union und dem territorial abgetrennten Mitglied Griechenland und weiter in die Türkei und den mittleren Osten größte Bedeutung hat, zeigt schon ein Blick auf die Landkarte. Vor dem NATO-Krieg hatten die Europäer entlang dieses politisch und wirtschaftlich wichtigen Verkehrsstrangs, des sogenannten Corridors zehn (10) von Ungarn über Serbien und Mazedonien zukunftssträchtige Projekte geplant, zunächst sollte Mazedonien im Süden wirtschaftlich an die Union angebunden werden, unter anderem durch eine 250 km-lange Pipeline von Thessaloniki nach Skopje, die Richtung Norden, geografisch logisch, nach Serbien und Ungarn hätte weitergeführt werden müssen.

Auch mit Serbien, damals von den UN-Sanktionen befreit, sollten Verabredungen getroffen werden. Doch diese Pläne widersprachen strategischen Überlegungen in den USA: deren Optionen hatte schon 1996 der US-amerikanische Politikwissenschaftler Jean Gorreschi (Gobbeschi?) so analysiert:

"Die Süddeile Jugoslawiens sollten der amerikanischen Interessen-Sphäre kefallen: Mazedonien, das die einzige Passage von Ost nach West und von Nord nach Süd auf dem

auf dem Balkan kontrolliert, sollte das Zentrum bilden. Aber die Amerikanische Sphäre würde ebenfalls Albanien einschliessen, und, wenn sich diese Regionen von Serbien abtrennen ließen, auch den Sandžak und den Kosovo. Einige Amerikanischen Planer sprachen sogar von der Entstehung eines eventuellen Groß-Albanien unter US und Türkischer Schirmherrschaft.

Anfang der 90er Jahre investierten US-Konzerne riesige Summen im kaspischen Becken für die Suche nach Öl und Erdgas. Die ehemaligen Sowjet-Republiken Aserbeidjan, Turkmenistan und Kasachstan verkauften bereitwillig Konzessionen an amerikanische Öl-Multis, die dort auf Grund von Satelliten-Aufnahmen die größten Öl-vorkommen der Erde vermuteten. Diese Konzerne dachten von Anfang an nicht nur an den amerikanischen Markt, der etwa 50% des eigenen Ölbedarfs importiert, sondern auch an die Türkei und die EU.

Während eine Pipe-line in Richtung Türkei einigermaßen problemlos schien, war die Fortsetzung nach Europa schwieriger. Robert Eable (Schröjwyde?) vom Centre for Strategic Investment Studies in Washington beschreibt die überraschend einfachen Entscheidungskriterien für den Bau solcher Projekte:

"Da die kaspischen und die Zentral-asiatischen Öl- und Gas-vorkommen von Land umgeben sind, müssen die Pipe-line-Kapazitäten mit den Produktionskapazitäten zusammen harmonisch entwickelt werden - ohne das eine ist das andere wertlos. Man sollte dabei folgende Lektionen beherzigen:

erstens 1) baut man keine Pipelines in der Hoffnung, daß das Öl folgt - Pipelines sind kommerzielle Objekte und ihr Bau muß finanziell begründet sein.

zweitens 2) können wir nicht annehmen, daß Pipelines, die internationale Grenzen überqueren, notwendigerweise Instrumente der Solidarität sind: für abtrünnige Gruppen können sie attraktive Ziele bieten. Vielleicht sollte man sich vor sich selber immer daran erinnern, daß eine Pipeline dem Frieden folgen kann, daß aber der Friede nicht notwendig einer Pipeline folgt.

Für die US-Ölmultis kam der Weg durch die russische Federation weder politisch noch aus Sicherheitsgründen in Frage. Und bei den erwarteten Fördermengen hätte sich der Bosphorus-Seeweg als Engpass erwiesen. Auch die Europäische Route, die an das Rhein-Main-Donau-Kanal-Netz anschliesst, wurde verworfen, genau so wie der von der EU geplante Ausbau des Korridors 10, Griechenland-Ungarn.

Nationale strategische Interessen der USA standen einer Zusammenarbeit mit der EU, ihrem Partner und Konkurrenten zugleich, regelrecht im Wege. Beschlossen wurde schliesslich die Süd-Balkan Route Ost-West, entlang des Europäischen Korridors 8 (acht), vom Schwarzen Meer über Bulgarien, Mazedonien und Albanien bis zur Adria.

Die Situation dort auf dem Balkan, sahen die US-Investoren zu diesem Zeitpunkt aber als nicht sicher an: Bulgarien war noch nicht näher an den Westen gerückt und blieb in der Einfluss-Sphäre Russlands, die Regierung Mazedoniens orientierte sich entlang der Nord-Süd-Achse nach Griechenland und vor allem Serbien, und Albanien stand trotz massiver deutscher Hilfe vor einem wirtschaftlichen und politischen Kollaps.

Krit. Tag. 1.9.2000. 4.

Deshalb schien es notwendig diesen geo-politischen Raum für eine Aber-Milliarden-Dollar-Investition zu stabilisieren, also: militärisch abzusichern! Die Option für eine zweckmässige Pazifizierung des Süd-Balkan-Terminals der angesehenen Pipeline lagen in der Schublade.

Der Amerikanische Geheimdienst in Mazedoniens Hauptstadt änderte seine Ziele und brachte die albanischen Nationalisten mit ihrem Traum von Gross-Albanien ins Spiel. Bis Mitte der 90er Jahre hatte der CIA die mazedonische Führung dabei unterstützt die Sezessionsbewegung der fünf und zwanzig-prozentigen (25%) Albanischen Minderheit ruhig zu stellen. Doch nach dem missglückten Attentat auf Präsident Ligorov, verweigerte ihm der Geheimdienst Hilfe bei der Aufklärung der Tat.

Im benachbarten Albanien setzte der CIA nach dem Sturz des von der Bundesrepublik protegierten Präsidenten Berisha nun auf eigene Reute und Baute in eigener Regie den albanischen Geheimdienst um.

In der Sezessionsbewegung der Kosovo-Albaner ließen sich die Amerikaner nicht auf die vom Bundes Nachrichten Dienst aufgebauten Strukturen ein. Der angeblich pazifistische Schattenpräsident der Kosovo-Albaner, Rugova, hatte mit deutscher und türkischer Hilfe die Kosovo-Albanische Geheim-Armee, FARK, aufbauen lassen. Sie verarschten vielmehr den von Milosevic abgefallenen albanischen Waffenschmugglern und Drogen-Baronen, die ihre Untergrund-Guerilla, die UCK, organisierten.

Nach dem Zusammenbruch der albanischen Regierung Berisha's 1997, begann im Frühjahr des nächsten Jahres der bewaffnete Aufstand der Kosovo-Albaner und die NATO, angeführt von den USA, verlangte

Krit. Tag. 1.9.2000 - 5.

verlangte von der jugoslawischen Regierung das Recht in den Kosovo und Serbien einzumarschieren. Nach der Ablehnung dieser Forderungen, drohte die NATO mit Bombardierungen zum Schutz der Kosovo-Albaner.

Während der Bombardierung Serbiens vor einem Jahr, zerstörte die NATO dann außer militärische Zielen viele Einrichtungen entlang des Europäischen Nord-Süd-Korridors 10, darunter zunächst scheinbar unerklärbar Brücken, sowie Öl-Terminals und Raffinerien an der Serbischen Donau. Dann wurde Serbien diplomatisch isoliert sodass zwei wichtige Europäische Verkehrswege auf lange Sicht technisch oder politisch unpassierbar bleiben. Die Europäer müssen nun eine neuere und zeit-aufwendige Umgehung von Ungarn über Rumänien und Bulgarien in den Süd-Balkan in Kauf nehmen.

Aus der Amerikanischen Perspektive sieht vieles günstiger aus: die vermuteten Öl-Vorkommen im kaspischen Becken haben sich bestätigt und eine in New York mit US-Amerikanischem Kapital gegründete albanisch-mazedonisch-bulgarische Ölgesellschaft baut eine 900 km-lange Pipeline vom Bulgarischen Hafen Burgas zum Albanischen Hafen Vlora. Beteiligt sind Öl-Multis von Rang und Namen, wie: Chevron, Texaco, Exxon, Shell und BP, sowie die stabilisierten Staaten des Süd-Balkans.

Ein Jahr nach der Bombardierung Jugoslawiens und nach der unstrittigen Befriedung des Kosovo wird auch die Diskrepanz zwischen den von der NATO proklamierten Zielen und der wirklichen Entwicklung auf dem Süd-Balkan immer deutlicher.

Krit. Tag. 1.9.2000 - 6.

deutlicher.

Nicht nur aus dem Kosovo, sondern auch aus Süd-Serbien und Mazedonien, wo die NATO-Presenz eine Ausbreitung des Krieges verhindern sollte, werden immer häufiger Unruhen, politische Morde und zahlreiche bewaffnete Auseinandersetzungen mit den secessions-willigen Albanern gemeldet. Das Kosovo-Szenario mit einem Albaner-Aufstand, dieses Mal in West-Mazedonien, solle sich nicht wiederholen, und ein Groß-Albanien komme nicht in Frage, beteuern US und die EU-Politiker in Chor. Doch die massive Unterstützung der USA für die albanischen Secessionisten Kosovo-Süd-Serbien und Mazedonien, läßt für die Europäischen Bündnispartner nichts Gutes erahnen." //

Redaktion der Sendung
Lothar Fendt.

Op pag. 2: Sandžak - de spelling heb ik bij een reis-bureau gevraagd. Het gebied Sandžak ligt in Zuid-Servië en sluit aan aan Kosovo.

de eigenmannen van personen, die mij onbekend waren, heb ik maar de klank van het woord geschreven: Eable (?) en Jean Göbbschi?
Constantinowitz?
excuses voor mogelijke fouten in de Duitse spelling.

USA-Motivatie
Kosovo-oorlog
(Belang van Bezet
gebied ex-Joegosl.)
voor militair-steun-
maakt.

ijder heist "US-Motivatie"
el ik bewaard een "Gelder-
ander-artikel van 9.4.2002:
Gas en Olie
Montenegro: een toewijding aan
de Adriatische Zee"
Wisten de Amerikanen dit al, toen
de perse deze oorlog wilden? →

Sagittarius

Van: "Ruza" <despot@www.dough.org>
Aan: "Branko Lisac" <branko8@hotmail.com>; "Nico & Neelje" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>; "Dolf Loth" <loh@hesasd.nl>
Verzonden: dinsdag 11 maart 2003 22:27
Bijlage: jorglst1.htm
Onderwerp: Fw: Zavera u gonocidu nad Srbima

— Original Message —

From: Boris Pribich

To: books@EUnet.yu ; milos@net.yu ; dibo@eunet.yu ; djakovac@yubc.net ; lyubomir.gruyitch@utbm.fr ; sibila@eunet.yu ; mihpavle@EUnet.yu ; zoran@belpagette.com ; millep@EUnet.yu ; sumadija@btinternet.com ; indic1@ptt.yu ; abcde@eunet.yu ; sujic@bitsyu.net ; nescic@eunet.yu ; civija@yahoo.com ; antich@eunet.yu ; sontina@sympatico.ca ; dragan@noos.fr ; bsavovic@f.bg.ac.yu ; drkrsljic@idirect.com ; bob@yubc.net ; rgeorgevic@yahoo.com ; DOBBE1@excite.com ; dukanac@eunet.yu ; olipa@elab.tmf.bg.ac.yu ; stefanos@EUnet.yu ; EPA2001@aol.com ; extreme@eunet.yu ; delphi77@yahoo.com ; petar@mail.cyberus.ca ; DRAGIN1@prodigy.net ; ivo@reporters.net ; Blazenka@aol.com ; despot@wishmail.net ; isakovicd@zonnet.nl ; richardenbeba@wxs.nl ; Blazenka@aol.com


Sent: Tuesday, March 11, 2003 12:25 AM


Subject: Zavera u gonocidu nad Srbima

<http://SerbianDefenseLeague.com/jorglst1.htm>

Jewish Conspiracy in the Genocide on Serbs

Jews fabricate lies in the media, Jewish PR firms promote the lies, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs authores policies based on lies, Jewish organizations use lies to influence the U.S. Government, Jewish U.S. Senator authors resolution on basis of lies, and Jewish U.S. General bombs the Serbian people off their land.

 **1993 -- Roy Gutman, Jew, lied about Serbs -- *Newsday* earned its third Pulitzer Prize for Foreign Reporting in 1993 when Roy Gutman revealed existence of death camps in the former Yugoslavia.**

 **David Finn, Jew, president of Ruder and Finn, promoted Gutman's lies under the policy of "We did not confirm the existence of death camps in Bosnia, we just made it known that *Newsday* affirmed it."**

In 1993 Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs authored a policy using lies.



American Jewish Committee

Australian Jewish Community

Canadian Jewish Congress



National Conference on Soviet Jewry

Rabbinical Council of America

United Synagogue Youth

Jewish Council for Public Affairs

Anti-Defamation League

United Synagogue of Conservative Judaism	Jewish Orthodox Union
Union of American Hebrew Congregations	Religious Action Center
Jewish Theological Seminary	United States Holocaust Memorial Council
The Rabbinical Assembly	Milwaukee Jewish Council for Community Relations
B'nai B'rith Int'l	National Jewish Community Relations Advisory Council
Jewish Community Relations Council	Jewish Peace Fellowship
 sj	1999 -- U.S. Senator Specter, Jew, introduced the <u>resolution authorizing air operations and missile strikes as part of larger NATO operation against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.</u>
 cl	1999 -- General Clark, Jew, " <u>was inspired by the story of his grandfather's persecution and his determination to defeat Milosevic was fed in part by his empathy for the victims of Serbian ethnic purges.</u> "

Serbian Defense League
exposing crimes against humanity

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MABEL WISSE SMIT

Een dame 'met pit' in koninklijke sferen

VAN DE REDACTIE

In de donkere dagen voor kerstmis plegen de media nogal eens met verhalen te komen die bedoeld zijn als luchtig leesvoer, om ons - met de overvloedig uitgedragen kerstgedachten - even uit de zorg van alle dag weg te nemen. Het weekblad Elsevier kwam in haar afgelopen kerstnummer met een verhaal over de tweede zoon van koningin Beatrix en zijn vriendin, met als titel 'Friso van Oranje & Mabel Wisse Smit': carrièreprins en dame met pit'. Over prins Friso lezen we vooral algemeenheden over zijn persoon, dat hij zeer intelligent zou zijn, van golfen en duiken houdt, niet homo-seksueel is en hard werkt aan een carrière bij de Amerikaanse bank Goldman, Sachs & Co in Londen. Over zijn vriendin Mabel Wisse Smit lezen we des te meer over haar handel en wandel.

Het koninklijk huis lijkt patent te hebben op het aantrekken van discutabele leden. Hebben we in het verleden het nodige te doen gehad rondom prins Bernhard, zijn vermeende lidmaatschap van Hitlers NSDAP en betrokkenheid bij de Lockheed corruptieaffaire, rondom het lidmaatschap van de Waffen-SS van prins Claus en de familie van Maxima die deel uitmaakt van de fascistische elite van Argentinië die lange tijd een verschrikkelijke terreur heeft uitgeoefend, nu wordt Mabel Wisse Smit door Elsevier uit de coulissen gehaald en gezien de achtergrond van de dame lijkt een nieuwe affaire niet uitgesloten.

De Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst zei na de begrafenis van prins Claus dat Mabel Wisse Smit 'de afgelopen dagen een steun en toeverlaat van de Koningin was geweest'. Op de zondag voor de bijzetting in Delft vergezelde ze de familie naar de Haagse Kloosterkerk, waar de zondagsdienst werd bijgewoond en waar prins Claus werd herdacht. 'Koningin Beatrix, die bekend staat om haar strikte opvattingen over protocol, moet al een band met haar aanstaande, derde schoondochter hebben ontwikkeld nog voordat er van een officiële verloving sprake is', aldus Elsevier. 'Wie eenmaal de grafkelder in is geweest, hoort voorgoed bij de familie. Zij is dan ook zo goed als zeker de toekomstige echtgenote van Friso', stelt Carla Joosten in haar artikel in Elsevier.

Netwerker

Wat is er zo bijzonder aan de dame in kwestie? Elsevier schrijft: 'Ze is erg bedachtzaam en strategisch. Alles wat ze zegt, heeft altijd een reden. Ze denkt heel goed na over wat ze wil. De econome en politicologe, altijd smaakvol ge-

kleed, heeft flair, gaat recht op haar doel af en zoekt op recepties alleen die mensen op aan wie ze wat heeft. Een netwerker pur sang.'

Wat zijn dan de netwerken waaraan de toekomstige 'prinses Mabel' zo doelgericht werkt? Alle draden komen samen in Bosnië en het doel is het openbreken van Joegoslavië.

Het begon in het voorjaar van 1993 met een stage bij de Verenigde Naties in New York, waar ze al gauw dikke vrienden werd met de Bosnische ambassadeur bij de Verenigde Naties, Mohamed Sacirbey. 'De relatie met de nu 45-jarige Sacirbey moet een paar jaar hebben geduurd, want in 1995 nog - hij was inmiddels minister van Buitenlandse Zaken in Bosnië - speelde hij mee op een familietoernooi van de Hilversumse hockeyclub: met de familie Wisse Smit', aldus Elsevier. Sacirbey staat sinds vorig jaar op de lijst van Interpol: hij wordt er door de huidige Bosnische regering van beschuldigd dat hij 600.000, en wellicht 2,5 miljoen, dollar heeft verduisterd toen hij ambassadeur bij de VN was.

Elsevier vermeldt verder: 'Op 4 september vergezelt zij Sacirbey naar een diner op de Amerikaanse ambassade in Parijs. De Franse schrijver Bernhard-Henri Lévy beschrijft die avond in zijn boek *Le Lys et La Cendre*, waar hij rept over 'Mabel Smith, de verloofde van Mohammed Sacirbey'. Aanwezig zijn verder de Amerikaanse ambassadeur, Pamela Harriman (familie van Averell Harriman die in de jaren twintig meewerkte aan de financiering van Hitler's NSDAP, zie pagina 2, red.), NAVO-generaal Wesley Clark en diplomaat Richard Holbrook, die tijdens het diner een keer of tien aan de telefoon wordt geroepen. Maar weinigen weten waarom: de vol-

te beschermen, de miljoenen die de straat op zijn gekomen om de terugkeer van de gekidnapte Elián Gonzalez te eisen en de massale deelname van de bevolking aan de verkiezingen en het plebisciet voor de verdediging van de verworvenheden van de revolutie, dat alles bestaat niet in de hoofden van de politici. Het geeft op onthullende wijze weer hoe zij over democratische processen denken.

Koloniaal

De richting die Europa uitgaat met betrekking tot Cuba is in alle opzichten verontrustend, zeker nu meer en meer geroepen wordt om een gemeenschappelijk Europees buitenlands beleid. We kunnen constateren dat de oude Europese koloniale machten hun relaties met hun ex-koloniën aan het herzien zijn. De politieke verbanden die zijn gevormd na de dekolonisatie ten tijde van de bipolaire machtsverhoudingen van de Koude Oorlog, zoals de Engelse Commonwealth, worden op de helling gegooid. De Europese landen proberen een directe greep op hun oude koloniën te herwinnen. Engeland speelt een leidende rol om president Mugabe van Zimbabwe te verwijderen, Frankrijk intervineert militair in Ivoorkust, België roert zich in Congo en Spanje werpt zich op als 'bevrijder' van Cuba.

In de discussie over een gemeenschappelijk Europees buitenlands beleid wordt vaak het argument genoemd dat Europa daarmee een tegenwicht tegenover de Verenigde Staten kan worden. Wanneer we echter kijken naar de realiteit dan zien we dat Europa in vrijwel alle internationale kwesties aan de Amerikaanse leiband loopt.

Bij de recente uitbreiding van de NAVO lag de eis op tafel dat de nieuwe leden hun grondgebied ter beschikking dienen te stellen en troepen moeten leveren voor de Amerikaanse oorlogsmachine. De landen worden onder druk gezet om Amerikaans militair materieel aan te kopen. Ook bij het proces van uitbreiding van de EU zien we de Amerikaanse bemoeienis, zoals het eisen van de opname van Turkije in de EU.

Een gemeenschappelijk Europees buitenlands beleid zoals dat nu vorm gegeven wordt, maakt Europa niet sterker of onafhankelijker, maar juist ondergeschikt aan de Amerikaanse politiek. Europa ontwikkelt geen onafhankelijke politiek, maar probeert in het kielzog van de Amerikaanse oorlogspolitiek de eigen belangen veilig te stellen. Dat heeft niets met mensenrech-



Oswaldo Paya op bezoek in Praag

ten of democratie te maken. Het dient ook geen enkel Europees volk.

Cuba komt meer en meer onder vuur van de valse kruisridders van de 21ste eeuw. Het eiland prijkt op de Amerikaanse lijst van 'schurkenstaten' en Amerikaanse functionarissen komen met krankzinnige beschuldigingen, als zou Cuba zich bezig houden met ontwikkeling en verspreiding van massavernietigingswapen.

Daarmee wordt een klimaat voorbereid om tot militair ingrijpen te komen. Dat is geenszins denkbeeldig, als we bedenken dat Clinton in 1996 serieus overwogen heeft om Havana te bombarderen na de beschieting van twee vliegtuigjes waarmee anti-Castro terroristen het Cubaanse luchtruim hadden geschonden.

De prijsuitreiking aan Paya is een signaal dat Europa meegaat met de Amerikaanse agressie tegen Cuba. Voor het Cubaanse volk is dit een onheilspellende ontwikkeling.

gende dag bombarderen de Amerikanen de Serviërs in Bosnië. Bij vertrek tegen middernacht blijkt ook de Bosnische president Alya Izetbegovic aanwezig op de ambassade. Mabel zit er met haar neus bovenop.'

Pro-moslim

We kunnen zonder meer geloven dat Mabel pit heeft. Volgens Elsevier verraden haar visies op de Balkan een pro-moslimgezindheid. In 1993 richtte ze het European Action Council for Peace in de Balkans op en werd er directeur. In 1994 was ze betrokken bij een conferentie in Macedonië die buitenlandse donoren bijeenbracht voor de financiering van de binnenlandse oppositie in Joegoslavië. Sinds 1997 is zij directeur van het Open Society Institute-Brussels, het kantoor van het Soros Foundations Network in West-Europa van George Soros. Deze Hongaarse speculant en multimiljardair heeft een belangrijke rol gespeeld bij het organiseren van binnenlandse oppositiegroepen in Oost-Europa.

In 1997 bepleitte zij al internationale bemoeienis met Kosovo en in maart van het afgelopen jaar drong ze aan op een definitieve scheiding van Servië en Montenegro. Veel 'action' dus, maar weinig 'peace'.

Van links tot rechts wordt Mabel geprezen. Zoals door de organisatie Press Now, die zich inzette voor de financiering van pro-westerse media op de Balkan. Ex-GroenLinks-kamerlid Wilbert Willems, toenmalig directeur, roemt in Elsevier haar 'gedrevenheid en betrokkenheid'. 'Ze keek verder dan de directe hulpverlening, maar maakte meteen een politieke analyse van de situatie', aldus Willems. We geloven hem op z'n woord.

Invloed op regeringsbeleid

Mabel is duidelijk zeer kundig in 'networking' en verkeert in de hoogste kringen. Hoe hoog blijkt uit het NIOD-rapport over Srebrenica in het hoofdstuk over de politieke situatie op de Balkan van juni tot september 1993, waar staat te lezen: 'Bij het Nederlandse standpunt speelde wellicht ook het nauwe contact met Mohamed Sacirbey mee. Sacirbey en zijn toenmalige vriendin Mabel Wisse Smit zijn de enigen die door ambtenaren van het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken werden aangewezen als personen buiten het Nederlandse politieke en ambtelijke circuit die invloed op het beleid uitoefenden', aldus Elsevier.



Wanneer deze pro-moslim dame en haar moslim-Bosnische vriend zoveel invloed op het regeringsbeleid hadden, dan is het goed om te kijken welke politieke krachten zij dan vertegenwoordigden. In de media wordt voortdurend het beeld opgehouden dat de moslims in Bosnië het slachtoffer waren van Kroatisch en vooral Servisch geweld. Zij waren het slachtoffer van twee agressors die hun eigen gewelddadige politieke agenda's hadden. Over de politieke bedoelingen en misdaden van de Bosnische moslims horen we vrijwel niets. Ook het Joegoslavië Tribunaal heeft vrijwel tegen geen enkele moslim een aanklacht ingediend.

Er wordt de suggestie gewekt dat de SDA

Sacirbey en zijn toenmalige vriendin Mabel Wisse Smit zijn de enigen die door ambtenaren van het ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken werden aangewezen als personen buiten het Nederlandse politieke en ambtelijke circuit die invloed op het beleid uitoefenden

(Partij van Democratische Actie) van president Izetbegovic streed voor een vrij en democratisch Bosnië-Herzegovina, tegenover door nationalisme bezeten tegenstanders. Wanneer we de opvattingen en daden echter nader bezien, dan blijkt dat we in feite te maken hebben met moslim-fascisten, gedreven door uiterst reactionaire opvattingen, die zich te buiten zijn gegaan aan buitengewone wreedheden. De rol van slachtoffer werd vooral gespeeld om de NAVO tot militair ingrijpen te krijgen, wat uiteindelijk ook gebeurd is.

De Islamitische Orde

Wat betreft de politieke agenda van de moslims is het verhelderend om kennis te nemen van de opvattingen van SDA-leider Izetbegovic. Hij publiceerde in 1970 voor het eerst zijn boek 'Islamic Declaration', soms vertaald als 'Islamic Manifesto'. Hij belandde daarvoor in de gevangenis, maar gaf het boek opnieuw uit in 1990, aan de vooravond van de verkiezingen. Izetbegovic gebruikte het boek duidelijk als een politiek program voor zijn campagne. Hij besteedt nogal wat woorden met uit te leggen wat hij be-

doelt met 'De Islamitische Orde' en hij definieert die als volgt:

'De meest complete definitie van de Islamitische Orde is: de eenheid van religie en wet, opleiding en kracht, idealen en belangen, de spirituele samenleving en de Staat en al dit met de harmonisering van de spontaniteit en verplichting ... de moslim bestaat absoluut niet als een onafhankelijk individu. Als hij wil leven en moslim blijven, dan moet hij een omgeving scheppen, een samenleving en een orde. Hij moet de wereld veranderen of hij wordt het slachtoffer van veranderingen. De geschiedenis heeft nog geen islamitische beweging laten zien die niet gelijktijdig een politieke beweging was, want islam is een religie, maar tegelijkertijd een filosofie, een ethiek, een orde, een stijl en een omgeving; dat is, een totale wijze van leven.'

Een duidelijke reactionaire opvatting. De moslim moet zijn omgeving scheppen en de wereld veranderen, anders wordt hij het slachtoffer van veranderingen. De nadruk op 'orde', de ontkenning van het individu, de verwoording van 'een totale wijze van leven', het zijn onmiskenbare eigenschappen van een fascistische samenleving.

Zo ook het volgende citaat:

'... in het principe van [moslim]broederschap ... ligt een verplichting voor de islamitische gemeenschap om instituties te scheppen waarin wordt recht gesproken in overeenstemming met haar behoeften ... De verschillende wetten, procedures en initiatieven die de werkelijke islamitische macht zou mogen doorvoeren om aan de principes van de moslim broedergemeenschap te beantwoorden zijn ontelbaar en onbeperkt.'

Verder:

'De opvoeding van de bevolking, en in het bijzonder de media die een effect op het publiek hebben, zoals kranten, radio en televisie, moet worden toevertrouwd aan mensen met een onbesproken islamitische reputatie, morele houding en intellect.'

De verplichting om instituties te scheppen die in overeenstemming zijn met haar behoeften, onbeperkte wetgeving voor de islamitische macht en totale controle over opvoeding en de media; hier wordt een pleidooi gehouden voor een totalitaire staat.

En wat schrijft deze man, waarvoor Mabel Wisse Smit zo gedreven bezig is, over andere samenlevingsvormen:

'... de belangrijkste zaak die de Q'uran aanbeveelt is: alles van islam; al het andere is slechts een detail en een verklaring van dit centrale idee. Dit aspect van islam bevat het principe van de Islamitische Orde, dat is te zeggen de vereniging van religie en politiek, maar het heeft ook consequenties voor een fundamenteel praktisch belang, waar-

van de eerste is de onmogelijkheid om de Islamitische Orde te vermengen met niet-islamitische systemen. Het is in feite onmogelijk dat er vrede of samenleving kan bestaan tussen de islamitische religie en niet-islamitische sociale en politieke instituties.'

De onmogelijkheid om de Islamitische Orde te vermengen met niet-islamitische systemen, ja zelfs de onmogelijkheid van vrede of samenleving, geeft in duidelijkheid aan elke verantwoordelijkheid de Bosnische moslimregering draagt voor de oorlog in Bosnië-Herzegowina. Het laat ook duidelijk zien vanuit wat voor mentaliteit de Albanezen een gruwelijke etnische zuivering van Kosovo hebben uitgevoerd, onder het wakend oog overigens van de NAVO-troepen.

Praktische uitwerking

Elders schrijft Izetbegovic:

'Men kan geen Islamitische Orde vestigen, behalve in een land waar de moslims de meerderheid van de bevolking uitmaken.'

Joegoslavië kon daarom geen optie zijn, aangezien de moslims veruit in de minderheid waren. Maar ook in Bosnië vormden zij een minderheid, de helft van het land was Servisch, slechts een kwart was moslim. De consequentie van de opvattingen was dan ook niet alleen de afscheiding van Joegoslavië, maar ook oorlog tegen andere etnische groepen in Bosnië. Hierover schrijft Izetbegovic, daarbij teruggrijpend op de Koran:

'En om tegen hen te vechten bereid je je voor met alles wat je hebt op het gebied van macht en uitgeruste cavalerie, zodat je de vijanden van Allah en jouw vijanden kunt bevechten, en andere vijanden die je niet kent, maar die Allah wel kent. En alles wat je offert op het pad naar Allah zal vorstelijk worden terug betaald en je zult geen verliezen lijden.'

Dit is een regelrechte oproep om andere etnische groepen te bevechten, waarbij een vorstelijke beloning in het vooruitzicht wordt gesteld. Verder schrijft hij:

'Oh Profeet, spoor de gelovigen aan om te strijden. Als er onder jullie twintig worden gevonden die weten vol te houden, dan zullen ze tweehonderd overwinnen, als er honderd gevonden worden dan zullen duizend ongelovigen worden overwonnen, want dat zijn mensen die dat niet kunnen begrijpen.'

Hier wordt de profeet gevraagd de gelovigen aan te sporen te vechten tegen de ongelovigen, d.w.z. de niet-moslims, 'die dat niet kunnen begrijpen'. Als de media gelijk zouden hebben gehad dat de moslims slachtoffers waren van Ser-

visch geweld, dan hadden ze geen profeet nodig om naar de wapens te grijpen om zich te verdedigen.

En hoe mochten de gelovigen vechten? Zie hier wat Izetbegovic schrijft:

'De sanctie voor een slechte daad is een andere en identieke slechte daad (een straf). Maar wie vergeeft en hervormt, brengt een last op Allah. Hij houdt niet van ongerechtigheid... Bestrijd op Allah's pad zij die jou bestrijden en wees niet ongehoorzaam. Allah houdt niet van de ongehoorzame! Dood ze wanneer je ze vindt, verjaag ze waar ze jou verjaagd hebben, samenwerking is een grotere zonde dan moord. Maar vecht niet tegen ze in de buurt van een heilige moskee, tenzij zij beginnen. En als ze je daar aanvallen, dood ze dan. Dat is de vergel-

Het is in feite onmogelijk dat er vrede of samenleving kan bestaan tussen de islamitische religie en niet-islamitische sociale en politieke instituties

ding tegen de ongelovigen. Mochten zij stoppen, dan zal Allah zeker genadig zijn.'

Oog om oog, tand om tand, moorden en niet vergeven, want dat betekent een last voor Allah! Wees niet ongehoorzaam, dood de ongelovige. Samenwerking is een grotere zonde dan moorden. De moordpartijen van de moslimstrijders in Bosnië worden zorgvuldig buiten beeld gehouden. De gebeurtenissen rond Srebrenica zijn een goed voorbeeld. Voortdurend wordt het beeld overeind gehouden van de vermeende massamoord op achtduizend moslims, terwijl er talloze feiten en berichten zijn die de bewering onderuit halen. Waar niemand over praat is dat in het jaar voorafgaande aan de inname van Srebrenica meer dan honderd Servische dorpen rondom Srebrenica zijn verwoest door moslimbendes onder leiding van Naser Oric, waarbij naar schatting tweeduizend mensen het leven hebben gelaten. Oric loopt gewoon vrij rond en heeft een nachtclub in Tuzla.

Handzar Divisie

Het fascistische karakter van Izetbegovic wordt nog duidelijker uit de door hem persoonlijk heropgerichte Handzar Divisie. De oorspronkelijke Handzar Divisie was opgericht door de Groot Moefiti van Jeruzalem, een bond-

genoot van Hitler die een helpende hand toestak door naar Bosnië te gaan en in een snel tempo jonge moslimvrijwilligers recruteerde om in samenwerking met de Kroatische fascistische Ustashe jacht te maken op joden en Serviërs. Meer dan een miljoen zijn er in concentratiekampen omgebracht, op een wijze waar zelfs de nazi's niet aan konden tippen.

Voordat de media Izetbegovic vertroetelden als 'democraat en slachtoffer' schrijft de Daily Telegraph:

'Andere en vreemde machten hebben nu de leiding, sommigen van het laagste allooi van het Bosnische moslimleger. Dit zijn de mannen van de Handzar Divisie. "We doen alles met het mes en we vechten altijd in de frontlinie", vertelde een Handzar tegen een VN-officier. Met zo'n zesduizend man sterk, verheerlijkt de Handzar Divisie de fascistische cultuur. Zij zien zichzelf als de erfgenamen van de SS Handzar Divisie, gevormd door de Bosnische moslims in 1943 om voor de nazi's te vechten. Hun spirituele model was Mohammed Amin al-Hussein, de Groot Moefti van Jeruzalem, die samenwerkte met Hitler. Tot verbazing van VN-officieren spraken een aantal van hen, die de leiding over de Handzars hadden in Fojnica, goed Servisch-Kroatisch. "Veel van hen waren Albanezen, hetzij uit Kosovo of Albanië."

Zij worden getraind en geleid door veteranen uit Afghanistan en Pakistan, aldus VN-bronnen. De sterke aanwezigheid van Albanezen is een onheilspellend teken. Het kan betekenen dat het zaad van de oorlog zich al uitspreidt naar het zuiden via Kosovo naar Albanië en naar de Albanezen in Macedonië. Pakistaanse fundamentalisten

hebben een grote hand in wapenleveranties en de kleine wapenindustrie voor de Bosnische moslims.

Hardliners van het Bosnische leger, zoals de Handzar, lijken in toenemende mate steun te krijgen van een groeiend extremistisch leiderschap in Sarajevo, vertegenwoordigd door Ejup Ganic, minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Haris Silajdzic, de eerste minister en Enver Hadzijasovic, de nieuwe legeropperbevelhebber.

Voor deze lieden heeft Mabel 'met pit' zich op gedreven wijze in volle overtuiging ingezet. En niet alleen dat. Zij heeft met haar, inmiddels door Interpol gezochte, vriend Sacirbey invloed uitgeoefend op het Nederlandse beleid, zo blijkt uit het Srebrenica rapport dat op dit moment in discussie is.

Het feit dat een ambassadeur van een ander land invloed uitoefent op het Nederlandse regeringsbeleid is ongehoord. Nog ernstiger is het feit dat de betrokken ambassadeur één van de deelnemende partijen in de oorlog was.

De vraag die velen stellen waarom juist Nederland zo nodig een 'mission impossible' wilde uitvoeren, lijkt te worden beantwoord. Nederland heeft zich aangeboden het vuile werk op te knappen om de Amerikanen een alibi te geven tot militair ingrijpen. Hun luchtsteun aan het Kroatische leger bij het verdrijven van 250.000 Serviërs uit de Krajina, was de eerste aanvalsoorlog buiten het NAVO-grondgebied, en de eerste stap in de uitvoering van de plannen die begin jaren negentig al klaar lagen: het bombarderen van geheel Joegoslavië.



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- * De Internationale beurs van Havana (Fihav): een ontmoeting tussen continenten

Wilt u een proefnummer? Vul dan de bon in op pagina 23

Sagittarius

Van: "Nico Steijnen" <n.h.van.holst@freeler.nl>
Aan: <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Verzonden: zaterdag 30 november 2002 22:43
Onderwerp: [Fwd: The Ustasha Genocide - A Historical

----- Original Message -----

Subject: The Ustasha Genocide - A Historical Review
Date: Sat, 30 Nov 2002 12:43:02 -0000
From: "CDSM" <cdsm_b@btopenworld.com>
To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;>

[HTTP://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK](http://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK) <<http://WWW.STOPNATO.ORG.UK>>

The Ustasha Genocide - A Historical Review

An Introduction to The Ustasha, The Independent State of Croatia...
 The Ustasha are members of a fascist movement, of an ultra-nationalist
 and terrorist orientation, aiming at a Greater Croatia (Ustasha means
 "rebel").

Research Papers
 English:

The application of remote sensing and IT in research of mass graves in
 the system of Jasenovac ustasha camps

By Jasmin Babic, Tomas Cupkovic and Nebojsa Bosiocic (PDF - 2330Kb)

Remote sensing enables a large amount of qualitative new data about the
 Earth's surface to be obtained. It also creates precise geodetic bases
 in a new, efficient and economic way. It can also be applied to the
 discovery of mass graves in the system of Croatian ustasha genocide
 camps. This research demands an interdisciplinary approach and a
 methodology by which we can find the precise location and make a
 detailed analysis of any individual grave.

Georadar test examinations on the place of mass execution - Donja Gradina

By Spomenko J. Mihajlovic, Vasilije Belobrkovic and Vladimir Miletic
(PDF - 460Kb)

Preliminary Project Donja Gradina

By Miroslav Markovic, Jasmin Babic and Nebojsa Bosiocic (PDF - 85Kb)

Related Links:

Federal Court to Hear Holocaust Case Against Vatican

On March 23 in a San Francisco federal court, Judge Maxine Chesney will
 hear arguments for and against a lawsuit filed by Holocaust survivors
 and their heirs against the Vatican Bank and Franciscan Order. Recent
 controversy surrounding the wartime Pope, Pius XII, figures in the
 lawsuit filed by Serbs, Jews, and Ukrainians. The subject of the lawsuit
 is the "Ustasha Treasury", tens of millions of plunder and concentration
 camp gold stolen by the brutal pro Nazi WWII Croatian government.
 Is Genocide Defined by Numbers?

by Stella Jatras

Clearly, the intent of the Nazis' "Final Solution" was to eliminate ALL Jews. But if they had killed a few hundred, or even a few thousand Jews, would it have been genocide? The proof of intent was in the systematic, brutal murder of millions. Likewise, it was the intent of the Croats in WWII to destroy all Serbs, Jews and Gypsies, or in the words of Andrija Artukovic, the 1941 Minister of the Interior in the Ustashe [Nazi] Independent State of Croatia, "Kill all the Serbs and Jews including the children so that not even the seeds of the beasts are left".

The Real Butcher of the Balkans: Pavelic not Milosevic
Ante Pavelic was the original 'Butcher of the Balkans.' He was the leader of the Nazi puppet government of the "Independent Sate of Croatia" who died peacefully in Madrid in 1959. The mass murderer of 80,000 Jews, 30,000 Gypsies, and over 500,000 Serbs survived the Second World War and never faced a war crimes tribunal unlike Slobodan Milosevic whose alleged crimes pale in comparison. Instead Pavelic was offered sanctuary by the Vatican and became a security advisor to Juan and Eva Person before retiring to fascist Spain.

Other Resources:

Jasenovac Research Institute

Holocaust Victim's Museum

Jasenovac, WWII Ustashi Concentration Camp

Encyclopedia of the Holocaust-Vol. 2, page 739, entry: "Jasenovac"

Croatian War Criminals linked to Franciscan Order and Marianist Cult
Witness To Jasenovac's Hell by Ilija Ivanovic
Ante Pavelic: Lord of the Danse Macabre

Jovan Babic's book Little Draculas (about massacre of Serbs in Croatian vilages)
Facts about Croatian Nazi chiefs

<http://www.balkan-archive.org.yu/Jasenovac/index.html>

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Michel Collon en de Verborgen Agenda van de Grootmachten

April 2002

Onlangs hield de Waal Michel Collon zijn boek: "Blufpoker, de grootmachten, Joegoslavië en de komende oorlogen" in ons land ten doop. De Amsterdamse Balie gaf hem daartoe de gelegenheid via een interview door Karel Glastra van Loon en door daarna Joeri Boom (De Groene Amsterdammer) en ondergetekende daarop te laten reageren. De zaal was vol. Velen, onder meer ex-secretaris van Pax Christi Jan ter Laak, konden pas na de pauze worden binnengelaten.

Alles tot één oorzaak herleiden of zich te stellig uit drukken lijkt ook minder handig. Met gelijk hebben ben je er immers nog niet.

Collons gelijk is dat hij de verborgen agenda van de grootmachten boven tafel brengt. Op zich positief, omdat we die meestal vergeten, maar moeilijk omdat deze niet altijd is hard te maken. Collon slaagt daar nochtans in zijn lijvige boek redelijk in, ook al vind ik zijn gegevens over de VS overtuigender dan die over Duitsland. Maar over het eerste wisten we trouwens al veel via de geschriften van Noam Chomsky.

Collons stelling is dat oorlogen eerder beginnen dan wij als burgers denken. Ik kreeg onlangs een e-mail van een Vlaams kamerlid, die me liet weten van de Belgische inlichtingendienst te hebben vernomen dat de Amerikaanse CIA reeds in 1997 in Albanië soldaten van het UCK militair zou hebben getraind. Veel van wat de CIA doet, is geheim. Maar wel is openlijk toegegeven dat de Amerikanen vanaf 1994 Bosnische Moslims en Kroaten trainten en wapens leverden, ondanks een door de VN afgekondigd embargo.

Collon meent dat inzake het UCK de Duitse geheime dienst hetzelfde deed. Wie weet. Onlangs wees Mient Jan Faber publiekelijk op het gegeven dat de CIA in drie dorpen in Noord Macedonië, vlak bij de grens met Kosovo, reeds vanaf eind 1998 UCK soldaten traint. Volgens Chomsky is dat steeds de Amerikaanse strategie: partijkiezen voor een groep en deze dan militair bewapenen en trainen. Nu had dat volgens Faber het voordeel dat door de Amerikaanse invloed op het UCK de recente ongeregeldeheden in Macedonië, die vanuit die drie dorpen werden veroorzaakt, snel de kop kon worden ingedrukt. En wat Duitsland betreft, stoot ik me vooral aan de beslissende, zo niet fatale rol die dit land speelde bij het doen uiteenspatten van Joegoslavië. In lezingen wijs ik, behalve op de politieke blunders van de Joegoslavische leiders Milosevic (het opheffen van de autonomie van Kosovo), Tudjman (liet in 1990 in Kroatië een nieuwe grondwet invoeren zonder het noemen van de

...sche minderheid) en Izetbegovic (liet in 1992 een reeds door hem getekend akkoord herroepen na een geheim bezoek van de Amerikaanse ambassadeur), op het in 1991 door Duitsland doordrukken van de afscheiding van Kroatië.

Collon wijst er op dat Duitsland:

- een uitweg naar de Middellandse Zee wilde,
- supermacht wenst te worden.

Het eerste is niet ondenkbaar. Via Kroatië, dat ook economisch sterk gelieerd is aan dit land, is er nu zo'n uitweg. Door het Duitse succes inzake Kroatië verschenen in 1992 ook de Amerikanen op het Balkantoneel. Volgens Collon uit rivaliteit met Duitsland. Niet onmogelijk, althans voor een deel.

Ernstiger is dat de Amerikaanse supermacht meteen op haar eigen wijze haar stempel op de zaak drukte en bijvoorbeeld de oorlog bijna drie jaar onnodig verlengde, door in 1992.. via druk op Izetbegovic het Lissabon-akkoord van de EU, dat als twee druppels water leek op het latere Dayton, te torpederen.

Duitsland was niet de enige reden. De VS vonden ook vooral (Chomsky wijst daar op) de Russische invloed in Joegoslavië te groot, welk land bovendien op een strategische route ligt, zeker in verband met de olie- en gastoevoer vanuit de Kaspische regio. Ten slotte leken enkele extra eigen militaire bases op de Balkan, zoals nu in Kroatië en in Kosovo, hun geen overbodige luxe.

Collon noemt vijf hoofdlijnen van de VS-strategie:

- het verzwakken van Rusland,
- Oost-Europa controleren,
- beletten dat Japan en Duitsland supermachten worden,
- in de Derde Wereld de vorming van onafhankelijke mogendheden voorkomen,
- Noord- en Zuid-Amerika behouden als eigen jachtgebied zodat de VS overal militaire bases vestigt.

Collon geeft daarover te veel gegevens zodat die daardoor aan onze aandacht ontglippen, ook omdat onze West Europese media daaraan nauwelijks aandacht besteden. In het licht van dit alles zou men zich kunnen afvragen of het in 1999 wel primair om Kosovo ging en niet meer om een oorlog tegen Servië uit geopolitieke overwegingen. Ook gezien het Rambouillet-dictaat; een dictaat dat door vele gezaghebbende mensen fel is bekritiseerd,

zoals o.a. door Heinz Loquai in het geruchtmakende VPRO-radio-interview op 8 februari 2001 en in de bekende BBC-documentaire over de oorlog. Ik houd het inzake de Amerikanen vooralsnog op een dubbele agenda, zoals tevens inzake de NAVO-expansie, tot nu toe ten onrechte louter gerechtvaardigd vanuit 'solidariteit met de Polen'. Lieten we ons niet te veel sussen door Clintons charme? Ook bij zijn Moralpolitik zat immers heel wat Realpolitik.

Het humanitaire aspect negeren, zoals Collon doet, onderschrijf ik niet, maar dat machtsoverwegingen (ook) een rol spelen ben ik met hem eens. Bij de nieuwe president Bush is dat thans zichtbaarder, ook al laat ook zijn bewind niet het achterste van zijn tong zien. Wat ik miste bij Collon is het procesmatige dat men al handelende als grootmacht geïrriteerd kan raken. Dat de eigen geloofwaardigheid op het spel gaat staan, althans in de eigen perceptie. Je hebt al zo vaak bedreigd en de ander wordt ervaren als koppig. Deze eens een lesje te leren is dan een begrijpelijke psychologische reactie, en voor men het weet belandt men in een fuik, waar geen weg terug meer is.

Zo ging het inzake Kosovo vooral. Het spoorde echter tevens met het geopolitieke belang van de Amerikanen. Als het eigen belang op de achtergrond niet mede een rol speelt, en zeker als een wereldbrand het gevolg zou zijn, had men zich niet laten irriteren. De verborgen agenda is dan ook wel degelijk van betekenis.

Ik bespeur dat de progressieve krachten zich daar meer en meer van bewust worden, zeker na het aantreden van Bush. Niet onbelangrijk, omdat voor 2003 de uitbreiding van de NAVO met de Baltische staten is gepland. Volstrekt onnodig, maar zeer riskant en haaks staand op conflictpreventie, omdat het zich al benard en eingekreist (omsingeld) voelende Rusland dat als een casus belli zal ervaren.

Stampij van Europa en de vredesbeweging om die verdere NAVO-expansie te voorkomen zal nu reeds moeten worden voorbereid. Het boek van Collon is daarin wellicht functioneel, zeker indien in een verkorte, meer handzame versie.

Hans Feddema Nieuwstraat 10
2312 KB Leiden Nederland

(De onderstropping in de laatste alinea is van de redactie. RW)

van holst en steijnen

From: CDSM <cdsm_b@btopenworld.com>
To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
Sent: woensdag 8 mei 2002 07:59
Subject: Sex, drugs and guns in the Balkans - NBC News

Sex, drugs and guns in the Balkans
 NBC News

NEARLY TWO YEARS after NATO troops drove Serb forces from this region, rebels are believed to still be skimming profits from drug and sex slave trafficking to fund illegal arms purchases for ethnic Albanian rebel movements.

This trafficking has allowed both the Kosovo Liberation Army in the southern Serbian province of Kosovo and the National Liberation Army in Macedonia to be outfitted with the latest in rocket-propelled grenades, machine guns, mortars, sniper rifles and night-vision goggles.

A look at European police blotters provides evidence of the close links between the rebels and Balkans trafficking. Two recent examples:

In 1999, a court in Brindisi, Italy, convicted an Albanian drug trafficker who also admitted obtaining weapons for the Kosovo Liberation Army.

In the first week of March, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty reported a reversal of the main heroin trafficking route across Albania ? into neighboring Kosovo rather than from Kosovo. Later, two Albanians were caught in Kukës with 20 kilos of heroin bound for Kosovo, and then on to Serbia and northern Europe.

Ali Ahmeti is the leader of the ethnic Albanian rebel movement in Macedonia. Ali Ahmeti, the leader of the Macedonian rebel group, conceded in an interview with MSNBC.com that some of the rebels' funding might come from narcotics trafficking and a flourishing sex slave trade in the region.

But Ahmeti, whom the Macedonian government has arrested on drug charges in the past, maintained that the volume of donations to the rebel movement made it impossible to check their source.

'We try to vet all the money,' Ahmeti said in an interview high in his mountain headquarters in Sipkoviča in northwestern Macedonia. But even Ahmeti admitted he counts rich Balkans smugglers among his supporters. 'We're not so fanatic to say that such money could not reach us,' Ahmeti told MSNBC.com.

To: Ksenija Sigulinski <sigu@worldonline.nl>; Nico & Neeltje steijnen <n.h.van.holst@freeler.nl>
Sent: zaterdag 11 mei 2002 02:09
Subject: Serbs ans Jews

"GOLEM" (Serbs and Jews)

By William Markiewicz

Stanislawski was Russian – probably of Polish origin as his name indicates – a theatre director who was fascinated with the Jewish theatre and revolutionised it. How strong must have been Jewish culture in Europe to attract a non-Jew to its orbit! A two thousand year old fragment of European culture is gone forever and the world will never again know what Stanislawski knew. Stanislawski was inspired by the legend of the Golem, a powerful supernatural entity created by the Cabalistic Rabbi Loew (16th century) in Prague to defend the Jews against pogroms. Golem is perhaps the first android in literature. Once the Golem did his job, the Jews, who didn't fear him and considered him strange and no longer useful, started to torment him. As a matter of fact, they gave him the same treatment the anti-Semites gave them. Enraged, Golem attacked the Jews, and the rabbi destroyed him. The Golem legend attracted not only Stanislawski; Golem was the hero of a varied literature and of expressionistic filmmaking at the beginning of the century. The lines below show how the idea of Golem applies to our times:

Fragments of interview by Mr. James Harff (director of Ruder & Finn Global Public Affairs) given to Mr. Jacques Merlino well known French journalist in Paris in October 1993. Ruder & Finn are a public relations company:

Harff: For 18 months, we have been working for the Republics of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as for the opposition in Kosovo. Throughout this period, we had many successes, giving us a formidable international image. We intend to make advantage of this and develop commercial agreements with these countries. Speed is vital, because items favourable to us must be settled in public opinion. THE FIRST STATEMENT COUNTS. The retractions have no effect.

Question: What achievement were you most proud of?

Harff: To have managed to put Jewish opinion on our side.

We OUTWITTED three big Jewish organizations - B'Nai Brith Anti-Defamation League, the Jewish Committee, and the American Jewish Congress. We suggested to them to publish an advertisement in the New York Times and to organize demonstrations outside the U.N.

This was a tremendous coup. When the Jewish organizations entered the game on the side of the (Muslim) Bosnians, we could promptly equate the Serbs with the Nazis in the public mind.

We won by targeting Jewish audience. Almost immediately there was a clear change of language in the press, with the use of words with high emotional content, such as "ethnic cleansing", "concentration camps", etc. which evoked images of Nazi Germany and the gas chambers of Auschwitz. The emotional charge was so powerful that nobody could go against it.

Question: But when you did all of this, you had no proof that what you said was true. You only had the article in Newsday!

Harff: Our work is not to verify information.

Question: Are you aware that you took on a grave responsibility?

Harff: We are professionals. We had a job to do and we did it. WE ARE NOT PAID TO BE MORAL.

How can we understand that the Jewish establishment was sucked into the antiSerbian machine so easily? They have nothing to be proud of. Like sheep they accepted Harff's claims, without making the slightest effort to verify the claims. They knew that Harff was paid to do a job. And the rest of the world, like sheep, followed the Jews, as who can be more expert on Nazism than the Jews? The charade continues: the media recently reported that Soros has donated a few million dollars to investigate "Serbian crimes"... Why didn't he donate to investigate all the crimes? Investigating only one side increases chances that their crimes will be blown out of proportion by all those unconfirmed stories about 'mega-rapes' and mountains of corpses which have since revived. Also, focusing on one side's crimes automatically puts the crimes of the other side into shadow. The tragedy is, for both Serbs and Jews, that Soros is a Jew. Why this fierce Jewish persistence against the Serbs? Never in history until now have the Jews lead a campaign against one particular nation. The Serbs became the Golem for the Jews. The analogy is even stronger when we remember that the Serbs were the least anti-Semitic nation of Europe and defended the Jews from the Nazis during the war. Why were the Serbs different? The answer is simple: anti-Semitism is of theoretical nature, I don't know one single anti-Semite who hates the Jews for personal reasons. It's always religious, racial, social, or, most often, a phenomenon of habit. Rebecca West who knew the Serbs well, described them as people of investigative spirit; of no-nonsense, and no foggy theories. The Serbs have never suffered from Jews until now, and they were not anti-Semites, it's as simple as that. And what will happen now?

It's true that the sources of Serbian misery do not lie only in the diabolical smartness of Ruder & Finn and the poor judgment of the Jewish establishment. For historical reasons the Serbs have no tradition of developing public relations. They also have bad historical luck; for centuries Germanics and Turks have considered the Balkans their backyard. For Germans it's the route to the Mediterranean, and the Turks left there a remnant of the Ottoman empire – an important Muslim population. The Serbs are the major obstacle to German – Turkish domination in the Balkans. The New World Order considers that a more powerful Germany means a more stable Europe. As for Turkey, it's a NATO member and US ally so not too much is refused to them. The Greeks also resist NWO, but after the Serbian doom they'll be easy to control as well. So, placed between Germany, Turkey, and the Muslim world, the poor Serbs and Greeks don't count too much and they don't have enough money to buy the services of the devil. All this mess favours the neonazis and the

mujahadeen. How will it end? If the Bosnian Serbs are obliged to leave their enclave, they'll go to starve in Serbia because nobody is ready to give a piece of bread to a Serb. If they're obliged to give away all Kosovo, they'll lose their soul because Kosovo for the Serbs is like Mecca for Muslims, Jerusalem for Jews, the Vatican for Catholics. Nobody in the world is at present in the situation of the Serbs.



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William Markiewicz

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From: Paul Davidson <p.davidson@btinternet.com>
To: BICEPS <biceps@btinternet.com>
Sent: donderdag 9 mei 2002 09:05
Subject: Re: On your recent article

Dear BICEPS editorial committee,

Thank you for your reply and I have been to your website and have read with interest your account in praise of what you describe as your new version of 'federalism'.

In it you state that the Yugoslav federation was doomed because the people did not accept domination by one constituent state, namely Serbia. Any school child who has taken an interest in the subject could tell you that this is a bastardised account and it verbatim rendition of the great media lie.

Serbia had the least role in the FRY than any other state. It alone could not change its constitution without the agreement of the other parties. It was the least independent. Tito, as is well known was of Croatian origin. After the war and revolution Tito constructed a federal constitution that was deliberately framed to placate the Croatia and BH, two countries that had been at the heart of the nazi occupation. The peoples of those two countries, more than any others had been indoctrinated with hatred of Serbs and the new constitution articulated the fear they had of Serb dominance, given that Serbs were the majority in the new federation. Lines were drawn on maps to create hitherto non-existing BH that would deprive the majority-rule within the federation. Kosovo was given virtual independence whereas the regions of other 'nations' were given considerably less power. This also led to some bitterness among the Serbs who had formed the backbone to the resistance against German nazi occupation. Millions of Serbs were horribly massacred by the nazi regimes of the Ustashi in Croatia and the islamists in BH.

The new federal army was made up of ALL nations and the commander corps was predominantly non-Serb.

Wealth and social benefits in the federation were shared amongst all the peoples (to the chagrin of some elitists who thought they might cut a better deal on their own with the west).

In the early 1970's Tito initiated changes that redefined the inhabitants of the new federation not as Yugoslav but by their supposed ethnicity. National bureaucracies grew up that promoted the respective national identities (in their own interests) and put the federation on a course for division.

In the 1980's the IMF and World Bank intervened in Yugoslav politics to promote these divisions. From the mid-eighties it became a strategic goal of the US to break up the federation. This policy became more aggressive with the end of the Soviet Union when the West was no longer keen to leave FRY as a buffer state between two conflicting super-powers, a situation they had exploited up to then. The new policy was to dismantle the FRY and use its constituent parts as a geo-platform to re-colonise the ex-soviet states.

Germany was the most aggressive Western power in this. German secret services brought back the exiled nazi leaders in Croatia and undermined further the polity of that nation. The line was, "why should Croatia and Slovenia be subsidising the southern and eastern FRY peoples when their future would be oh so much rosier in the EU and NATO?"

Slovenia did not, as you put it, secede legally. The national regime there illegally started a war against the mostly unarmed and multi-national federal army posts strung out on its western borders. NATO and Germany threatened FRY not to stop them. The constitutional process which could have allowed secession was totally ignored at the behest and with the complete encouragement of German imperialism. At the same time great efforts were made, both in Slovenia and in Croatia to ethnically cleanse Serbs out of all government and state employment and even out of their homes. This is how it all started.

German imperialism then armed the Croatian police militia with tens of thousands of weapons (despite an arms ban) and hoisted the old Ustashi nazi checkered flag of genocide. The killing of Serbs began even before 1990. And in Kosovo it had been going on for years. Thus we see a combination of corrupt interests and NATO/IMF intervention leading to the break-up of what had been a voluntary federal association with all legal and constitutional means for peaceful secession.

Serbia (as in the war) was the one hold-out state. That is why it had to be destroyed.

As for the trial of Milosevic. You say you regard that as the 'lesser evil'. This siding with an illegal imperialist court to stamp out the one nation that resisted the new Empire puts you in the camp of the fools - either unpaid fools or paid tools, I do not care to say which. To suggest that you are happy that the trial in this NATO court "constitute(s) an absolutely crucial stage in the slow but steady elimination of the virus of Stalinism," shows an abysmal failing on your part. If you consider Stalinism to be a crucial weapon used by imperialism against the working class, why do you imagine the imperialists would want to crush it? Can you not see that your office is full of elephants trampling about over your concepts? These elephants are only invisible to you. We all see them clearly enough.

You denigrate Cuba as a bourgeois-nationalist state and then say you would defend it. May I ask you to name one single act you have undertaken in this defence?? No, for it is all words and words come so cheap.

I am profoundly disappointed that an organisation (which I did not know before) that has produced a quite reasonable account of the French elections can take such totally reactionary positions on the two most crucial issues in international politics - in both cases where the US has had its guns trained for decades, Cuba and Yugoslavia.

For all your strong talk of 'BICEPS' you are weak-muscled imperialist stooges, whether you know it or not.

I trust you do not sell yourself at kindergarten prices

Paul D

— Original Message —

From: BICEPS
To: Paul Davidson
Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2002 2:25 PM
Subject: Re: On your recent article

Thankyou very much for your message. It's good to know that someone out there has actually read what we've written - unlike some of our other correspondents, who have tried to enrol us in various nationalist anti-EU campaigns. We hope that you will also get something from the other commentaries, and the texts of our pamphlets, available at www.marxist.org.uk.

Meanwhile, as you rightly say, "now is the time of the breaking down of myths". It is with some regret that we therefore have to part company with you on the final paragraph of your message:

(1) In our view, Cuba is not a socialist society. It is certainly relatively progressive, and undoubtedly deserves our support against US attempts to undermine its institutions, but singling out any one nation-state for special praise distorts the internationalist message of socialism as much as singling out any one nation-state for special condemnation. All nation-states are capitalist (whether market- or state-), and they all require to be analysed critically and independently.

(2) As for Milosevic, he and his co-defendants represent precisely the type of "national Bolshevism" that the left needs to separate itself from, and their trials constitute an absolutely crucial stage in the slow but steady elimination of the virus of Stalinism, which has infected the European left for so long and done so much harm. It would have been better if the Serbian people could have tried and punished them, but that was never going to work in a society where most judges are Milosevic appointees. As with so many other cases where the principle of the lesser evil has to be applied, however reluctantly, better an unsatisfactory and problematic intervention by the UN than no intervention at all.

Yours for socialism
 Biceps Editorial Committee

----- Original Message -----

From: Paul Davidson
To: biceps@btinternet.com
Sent: Thursday, May 09, 2002 11:11 AM
Subject: On your recent article

Dear James,

I have just read your piece in Counterpunch, "No Earthquake in France, Nobody Dead" and want to thank you for this useful analysis, with which I agree wholeheartedly. The collapse of public support for the bourgeois middle ground is notable everywhere, and it to be expected that the mounting lack of identity (in 'nation', 'class', and 'party') felt by the masses will find its expression in diverse ways - abstention, right/left and united 'anti'. The continuing break down of the nation state cannot be answered by "we are all Europeans now" when being a 'European' means everything from a MacDonalds in every French village to corporate control of every home. The 'Europe united against fascism' line cannot hold things together for long, as people want to know what they are for even more than what they are against. But now is the time of the breaking down of myths. If the 'left' gets sucked into this resurrectionist trap of supporting the failing middle against the stagnant right it will be doomed. I have also noted the emergence of contradictory trends within some sectors of the left which are airing radical national solutions, such as 'National Bolshevism' and 'the interest of the working class is to protect the nation state and the national identity against corporate power and misguided cosmopolitanism.' In Holland there are those (not Pim F) on the extreme left who advocate this line and so are opposed to the building of mosques as "it is not part of our national identity." They regard neo-cosmopolitanism (immigration) as a US-led corporate conspiracy to lower national resistance. There are even those who stand with Israel in stamping out 'CIA-Islamist terrorism.' The general tenor

of the discourse has moved towards hysteria as the old safe house of oppositionism crumbles. We live in challenging times when clarity of vision and the avoidance of emotional message is all the more important. Our terrain must be the heart, soul and intellect, not emotion and ego.

I run two email services, one on Cuba (EuroCubaNews) and the other on the sham trial of Slobodan Milosevic. Subscription is free and you are welcome to subscribe. In any case I would welcome to further this dialogue if it would interest you.

Thanks again

Paul Davidson (London)

History-Book

van holst en steijnen

From: Paul Davidson <p.davidson@btinternet.com>
To: <Undisclosed-Recipient:;>
Sent: maandag 13 mei 2002 02:03
Subject: U.S. WON'T "ABANDON" CENTRAL ASIA.: Emperors Clothes

URL for this article: <http://emperors-clothes.com/news/bbc1219.htm>

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www.tenc.net * [Emperor's Clothes]

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U.S. WON'T "ABANDON" CENTRAL ASIA...

BBC Monitoring Central Asia Unit Supplied by BBC Worldwide Monitoring December 19, 2001, Wednesday LENGTH: 1420 words FROM: Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency, Almaty, in Russian 19 Dec 01 [Posted 26 January 2002]

Note: The following text contains no commentary from Emperor's Clothes. For related reading, see end.- EC]

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...WATCH OUT, CENTRAL ASIA!
 by Jared Israel

Below is a report on the testimony of Elizabeth Jones, US assistant Secretary of State for Eurasian Affairs, before the US Senate last December. It comes from Kazakhstan courtesy of BBC. I could find no mention of Jones' Senate testimony in any US newspaper. Fortunately, we have Kazakhstan which is only about 6547 miles away and so it is possible for US citizens like me to find out what our leaders (so-called) are doing.

People in the US - and all over the world - were originally told it was necessary to launch a military attack on Afghanistan to get rid of the Taliban and to arrest Osama bin Laden.

Remember him?

But as far back as December, Undersecretary Jones said something quite different in the media-free privacy of the U.S. Senate.

She explained that no matter what happened in Afghanistan, the US and its allies would stay and "assist" the Central Asian Republics. However:

"that assistance was conditional on economic and democratic reforms and the observance of human rights. Jones outlined US priorities in the region: combating terrorism; reform; the rule of law; Caspian Sea energy resources."

Many who oppose US policy will see the phrase "Caspian Sea energy resources" and think, "Aha! It's oil! They're after oil."

I don't think that's useful for understanding US policy. If the US Establishment needed oil then, as Mr. Castro has argued, they could buy it. Or they could buy the oil wells. Or the local oil companies. There really is nobody interested in standing in the way of the US having a reasonable supply of oil.

Rather, the US establishment, and the Empire of which it is a leading part - perhaps we should call it the New World Empire - is very much interested in protecting its current hegemonic position in the world from possible future challenges coming from Eurasia - namely, from the still-nuclear-armed former Soviet Union.

Hence the drive into Central Asia.

In her Senate testimony, Undersecretary Jones made it clear she wishes to transform the Central Asia Republics into US protectorates. She didn't say it outright, of course, but she used easily decipherable code:

"The USA believes, Jones said, that "certain countries" in the region should noticeably step up their economic reforms and democratic processes, the observance of human rights and the formation of a strong civil society."

Ahh, "a strong civil society." This phrase has a definite meaning in the New World Empire. "Civil society" is strengthened when USAID, the National Endowment for Democracy and other government agencies in the U.S., Norway, Holland and Germany, as well as seemingly private groups, like the CIA-connected Open Society Foundation of George Soros, move in.

What do these agencies do?

They fund people who work for the Empire in the guise of "democratic" this and "human rights" that and "institutes for economic reform" and "independent media."

In the words of Allen Weinstein, the man who conceived the National Endowment of Democracy:

"A lot of what we do today was done covertly 25 years ago by the CIA," agrees Weinstein.
 - Washington Post, September 22, 1991

To "strengthen civil society" these fake democracy-funding agencies set up NGOs, newspapers and TV stations and political parties as a Fifth Column to destabilize local societies along vulnerable lines of conflict. Or they inflame regional conflicts in the guise of "peace" and "mediation" groups. Ultimately

these Fifth Column groups stage, or attempt to stage coup d'états, always under the guise of democratic reform, thus putting US operatives in power.

This happened in Yugoslavia and Philippines. It was attempted in Belarus and Venezuela. The basis is being laid for such coup d'états all over the former Soviet Union.

Since Ms. Jones gave this testimony, the former Soviet Central Asian Republics have become closely involved with the US military, turning over their territory for military bases and allowing NATO forces to train their troops. This situation poses a grave threat to national sovereignty and increases the potential of war and massive destruction all over the world. This Empire is living on the edge.

Note that more than once Ms. Jones explains that the US drive into Central Asia, which is Russia's backyard, does not conflict with Russian interests. Does she mistake the Russians for morons? Does she mistake us all for morons?

Ms. Jones' preposterous statement calls to mind the famous words of the German playwright, Mr. Brecht:

"When the leaders speak of peace the common people know war is coming."
— Bertolt Brecht, 'Hollywood' in COLLECTED POEMS 1913-1956

— Jared Israel

USA pledges not to abandon Central Asia after Afghan war

The USA will not abandon Central Asia after the Afghan war, Elizabeth Jones, US assistant secretary of state, has told a US Senate subcommittee hearing. She said that the USA wanted to help Central Asia carry out reforms in return for help in combating terrorism, but made it clear that assistance was conditional on economic and democratic reforms and the observance of human rights. Jones outlined US priorities in the region: combating terrorism; reform; the rule of law; Caspian Sea energy resources. She described US cooperation with Russia in Central Asia as "extremely close", and said that the USA had more common ground in the region than areas of rivalry with Russia, China, Turkey and Iran. The following is the text of the report by Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency. Subheads have been inserted editorially.

Almaty, 19 December

The USA does not intend to leave the Central Asian region after completing the antiterrorist operations in Afghanistan, and it has declared its long-term plans and interests. Pledge not to abandon region

"We will not leave Central Asia after resolving the conflict (in Afghanistan - Interfax-Kazakhstan). We want to support the Central Asian countries in their desire to reform their societies as they supported us in the war against terrorism. These are not only new but long-term relations," Elizabeth Jones, US assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian Affairs and US president's special envoy on Caspian Sea issues said about US policy in Central Asia. She was speaking at the Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus of the US Senate Committee on International Relations.

High stakes

"The stakes in Central Asia are undoubtedly high," Jones said. "The USA now has thousands of troops working jointly with their Central Asian counterparts in a region which was part of the Soviet Union only 10 years ago. We count on the governments of these states in ensuring the security and wellbeing of our troops and in obtaining vitally important intelligence data, which has helped us carry out such an efficient military campaign in Afghanistan," she said.

Economic benefit

Jones said it was in the interest of the USA that "the restoration of Afghanistan helps develop Central Asia as well. We want to bring in goods and materials for postwar restoration from neighbouring countries as much as possible, in order to stimulate their economies," she stressed.

Jones said that the Central Asian countries are interested in receiving assistance from the USA. "Uzbekistan has asked for support for its relations with the IMF and other international financial institutions. Kazakhstan needs more foreign investment and support to develop the local private sector. Turkmenistan may need support to develop local public organizations. Kyrgyzstan needs help to restructure its debts. Tajikistan, the poorest state in the region, which still has not recovered from the 1992 civil war and a drought, needs a wide range of humanitarian, economic and political aid," Jones said in her report, a copy of which the Interfax-Kazakhstan news agency received from the US embassy in Kazakhstan.

Democracy and human rights

The USA must step up "constant support for democratic political institutions, local NGOs and the independent media" in all five countries.

At the same time, Jones stressed that the USA would render assistance to the Central Asian states only "providing that the latter take specific steps towards reforms."

The USA believes, Jones said, that "certain countries" in the region should noticeably step up their economic reforms and democratic processes, the observance of human rights and the formation of a strong civil society.

"It is not easy to assist in carrying out reforms in Central Asia," Jones, who headed the US diplomatic mission in Kazakhstan several years ago, said. The USA is "largely" concentrating its aid on programmes "to enlighten and encourage the next generation of leaders in the region". This aid includes "the FLEKS name transliterated programme for secondary schools, a programme for university students on the law on supporting freedom and the Muskie programme for graduates. The AYREX name transliterated exchange programme is for young specialists, and the Peace Corps is carrying out a wide-range of programmes for the next generation," the report says.

She does not justify "the existing problems and acute aspects" in Central Asia, however "generations may have to change in order to radically change the basic nature of these (Central Asian - Interfax-Kazakhstan) governments." "One has to recall the history of the region in the 20th century," Jones said.

Priority areas

The USA has three four are listed "major national interests" in the region, she said: preventing terrorism, to providing the tools to carry out political and

economic reforms, establishing the rule of law and ensuring the safety and transparent development of Caspian Sea energy resources.

At the same time, she said, cooperating with the countries in the region in combating terrorism, the USA must pay more attention to the observance of human rights. "Our (US - Interfax-Kazakhstan) numerous initiatives to promote human rights, democracy and economic development are as important as the assistance we render in ensuring security and combating the real reasons behind terrorism," she underlined.

Energy

The development of huge Caspian Sea fuel and energy resources and ensuring their reliable export onto the world market, she said, "largely" defines whether Central Asia will be able to gain economic independence and raise the living standards of its citizens. According to Jones, the USA's policy in this sector focuses on helping these states set up numerous reliable transport routes to export these resources onto the world market.

These hydrocarbon resources are currently being exported to the West in transit via pipelines in Russia, she recalled. The USA, she said, is trying to expand the export opportunities of the Central Asian countries and the companies which are operating there. The White House stresses that its "aim has an antimonopolistic nature, and not an anti-Russian one."

In connection with this, Jones took "pride" in saying that the construction of the most important Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline would start next summer and that by 2005 the pipeline would start exporting oil to the world market. The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan-Shakh Deniz Azerbaijan's gas deposit gas pipeline is also under way.

At the same time, Jones "is satisfied with the fact that the Caspian Pipeline Consortium oil pipeline is officially operating now. This pipeline, linking Kazakhstan with the world market via Russia, shows Kazakhstan's desire to cooperate with the former Soviet republics in developing the Caspian Sea energy resources."

Kazakhstan - the leader

According to an assessment by the USA, Kazakhstan is the country with the highest economic potential in the region. "Stable, multi-ethnic and nuclear-free Kazakhstan, will, most likely, become one of the fifth largest oil producers in the world by 2010. EBRD regards Kazakhstan as the leader amongst the former Soviet republics in terms of economic reforms. US investment in Kazakhstan has exceeded 5bn dollars and is increasing," Jones said.

Common ground

Discussing cooperation between the USA and Russia in the Central Asian region, Jones described it as "extremely close". In her view, "both states want long-term stability and prosperity" in Central Asia, in which they have "important interests".

Jones said that President George Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin "are leading our countries to a new level of cooperation in many spheres, including in Central Asia".

"Putin showed wonderful leadership by actively coordinating the efforts of the leaders of the Central Asian countries to stimulate their cooperation with the USA in combating terrorism. This confirms our old claim that Central Asia is not a game in which only one party could be a winner," Jones noted.

The USA supports the efforts of Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to create a new scheme for dividing the Caspian Sea "as long as these efforts do not hamper the future transportation of hydrocarbons."

"We have more common interests than areas of competition with Russia and other regional powers - China, Turkey and even with Iran," the report stressed.

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Further Reading on US/NATO Encirclement of Russia
.....

For map of Central Asia, see http://www.sitara.com/central_asia_map.html

1) "US Military Pushes into Ex-Soviet Georgia Under Guise of Fighting Terror," by Rick Rozoff can be read at <http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/rozoff/pushes.htm>

2) 'Why Washington Wants Afghanistan,' by Jared Israel, Rick Rozoff & Nico Varkevisser, analyzes the geo-political designs behind the massive deception called 'The War On Terror'
<http://www.tenc.net/analysis/afghan.htm>

* En Français
<http://emperors-clothes.com/french/articles/pourquoi.htm>
* Deutsch
<http://emperors-clothes.com/german/articles/d-afghan-i.htm>

3) What's the Target of the U.S. Move into Central Asia?
Two news reports look at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which includes Russia, China and the Central Asian former Soviet Republics.
<http://emperors-clothes.com/news/sco.htm>

4) Afghan Operation Leaves Russia 'Encircled' by US-NATO
by Sergey Ptichkin and Aleksey Chichkin
<http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/encircle.htm>

5) 'Why is NATO Decimating the Balkans and Trying to Force Milosevic to Surrender?' by Jared Israel and Nico Varkevisser. Can be read at
<http://emperors-clothes.com/analysis/whyisn.htm>

6) Osama Bin Laden was propelled into power as part of the U.S. drive to create an Islamist terrorist movement for use , in the first instance, to crush the former Soviet Union. See the truly amazing account from the 'Washington Post,' 'Washington's Backing of Afghan Terrorists: Deliberate Policy.' at <http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/anatomy.htm>

7) 'Osama bin Laden: Made in USA,' by Jared Israel . This article includes quotes from a New York Times piece documenting the vast sums spent creating Islamist terrorism. It can be read at <http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/jared/madein.htm>

8) To read the New York Times piece quoted in the above article, go to 'Afghan Taliban Camps Were Built by NATO,' By TIM WEINER The New York Times August 24, 1998, at <http://emperors-clothes.com/docs/camps.htm>

9) One of Washington's most amazing uses of terrorists (amazing because of the extent of the hypocrisy involved) is against Macedonia, whose government, like that of Mr. Putin, did everything to please the American Empire. Macedonia is nevertheless - and indeed, all the more easily - now being destroyed. See "Articles Documenting Washington's Terrorist Attack on Macedonia," at <http://emperors-clothes.com/mac/listm.htm>

10) Regarding bin Laden's supposed break with the CIA, see 'Gaping Holes in the 'Washington Hates bin Laden' Story,' by Jared Israel at <http://emperors-clothes.com/news/probestop-i.htm>

MICHAEL PARENTI

POLITICAL ARCHIVE

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How to Order this Book

To Kill A Nation: The Attack on Yugoslavia



1-859-84776-5 (cloth)
Verso Books, 2001

For ten years, US and NATO forces have waged a campaign to dismember Yugoslavia, including 78 days of round-the-clock aerial attacks in 1999 that killed or injured upwards of six thousand people. Drawing on a wide range of published and unpublished material (mostly Western sources) and observations gathered from his visit to Yugoslavia in 1999, Michael Parenti challenges the mainstream media demonization of Yugoslavia and the Serbs, and uncovers the real goals behind Western talk of "genocide," "ethnic cleansing," and "democracy."

To Kill A Nation reveals a decade-long disinformation campaign waged by Western leaders and NATO officials in their pursuit of free-market "reforms." The political and economic destabilization of that country continues today, Parenti shows, as does the forced privatization and Third Worldization of the entire region.

What they are saying about TO KILL A NATION: The Attack on Yugoslavia:

"Parenti has written a brilliant critique of the news reports on Yugoslavia published in the respectable press. Each chapter provides a detailed refutation of the propaganda myths that justified NATO's war. This is by far the most compelling account in print."

— James Petras, co-author of *Empire or Republic?*

"A fierce, elegantly constructed elegy not just for the lives sacrificed in the Balkan wars, but for concepts of national sovereignty and constitutionality ... he writes with a taut cadence that exudes conviction. Extremely disturbing, but, for the brave, jolting and necessary reading."

— Kirkus

"To Kill a Nation is the best explanation of the great crime NATO committed and what it will mean for our future. It is full of insights on the role of US militarism and media disinformation in the service of corporate profits."

— Sara Flounders, editor and co-author of *NATO in the Balkans*

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n holst en steijnen

From: Ruza <despot@wish.net>
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Sent: dinsdag 7 mei 2002 15:12
Subject: zie dit boek

<http://www.michaelparenti.org/ToKillANation.html>