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Aus: junge Welt vom 23. Mai 2005
<http://www.jungewelt.de/2005/05-23/022.php>

UMKEHRUNG DER NORMEN
 EINE DISSERTATION ÜBER WESTLICHE LEITMEDIEN UND DIE KRIEGE ZUR ZERSCHLAGUNG
 JUGOSLAWIENS.

Von Cathrin Schütz

Mit dem Buch »Die Jugoslawien-Kriegsberichterstattung der Times und der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung« von Alexander S. Neu erscheint bei Nomos nach den Büchern von General a. D. Heinz Loquai über den Konflikt im Kosovo und die Vorbereitung des NATO-Krieges gegen Jugoslawien erneut eine beachtenswerte Studie, die sich kritisch mit der Periode des Zerfalls Tito-Jugoslawiens auseinandersetzt. Neu nimmt die Medienberichterstattung über den Balkan-Konflikt unter die Lupe und zeigt, wie die herrschende Meinung, wonach Slobodan Milosevic bis heute in den Augen der deutschen Bevölkerung unbestritten der »Hitler« vom Balkan ist, entstanden ist. Wie konnte es geschehen, daß Serbien für alle Kriege im zerfallenden Jugoslawien verantwortlich gemacht wird und der deutsche Außenminister Joseph Fischer fast unwidersprochen zur Rechtfertigung der deutschen Beteiligung am NATO-Krieg gegen die Bundesrepublik Jugoslawien 1999, in dem es angeblich

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ganzlich vom Tisch legte, forderten Times und FAZ die Mitgliedstaaten die Wahrung der territorialen Integrität, ungeachtet der Tatsache, daß deren Grenzen mit den ethnischen Grenzen nicht zusammenfielen. Indem sie das Prinzip des Selbstbestimmungsrechts für ihre Argumentation selektiv nutzten, betrieben die Zeitungen, so Neu, eine »Umkehr der völkerrechtlichen Normenhierarchie«, an dessen Ende nicht das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker, sondern das der Republiken stand. Dabei wurde ideologisch für einen Systemwechsel »weg vom Sozialismus«, an dem die Teilrepublik Serbien festhielt, argumentiert. »Die Verfassung eines Staates hat nur dann die Chance auf Respektierung seitens der FAZ, wenn es sich um ein ihr genehmes Gesellschaftssystem handelt.« Durch Analogien, »bei denen die Serben dämonisiert wurden«, wurden sie zum »Inbegriff des Monströsen«. Neu gelingt es, Behauptungen der FAZ, wonach Jugoslawien etwa ein »Mißgebilde« und das Staatspräsidium »Werkzeug« des »serbischen militärisch-bolschewistischen Komplexes« war, ebenso dezidiert zu widerlegen wie das gängige Bild vom multiethnischen Bosnien, vom freiheitsliebenden Kroatien und den laut FAZ ausschließlich freiwillig fliehenden Krajina-Serben.

Entgegen der Realität

Laut Neu erschien der FAZ »keine Analogie zu abstrus«, um entgegen der Realität auf dem Kriegsschauplatz dieses Konfliktbild aufrecht zu erhalten. Durch die Abbildung der serbischen Volksgruppe als »Herrenvolk« Jugoslawiens gelang es, »die einstigen Opfer der nationalsozialistischen Kriegspolitik auf dem Balkan . selbst zu den Trägern der völkischen Ideologie« zu machen.

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darum ging, die Menschenrechte der Kosovo-Albaner zu beschützen, sagen konnte: »Ich habe nicht nur nie-wieder-Krieg gehört, sondern auch nie-wieder-Auschwitz«?

Reduktion, Dämonisierung

Neu Dissertation im Fachbereich Politikwissenschaft analysiert die Kriegsberichterstattung der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung (FAZ) und der britischen Times zwischen der Zeit kurz vor Ausbruch bewaffneter Kämpfe Anfang 1991 und deren Beilegung nach dem Dayton-Abkommen Ende 1995. Detailliert zeigt er, wie das vorherrschende Bild über den Balkankonflikt durch Reduktion und Simplifizierung seitens der Medien aufgebaut wurde und zu welchem Zeitpunkt welche Falschdarstellungen über den Konflikt verbreitet wurden. Neu verfügt über eine ausgesprochen gute Kenntnis der Fakten, etwa wenn er auf die falschen Interpretationen der jugoslawischen Verfassung Bezug nimmt. Diese wurde von Times und FAZ instrumentalisiert, um die Argumente für die Auflösung der jugoslawischen Föderation zu untermauern. Sie wurde selektiv zitiert, »wodurch die Aussagen, da aus dem Verfassungskontext isoliert, stets darauf hinausliefen, daß die bundesstaatlichen Organe Jugoslawiens Verfassungsbruch begangen hätten«. Vor allem die FAZ versuchte, »den jugoslawischen Bundesstaat aus ideologischen und anti-jugoslawischen Motivationen heraus . geradezu pathetisch zu unterminieren«.

Ganz im Sinne der Regierung Kohl/Genscher, die mit der überstürzten Anerkennung von Kroatien Ende 1991 die Möglichkeit einer friedlichen Lösung gänzlich vom Tisch fegte, forderten Times und FAZ für die jugoslawischen Gliedstaaten die Wahrung der territorialen Integrität, ungeachtet der Tatsache, daß deren Grenzen mit den ethnischen Grenzen nicht zusammenfielen. Indem sie das Prinzip des Selbstbestimmungsrechts für ihre Argumentation selektiv nutzten, betrieben die Zeitungen, so Neu, eine »Umkehr der völkerrechtlichen Normenhierarchie«, an dessen Ende nicht das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker, sondern das der Republiken stand. Dabei wurde ideologisch für einen Systemwechsel »weg vom Sozialismus«, an dem die Teilrepublik Serbien festhielt, argumentiert. »Die Verfassung eines Staates hat nur dann die Chance auf Respektierung seitens der FAZ, wenn es sich um ein ihr genehmes Gesellschaftssystem handelt.« Durch Analogien, »bei denen die Serben dämonisiert wurden«, wurden sie zum »Inbegriff des Monströsen«. Neu gelingt es, Behauptungen der FAZ, wonach Jugoslawien etwa ein »Mißgebilde« und das Staatspräsidium »Werkzeug« des »serbischen militärisch-bolschewistischen Komplexes« war, ebenso dezidiert zu widerlegen wie das gängige Bild vom multiethnischen Bosnien, vom freiheitsliebenden Kroatien und den laut FAZ ausschließlich freiwillig fliehenden Krajina-Serben.

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Konfliktgegners als »geeignete publizistische Waffe« beschreibt, um »die Emotionen der (Welt-)Öffentlichkeit und der politischen Entscheidungsträger auf Kriegskurs zu bringen«. Ist die Macht der Medien nicht zu unterschätzen, wäre es ein doch allzu kurzschlüssiges Bild, daß sie allein die politische Agenda bestimmten. Medien wie die FAZ haben diese Politik nicht erzwungen, aber sofort erkannt, was auf der politischen Agenda steht. Sie haben den zum Krieg treibenden Politikern die Bälle zugespült, so daß deren Kurs alternativlos erschien, und die Militarisierung der Außenpolitik Rückhalt in der deutschen Bevölkerung gewann.

Alles in allem ist die inhaltliche Analyse von 827 Beiträgen, die die Technik der Medienmanipulation transparent macht, nicht nur für am Balkan interessierte Leser ein echtes Fundstück.

* Alexander S. Neu: Die Jugoslawien-Kriegsberichterstattung der Times und der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung. Ein Vergleich. Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden 2004, 271 Seiten, 49 Euro, ISBN 3-8329-0797-1

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Erkenning Kroatië als politiek signaal

door dr. R.C.R. Siekmann

Europese Gemeenschap en Westeuropese Unie zijn onmachtig gebleken om daadwerkelijk iets te doen aan de situatie in Joegoslavië, maar houden nog altijd de schijn op dat zij bezig zijn met de vreedzame beslechting van geschillen. De fase van diplomatieke bemiddeling is echter stilaan ten einde gekomen, nu ook het laatste bestand, dat van Igalo, met voeten is getreden.

De situatie lijkt duidelijk genoeg: Servië wil Kroatië met militaire middelen aan zijn wil onderwerpen. De EG had er daarom beter aan gedaan definitief een punt te zetten achter haar bemiddelingspogingen, nu men opnieuw onderling te verdeeld is gebleken om zelfs ook maar een principebesluit te nemen over het uitzenden van een vredesmacht. Dat was toch het minste geweest en wel op voorwaarde dat er een staakt-het-vuren tot stand zou komen en alle betrokken partijen in Joegoslavië akkoord zouden gaan. Men had aan dat principebesluit, waaraan door de WEU vervolgens handen en voeten zou zijn gegeven, een opdracht aan de EG-trojka onder leiding van minister Van den Broek resp. aan Lord Carrington namens de Haagse vredesconferentie kunnen verbinden om na te gaan, in een allerlaatste poging, of met name Servië niet alsnog zou zijn over te halen geweest een vredesmacht te dulden.

Wat EG en WEU nu hebben gedaan is zich beperken tot de intentie van militaire beveiliging der civiele waarnemers die momenteel werkloos moeten toezien hoe de vijandelijkheden gewoon worden voortgezet. We moeten vrezen dat deze variant die in een eerder stadium wellicht nog zinvol zou zijn geweest, nu niet veel meer zal kunnen uithalen.

Dwangactie

Wanneer diplomatieke bemiddeling een gepasseerd station is – en *peace-keeping* met toestemming van partijen om een bestand te bewaken behoort ook tot die fase – dan treedt men het domein van de zogeheten 'dwangactie' binnen. De vrede moet dan worden afgedwongen en opgelegd met militaire middelen, of partijen dat nu willen of niet, of er nu al een bestand is of niet. Dat stadium lijkt nu aangeboden en daar heeft de EG in ieder geval niets te zoeken.

Er is slechts één organisatie die zwart op wit de bevoegdheid tot dwangactie tegen staten bezit en dat is de Verenigde Naties. De VN bezitten zelfs het monopolie op dit terrein in de wereld en dat is van tweeërlei aard. Het meest bekend is de mogelijkheid agressie te niet te doen (zie de kwesties Korea en Irak/Koeweit). Minder bekend is de theoretische mogelijkheid met dwang op te treden tegen een staat, omdat de binnenlandse toestand ervan als een bedreiging van de internationale vrede en veiligheid wordt beschouwd.

De Veiligheidsraad zou in beginsel kunnen bepalen dat in Joegoslavië wordt geïntervenieerd om de orde en rust te herstellen. Daarbij is het niet van belang of Kroatië nu wel of niet door een of meer staten officieel is erkend. Het gaat om het herstel van de vrede in de Balkanregio. Dat kan feitelijk betekenen dat Kroatië te hulp wordt geschooten tegen de Servische 'agressie'

omdat dat de beste manier zou zijn om de rust te herstellen. Agressie tussen aanhalingstekens, omdat Kroatië nog geen erkende staat is. Zou Kroatië wel zijn erkend, dan hoeft de VN-operatie daarom nog geen ander karakter te dragen. Zo bezien zal erkenning van Kroatië bijvoorbeeld door Duitsland of zelfs, op een gegeven ogenblik, door alle EG-landen, vanuit VN-perspectief weinig verandering in de zaak brengen.

Hopeloos verdeeld

Nu ziet het er helemaal niet naar uit dat de Veiligheidsraad tot besluitvorming inzake Joegoslavië zal geraken. Daarover bestaat geen consensus tussen de permanente leden van de Veiligheidsraad, waarbij in de Europese context al de tegengestelde posities van Engeland en Frankrijk inzake zelfs maar een WEU-vredesmacht (dus *peace-keeping* en geen *peace-enforcing*) zijn gebleken. Bovendien zal de Sowjet-Unie nog altijd wel tegen VN-bemoeienis in zo'n geval zijn of daar op zijn best sceptisch neutraal tegenover staan, terwijl de Verenigde Staten zich denkkelijk naar de EG-landen zullen richten en die zijn dus als zo vaak hopeloos verdeeld. Als de VN passief blijven, dan zouden individuele EG-landen bij wijze van zuiver politieke daad niettemin tot erkenning van Kroatië en ook Slovenië (zal het federale leger zich nu ook niet weer tegen die deelrepubliek richten, als niemand iets blijkt te doen ten aanzien van Kroatië?) kunnen overgaan. Daarmee symboliserend dat de onafhankelijkheidsverklaringen van die gebiedsdelen, als uitoefening van het zelfbeschikkingsrecht van volkeren die geen werkelijk autonome status was gegund in Joegoslavië, het verdienen gehonoreerd te worden. In juridisch opzicht kan het federale (Servische) optreden dan als agressie, uitmondend in territoriale annexatie, worden gekwalificeerd.

Het zal voor de Kroaten dan wachten op betere tijden zijn die hopelijk veel sneller zullen komen dan de Baltische landen is wedervaren. Door erkenning wordt een politiek signaal afgegeven dat met geweld geen voldongen juridische feiten mogen en kunnen worden gecreëerd.

De auteur is verbonden aan het T.M.C. Asser Instituut voor internationaal recht in Den Haag.

(Advertentie)



Zogezegd

Jan van der Blom. Het inzaaien van wegbermen met gevarieerde kruidmengsels heeft tot gevolg dat met name bij automobilisten de indruk ontstaat dat ons land schoner wordt.

Rijksuniversiteit Utrecht.

Henk Elffers. Wie zijn academische titel vermeldt, anders dan in sollicitatiebrieven, geeft er blijk van de betrekkelijke waarde van een universitaire opleiding niet te onderkennen.

Erasmusuniversiteit Rotterdam.

Opdelen Joegoslavië gevaar voor vrede (slot)

De rol van de westerse media in de burgeroorlog

Nog voor de burgeroorlog in voormalig Joegoslavië uitbrak, werd er al door nationalistische groeperingen (die van Tudjman in Kroatië en van Izetbegovic in Bosnië en Herzegovina) contact opgenomen met Amerikaanse publiciteitsmakers. Reclame- en persbureaus die hun sporen hadden verdiend in de Koude Oorlog en het maken van publiciteitscircussen bij presidentsverkiezingen in de VS. Daar waar het mannetjes maken tot in de finesse wordt beheerst. De nationalistische propagandachefs hadden al snel begrepen, dat een oorlog sneller gewonnen is wanneer je een groot deel van de oorlogsbegroting uitgeeft aan een mediabespeker. Eén van de grootste bureaus op dit gebied is Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs. Tientallen miljoenen dollars ontvingen zij van Tudjman en Izetbegovic voor een planmatige aanpak om het publiek rijp te maken voor het demoniseren van de Serviërs en fondsen te werven in de Moslimwereld.

Ruder Finn arrangeerde vele 'Tonkin incidenten' in Kroatië en Bosnië. Zo werden op 27 mei 1992 in een drukke winkelstraat in Sarajevo granaten tot ontploffing gebracht, waarbij vele doden vielen onder een rij wachtenden voor een bakkerij. De straat was vlak voor de ontploffing afgezet en om de hoek stonden ambulances klaar. Binnen twee minuten na de ontploffing waren tientallen TV-journalisten met hun cameramensen uit de hele wereld ter plekke om verslag te doen, via o.a. CNN, van deze onmenselijke terreurdaad van de Serviërs. Nu zijn de reistijden de laatste decennia wel verkort, maar zo snel.....

Op 21 augustus 1992 vond zelfs een krant als de Britse *The Independent* het te gortig worden. In een paginagroot artikel weerstonden zij de almacht van Ruder Finn en schreven onder de kop "De waarheid is het eerste slachtoffer van pr-offensief", dat de Serviërs werden vereenzelvigd met communisten en Kroaten en Moslims met westerse vrijheid en democratie en welke rol Ruder Finn daarin speelt.

Later, nadat de Serviërs waren gestraft met VN-sancties, kwamen VN-onderzoekers tot de conclusie dat een en ander in scene was gezet en er geen enkel bewijs te leveren was dat Serviërs hierbij betrokken waren.

Ook werd de wereld kond gedaan van de totale verwoesting van de parel van de Adriatische kust, de plaats Dubrovnik, door de Serviërs. Maandenlang stond de pers vol van deze gruweldaad. Tot op heden is de conclusie

betreffende de realiteit dat er maar twee zeer oude gebouwen

met de grond gelijk gemaakt zijn te weten een Servisch-Orthodoxe kerk en een Servische bibliotheek en museum.

In het begin van de burgeroorlog in Joegoslavië werden op de televisie beelden getoond van moslimvrouwen die hun dode familieleden begroeven. Op hetzelfde moment, dat de opnamen aan de gang waren, werden zij beschoten door Serviërs, aldus een plaatselijke 'verslaggever'. Deze beelden zorgden dat het stigmatiseren en demoniseren van de Serviërs tot een hoogtepunt kwam.

Ik kom al meer dan dertig jaar, meerdere keren per jaar, in alle delen van Joegoslavië en weet zo langzamerhand wel wat ik zie als er beelden uit voormalig Joegoslavië tot mij komen. Er was iets mis aan die beelden van moslimvrouwen op het kerkhof..... het waren Servische vrouwen op een Servisch-Orthodoxe begraafplaats. Op een moslimbegraafplaats staan geen Servisch-Orthodoxe kruisen op de graven en vooral ook geen Servisch-Orthodox kerkje. Gemengd begraven, zoals in Nederland, is daar zeer ongebruikelijk en in het algemeen zelfs onmogelijk. Op de TV-beelden waren dus alleen maar Servisch-Orthodoxe kruisen te zien en niet gehinderd door enige kennis van zaken deed Maartje van Weegen in het programma NOVA (NOS & VARA) haar propagandistische arbeid.

Op 1 december 1992 deed journalist drs. J.A.E. Vermaat van dagblad *Trouw* verslag van een reis per auto van Zvornik (op de grens van Servië en Bosnië) en Sarajevo. Volgens zijn relaas pikte hij onderweg in Vlasenica een lifter op. Het bleek een Serviër te zijn. "Even denk ik dat ik vijftig jaar in de tijd ben teruggegaan en een SS'er in de auto heb. Deze Serviër heeft net zulke laarzen en draagt precies zo'n uniform met bijbehorende herkenningstekens als de SS'ers uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog." Verder bericht deze journalist/propagandist dat deze Serviër hem vertelt dat het streven van zijn elitekorps is om alles wat aan de islam herinnert in Bosnië uit te roeien. Ik bespaar u de rest van zijn misselijk makende verhaal. Als illustratie komt boven zijn verhaal een foto te staan van deze Serviër met als onderschrift: "Een soldaat met een Duitse, uit de Tweede Wereldoorlog stammende pet op. In Sarajevo lijkt de tijd een halve eeuw teruggedraaid."

Toevallig had ik het Belgische dagblad *De Morgen* van 30 oktober 1992 gelezen. Daarin stond een artikel van

leiding, leiders en mensen die effectief gebruik weten te maken van de technologie." Potentiële tegenstanders zullen namelijk kiezen voor "asymmetrische benaderingen", waarbij geen front wordt gemaakt tegen de superieure oorlogsmachine van de VS, maar via heel andere tactieken juist de zwaktes worden uitgebuit. "Het potentieel van zulke asymmetrische benaderingen is misschien het meest ernstige gevaar dat de Verenigde Staten in de nabije toekomst te wachten staat." Genoemd worden "lange-afstandsraketten en andere bedreigingen voor VS-burgers en grondgebied". Elders wordt gesproken over "non-traditionele" vijanden die zich in het informatie-domein bewegen. Zulke booswichten "zijn niet beperkt tot het traditionele concept van een geuniformeerde militaire tegenstander". Mede daarom is er behoefte aan "full spectrum dominance", zeg maar heerschappij over de volle bandbreedte.

'Te land, ter zee en in de lucht' was de klassieke kreet van de Nederlandse strijdkrachten. In Vision 2020 gaat het om vijf domeinen: ruimte, zee, land, lucht en informatie. Gezien de "mondiale belangen en verantwoordelijkheden" wordt benadrukt dat de VS hun overzeese aanwezigheid moeten handhaven en snel overal ter wereld troepen heen moeten kunnen zenden. Dat overwicht nog niet betekent dat de oorlogen van de toekomst makkelijk of zonder bloedverlies zullen worden gewonnen wordt onderkend. De gedachte dat de vijand uitsluitend door elektronische en digitale ontwrichting op de knieën kan worden gedwongen (zie Vredes-Info 4/96) wordt door de Joint Chiefs niet gedeeld.

Over Star Wars en NMD zeggen ze opvallend weinig. Nogal aan het eind wordt heel voorzichtig gesproken van een "mogelijk beperkte raket-bescherming van de Verenigde Staten". Misschien verklaren eerdere ervaringen met Reagans geldverslindende SDI de curieuze passage waarin een "redelijke tolerantie voor fouten en vergissingen in het proces van experimenteren" wordt verlangd. Succes kan niet worden gegarandeerd, tekenen de auteurs al vast aan. Ook kan het zijn dat de traditionele concurrentie tussen de verschillende krijgsmachtonderdelen binnen de "Total Force" het al te duidelijk aangeven van zwaartepunten verhindert. Star Wars en zijn varianten zijn vrijwel exclusief het domein van de US Air Force.

Dat geldt niet voor de "informatie-superioriteit", die tenslotte voor elk krijgsmachtonderdeel vereist wordt. Al in Joint Vision 2010 werd het aldus geformuleerd: "Informatie-superioriteit is het vermogen om een ononderbroken vloed van informatie te verzamelen, te verwerken en te verspreiden terwijl men het vermogen van een tegenstander om hetzelfde te doen uitbuit of hem dit ontzegt." Het belang van de National Security Agency (zie elders in dit blad) zal ongetwijfeld toenemen. In JV 2020 wordt gesteld dat de hele geschiedenis door militaire leiders informatie als de sleutel tot het succes hebben beschouwd, maar dat de

huidige 'informatie-revolutie' tot een kwalitatieve omslag zal leiden, ook in de opzet van militaire operaties. De vrees wordt zelfs uitgesproken dat men de capaciteitstoename niet meer kan verwerken. Informatie-superioriteit verschaft alleen voordeel als hij leidt tot superieure kennis en van daaruit tot "beslissings-superioriteit".

Technische innovatie was gedurende het gehele Industriële Tijdperk de sleutel tot het militaire succes van de VS, merken de auteurs op, maar ze willen de blik niet verengen tot alleen technologie. Het gaat erom, nieuwe (en deels ook oudere) 'dingen' te combineren met nieuwe 'wegen'. Kennelijk denken de heren inderdaad niet alleen aan het winnen van conflicten en oorlogen door puur geweld, want met nadruk noemen ze ook "het maximaal gebruik maken van de vaardigheden en hulpbronnen" van onder meer "regionale en internationale organisaties, non-gouvernementele organisaties en particuliere vrijwilligersorganisaties".

Oorlogvoering in het high-tech-tijdperk vereist beter opgeleide militairen. Dat wordt nog een probleem. JV 2020 voorspelt weliswaar een voortdurend stijgend opleidingsniveau, maar dat zal er toe leiden dat steeds minder kandidaten zich voor militaire dienst melden. Hoger opgeleiden zullen bovendien vaak al een gezin hebben, wat de sneuvelbereidheid in den vreemde ook niet ten goede komt. De "doctorandus in gevechtspak", die Alvin en Heidi Toffler in 'De nieuwe krijgselite' in 1994 optimistisch aankondigden (zie Vredes-Info 3/95), blijkt toch ook zijn zwakke kanten te hebben.

Problematisch wordt de samenwerking met bondgenoten die technologisch 'incompatible' zijn. Hun toegang tot gevoelige informatie en informatiebronnen dient beperkt te blijven. Wel kunnen hun gespecialiseerde vaardigheden in een gezamenlijk operatieschema worden opgenomen. Groot belang wordt gehecht aan de mogelijkheid om troepen snel van de ene plaats naar de andere te vervoeren. Het besef bij de tegenstander dat de VS daartoe in staat zijn kan de fysieke aanwezigheid van militairen in een bepaalde regio overbodig maken. Een geavanceerde logistiek is daarbij essentieel.

Al met al een weinig concreet verhaal, dat echter wel aangeeft in welke richting gedacht en gehandeld wordt. Onderkend wordt dat handhaving van de status quo (of expansie) in het huidige tijdperk een hoge mate van flexibiliteit vereist. Of dat voldoende zal zijn om ook de overwinning te behalen in onoverzichtelijke Low Intensity Conflicts, zoals beschreven door Martin van Creveld in zijn werk 'The Transformation of War' uit 1991, is een vraag waar de Joint Chiefs of Staff niet op ingaan. Deze Israëlische militair-historicus constateerde bij generale staven en departementen van defensie tenslotte een "angst om militair impotent te worden of zelfs elke betekenis te verliezen"

Guus Gonggrijp

geheel tegenovergestelde strekking met dezelfde foto als in Trouw. Onder de foto in De Morgen stond de volgende -en enige juiste- tekst: "Een lid van de Kroatische militie HVO probeert te beletten dat een foto van hem wordt gemaakt. Hij draagt een Hitler-kepi, met boven het IJzeren Kruis het U-teken van de Ustasjha's. Dit was de fascistische militie in Joegoslavië, die tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog honderdduizenden Serviërs én Tito-partizanen heeft vermoord. De foto is genomen in de Bosnische stad Prozor, waar de Kroaten onlangs een bloedbad onder de moslimbevolking hebben aangericht."

Is de propaganda nu voorbij?

In juli 2000 werden vier Nederlanders gearresteerd in Joegoslavië. Met veel ophef en bombarie trokken de Nederlandse media en de overheid van leer. Hoe durven ze 'onze jongens' dit aan te doen?!


Enige dagen later sprak een van de leden van het Anti-Fascistisch Front in een interview voor de Amsterdamse lokale televisie AT5 over het feit dat hij één van de vier mannen had getraceerd als lid van de verboden CP186. Dit maakt ook duidelijk waarom zij naar Kosovo wilden. Vanaf de dag dat bekend werd dat zij waren gearresteerd wordt telkens de zoon van (Ik) Jan Cremer voor een TV-camera geplaatst om zijn deskundige kijk te geven op deze gebeurtenissen. Hij heeft n.l. zelf een boek geschreven waarin hij uitvoerig beschrijft hoe hij bij het begin van de burgeroorlog in Joegoslavië is afgereisd en aan de kant van de Kroaten aanslagen heeft gepleegd op de Servische bevolking. Niemand bij de media die ook maar een kritische vraag stelt. U zult hem nog wel tegenkomen als bekende Nederlander bij een van de vele spelletjes op de Nederlandse TV. Wees op uw qui-vive.

Rob Fransen

SARAJEVO: YUGOSLAVIA: SARAJEVO, BOSNIA HERCEGOVINA, 29 OCT 1992, - a soldier of the Croat defence council, HVO, wearing a German WWII army hat, waves off a photographer on the main street of the central Bosnian town of Prozor, which had been the scene of heavy fighting between muslim and Croatian forces at the last weekend. Prozor, on October 28. pku/str-Peter Kullmann REUTER



De Bosnische president Alija Izetbegović was vorige week de laatste. De hoofdrolspelers van Dayton hebben het strijdtoneel verlaten. Begin deze maand blies Milošević de aftocht, de Kroaat Tudjman stierf een jaar geleden. Ze vertrokken allemaal in het aanzicht van het Joegoslavië-tribunaal. Afscheid van een generatie politici.



Renée Postma

De leiders van de zes Joegoslavische republieken in 1991: (vlnr) Momir Bulatović van Montenegro, Milan Kučan van Slovenië, Franjo Tudjman van Kroatië, Kiro Gligorov van Macedonië, Alija Izetbegović van Bosnië-Herzegovina, en Slobodan Milošević van Servië. Foto Srdjan Ilić

Vergane ego's

De verdwenen hoofdrolspelers van het Dayton-akkoord, dat vrede bracht in Bosnië

De één ging dood, de tweede erkende zijn verlies nadat zijn parlement in brand was gestoken en de derde trad af om gezondheidsredenen. De Kroaat Franjo Tudjman, de Serviër Slobodan Milošević en de Bosniër Alija Izetbegović. In één jaar tijd zijn de drie ondertekenaars van het verdrag van Dayton, dat vrede bracht in Bosnië, de drie belangrijkste spelers in het Joegoslavische conflict, van het toneel verdwenen.

Bijna tien jaar lang bepaalden zij het

zingsnederlaag door zijn nationalistische HDZ heeft hij niet meer mee hoeven maken. In *no time* kwamen zijn grootste vijanden aan de macht: president Stipe Mesić, de man die tot het laatst had gevochten voor het behoud van de oude Joegoslavische federatie, en de sociaal-democraat Ivica Račan. Tudjman, die de Kroatische deelrepubliek in 1991 naar onafhankelijkheid leidde, leek de dag na zijn dood, afgelopen december, al vergeten. Jaren van oorlog, verzet, herovering, verdrijving



Elkaar hebben de voormalige leider van Servië (en later Joegoslavië), Kroatië en Bosnië wel gevonden. De Kroaat Tudjman heeft altijd zijn lijnen opgehouden naar zowel Belgrado als Sarajevo. Na zijn dood bleek op zijn bureau een telefoontoestel te staan dat rechtstreeks verbonden was met Belgrado. Al voor het uitbreken van de vijandelijkheden hadden Tudjman en Milošević schetsen gemaakt van een gedeeld Bosnië, waarbij de ene helft aan een Groot-Kroatië zou toekomen en de andere aan een Groot-Servië. Maar Tudjman wist ook Izetbegović

lošević met zijn koele, uitdrukingsloze gezicht, en Izetbegović, de gelovige moslim en melancholieke veldheer tegen wil en dank.

Izetbegović trok een week geleden als laatste de deur zachtjes achter zich dicht. Hij trad af als voorzitter van Bosnië's gedeelde presidentschap en maakte plaats voor de Bosnische Servier Živko Radišić. De 75-jarige moslimleider zou nog tot 2002 hebben kunnen aanblijven. Maar hij is fysiek gesloopt en wil de hem resterende tijd besteden aan zijn 'memoires', waarin hij belooft 'alles zonder verhullingen' te zullen opschrijven.

Dat is althans de officiële versie. Volgens het gezaghebbende Kroatische weekblad Nacional speelde er ook nog iets anders: het Joegoslavië-tribunaal in Den Haag was bezig een aanklacht op te stellen tegen Izetbegović. Hij zou 'objectief' verantwoordelijk worden gehouden voor misdaden begaan tegen Bosnische Kroaten en Bosnische Serviërs. Volgens Nacional, dat dicht bij de Kroatische president Stipe Mesić staat, zou op het laatste moment zijn afgezien van een aanklacht tegen de gerenommeerde moslimleider. 'Met de Amerikaanse regering werd afgesproken dat de kwestie van Izetbegović' verantwoordelijkheid niet op tafel zou komen en dat hij zou aftreden wegens zwakke gezondheid en ouderdom', aldus Nacional.

Het zou merkwaardige ironie geweest zijn: een aanklacht tegen de man die met een helm op achterzandzakken tussen zijn eigen mensen stond terwijl de Serviërs vanaf de heuvels Sarajevo aan slarden schoten.

In een afscheidinterview in Le Monde zegt Izetbegović deze week dat hij altijd bang geweest is dat zijn mensen wraak zouden gaan nemen. Hij wekt de indruk dat dat niet gebeurd is. Maar het Joegoslavië-tribunaal onderzoekt inmiddels een aantal zaken: dode Kroatische gevangenen in Oost-Mostar, dodelijke slachtoffers onder de Kroatische bevolking van het dorpje Grabovica en in de zaak Kazani, waarbij vele tientallen Serviërs uit Sarajevo geliquideerd werden.

De schaduw van het tribunaal valt over alle ondertekenaars van het vredesverdrag van Dayton. Milošević is als enige formeel aangeklaagd. De Kroaat Franjo Tudjman was het laatste jaar van zijn leven als de dood dat hij zou worden aangeklaagd. Hij durfde in de zomer van 1999 nauwelijks naar Sarajevo te komen voor een bijeenkomst van regionale en wereldleiders in het kader van het Stabiliteitspact voor Zuidoost-Europa, uit angst dat hij zou worden opgepakt. Tudjman was panisch dat hij op een geheime opsporingslijst stond.

De afgang van een aanklacht bleef Tudjman bij leven bespaard. Ook de afgang van een desastreuze verkie-

tot ieders verbazing zelfs na enkele maanden mee te werken aan het Joegoslavië-tribunaal in Den Haag.

Milošević' verhaal is nog niet af. Hij heeft zijn nederlaag toegegeven maar daarna heeft niemand meer iets van hem gehoord. Niemand weet wat hij uitspookt in zijn villa in Dedinje, een buitenwijk van Belgrado. Er zijn genoeg mensen die vrezen dat hij zit te broeden op wraak. Misschien doet hij dat ook wel, ver weg verstopt in de bunker onder zijn huis, maar veel zal het niet meer uitmaken. Op straat is de revolutie voorbij.

Ineens zijn ze allemaal weg, terwijl alle leiders van de zes Joegoslavische deelrepublieken op een foto uit 1991 nog naast elkaar staan. Tudjman in het midden, in een duur maatpak - Izetbegović, de zo juist gekozen geleerde uit Bosnië, wat ongemakkelijk naast een zich breed makende Milošević. Ook de andere leiders van de deelrepublieken staan er nog bij - Kiro Gligorov van Macedonië, Momir Bulatović van Montenegro, en de kleine Milan Kučan van Slovenië.

Eigen agenda's

Zo zag Joegoslavië eruit aan de vooravond van het conflict dat honderdduizenden levens zou gaan eisen, van Kroatië via Bosnië tot en met Kosovo, en dat miljoenen van huis en haard verdreef. Het was een federatie van zes naast elkaar bestaande deelrepublieken, aangestuurd door het door Serviërs beheerste Belgrado. Het waren zes politieke leiders met eigen agenda's - zes politieke ego's van verschillend formaat. Van hen is alleen de Sloveense president Milan Kučan nog in functie. Hij wist zijn kleine, etnisch homogene republiek als eerste uit de federatie te loodsen. Slovenië, inmiddels bijna vergeten door de buitenwereld, is kandidaat-lid voor de Europese Unie. De Sloveense 'dorpspolitik' haalt zelden meer de krant.

De op de foto vroom naar boven kijkende Montenegrijn Bulatović en de ontspannen lachende Macedoniër Gligorov kozen aanvankelijk 'tactisch' voor Milošević: zij weigerden zich in separatistische avonturen te begeven. Bulatović bleef hem het langste trouw, hij trad vorige week na de omwenteling in Servië af als federaal premier. Hij had tot het laatst op de sterke man van Servië gewed.

Gligorov was in de begintijd van het conflict ook in het Milošević-kamp te vinden. Hij wilde het oude Joegoslavië zo lang mogelijk intact houden, Macedonië had geen belang bij onafhankelijkheid. Later zag hij in dat hij, vooral ook financieel, meer van de internationale gemeenschap te verwachten had dan van Belgrado en dreef geruisloos weg.

De foto toont een Joegoslavië dat in zijn voegen kraakt. Milošević is in 1991



al ruim drie jaar bezig om de door Tito ontworpen constructie naar zijn hand te zetten. Kosovo en Vojvodina zijn hun autonome status al kwijt. Niemand kan meer een meerderheid tegen Milošević vormen. De grijze communist Milošević heeft het nationalisme ontdekt als instrument om zijn macht te vestigen. Tudjman bijt graag, Izetbegović laat zich uiteindelijk ook meesleuren.

De puinhopen die ze achterlaten vertellen een eigen verhaal. Wie vandaag in het Oost-Slavonische Vukovar (Kroatië) komt, eerste brandpunt van de oorlog, raakt nog steeds verbijsterd over het geweld dat dit romantische stadje geheel in puin heeft gelegd. Maandenlang beukte het zware geschut van het Joegoslavische leger in het najaar van 1991 op het stadje in. Het was het antwoord van Belgrado op het onafhankelijkheidsstreven van de Kroaten. Even buiten Vukovar ligt het eerste massagraf van de oorlog: bijna tweehonderd afgemaakte patiënten uit het plaatselijke ziekenhuis. Vukovar was ook de plaats van de eerste etnische zuivering: tienduizenden Kroaten werden uit de stad verdreven en zouden pas jaren later weer terugkeren.

Het patroon herhaalde zich honderden keren: eerst kwam het zware geschut, daarna de milities en ten slotte de etnische zuivering. Het was het brandmerk van de Serviërs die het Joegoslavische leger aan hun kant wisten, maar zodra het Kroatische leger op de been stond werd de tactiek overgenomen. Het Bosnische leger heeft nooit over zware wapens beschikt.

Wervelwind

Er loopt een spoor van massagraven en puin van Oost- en West-Slavonië in Kroatië, via de omstrede Krajina Bosnië in. Er zijn maar weinig plaatsen in de kleine multi-etnische republiek Bosnië die aan het geweld ontsnapt zijn. In Banja Luka staat geen moskee meer overeind, in Mostar ging de eeuwenoude brug aan barrellen, in Srebrenica kwam de oorlog voor Nederlanders even heel dicht bij, in Sarajevo probeert de internationale gemeenschap de basis te leggen voor een nieuw vreedzaam Bosnië, in Brčko vechten moslims en Servische scholieren deze week nog omdat ze van de internationale gemeenschap naar dezelfde school moeten.

In de destructieve wervelwind die

over het gebied joeg, stond Alija Izetbegović altijd het dichtst bij zijn mensen. 'Deda' (opa) Izetbegović bleef op zijn post, ook al lag het presidentiële paleis in Sarajevo midden in de vuurlinie. Hij werd het symbool van het hardnekkige verzet van de moslims in een landje waar de internationale gemeenschap nauwelijks in geloofde. Waarnemers onder wie James Lyon van de International Crisis Group (ICG) menen dat het voortbestaan van Bosnië als ter-

De drie ondertekenaars van Dayton waren via onzichtbare draden met elkaar verbonden

ritoriale eenheid te danken is geweest aan het heldhaftige verzet van Izetbegović.

De Kroatische president Tudjman liet zich in de jaren van oorlog vooral op de televisie aan zijn volk zien. Wel was hij de eerste om triomfantelijk een buitensporig model Kroatische vlag te hijsen als er weer een gebied was 'heroverd' op de Serviërs: zoals in 1995 in Knin, de hoofdstad van de Krajina, en twee jaar later in Vukovar, dat onder toezicht van de Verenigde Naties werd overgedragen.

De Servische president Milošević heeft zich de afgelopen tien jaar nauwelijks met zijn volk bemoeid. Zelfs in Bosnië, waar om zijn Groot-Servië werd gevochten, vertoonde hij zich zelden. Servische vluchtelingen die uit alle hoeken en gaten van de Joegoslavische federatie het Servische moederland binnenstroonden heeft hij nooit bezocht. Zelfs de slachtoffers van zijn laatste catastrofale avontuur in Kosovo hoefden niet op zijn steun te rekenen. Milošević ging in het kader van de wederopbouw van zijn land na de NAVO-bombardementen liever een brug openen in het noorden van het land, dan op bezoek bij de haveloze vluchtelingen die in lange stoeten van roestige auto's en tractoren een goed heenkomen zochten. Weinig Serviërs zullen de neiging hebben om hem liefkozend 'opa' of 'oompje' te noemen.

de oorlog die in 1993 en 1994 woedde tussen moslims en Kroaten in Bosnië, ging de telefoon achter de zandzakken van het presidentiële paleis in Sarajevo. Tudjman wilde praten over vrede omdat de Centraal-Bosnische stad Vitez, bolwerk van de Bosnische Kroaten, op het punt stond te vallen.

De drie die eind 1995 hun handtekening zetten onder het vredesverdrag van Dayton waren door onzichtbare draden verbonden aan elkaar en aan het oude Joegoslavië. Presidenten van deelrepublieken die leiders werden van onafhankelijkheid. Machtscentra in de chaos van een uiteenvallend land. Sterke mannen die hun eigen dynastieën wilden vestigen door hun zonen naar voren te schuiven. Opmerkelijk is dat niet alleen de zoon van Milošević, Marko met een eigen keten, maar ook de zoon van Izetbegović, Bakir, met corrupte zaken grote kapitalen wist te vergaren. Tudjman had voor zijn zoon een politieke loopbaan in gedachte: hij maakte hem chef van de geheime dienst.

De generatie van de politieke 'mastodonten' in het voormalige Joegoslavië is verdwenen. In Kroatië zit inmiddels een democratische regering die haar uiterste best doet om zo snel mogelijk aansluiting te vinden bij Europa. In Servië en Montenegro moet het stof van de democratische omwenteling nog optrekken. Maar als Koštunica de zaak enigszins in de hand zal weten te houden, zal Europa ook dit land met open armen ontvangen. Bosnië ten slotte staat na het vertrek van Izetbegović ook voor een nieuwe uitdaging. „Izetbegović was een fantastische leider tijdens de oorlog, maar de vrede heeft hij minder goed gedaan”, aldus James Lyon, analist van de ICG.

Hij doelt op de corruptie en vriendschapspolitiek van de partij van Izetbegović, de SDA. Vele miljoenen, zo niet miljarden gulden aan hulpfondsen zijn weggevoerd in de zakken van de verkeerde personen. Bosnië heeft na alle financiële injecties van de afgelopen vijf jaar nog steeds geen eigen economie. De terugkeer van meer dan één miljoen vluchtelingen naar hun huizen blijft een groot probleem. De SDA (Partij van Democratische Actie) van de vertrekkende president heeft zich ontwikkeld tot een nationalistische moslimpartij die zich verzet tegen iedere vorm van integratie. De moslims van Bosnië beginnen daar genoeg van te krijgen. Gemeenteraadsverkiezingen dit voorjaar liepen uit op een nederlaag voor de SDA. De nationalistische retoriek werkte niet meer. De kiezers bleken meer te vertrouwen op de multi-etnische sociaal-democraten van Zlatko Lagumdžija. Op 11 november zijn er weer verkiezingen in Bosnië, ditmaal voor een nieuw parlement. Verwacht wordt dat de nieuwe generatie politici dan definitief zal doorbreken.

2. EEN SMELTKROES VAN NATIONALITEITEN

April ~~2000~~
1998

De eeuwenlange bezetting van Joegoslavië door rivaliserende mogendheden heeft geleid tot voortdurende volksverhuizingen en de verdeling van talrijke bevolkingsgroepen. Het land is dan ook een ware smeltkroes van nationaliteiten. Van 1945 tot 1991 was het land verdeeld in zes republieken (met twee autonome provincies die in Servië waren geïntegreerd). Van de 8 miljoen Serviërs leefden bijvoorbeeld slechts 5,8 miljoen in Servië. De anderen woonden in Kroatië, Bosnië, enz. Vandaag worden zij voorgesteld als "indringers", maar in feite zijn zij vaak "uitgeslotenen" die verjaagd werden uit hun streek. In het kaderstuk op volgende bladzijde kan je zien hoeveel nationaliteiten er in Joegoslavië vermengd waren. Een zeer complexe situatie. In vergelijking is de toestand in België heel eenvoudig: Vlamingen in het noorden, Walen in het zuiden, een mengeling in Brussel.

Als of men Brussel zou verdelen in Vlaamse, Franstalige en Arabische gemeenten...

Bosnië - waar de oorlog woedt sinds 1992 - is de meest "gemengde" republiek: 43% van de bevolking is moslim (die wonen in de steden), 31% Servisch en 17% Kroatisch (voornamelijk boeren). Het is eenvoudig onmogelijk de nationaliteiten te verdelen zonder over te gaan tot etnische zuivering. Beweren Joegoslavië te verdelen is even absurd als zeggen Brussel te willen verdelen in Vlaamse, Franstalige, Arabische, Spaanse, Italiaanse... gemeenten. Absurd en misdadig. Dat is nochtans wat eerst Duitsland en daarna Europa en de Verenigde Staten hebben gedaan in Joegoslavië door de onafhankelijkheid op te leggen aan Slovenië en Kroatië in 1991 en aan Bosnië in 1992.

Washington et Berlijn zetten alles op de kaart van president Izetbegovic, een moslim-nationalist, die de afsplitsing heeft opgelegd. Men doet ons geloven dat het probleem alleen voortkomt uit Servische agressie. En men verzwijgt dat de Westerse "verdeelplannen" de Serviërs willen verdrijven van het grondgebied waar zij leefden en hen beroven van alle economische middelen en infrastructuur. Men verdoezelt het feit dat de Kroatische nationalisten

de moslims in Mostar hebben vermoord en dat de vrede nog steeds niet is teruggekeerd in deze stad, hoewel ze onder het beheer van een... Duitse burgemeester werd geplaatst!

De Serviërs leefden sinds eeuwen in een streek in Kroatië: Krajina. Ze werden er zopas weggejaagd door het Kroatische leger van Tudjman. Deze etnische zuivering (de grootste uittocht van vluchtelingen sinds het begin van de oorlog) leidde tot geen enkele sanktie door het Westen. Integendeel, Washington en Berlijn hebben financieel en militair deelgenomen aan deze zuivering.

Om de controle te verwerven over heel de streek, zijn rijkdommen, zijn regeringen en zijn militair strategische gebieden, hebben Berlijn en Washington beslist Joegoslavië te "reorganiseren", hierbij te steunen op de racistische ultranationalisten en voor deze leiders "zuivere" staten te creëren. Zoiets is onmogelijk zonder de bevolkingsgroepen massaal te doen verhuizen of uit te moorden. Daarom dragen degenen die gekozen hebben om het land uiteen te doen spatten, Berlijn en Washington, maar ook onze Belgische regering die hen is gevolgd, de eindverantwoordelijkheid voor deze monsterachtige misdaden. Ons kapitalistisch systeem, dat hele bevolkingen opoffert aan zijn winstdoeleinden, is een misdadig systeem.



Voor het eerst sinds de tweede Wereldoorlog namen ook Duitse tornado-vliegtuigen deel aan de bombardementen. "Daardoor kwam de eerste internationale actie van bewapende Duitse militairen sinds het einde van de oorlog te vallen op vrijdag 1 september, de dag precies 59 jaar nadat de Tweede Wereldoorlog begon met de inval van Hitler-Duitsland in Polen", schreef het Nederlandse dagblad NRC op 2 september. Deze Duitse 'historische' doorbraak op het militaire vlak is begonnen met het leveren van 'humanitaire' logistieke steun aan de UNO in Joegoslavië. Daarnaast wil Duitsland ook gaan behoren tot de nucleaire mogendheden. Daartoe rekent het op het Franse atoomwapen dat in Europees verband onder haar controle kan komen. In deze evolutie kan Duitsland in botsing ko-

men met zijn huidige bondgenoot, de Verenigde Staten. De economische oorlog tussen de verschillende kapitalistische blokken die niet in staat zijn de wereldwijde economische crisis te beheersen, kan naar een Europese of zelfs wereldoorlog leiden.


Frankrijk en Groot-Brittannië

Ook deze twee landen proberen hun economische, politieke en militaire positie te versterken. In Kroatië en Bosnië kunnen ze niet op tegen de VS en Duitsland. Ze rekenen eerder op hun historische bondgenoot, Servië. Het zijn machten van tweede orde. Daarom zijn ze verplicht de Verenigde Staten en

Duitsland te volgen in hun agressie tegen Servië. Al tijdens de Golfoorlog was Parijs verplicht bondgenoot Irak aan te vallen. Maar terwijl Berlijn en Washington iedere Servische weerstand willen breken, pleiten Parijs en Londen voor een "evenwichtige" oplossing: een kompromis tussen Kroaten, moslims en Serviërs zonder deze laatste teveel te verzwakken. Dit neemt niet weg dat ze akkoord gaan met een opdeling, wat neerkomt op het steunen van de politiek van etnische zuiveringen. Fransen en Britten hebben zich gehaast een belangrijke militaire positie in te nemen op het terrein. Je kan stellen dat hier dezelfde redenering speelt als bij de Franse atoombom: "Wij ook zijn een grootmacht die in staat is de volkeren van de wereld te overheersen".

En Rusland ?

Rusland heeft op dit ogenblik niet de middelen om een politiek van grootmacht te volgen. Het zou fout zijn Rusland op dezelfde voet te plaatsen als de grootmachten die Joegoslavië aanvallen. Joegoslavië is vandaag eerder een oefenterrein. Het Westen bereidt zich voor op het neerslaan van sociale of nationalistische revoltes in de ex-Sovjetunie.



In de kadertjes kan je de percentages van de nationaliteiten lezen in iedere republiek zoals de toestand in 1991 was. Deze cijfers leren : Joegoslavië was (en blijft) het meest "gemengde" land van Europa. In alle zes republieken (en de twee autonome provincies in Servië) wonen heel belangrijke nationale minderheden.

3. DUITSLAND EN DE VS DEDEN JOEGOSLAVIË UITEENSPATTEN

Flash-back. Al geruime tijd wil de Duitse burgerij Joegoslavië uit elkaar doen spatten. Joegoslavië kwam tot stand via het Verdrag van Versailles na de oorlog van 1914-1918. In 1941 viel Hitler het land binnen en ontmantelde het. Slovenië werd opgedeeld tussen Duitsland en Italië. In Servië en Montenegro zetten de nazi's systematische uitmoordingsoperaties op het getouw. Kosovo werd toegevoegd aan het fascistische Groot Albanië. Onder de moslims van Bosnië werden twee SS-divisies opgericht. Groot Kroatië kreeg, met de hulp van de katholieke kerk, een nazi-regime. De bloedige barbarij hiervan kostte onder meer in het uitroeiingskamp Jasenovac 700.000 mensen het leven: Serviërs, joden, zigeuners. Vandaag rehabiliteert Tudjman dat fascistisch regime en heet hij de oude oorlogsmisdadigers welkom. Klaus Kinkel is op dit ogenblik de Duitse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken. Van 1979 tot 1982 was hij de chef van de Duitse geheime dienst BND. De journalist Erich Schmidt-Eenboom beschrijft in zijn boek "Klaus Kinkel en de BND" hoe Kinkel werkte aan de ontbinding van Joegoslavië. Op het ogenblik dat Kinkel chef werd van de geheime dienst, had Duitsland al een belangrijk netwerk uitgebouwd in Joegoslavië. In het begin van de jaren '80 bestond dit netwerk uit honderd agenten. Deze mensen hadden als taak de Kroatische separatistische beweging aan te wakkeren. De Duitse spionnen legden contacten tussen de nationalistische en fascistische beweging in ballingschap. Het mannetje van Kinkel in Belgrado (Servië) was Klaus Dörner. Hij was goed gekend in de nationalistische kringen van Zagreb. Die kringen zouden tien jaar later aan de basis liggen van de afscheidingsbeweging. In 1981 ging Dörner op bezoek bij Tudjman die toen voor de tweede keer in de gevangenis zat wegens separatistische drijfverijen. Dat vormde het begin van een mediakampagne in Duitsland die tot doel had Tudjman vrij te krijgen. Dörner stond ook in nauw contact met Bruno Busic, de ideoloog van "Groot Kroatië". Dörner was

ook vriend aan huis bij Ernest Bauer, de vroegere chef van de geheime dienst van de Ustasji-staat van onder de oorlog. Duitsland moedigde ook de illegale terugkeer aan van Kroatische Ustasji's die na de oorlog uit Joegoslavië waren gevlucht. Dat was onder meer zo voor Tomislav Mici die nu chef is van de afdeling "speciale opdrachten" van de politie van de Kroatische hoofdstad Zagreb. Het "onafhankelijke" Kroatië is in feite een creatie van Duitsland en meer specifiek van de Duitse geheime dienst.

December 91. Duitsland legt de afscheiding van Slovenië en Kroatië op. Europa was nochtans voor de eenheid van Joegoslavië. De toenmalige voorzitter van de Europese Commissie Jacques Delors zei dat er geen sprake zou zijn van Europese kredieten moest het tot een afscheiding komen. Maar Duitsland drukte door.

Februari 92. Tot dan waren de VS ook voorstander van de eenheid van het land. Maar nu veranderen ze plots van standpunt en scharen ze zich aan de zijde van Duitsland wanneer deze laatste de "onafhankelijkheid" van Bosnië opeist. Washington steunt, bewapent en financiert sindsdien met volle kracht het mos-

lim-nationalistische regime van Izetbegović. Kort daarop legt het een verbond op tussen de Kroatische nationalistische moslims, de vijanden van gisteren. Doel: deze legers versterken en het hen mogelijk maken de Serviërs uit te schakelen.

Waarom die Amerikaanse ommeswaai? Na de Golfoorlog zijn Bush en daarna Clinton tot de konklusie gekomen dat ze efficiënte regionale bondgenoten nodig hebben die in het kader van de Amerikaanse Nieuwe Wereldorde als plaatselijke gendarm kunnen optreden. In Europa hebben ze gekozen voor Duitsland. Dat land is versterkt door de opslorping van de voormalige DDR en de ineensinking van het socialisme in Oost-Europa en beheerst steeds meer de Europese Unie door zijn economische en politieke suprematie. Een ideale gendarm voor Centraal en Oost-Europa. Tweede regionale gendarm: Turkije. Washington rekent op de fascistische generaals van Ankara om het Midden-Oosten en zijn olie te controleren. Turkije heeft eeuwenlang de Balkan en een deel van Joegoslavië bezet. Het staat te popelen om terug te komen. Washington moedigt het aan. Bosnië wordt geleid door een integristische nationalistische partij? Geen probleem voor Washington. Integendeel zelfs. Na de repressie tegen de Palestijnen en na de Golfoorlog, zijn de Amerikanen allesbehalve populair in de Arabische en moslimwereld. Door Bosnië nu te steunen, kunnen de Amerikanen zich voordoen als de grote verdedigers van de islam. Ze moedigen Saoedi-Arabië, Iran en Turkije aan om het integrisme in Bosnië te financieren.



Massa-executies door het Ustasji-regime van Ante Pavelic tijdens de tweede wereldoorlog.

IZETBEGOVIC, DEMOKRAAT OF INTEGRIST ?

Izetbegovic, de president van Bosnië en voorzitter van de Islamitische partij wordt in de media voorgesteld als een antiracistische en multi-etnische democraat die wordt aangevallen door de vreselijke Serviërs. Wat denkt en doet Izetbegovic dan?

De drie gezichten van Izetbegovic

Geboren in 1925 engageert Izetbegovic zich voor de oorlog in de "Jonge Moslims", een traditionalistische groep die «de teloorgang van de cultuur en de op drift geslagen modernistische Islam bestrijdt». In 1946 wordt hij tot drie jaar veroordeeld wegens 'nationalisme en islamisme'. (1) In 1970 publiceert hij een "Islamitische verklaring" die

veel stof doet opwaaien. Dertien jaar later wordt Izetbegovic veroordeeld tot 14 jaar gevangenis voor «moslim-nationalisme, dat van Bosnië een etnisch zuivere islamstaat wil maken. Een imam, medestander van hem, wordt veroordeeld omdat hij gemengde huwelijken wil verbieden.» (2). Als men deze feiten voorlegt aan pro-Izetbegovic militanten, dan zeggen ze dat dat oude koek is... «Helemaal niet», weerlegt

professor Gervasi, een Amerikaanse specialist inzake Joegoslavië, «Izetbegovic heeft zonder ophouden gewerkt aan het realiseren van dat programma van 1970.» (3) Even de feiten op een rij.

Wat was de eerste daad op internationaal vlak toen Bosnië door het Westen als onafhankelijke staat naar voor geschoven werd? Aansluiten bij de Organisatie van de Islamitische Conferentie. Het land dat in meerderheid kristelijk is (40% orthodoxe Serviërs en 19% katholieke Kroaten), werd lid van een organisatie die in hoofdzaak gedomineerd wordt door Iran en Saoedi-Arabië, twee staten die zeer actief zijn in de propaganda voor de fundamentalistische islam» (4). In 1990 gaf Izetbegovic trouwens zijn "Islamitische Verklaring" opnieuw uit. Zo 'verleden tijd' is het toch niet...

De man die aanstuurde op afscheuring en oorlog

Begin 1990 weigerde Izetbegovic verkiezingen voor de Joegoslafse federatie «bewerende dat de Serviërs, die wat bevolkingsaantal het belangrijkste zijn, oververtegenwoordigd zouden zijn in het parlement. Tegen verkiezingen in Bosnië volgens hetzelfde principe had hij geen bezwaren. Hier zouden de moslims hun voordeel uit halen.» (5) In november '90 wint Izetbegovic de verkiezingen in Bosnië met een nationalistische lijst, samen met nationalistische Kroaten en Serviërs, tegen de



Slachting in Sarajevo. De publieke opinie is terecht ontzet over zo'n gruwel. Maar de vorige slachtingen waren aangericht door het Moslim-leger dat op zijn eigen burgers schoot om NAVO-bombardementen uit te lokken.



Izetbegovic

multi-etnische partijen, de titistische liga en de liberale partij van Markovic. «Hij verdeelt de macht op zijn Libanees: het presidentschap voor hem, de Serviërs het voorzitterschap van het parlement, de Kroaten de leiding van de regering. Een nutteloze evenwichtsoefening want in de 18 maanden "aktiviteit" heeft het parlement geen enkele wet aangenomen; het enige tastbare resultaat van het nieuwe regime was een regelrechte zuivering in het ambtenarenapparaat en in de openbare diensten (...). De Serviërs betaalden de rekening.» (6) De grootmachten, met Duitsland voorop, hadden het multi-etnische Joegoslavië laten springen, wat wel moest leiden tot een burgeroorlog tussen de nationaliteiten. Zij hadden het bestaan van een zogezegd multi-etnisch Bosnië opgelegd. Maar wie was de eerste die daar voor een breuk zorgde? Luister naar wat Adil Zulfikarpasc, een van de stichters van de SDA-moslimpartij en raadsman van Izetbegovic in de herfst van 1991 vertelde: «Ik had hem gezegd dat hij open met de Serviërs moest praten. Wij wilden een soeverein Bosnië, maar we stelden een konfederatie voor (dat hen autonomie gaf). (...) De Servische raadsman en ikzelf hadden een historisch akkoord voorbereid, we waren in het bureau van Izetbegovic met het dokument dat hij moest tekenen, en ik zag dat hij altijd maar nerveuzer werd. Izetbegovic besliste uiteindelijk tot een referendum voor de onafhankelijkheid, zonder de Bosnische Serviërs. En de conflicten laiden weer op.» (7)

In werkelijkheid trekt Izetbegovic de islamitische kaart. Hij en eerste minister Siladzic beginnen aan een monster-toernee: mei '91 in Teheran, juli in Ankara, maart '92 in Saoedi-Arabië waar de leiders hen een miljard dollar overhandigen en bereid zijn nog dieper in de portefeuille te tasten als Bosnië een islamistische staat wordt, oktober in Teheran en Karachi, nog eens in Teheran in oktober (8). Het doel: steun bekomen voor een oorlogsstrategie. In juli '93 zegt een Brits parlementslid dat hij verbijsterd was toen Siladzic en Izetbegovic verklaarden dat ze de oorlog wilden. (9) In juni titelt *Le Soir* nog maar eens: «Bosnië neemt het wapen van de islam op.» Izetbegovic beweert inderdaad dat «het gaat om een oorlog tegen de moslimbevolking» en bedreigt «de westerse landen die onjuiste standpunten zouden innemen» met een boycot door islamistische landen. (10)

We lezen zorgvuldig wat Izetbegovic schrijft: «Het Servische volk zal in het geheugen van de volkeren altijd geassocieerd blijven met volkerenmoord: moord, verkrachting, vernietiging van cultureel erfgoed.» (11) Voor hem is de vijand dus het hele Servische volk en niet de nationalistische leiders. Dat zijn racistische ideeën. We zouden hier nog andere aspecten van de regering van Izetbegovic kunnen belichten: schieten op de eigen burgerbevolking om een internationale tussenkomst te bekomen, de rol van de CIA achter het regime (12), het inzetten van integristische islamistische huurlingen (13). *Le Soir* meldde dat het integristische kommando dat verantwoordelijk is voor de aanslag in de metro van Parijs «in Bosnië onder de hoede genomen is door integristen van sjeik Anouar Chaabane.» (14)

Besluit: Izetbegovic is een man met drie gezichten. Bij de westerse democraten doet hij zich voor als een antiracist die voorstander is van het multi-etnisme. Tegenover de Arabische progressieven stelt hij zich voor als een strijder tegen het imperialisme. Dat alles is een strategie die werd uitgewerkt door zijn meester, de VS (15), en gepolijst door het Amerikaanse reclamebureau Ruder & Finn, specialisten in het creëren van imago's (16). Alleen dat derde gezicht is echt: Izetbegovic is een pion in de imperialistische strategie van de VS.

(1) Événement du Jeudi, 14.1.1993.

(2) *Le Monde*, 28.8.1983.

(3) Persoonlijk gesprek.

(4) "L'Islam en Bosnie", onuitgegeven tekst van Nikola Vukasinovic.

(5) Rapport voor de Britse parlementsliden door het Balkan Research center, in *Revue Hérodote*, 4/92.

(6) Vernet en Gonin, *Le Rêve écrasé*, p. 99, Ed Jacob, 1994.

(7) Geciteerd in "Die Junge Welt", 8.8.1995.

(8) Vernet en Gonin, *ibid.* p. 178.

(9) Radio Joegoslavië, 29.7.1993.

(10) *Le Soir*, 13.6.1994.

(11) Vernet en Gonin, p. 209.

(12) *Solidair*, 7.7.95.

(13) *Solidair*, 22.3.1995.

(14) *Le Soir*, 4.8.95.

(15) zie blz 15.

(16) Hun rol wordt goed uitgelegd door J. Merlino (France 2) in "Toutes les vérités yougoslaves ne sont pas bonnes à dire", 1994.

Martin S. Past bemande de afgelopen drie jaar in Sarajevo de Buitenpost van het Vredesburo in Eindhoven. In het onlangs verschenen *The Ease of Mind* heeft hij zijn 'gedachtenspingsels tijdens het vredesproces' opgetekend. Politieke analyses, afgewisseld met persoonlijke observaties, poëzie en fictie. Freek Kallenberg sprak met de veelzijdige auteur.

„Ja, wat moet je? Joegoslavië, het land dat ik ken als een prachtig, gastvrij en inspirerend land, werd ineens Beiroet. Een plek waar niemand iets van weet maar waar vrijwel iedereen wel slechte associaties bij heeft”, begint Martin het gesprek. „Als dat de toekomst zou zijn, zou ik daar de rest van mijn leven mee zitten. Het enige wat ik kon doen - naast het vergeten van mijn eigen toekomst - was te proberen de bestaande vooroordelen, ontstaan door de jarenlange eenzijdige berichtgeving in de media, te nuanceren.” Het was met name om deze reden dat Martin S. Past drie jaar geleden naar Sarajevo vertrok om daar een Buitenpost voor het Eindhovense Vredesburo te vestigen. Als muzikant had hij al regelmatig in voormalig Joegoslavië gespeeld, dat hij in de loop der jaren is gaan beschouwen

vanuit een geheel ander perspectief. Dat leidde tot heftige correspondenties over en weer. Tegelijkertijd verdubbelde in deze periode het aantal abonnees van vier- naar achthonderd. Er was blijkbaar behoefte aan een ander soort nieuwsvoorziening.”

In zijn onlangs verschenen boek *The Ease of Mind* gaat Martin S. Past uitvoerig in op de rol van (des)informatie in de oorlog in Joegoslavië. Hij citeert onder andere Jame Harff, directeur van de Washingtonse PR-firma Ruder Finn Global Public Affairs die werkte voor de regeringen van Kroatië en Bosnië Herzegovina en de parlementaire oppositie in de Servische provincie Kosovo.

'Snelheid is het allerbelangrijkste... de aller-eerste bewering heeft de meeste impact. Eventuele latere ontkenningen hiervan hebben

Westeuropese landen grotendeels dezelfde lijn gevolgd als Amerika. Al geloof ik dat dat deels kwam doordat zij zelf geen flauw benul hadden wat anders te doen. Ze hebben kwaad gedaan uit onwetendheid en minder uit slechtheid.”

Vervolg

'Gedachtenspingsels tijdens het vredesproces' luidt de ondertitel van *The Ease of Mind*. Omdat gedachtenspingsels zich niet altijd aan de wetten van de logica houden is het een bij vlagen verwarrend boek. Zo worden politieke analyses afgewisseld met persoonlijke observaties, poëzie en fictie. In het fictieve verhaal, dat als rode draad door het boek loopt, converseert de hoofdfiguur Tejo regelmatig met een ruimtewezen, Koermdjak. Waarom deze

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als z'n tweede thuisland.

Martin: „Je kunt je voorstellen hoe ik me voelde in Nederland; iedere dag dat vreselijke nieuws, vele vrienden waarmee je contact verliest, mensen in Nederland die uiteindelijk zeggen: 'hou toch eens op over Joegoslavië, ik zie al genoeg op tv.' Iedere dag stond ik ermee op en ging ermee naar bed. Ik kon uiteindelijk twee dingen doen: er niet meer aan denken en iets anders gaan doen - wat voor een reiziger als ik al snel betekent dat je ergens anders heen gaat - of erop afstappen.”

Informatie

Hij koos voor het laatste. Sinds december 1997 verblijft Martin S. Past in Sarajevo alwaar hij in zijn eentje de Buitenpost bemant en tal van activiteiten ontplooit.

Om de berichtgeving over voormalig Joegoslavië te nuanceren verzorgde Martin samen met enkele lokale mensen maandelijks een (digitale) nieuwsbrief. Deze werd verspreid in drie talen (Nederlands, Engels en Bosnisch) en door zo'n duizend mensen van over de hele wereld gelezen. Dit zorgde wel eens voor problemen.

Martin: „Tijdens de Navo-bombardementen op Joegoslavië kregen mensen uit Servië dezelfde teksten te lezen als mensen in de Verenigde Staten, terwijl beide groepen de berichtgeving

totaal geen effect', aldus Harff in een gesprek met het Franse TV2. Of beweringen waar zijn maakt Jame Harff niet uit: *'We worden niet betaald om ethische normen in acht te nemen'*. Zo was Harff's PR-firma onder meer verantwoordelijk voor de melding van het bestaan van Servische 'dodenkampen' in Bosnië in 1992. Bewijzen hiervoor had hij niet. Harff hierover: *'Ons werk bestaat er niet uit om informatie na te trekken. Daarvoor zijn wij niet toegerust. Onze taak bestaat eruit om de omloopsnelheid van voor ons gunstige informatie op te voeren'*.

Dat ook de NAVO en de VS zich tijdens de Kosovo-oorlog van deze methode hebben bediend, zal niemand verbazen. Martin S. Past wijst in zijn boek vooral de VS aan als grote motor achter de oorlog in voormalig Joegoslavië. Zij zouden daar hun macht en invloed willen vestigen ten koste van de Europese landen. Soms krijg je tijdens het lezen de indruk dat de situatie in voormalig Joegoslavië helemaal geen interne oorzaken kent.

Martin: „Laat hier geen misverstand over bestaan. Degene die veruit het best in staat waren deze oorlog te voorkomen, komen allemaal uit voormalig Joegoslavië. Maar ik heb de schone schijn van de VS een beetje doffer willen maken, omdat hun politiek niet stopt bij de Balkan. Daarnaast hebben de

figuur?

Martin: „Om te laten zien dat als wij het over ons hele leven hebben, wij nogal eens vergeten dat dat maar een schijntje is vergeleken bij de rest van onze menselijke geschiedenis. En dat de menselijke geschiedenis maar een schijntje is vergeleken bij de geschiedenis van deze aardbol. Mensen hebben nogal eens de neiging om erg trots te zijn op zichzelf. Koermdjak is de belichaming van het idee dat alles anders gezien kan worden, de dimensies, de tijd, de waarheid, het nut en zo verder.”

The Ease of Mind is een vervolg op *In the Balkan of the Mind* uit 1995. Dat ging, zo schrijft Martin in zijn laatste boek, over *'de destructie van mijn belevingswereld. (...) Vernietiging door de fictieve 'grote boze wereld' en de vernietiging van de prachtige dingen 'in mijn eigen kleine wereldje'*.

„Het was een product waarmee ik afreageerde en werd geboren uit frustratie, een zwart boek”, zo verduidelijkt Martin. „*The Ease of Mind* gaat daarentegen over een grotere destructie die er in de wereld gaande is dan ik toen kon inzien. Tegelijkertijd is het bekeken met meer ontspannen ogen, meer nuances. Om die reden heeft het ook een witte omslag.”

Uitwisseling

Martin heeft tijdens zijn verblijf in Sarajevo

naast het schrijven van de nieuwsbrief veel tijd gestoken in het organiseren van culturele uitwisselingsprojecten. Zo bezochten theater- en muziekgezelschappen als Ambrosia, Sarajevo Drum Orchestra, Forbiden Fruits en Pessimistic Lines Nederland. Ze speelden in het alternatieve circuit maar ook in de vluchtelingencentra, tijdens de Hague Appeal for Peace en voor de IKON en VPRO-radio.

Andersom wilde het niet zo lukken met de uitwisseling. Behalve het multi-media gezelschap Vorsicht Bissiger Hund en de band Toad kwamen er uit Nederland geen groepen naar Sarajevo. „Ik vind dat groepen eerst zelf moeten willen komen en zelf hun (financiële) mogelijkheden moeten vinden voordat wij ze verder kunnen helpen in Bosnië Herzegovina. Dat verklaart enigszins waarom er vrijwel geen Nederlandse groepen naar Sarajevo togen”, licht Martin toe.

Martin maakte ook muziekprogramma's voor de Nederlandse radio waarin veel achtergrond informatie over de situatie in voormalig Joegoslavië aan bod kwam. Hij ondersteunde westerse fonds- en donatieorganisaties en lokale organisaties zoals Kolektiv (een culturele en multimedia organisatie), Zelenkovac (een ecologische organisatie), Ambrosia (een culturele organisatie), Alter Art (een sociaal culturele organisatie uit Travnik) en het Sarajevo Drum Orchestra (door middel van donatie van instrumenten).

Verder begeleidde hij filmers en journalisten, maakte informatieprogramma's voor het Vredesburo Eindhoven in Nederland, hielp hij



Martin S. Past in Sarajevo

dragen aan lokale mensen." Daar komt bij dat de Buitenpost als doel had een cultureel en sociaal managementkantoortje na te laten. „In feite heeft de organisatie Kolektiv deze taken op zich genomen. Indien er Nederlanders zouden zijn die interesse hebben om hier verder te gaan zou dat welkom zijn,

echter een bescheiden budget nodig omdat de mensen in Sarajevo niet in een situatie zitten waarin zij dat vrijwillig kunnen doen." Martin vond het heel verfrissend om een aantal jaar met afstand naar Nederland te hebben gekeken. „Nederland is aan het veranderen in die zin dat het niet meer zo kultureel en eigen-

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bij de opvang van vluchtelingen die uit Nederland 'verwijderd' werden en leverde hij informatie aan mensen die Bosnië wilden bezoeken. Martin: „Zoals je ziet, een breed spectrum aan zaken. Maar bijna altijd werden ze door anderen geïnitieerd. Buitenpost zorgde slechts voor de ondersteuning.”

Hobby

Na drie jaar Buitenpost houdt Martin het binnenkort in Sarajevo voor gezien. Niet omdat hij er genoeg van heeft, maar omdat hij zich graag aan zijn eigen doelstellingen houdt en die waren gesteld op drie jaar. De Buitenpost zal niet bemand worden door andere mensen. Er is geen geld voor. Het is moeilijk geld te krijgen voor lopende projecten. Voor het eerste jaar kreeg hij een opstartsubsidie van de SOS rommelmarkten en betaalde het Vredesburo een deel mee. Het tweede jaar moest hij een deel van de onkosten financieren met werk voor de radio of voor journalisten. Het laatste jaar betaalt hij de twee part-time medewerkers, een vertaalster, de reiskosten, accommodatie en telefoonkosten vrijwel uit eigen zak. Martin: „Een redelijk uit de hand gelopen hobby zou je kunnen zeggen. Ik vind het geen probleem zolang ik daar een soort sociale uitkering voor terugkrijg, maar dat is geen gezonde basis om het kantoor over te kunnen

maar belangrijker vind ik het als lokale mensen de werkzaamheden op zich nemen. Het blijft hun stad, hun land en hun leven." Dit leven is voor jongeren in Sarajevo niet altijd eenvoudig. Martin: „De Navo-actie heeft nog eens veel mensen doen besluiten dat zij weg willen uit Bosnië. 'Er is hier geen toekomst' hoor je hen zeggen. Zij bouwen daarom niks op. Ze kunnen geen afspraken aangaan die een of twee jaar duren want misschien kunnen zij voor die tijd wel weg. Er is mij hier vaak gezegd dat ik het hier, in Sarajevo, makkelijk heb want ik kan weer weggaan, wanneer ik wil." Van politiek willen de jongeren vaak weinig weten. „Praktisch alle jongeren, vooral in de steden, weten dat ze zijn verneukt door de politici, dus het bewustzijn is wel degelijk aanwezig. Maar velen proberen zich toch op andere dingen te concentreren om zodoende nog een beetje levensvreugde over te houden.”

Afstand

Hoewel Buitenpost Sarajevo haar deuren zal sluiten, zal de Buitenpost als 'fenomeen' blijven bestaan en nieuwe projecten gaan voorbereiden. Ondertussen wil Martin S. Past betrokken blijven bij projecten die hij heeft geïnitieerd. „Ik hoop ook van harte dat de nieuwsbrief door zal gaan, geschreven vanuit zowel Sarajevo als Eindhoven. Hiervoor is

zinnig is. Het loopt maar een beetje achter de feiten aan, uit de wind. Eigenlijk is Nederland maar een klein land vol zelfmedelijden en betweterigheid, maar te rijk om zowel het ene als het andere in te zien. Tegelijkertijd hebben veel mensen in Nederland me echt fantastisch geholpen. Niet zozeer met dingen of geld, maar vooral met een vorm van begrip en interesse, acceptatie.”

Door opgedane ervaringen begint Martin steeds beter in te zien dat de mensen overal en in het algemeen hetzelfde zijn. Alleen de situatie waarin men zich bevindt, maakt dat de ene meer zus en de ander meer zo doet. „Ideologie is werkelijk geen issue meer en zodoende praat iedereen maar met elkaar mee of tegen elkaar in zonder dat het ergens over gaat. Het is maar net wat ze beter uitkomt.”

Freek Kallenberg

Martin S. Past *The Ease of Mind. Gedachtenspinsels tijdens het vredesproces. Vredesburo Eindhoven, 211 pag., fl. 20,-, ISBN 90-803872-2-3*

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Boekbespreking**'De weg naar de oorlog - Duitsland, de NAVO en Kosovo'**Door
Klaus von Rausendorf (*)

De weten- schappelijke beschrijving van de voorgeschiedenis van de NAVO-oorlog, die in dit boek voor het eerst wordt geopenbaard, is een zeer sterk geformuleerde analyse uit de beschikbare bronnen - documenten van de VN en berichten van de internationale pers -, die in al hun onvolkomenheid ondubbelzinnig bewijzen, dat Duitsland niet zomaar "bereidwillig, overbelast en tenslotte machteloos" (Die Zeit) toevallig in de oorlog betrokken is geraakt. De regeringen van Kohl en Schröder hebben integendeel, nog meer verbeten dan hun NAVO-partners, aangestuurd op de militaire interventie en het stichten van een internationaal protectoraat in Kosovo.

Ze hebben oude modellen van de imperialistische-Duitse balkanpolitiek opnieuw opgepakt. Kenmerkend voor de voorgeschiedenis van de NAVO-oorlog is niet het opgaan van Duitsland in vormen van buitenlandse politiek van de 'westerse beschaving', maar een vorm van buitenlandse politiek, die inzette op 'zelfbeschikking' voor etnische groepen, op afscheiding, op het vormen van ministeriën voor elke etnische groepering afzonderlijk en op een racistische ideologie, d.w.z. een nationalistische buitenlandse politiek, die typerend is voor het Duitse imperialisme in de periode tussen de twee wereldoorlogen, die nu ook, met de NAVO-agressie op de Balkan, de overheersende politiek is geworden van de 'oude' democratieën, de VS, Groot-Brittannië en Frankrijk. Dit blijkt ook duidelijk uit een vergelijking tussen 'voormalig) Sudetenland en Kosovo'. Zeer interessant is de poging van Matthias Kuntzel aan het slot van de beschrijving van de voorgeschiedenis om een eerste min of meer algemene verklaring te geven van deze oorlog. Hij is van mening dat het veel te oppervlakkig en te kort door de bocht is om te zeggen, dat deze oorlog bedoeld is voor een eerste uitbreiding van de NAVO. Ook gaat het hier niet gewoon om een 'Duitse oorlog', hoe gerechtvaardigd het buitenlandse wantrouwen inzake de Duitse Balkanpolitiek ook is. Hij

schrift het volgende: "Eerder nog zal men de oorlog in Kosovo moeten afschilderen als een soort dubbele oorlog, waarin diverse motieven en doelen versmelten in een mix van tegenstellingen. Voor Duitsland was dit een segregatieoorlog. De militaire interventie werd sterk aanbevolen en aangezwengeld, om ten eerste hulp te kunnen verlenen bij de doorbraak van de gewapende aanvallen van het UCK en ten tweede zo een zelfstandige, politiek machtige, rol in de wereldpolitiek te kunnen spelen. Dit was echter niet in het belang van de andere NAVO-partners.

Eerste oorlog van Nieuwe Wereldorde

De VS, Frankrijk en Groot-Brittannië reageerden met hun betrokkenheid bij de oorlog op de impuls uit het Duits 'episch centrum', maar ze verdedigden meteen ook hun eigen belangen. Deze belangenstrijd lijkt te rechtvaardigen om te spreken over de eerste oorlog van de Nieuwe Orde, sinds de val van de muur en het begin van deze 'nieuwe' wereldorde. Het ging de VS erom, de eigen invloed in Europa te behouden, de politieke rol

van de NAVO in de wereld te versterken en de invloed van Rusland af te zwakken. De NAVO-oorlog tegen Joegoslavië moest duidelijk maken, hoe weinig Moskou zelfs in een traditioneel Russische invloedssfeer nog kan betekenen.

Voor de VS is dit een precedent, om de dominantie van Rusland ook in andere gebieden, bijvoorbeeld rond de Kaspische Zee, te kunnen doorbreken of in te perken. Niet zonder toeval heeft direct na de Kosovo-oorlog Zbigniew Brzezinski, de meest welbespraakte lobbyist van de VS-belangen in de oliegebieden van de Kaspische Zee en de Kaspische Zee, partij getrokken voor de Tsjetsjeens afscheidingsbeweging en opgeroepen om "druk uit te oefenen op Rusland, zodat Moskou de republiek in de Kaukasus (Tsjetsjenie) de onafhankelijkheid toe zal staan."

Groot-Brittannië en Frankrijk wilden zowel de eigen militair-politieke meerderheid ten opzichte van Duitsland benadrukken, als ook het opbouwen van een interventiestijfheid, onafhankelijk van de VS, op gang brengen. Duitsland op zijn beurt verzekerde zich van de hulp van Frankrijk en Groot-Brittannië, om de afhanke-lijkheid van de VS zoveel mogelijk af te schudden. Het deed echter tegelijkertijd een beroep op het State Department en het Pentagon, om de Britse en Franse concurrentie uit te schakelen: De uitschakeling van de VN-veiligheidsraad bij het doorzetten van de aanvalse oorlog tegen Joegoslavië was bijvoorbeeld niet alleen gericht tegen Rusland, de macht met vetorecht, maar ook tegen de voorsprong in macht, die Londen en Parijs als machten met vetorecht in de VN-veiligheidsraad tot aan de Kosovo-oorlog hadden.

Kloof tussen VS en EU

De Kosovo-oorlog zou ook kunnen worden betiteld als een overgangsoorlog, die bij deze stand van zaken vast niet zal worden herhaald. Heeft zich immers niet al in 1944-1945 de kloof tussen de westerse machten en de Sovjet-Unie afgetekend, die later gestalte kreeg in de Koude Oorlog? Al werd het ook anders gemotiveerd, toch manifesteerde zich ook in deze oorlog een kloof, nu echter tussen de militaire macht van de VS en haar grootste economische concurrent, de Europese Unie. Op dit moment wordt de oriëntatie op een Europese supermacht, die in belangrijke mate door Duitsland wordt beheerst, sterk beïnvloed door anti-Amerikanisme, dat stoelt op de ervaringen in de Kosovo-oorlog.

Weliswaar wordt ook de nieuwe Europese bewa-ning verkocht als een missie, op wereldniveau, voor de rechten van de mens. Maar een kijkje achter de schermen van de Duitse Kosovo-politiek toont een beeld, dat onvermijdelijk ook alle huidige plannen voor een Europese hegemonie aan de kaak stelt.

Nieuwe wereldchaos

De belangrijkste betekenis van de Kosovo-oorlog is dus, dat hij een aanwijzing was voor het feit, dat de 'nieuwe wereldorde' een nieuwe wereld-chaos is. Deze oorlog was niet alleen de aanzet tot Europees militarisme, maar ook het signaal voor een nieuw wereldwijd streven naar interventie onder de vlag van een 'ethisch imperialisme'. Bewapening ter voorbereiding van nog meer toekomstige oorlogen - dat is het dewes wat je nu alom hoort, terwijl de regels van de VN, dat oorlog eigenlijk voorkomen moet worden en oplossen van conflicten langs diplomatieke kanalen moet gebeuren, uitgehoid en in fette afgeschaft zijn. (...)

Hier ligt dus de bijzondere betekenis van de Kosovo-oorlog. Wat ook de belangen van de concurrentie en de tegenstellingen met de andere NAVO-partners geweest mogen zijn, in de Kosovo-oorlog eindigden zij duidelijk waarneembaar, in het collectief aanzetten tot een, door rassenhaat inge-

geven, segregatie. (...) -Als "versneller van de historie" (aldus Joschka Fischer) heeft de oorlog tegen Joegoslavië Duitsland een plaats onder de zon verschaft en daarmee de schuld breder gemaakt, die de Duitse buitenlandse politiek werpt op de toekomstige ontwikkelingen in Oost-Europa. De Duitse weg naar de oorlog, die intern nooit een punt van discussie is geweest, heeft in kringen buiten de invloed van Berlijn voor hevige irritatie gezorgd.

Uit: 'De weg naar de oorlog - Duitsland, de NAVO en Kosovo' (door Matthias Kuntzel), pag. 199-205. Berlin (Elefantentpress) 2000; 256 pagina's paperback; ISBN 3-88520-771-0/II DM 34,90.

Matthias Kuntzel is politico-oloog en publicist, hij woont in Hamburg en werkt daar als leraar in het beroepsonderwijs. Tot 1988 maakte hij deel uit van het fractiebe- raad van de Grünen in de bondsdag; hij schreef o.a. het boek "Bonn en de bom, Duitse kernwapenpolitiek van Adenauer tot Brandt" (Frankfurt am Main, 1992).

Vert. Toos Plug.

14-7-99

Een Europees gebied in quarantaine, symoniem voor alles wat duister is. De Balkan. Daar zijn de mensen niet 'zoals wij zijn'. Erger nog, daar zijn ze nooit zo geweest als wij. Stigma's die het Westen helpen de eigen wandaden te vergeten.

De achterkant van Europa

door Serge van Duijnhoven

maken via nieuwsk berichten die de stereotypen over 'dat deel van de wereld' – dus niet ons Europa – alleen maar bevestigen en het geloof versterken dat 'die mensen niet zijn zoals wij'. De Balkan is een gebied van heethoofden, primitieveningen, fanatiek en uiterst ruwe bergbewoners. Archaische, onuitroerbare mythen, velen en wrede gebruiken maken de regio tot de jungle binnen Europa.

De Nederlandse cultureel antropoloog Mattijs van de Port verrichte aan het begin van de jaren negentig gedurende een jaar veldwerk in Novi Sad, in het noorden van Servië, waar hij de muzikale en buitennuzikale banden tussen Serviërs en zigeuners bestudeerde tijdens de bacchantisch aandoevende feesten in de schemerige *kaffana's*, de zigeunercafés waar beschaving en barbaarij elkaar raken. Van de Port kreeg niet alleen van zeer nabij te maken met het uitbreken van een nieuwe Balkan-oorlog op het continent, de derde al in deze eeuw, maar hij werd hierdoor ook gedwongen na te denken over de vraag in hoeverre de extreme wreedheid van dit conflict te maken heeft met de cultuur van de Balkan.

Van de Port leverde in 1994 zijn proefschrift af: *Het einde van de wereld: Beschaving, redeloosheid en de overleving van de mens*. Het boek werd vertaald naar het Nederlands door de uitgeverij De Bezige Bode. Het boek is nu te koop bij De Bezige Bode, Postbus 100, 3720 AB Utrecht, telefoon 043 380 0000.

'De geweldadigheden, het bloedvergieten, de vernielingen en emoties die in de loop van de zomer van 1991 het nieuws gingen beheersen', schrijft Van de Port in het hoofdstuk *'De terugkeer van de wilde Balkanbewoner'*, 'leken het voorheen goedgeleids verborgten vertoog over deze wereld als zijnde "de Balkan" naar de oppervlakte van het openbare leven te sluizen. Bij mijn gesprekspartners vielen steeds meer en steeds vaker opmerkingen te beluisteren als zou de totale wanorde, niet-beheersing en wildheid die nu zo snel om zich heen grepen in dit deel van Europa, slechts te verklaren zijn door de "primitieve" inborst van de Balkanbewoners. "Zie je wel", zeiden de mensen tegen elkaar, "zie je wel, dit is die eeuwige, onveranderlijke Balkan, het land van bloedwraak, broederstrijd en stammetwisten, waar de taal van het geweld en de emoties altijd meer hebben aangesproken dan de taal van de rede." Dergelijke opmerkingen leken aanvankelijk uitdrukkingen van verbijstering en ongeloof te zijn. Later klonken ze echter steeds serreuzer.'

In zijn boek verhaalt Van de Port hoe ook veel Joegoslaven zelf vol ongelof en afgrijzen reageerden op het afglijden van hun land richting oorlog. Hoeveel onbegrip er bovenkwam in de optiekolommen van de krant ten aanzien van de wreedheden die door het eigen volk werden begaan. In Joegoslavië zagen veel mensen de oorlog in hun land als een sprong terug naar de barbaarij en

De holocaust was een

atypische consequentie van een rationeel Europa; de Balkan-wreedheden zouden het natuurlijke gevolg zijn van de Balkan-essentie

het primitivisme. 'We zijn geen barbaren, geen wildemannen', was de vraag die veel brievenrichters zich stelden. 'Maar als we dat niet zijn, wat is dan het gif dat nu binnen in ons opborrelt?'

In een interview voor de Vlaamse radio zei Van de Port: 'Ik heb eindeloze hoeveelheden ingezonden brieven verzameld van burgers die naar kranten en tijdschriften schreven waarin je duidelijk de onthuising kunt lezen van mensen die zichzelf hadden gehuisvest in een verhaal over wie en wat ze waren, maar die daar door de oorlog worden uitgejaagd. Die zoiets hebben van: ja, maar wat zijn we dan? Als dit verhaal dat wij over onszelf vertelden niet klopt, wat zijn we dan, wat kan verklaren wat er hier gebeurt?'

Wat je zag, was dat de oorlog voortdurend werd vergeleken met anachronismen, met iets wat eigenlijk niet in deze tijd thuishoort. Het deed denken aan de middeleeuwse belegering van steden, aan de martelpraktijken van heidense legers, enzovoort. Ik las ingezonden brieven waarin onthuisst en tegelijk sarcastisch stond geschreven: zelfs in Afrika spreekt men nu van "balkanisatie".'

De vergelijking is de afgelopen jaren vaker te horen geweest. Martin Bell, de Engelse gentleman-verslaggever van de BBC die ongeacht de omstandigheden altijd even onbespelijk in wil pak voor de camera verschijnt, vertelde in de talkshow van Selma Scott: 'Wat we in Bosnië meemakten sloeg alles. Soldaten die granaten in huizen wierpen waar de burgers zich verschansen en die de huizen daarna onder schot hielden zodat de mensen levend verbrandden. Vrouwen die de tepels ruw werden afgeknipt met een heggenaar, mannen die gedwongen werden motorolie op te likken, kampementen waar meisjes systematisch werden verkracht en gesteriliseerd. Dingen die we zelfs in Afrika nooit hadden meegemaakt.'

DE BALKAN – dat gebied 'daarinds' in Zuid-Oost-Europa – is voor veel westerlingen niet meer dan *empty space*. 'Het grijze deel van ons continent', zo omschreef een journalist het gebied in het Vlaamse dagblad *De Morgen*. H.J.A. Hofland signaleerde op 16 juni in NRC Handelsblad dat de regio 'hoewel het er steeds ernstiger is geworden, toch ver weg is gebleven'. Hofland achtte dit een van de belangrijkste eigenschappen van de Balkan. Hoe vaak de streek ook op het nieuws te zien is, hoeveel journalisten zich er ook ophouden om te fungeren als ons alerte opengeperde oog – voor de burgers van de Schengenlanden blijft het 'ergens ver weg in Europa'. Een bewijs daarvan was volgens Hofland dat de oorlog in Kosovo geen enkele rol speelde in de Europese vertelzinnen die midden in die oorlog plaatsvonden. Dit terwijl de crisis daar toch gezien wordt als het grootste vraagstuk binnen Europa sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog.

Ook al droppen 'onze jongens' lasergeleide bommen boven Servië vanuit F16's en marcheren Hollandse Gele Ridders door Albanië en Kosovo, ook al zwakt er een bataljon van zo'n zesduizend journalisten rond op de Balkan en ook al mist het thuisfront geen enkel journaal – de regio ontglipt aan ons bewustzijn. De luchtoorlog was een virtuele oorlog. We waren wel in oorlog, maar niet echt. Voor de gewone burger in het veilige pretpark van het Westen was het iets van buiten de omheining. Iets wat zich afspeelde in de krant, op tv. Evengoed kun je stellen dat de Balkan een 'virtuele Europese regio' is geworden. Een Europees gebied in quarantaine. Alleen op de stafkartten behoort het tot het Westen.

Brussel mag grootmoedig beweren dat het huis van Europa vele kamers telt, de Balkan moet voorlopig genegeven nemen met het schijfhuis. De beerput in de achtertuin. Waar je liever niet komt, tenzij het strikt noodzakelijk is.

De stigma's zijn de realiteit op de Balkan gaan overschaduwen. De regio bezit – na alles wat er gebeurd is, na alles wat zij zichzelf recentelijk heeft aangedaan, en na


Tijdens een verblijf in Jahorina, in de Bosnische bergen boven Sarajevo, hoorde ik hoe een ingenieur uit Belgrado zich erover beklagde hoezeer Milosevic de Serviërs tot 'het uitschot' van Europa had gemaakt met wie niemand nog met goed fatsoen iets te maken wilde hebben. Voor alle duidelijkheid: dit was ruim een jaar vóór de oorlog in Kosovo tot uitbarsting kwam. Nog niet zo lang geleden kon de ingenieur overal op vakantie. Nu was een uitstapje naar Bosnisch-Servië het meest exotische dat hij zich kon veroorloven. Met een melancholieke blik in de ogen haalde hij herinneringen op aan de tijd dat hij voor zijn studie Moskou bezocht. Een Russische douanebeampte op het vliegveld had hem gevraagd: 'Oost of West? Waarop de ingenieur antwoordde: 'Oost.' De douane vroeg waar hij vandaan kwam. 'Joegoslavië', antwoordde de man. De douanier zou toen hebben gezegd: 'Beste man, dat is niet Oost. Dat is West.'

Een Bulgaarse dame vertelde lachend van de keer dat ze bezoek kreeg, tien jaar geleden, van Russische familie die voor het eerst Sofia aandede. De vader zou hebben geroepen: 'Mijn God, kan het nog westersr dan dit!' Servië, de grillige ruggegraat van de Balkan, heeft zich met zijn onuitputtelijke reeks van wreedheden, slachtingen, belegeringen en zuiveringen verder dan ooit van de rest van Europa verwijderd. Volgens mij was dit wat Emir Kusturica probeerde uit te beelden toen hij aan het eind van zijn allegorische film *Underground* (1995) het stuk land liet losbreken waarop het zigeunerokst stond te telleren op een Servische bruiloft. De schol dreef weg, het water op, en werd van een stukje oever een eiland op drift. Het feest ging ondertussen voort.

'Wat weten burgers uit de Schengen-landen nu nog van grenzen? Vraag het aan een vluchteling, een Koerd of Kosovoar die zwenmend Italië tracht te bereiken...'. Deze bittere constatering is afkomstig van de Kroatische schrijfster Dubravka Ugrešić, die gedurende de oorlog van 1991-95 enige jaren in Nederland doorbracht. 'Toen ik nog met een Joegoslavisch paspoort reisde', schrijft ze in haar essay *'Nice People Don't Mention Such Things'*, 'voelde ik nog niet de realiteit van een grens.' Nadat haar geboorteland in stukken was gebroken en ze van Joegoslavisch staatsburger Kroatische werd, veranderde dat rigoreus. Tegen een wantrouwige beambte die wilde weten wat haar nationaliteit was, antwoordde ze: 'Geen.'

In Kroatië was ze *persona non grata* vanwege haar kritische artikelen over het nationalisme dat de kop opstak. In de rest van de wereld was ze gebrandmerkt als Kroatische, naderhand als politiek vluchteling. Ze voelde zich stateloos. 'Kan niet', zei de beambte. 'Iedereen heeft een nationaliteit. Iemand zonder nationaliteit bestaat niet. Die is niemand. En iedereen is iemand...'

Europa kreeg de afgelopen jaren met de Balkan te



Zigeuners in Emir Kusturica's nieuwste film 'Black Cat White Cat'

alles wat buitenlandse mogendheden (de Turken, Oostenrijkers, Hongaren en Duitsers) haar vroeger hebben aangedaan – geen enkele neutrale betekenis meer. In essentie is 'de Balkan' niets anders dan de aanduiding voor een bepaalde hoge top in Bulgarije (de Balkan-berg), maar tegenwoordig is de term synoniem geworden voor zo'n beetje alles wat duister is op aarde, gecompliceerd, versnipperd en oncontroleerbaar. Een pejoratieve term *l'ouï courri* die is losgekoppeld van de regio.

De Balkan is alles wat het tegenovergestelde is van het moderne, globale, geïntegreerde. Het is het archaische, anachronistische en zelfs tijdloze (in de zin van: dat wat buiten de tijd staat). In de twintigste eeuw, de eeuw van de toestandkoning van de *global village*, is 'balkanisering' het schrikbeeld bij uitstek geworden. Zoals de liberaal Raymond Aron al in 1942 propageerde: 'In de eeuw van vliegtuigen en van de draadloze telegraaf is de verdeling van Europa in een twintigtal soevereine staten even anachronistisch als de sikkkel of de handploeg.'

In de Verenigde Staten is het woord gangbaar geworden in conservatieve kringen als een aanduiding voor het schrikbeeld van de culturele fragmentatie in het debat over de multiculturele samentelling. Ook in Nederland is het negatieve Balkan-stereotype flink ingeburgerd. In *Te bed op de Wallen: Handboek voor de betaalbare liefde*, een boek over de Amsterdamse raamprostitutie van Vincent Bakker, las ik de constatering dat de Wallen na het einde van de Koude Oorlog een kleine afspeellocatie waren geworden van de Balkan. 'Klein Joegoslavië', schrijft Bakker, 'dat ligt tussen de Bloedstraat, de Stootsteeg en de Zeeijk. Razza's onder illegale prostitutieus scheppen het toeristieklimaat waarin Russen en Joego's gedijen. De balkanisering van de Wallen is in volle gang.'

De Balkan is nooit meer zomaar de Balkan. Zelfs als het echt om de regio in kwestie gaat. Het is altijd ofwel die zuidkaap die als een wat provisorische, ongelukkige kiel aan de rest van Europa vastzit, ofwel die donkere, woeste samentone aan de rand van de beschaving: *the Heart of Darkness*, het gebied waar oorlogen scheren als stormwinden over de Azoren.

De streek is verbanen naar de donkere achterzijde van het continent. Het is Europa *'from the other side of the mirror'*. Het is ons alter ego, een wereld zoals West-Europa had kunnen zijn, maar gelukkig niet is geworden – god verhoede het – ook nimmer worden zal. Ook al zijn er op sommige stinkende plekken al wat barsten in het oppervlak waar kleine stukjes Balkan doorheen schemeren, zoals in Vincent Bakkers visie op de Wallen.

Met stigma's moet men voorzichtig zijn. Stigma's plakt men op zieken, zoals men leprozen beltejes om hun nek hing, om ze op afstand te houden. Ze maken hun herkenbaar, en ze leiden de aandacht af van de anderen. Ze helpen het Westen zich van eventuele blaam te zuiveren, of eigen wandaden te vergelien. Het stereotype van de barbaarse Balkan verschaft ons een alibi om minder kritisch naar de eigen werkelijkheid te kijken. In het licht van deze hele eeuw bezien is de geschiedenis van de Balkan voor velen niets anders dan een

aaneenschakeling van onderling verbonden en nimmer eindigende ellende die de ware ziel van het gebied blootlegt ('ze maken mekaar daar al eeuwen af, het is nooit anders geweest en het zal nooit anders zijn').

Hoe begrijpelijk ook, objectief is die visie niet. De wereldoorlogen die vanuit Berlijn, Wenen, Londen en Rome werden bekoksloofd, worden bij ons voorgesteld als geïsoleerde periodes in het verder vreedzame bestaan van het Westen. Volgens deze interpretatie is de holocaust een *atypische consequentie van een weder rationeel Europa*, een vlekje op een verder schoon blazoen, terwijl Balkan-wreedheden het natuurlijke gevolg zijn van de Balkan-essentie.

DE KWALIJKE REPUTATIE hangt inmiddels over de hele Balkan als een *odeur de cadavre* die tot diep in de omliggende landen is geïmpregneerd. Ook in de gebieden waar het inmiddels weer rustig is of zelfs nooit oorlog is geweest, wil de damp niet meer verdwijnen. De Balkan lijkt evenzeer onder zijn stigma's als onder de aanhoudende ellende. Toeristen denken wel twee keer na voor ze nu een hotel boeken in Kryn of Ossijek, of voor ze naar de Igmarische bergen boven Sarajevo trekken. Griekenland, Bulgarije en Kroatië hebben hun toerisme gedurende de afgelopen maanden drastisch zien kelderen en ook de handel tussen de landen onderling op de Balkan heeft een enorme knauw gekregen. Weinig investeerders vinden de regio een geschikte locatie voor nieuwe vestigingen. In Sarajevo zag ik hoe lang de winkeliers na het bestand van herfst 1995 nog wachtten met het plaatsen van glas in de sponningen van hun etalages. De kans werd te groot geacht dat er toch nog kogels of splinters door de zaak zouden vliegen.

De donkere associaties en connotaties die de Balkan onherroepelijk ten deel vallen, hebben zeker ook effect op het zelfvertrouwen en het bewustzijn van de bewoners van het schiereiland. Aan de ene kant zijn er de Balkan-lieden die net als de Geuzen trots zijn op de afkeer van anderen: wij mogen dan te boek staan als lomperken, als de leprozen van de Balkan, wij zijn *ziek*, en vogelvrij, wie ons aanraakt wordt besmet. Voor de pro-occupaties en benoemenissen van het Westen halen zij hun neus op. Dat

kan hun toch niet begrijpen. Het mist er de diepte voor, het Balkan-gevoel, de kennis van de regio, van hun particuliere geschiedenis, de ellende die ze zelf en hun voorouders hebben moeten doormaken.

Over het algemeen geldt: hoe dieper de Balkan in, hoe trotser. Servische militairen in Kosovo schamperden tijdens hun smadelijke aftocht uit Kosovo Pojje over de 'doetjes van Navo-soldaten' die hun op de hieën zaten. 'Ze hebben geen baard', werd gezegd, 'het zijn geen mannen zoals wij.' Franse soldaten werd nageroepen dat ze de grootste homoseksuelen waren die er bestonden. 'Op de grond hadden we jullie zeker vernederd!'

In sommige streken kan men het grapple horen vertellen van de Slavische vrouw die uit het vliegtuig stapte en bij de douane wordt tegengehouden. De beambte checkt het paspoort en merkt op: 'Hola, u bent van de Balkan. Draagt u wapens?' Waarop de vrouw antwoordt: 'Hoe bedoelt u wapens? We hebben geen wapens nodig op de Balkan. We gebruiken onze tanden.'

Aan de andere kant heb ik behoorlijk wat bewoners ontmoet die zich, uit een gevoel van schaamte of minderwaardigheid, van de Balkan distantiëren. Sommigen ontkennen ronduit dat ze er deel van uitmaken. Ja, ze wonen dan misschien wel op dat beruchte schiereiland maar de echte Balkan-heethoofden, die wonen beslist elders.

Zo wordt de grens van de Balkan naar goeddunken zuid- of oostwaarts geschoven, en zo blijft het dus altijd de woeste middenbarn, de ongrijpbare samentone. 'Het oosten van het Westen en het westen van het Oosten.'

DE BULGAARSE HISTORICA Maria Todorova, die als gastdocente Oost-Europese studies in Amerika werkzaam is aan de University of Florida en Harvard University, pleit in haar boek *Imagining the Balkans* (1997, Oxford University Press) voor een onbevangen, historische herwaardering van de term 'Balkan'. De historica tracht het a-historische 'altijd' van de heersende stigma's te bestrijden en te vervangen door de werkelijkheid, de concrete situatie zoals die geldt met betrekking tot de geschiedenis van het schiereiland. Het is niet de Balkan die te kampen heeft met een vloek die niet te breken is, het is niet het lot van de Balkan om 'buiten de geschiedens' te zijn geplaatst, beweert Todorova. Degene die de pejoratieve connotaties en rangorde hanteert, is zelf 'Balkan', zegt Todorova onomwonden.

Ze wijst erop dat de oude Cycladen-bewoners in de Egeïsche Zee het vasteland buiten hun eilandengroep 'Evropa' noemden, het gebied aan de rand. Dat is het gebied dat wij vandaag de dag ironisch genoeg juist omschrijven als 'de Balkan'. De vraag die de historica enigszins provocerend stelt is: hoe heeft West-Europa zich een naam eigen kunnen maken die eigenlijk een synoniem was voor de Balkan? En hoe heeft de term 'Balkan' zo'n gevoel van minderwaardigheid teweeg kunnen brengen bij de Balkan-bewoners?

Volgens haar is het van cruciaal belang voor de bewoners van de Balkan de eigen stem te laten horen en verzet aan te tekenen tegen het feit dat een term die op een hele groep Europeanen betrekking heeft, gebruikt wordt als een politieke en maatschappelijke belediging. 'Het is van het grootste belang om te stellen dat de Balkan zeker geen monopolie bezit op het gebied van de wreedheid', concludeert Todorova. 'Stigmatisering leidt tot uitsluiting, zelfverheerlijking en het misplaatst zuiveren van de eigen blaam tegenover de gedemoniseerde, in dit geval de Balkan.'

Overigens merkt Todorova op dat we niet hoeven doen alsof er geen problemen zijn op de Balkan. Die zijn er momenteel helaas te over. Stereotypen worden vaak gevormd uit gemakzucht. Ze bieden uitkomst voor wie geen zin of tijd heeft om naar de reële situatie te kijken. Maar ze komen ook niet uit de lucht vallen. Todorova: 'Op dit moment is de Balkan inderdaad een kommervolle regio die aandacht en steun behoeft. Maar waar ik bezwaar tegen maak, dat is dat stereotypen gebruikt worden voor politieke, economische of culturele doeleinden.'

Todorova haalde tijdens een lezing in Amsterdam een anekdote aan over een moerzaan verlopen reisveraring, toen de Oostenrijkse douane haar niet door wilde laten. De historica was op weg naar een lezing in Duitsland en bezat een officiële uitnodiging. De douanebeambte deed desalniettemin zeer lastig toezien in het paspoort zag dat ze met iemand uit Oost-Europa van doen had. De vrouw begon een ondervraging, waarop Todorova uitreep in vloeiend Duits: 'Ik sta ook niet te springen om het geboorteland van Hitler binnen te gaan, mevrouw, maar ik kan helaas niet anders als ik op tijd in Duitsland wil zijn voor mijn lezing.' Waarop ze onmiddellijk werd doorgelaten.

Brusssel mag grootmoedig beweren dat het huis van Europa vele kamers telt, de Balkan moet voorlopig genoeggen nemen met het schijfthuis

Door een onzer redacteurs
ROTTERDAM, 10 JUNI. Het Joegoslavische leger heeft begin 1991, vlak vóór de desintegratie van het oude Joegoslavië, getracht de presidenten van de zes Joegoslavische deelrepublieken – onder wie Slobodan Milošević – te arresteren. Dat heeft de Macedonische televisie gemeld naar aanleiding van de verschijning van de memoires van admiraal Branko Mamula.

Het leger onder minister van Defensie Veljko Kadijević hoopte met de arrestatie van de leiders van Servië, Kroatië, Slovenië, Bosnië, Montenegro en Macedonië het uiteenvallen van het land te voorkomen. Het plan was de zes begin 1991 te arresteren op een top in Sarajevo. Die poging mislukte: de presidenten kregen lucht van de legercoup en verlieten de Bosnische hoofdstad spoorslags. Het plan werd uitgesteld tot een nieuwe top (naar later zou blijken de laatste van de zes leiders), op 18 april 1991 in het Macedoni-

Coup 1991 Joegoslavië mislukte

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sche Ohrid. Kort tevoren haalde Kadijević de Servische president Slobodan Milošević van de lijst van te arresteren leiders.

Tot dan toe had Milošević voor het leger te boek gestaan als een van de vijanden van de Joegoslavische federatie. Maar Kadijević had Milošević goed leren kennen en was sterk onder de indruk geraakt van zijn denkbeelden.

Het was de bedoeling dat de arrestatie van de anderen, Tudjman van Kroatië, Izetbegović van Bosnië, Kučan van Slovenië, Bulatović van Montenegro en Gligorov van Macedonië, zou worden gevolgd door vergaande zuiveringen.

Het plan moest worden uitgevoerd door de chef van de Macedonische afdeling van de contraspionagedienst KOS. Het mislukte omdat de Macedoniërs elke medewerking weigerden. Zij sloten het conferentie-oord hermetisch af en weerden ook legerpersoneel.

Daarop werden de Macedoniërs overstroomd met geruchten over alternatieve acties. Zo zouden bommen zijn verborgen in het vliegtuig van Tudjman, het Macedonische parlement en het hoofdkantoor van Skopje. Toen de presidenten per boot op het meer van Ohrid op weg waren naar Naum werd via een walkie talkie van de politie gerept van de mogelijkheid een bom aan boord van het schip te gooien. Vervolgens viel twintig minuten lang de politieradio uit. „De Macedonische politie werd op dat moment echt bang”, aldus tv-Skopje. Maar er gebeurde niets. Twee maanden later viel het land uiteen en begon de oorlog in Kroatië.

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Serbs as Victims

By Walter R. Roberts

Saturday, April 10, 1999; Page A21

The pictures from the borders of Kosovo have outraged the whole world. There is no doubt that Serb elements in Kosovo were responsible for many, though by no means all, refugees. The Yugoslav authorities should stop denying Serb involvement.

But where was the outrage when more than 300,000 Serbs were evicted by the Croatian government from the Krajina, a Croatian land inhabited by Serbs for centuries? Although a few news clips were shown on TV, they soon disappeared from the screens. There were hardly any statements denouncing Croatian actions. Yet the circumstances were similar to today's expulsions, except that some NATO powers quietly encouraged them because they weakened the Serb position in Bosnia. The deportations were as brutal as the ones we are now witnessing. Serbs had to leave instantaneously; houses were burned, and many Serbs were killed.

The Yugoslav government, burdened by U.N. sanctions, absorbed these refugees into Serbia. There were no relief flights from NATO countries and hardly any help from U.N. or other nongovernmental relief organizations.

The horrific scenes now being seen hourly on television would not have occurred had NATO not initiated bombing. NATO, of course, denies this. U.S., British and NATO officials, however, have not been consistent in their denial. At first they said ethnic cleansing of Kosovars by the Serbs was imminent and that bombing was begun in order to forestall expulsions. Because that explanation did not ring convincingly, the statements were changed to say that ethnic cleansing had been going on for some time and NATO started bombing to slow it down.

Does anyone really believe that Serb forces would have undertaken such a large-scale eviction while more than 1,600 foreign observers were stationed all over Kosovo? While it does not in any way excuse the inhuman actions of the Serbs, it must be emphasized that the

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situation in Kosovo became really ominous when the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) came into existence and attempted to change the status in Kosovo by military means, including the killing of many Serbs. But that fact was never mentioned by any NATO spokesman before the bombing was initiated.

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What led NATO to its bombing decision? A draft agreement was
<http://search.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPlate/1999-04/10/0531-041099-idx.html>

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worked out by an American diplomat assisted by a European Union representative (an Austrian) and a Russian diplomat, which was to settle the future of Kosovo. It was presented to the Kosovars and the Yugoslav government at Rambouillet on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. But the Russian representative in the group was not informed that a military clause was added before the document was submitted to the parties. It was precisely that military clause, providing that 28,000 NATO troops be stationed in Kosovo, to which the Yugoslav government objected.

When the Kosovars finally signed the agreement and the Yugoslav government did not, bombing began. The whole air armada of NATO is in action. Yugoslavia's infrastructure is being systematically destroyed. Tens of thousands of Kosovars have fled their homeland, most of them forced out.

This tragedy must be brought to an end. The only way is by negotiation. Here the Russians could be helpful. Both sides will have to give. The Yugoslav government says it has agreed to the withdrawal of its forces to the status of the Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. It has announced that all refugees may return. As much as the Yugoslav government dislikes the idea, an international monitoring force will have to be sent to Kosovo to ensure compliance, including KLA disarmament. NATO will have to agree that such a force will not contain troops from countries that were involved in the bombing campaign. Ideally, it should be provided by some or all of the neighboring countries -- Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Italy.

This is not a situation like World War II, in which unconditional surrender was demanded. Reading statements of some American politicians, however, gives the impression that unconditional surrender is their only acceptable resolution, since they call for more bombing, ground troops and eventual victory.

What is expected after victory? A NATO-installed Serb government? It is highly unlikely that any responsible Serb politician would undertake such a task. A NATO protectorate with 10 million restless Serbs? If we travel this road, the Balkans will not be at peace for a long, long time. Surely there is a better way.

The writer, a retired Foreign Service officer, is the author of "Tito, Mihailovic and the Allies, 1941-1945."

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The Kosovo/NATO Conflict:

Questions and Answers

By Michael Albert and Stephen R. Shalom

1. What are the roots of the Kosovo conflict?

Ethnic Serbs and Albanians give extended historical arguments going back as far as 1389 or 1912 or World War II. The basic issue is that the Kosovo province of Serbia (called Kosova in Albanian) has a large majority -- as much as 90 percent -- of ethnic Albanians with a roughly 10 percent Serbian minority. The Kosovo Albanians, however, are only about 16 percent of Serbia's total population. The Kosovo Albanians claim to be an oppressed minority within Serbia and want self-determination. The Kosovo Serbs claim to be an oppressed minority within Kosovo, and want protection from the Albanians. For Serbs, Kosovo, particularly in the north, is the site of many historical events and locales, their Jerusalem and Alamo rolled into one.

Yugoslavia consisted of 6 republics (Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) and in 1974 Tito gave autonomous status to two provinces of Serbia, Kosovo and Vojvodina. Kosovo autonomy allowed its ethnic Albanians to develop their own institutions, but angered Serbian nationalists. The Yugoslav League of Communists (LCY) under Tito and after his death in 1980, suppressed nationalist ideology and political dissent.

In 1987, however, Slobodan Milosevic used anger over Kosovo to take control of the Serbian branch of the LCY. The previous leaders, Milosevic charged, had appeased the Albanians and failed to defend Serb interests. In 1989, Milosevic revoked Kosovo's autonomy, encouraging forcible Serb repression of the Albanian majority ever since. Most Albanian Kosovars now want complete independence.

2. What is the KLA?

The Albanian Kosovars fought Serb control in 1989 by non-violent resistance: they elected their own leaders, refused to cooperate with the Serb authorities, and established their own counter-institutions. Their "president" was Ibrahim Rugova, a follower of Gandhi, who urged his people to reject violence while working toward independence. Serbian repression in Kosovo since 1989 didn't attract much concern from Washington. In 1995, when the United States sponsored talks in Dayton, Ohio to end the fighting in Bosnia, Milosevic was feted as the key to peace and Rugova was excluded from the conference. Thereafter repression increased in Kosovo and Rugova had little to show for his non-violent approach.

In 1996, an obscure organization appeared on the scene, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, or UCK in Albanian), committed to armed struggle. They undertook some ineffectual attacks on police stations and

sometimes Serb civilians, including Serbian refugees from the Yugoslav wars whom many Albanians viewed as colonizers intended to shift the demographic balance. In early 1998, Serbian special police assaulted three villages, killing more than eighty people, at least seventeen after they had been detained or surrendered. This attack drove thousands of Albanians into the KLA, and though still called terrorists by the Serbian authorities, they became a serious guerrilla army, with mass support. Over the next months the KLA took control of roughly 40 percent of Kosovo's territory. By late summer, however, Serbian forces retook most of the territory, their major tactic being to crush civilian support for the rebels by systematically destroying towns and villages and forcing thousands of people to flee.

It is difficult to tell the KLA attitude toward Serb civilians. Human rights groups have accused them of serious human rights violations, including compelling Serb villagers to leave their homes, with some killings, though not approaching the scale of atrocities committed by Serbian forces. The KLA claims not to target civilians, while acknowledging that abuses are committed by fighters in the field.

3. Why does everyone talk about the conflict spreading?

Massive refugee flows have the potential to destabilize many surrounding countries where there is a delicate ethnic balance. In Macedonia, for example, commentators fear that Albanian immigration would provoke the Albanian minority to secede or would even make it a majority, which the Macedonian majority is determined to prevent. And having hundreds of thousands of Albanians living in refugee camps brings visions of the Palestinians, with all the instability their plight has caused the Middle East. In addition, Albania has warned that it will not sit idly by if its compatriots across the border are slaughtered, and Serbia has made incursions into Albania to prevent the flow of weapons and recruits to the KLA. Finally, Turkey and Greece, long-time enemies, and Bulgaria as well might get involved. (Of course, it is a little odd for NATO to launch a war in order to prevent two NATO members -- Turkey and Greece -- from going at each other.)

4. Is the U.S. motivated by humanitarianism in the Balkans?

No. But how do we prove such a claim? Suppose the U.S. is motivated to wage war and drop bombs in this instance by humanitarian concerns. If so, that would mean that concern for the plight of oppressed minorities and populations ranked very high in U.S. policy-making calculations. We would then expect, it follows, that in any case where large populations are suffering horrible repression Washington would try to intervene to stop the repression.

Now consider the reverse claim that U.S. foreign policy is never motivated by concern for the well being of local constituencies but will only opportunistically use related rhetoric for rationalization purposes when possible. If this were true, in contrast, we would expect that the U.S. would intervene in the affairs of other countries only to serve domestic elites in the U.S. or to aid local elites in other countries on behalf of U.S. elites, or perhaps to influence or enhance policies undertaken by other countries thought to benefit U.S. government and elite interests -- but with the human costs to victims playing virtually no role in the calculations.

Now look at the evidence.

Before World War II, for example, the United States could have admitted many Jews fleeing from Hitler's Europe; it did not.

During World War II, the United States could have bombed the death camp at Auschwitz, slowing down the Nazi killing machine; it did not.

When hundreds of thousands of people were slaughtered in Indonesia in 1965; the killers were cheered on by the U.S. government who even provided lists of communists to exterminate.

When the Pakistani army began slaughtering and raping hundreds of thousands of Bengalis in 1971, sending millions into exile, U.S. policy was to (in Kissinger's words) "tilt in favor of Pakistan."

When Indonesia invaded East Timor, leading to the deaths of one third of the population, it received weapons and diplomatic support from Washington. Just this past week, White House press secretary Joe Lockhart was asked whether the United States supported independence for East Timor. "Not that I am aware of," he replied.

When the Khmer Rouge was responsible for monstrous killings in Cambodia, the United States encouraged China to aid the Khmer Rouge and provided covert aid of its own.

When the government of Guatemala killed 200,000 people in the 1980s, it was with United States aid and encouragement.

When upwards of half a million people, mostly members of the Tutsi ethnic minority, were exterminated in Rwanda in 1994, the Clinton administration demanded that a UN force already on the scene be reduced and obstructed efforts to save lives, even failing to apply diplomatic pressure against the killers.

Investigation of all these cases and many more -- the Turkish treatment of Kurds in Turkey, for example -- reveals a consistent pattern which has nothing to do with concerns for repressed populations and everything to do with calculations of U.S. elite and geo-political interests. In every case policy would have been roughly opposite to what took place, if there had been humanitarian concerns. There weren't, and there aren't.

5. So why is NATO now bombing in the Balkans?

Just as killings by the (U.S.-trained) junta in Haiti did not concern U.S. policymakers until large numbers of refugees started fleeing to the United States, so too human rights abuses in Kosovo did not concern U.S. policymakers as long as they didn't threaten regional stability. But as the fighting in Kosovo escalated, with large numbers of displaced Albanian refugees, U.S. officials decided they needed to curb the problem--not to aid locally affected people, but to prevent losses to U.S. interests due to the conflict spreading into other parts of Europe.

In February and March at Rambouillet in France, the United States and its European allies invited the Albanian Kosovars and the Milosevic government to sign an agreement that provided for the withdrawal of Serbian security forces from Kosovo, the disarming of the KLA, autonomy for Kosovo, a NATO peacekeeping force, and follow-up final-status negotiations after three years. Milosevic said he was unwilling to accept foreign troops on his territory. NATO said it would bomb him if the Albanians signed and he didn't. (Compare this with U.S. mediation efforts in Northern Ireland where threatening to bomb a recalcitrant party was not part of the equation.) The Albanians reluctantly accepted the Rambouillet agreement and Milosevic refused.

Now the primary NATO goal became maintaining its credibility. The Clinton administration had invested heavily in expanding NATO, to make it a primary instrument of U.S. policy not only in Europe, but beyond. There is an elementary point of big power politics that no one denies: threats made need to be carried out if the credibility of future threats are to be maintained. And, likewise, threats carried out but not yielding total victory need to be escalated until the adversary is crushed.

So why make the initial threat to bomb? There is a predisposition in Washington to favor military solutions. A diplomatic approach would have strengthened the UN and international law and made Russia a player, all of which would interfere with U.S. freedom of action. Bombing, on the other hand, leads with the U.S. strong suit. It provides a rationale for U.S. domestic military spending, and an international arms bazaar. It tells the world that the U.S. response to problems with other nations is to bomb them. "What good is this marvelous military force," Albright asked Gen. Colin Powell a few years back, "if we can never use it?"

6. What effects do the bombings have?

In preparation for the bombing, relief workers (who might have continued to mitigate the suffering) and international observers (who might have continued to discourage the most blatant atrocities) were pulled out of Kosovo. The NATO bombing then provoked a horrific outburst of ethnic cleansing by Serbian forces as hundreds of thousands of Albanian Kosovars were driven from their homes. Because all reporters and international observers had left Kosovo, we do not know the human toll of Serb actions, but it surely considerably exceeds the toll for the previous year, during which some 2,000 ethnic Albanian civilians had been killed and about 250,000 ethnic Albanians had become refugees, most of them within Kosovo.

Even without the bombing, a Serbian offensive was likely imminent, but it is hard to believe it would have been as ferocious as what has occurred. The bombing incensed many even in Serbia's democratic movement, so one can only imagine how it must have affected Serb security forces in Kosovo. Unable to retaliate against NATO missiles and warplanes, they could be expected to lash out at those most vulnerable, ethnic Albanian civilians. Of course, none of this mitigates the responsibility for the atrocities on the part of those who carried them out. But if someone is holding a person hostage and you recklessly charge forward, leading to the death of the hostage, you also bear some responsibility -- all the more so if you rush in not out of true concern for the hostage, but for other reasons entirely. Many U.S. officials have acknowledged that they thought the bombing might well lead to a paroxysm of violence from Milosevic and that air power, the NATO tool of choice, could do nothing to stop that violence in the short run.

Bombing, of course, has had other implications as well. Within Yugoslavia the population has rallied to its leader, Milosevic. The democratic opposition, previously challenging Milosevic, now appears to be either dismantled, jailed, or, most chillingly, supporting him. As Zoren Djindjic, the leader of Serbia's Democratic Party and an organizer of pro-democracy demonstrations in 1996-97 put it, the "bombs have marginalized any dissenters here." Washington, he said bitterly, has spent more on one day's bombs than it ever spent helping the democracy movement in Yugoslavia. Montenegro, the smaller of the two Yugoslav republics, had previously passed a resolution questioning Milosevic's Kosovo policy, but the bombing has quieted its opposition as well. These results were predictable. And the level of hostility and tension in the whole region has climbed dramatically, making negotiations and a lasting peace, eventually obviously required, that much more difficult.

And then there is the horrible loss of life and means of sustaining life that mounts with each new raid of Belgrade and Yugoslavia as a whole. Bombing has a deadly logic of its own. What begins as "surgical" attacks inevitably expands. "We have to drop the bridges and turn out the lights -- there should be no more outdoor rock concerts in downtown Belgrade," Sen. John McCain told Newsweek. "Twelve days of surgical bombing was never going to turn Serbia around," wrote New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman. "Let's see what 12 weeks of less than surgical bombing does. Give war a chance."

7. But even if badly motivated, and even if they have some bad effects, won't the bombings at least restrain Milosevic?

Restrain him from what? The idea that doing something necessarily improves a situation is, of course, quite false. Some things may be beneficial. Others not. Yes, even an ill-motivated action can sometimes have a desirable effect and therefore deserve support, but in this case the bombing is not only ill-motivated, its effects are horribly detrimental as well. It has worsened the plight of the Albanian Kosovars, vastly increasing the flow of refugees and, due to the scale, created a catastrophe of the first order. It has diminished the internal opposition to Milosevic, and if reports are accurate perhaps destroyed it. It has undermined the UN, turned NATO into an offensive, interventionary institution, played havoc with international law, and further projected the U.S. as a country eager and willing to punish any deviations it discerns from its will with bombs, thus acting as a threat against countries throughout the world. All these effects are horribly negative and then there is the devastation of Yugoslavia itself, the immediate expansion of deaths and casualties, and the future expansion due to the wrecking of a country's infrastructure.

The remarkable thing is that there is little dispute about the above. Yes, our formulation has a moral tone that many others lack when recounting these facts, but the facts are not in doubt.

8. But can the U.S. really be that vile? Isn't this just left cynicism and a knee-jerk rejection of all U.S. actions?

Sometimes when a person or group holds roughly the same position repeatedly in different contexts it indicates that the person or group is gravitating to it reflexively or has lost touch with reason and is bending reality to fit his or her prejudices. And yes, there are likely critics of the bombing who have adopted a stance based not on evidence and sound reasoning, but on a pre-determined mindset, with facts bent to fit.

But, the facts of U.S. international relations, and of the limited options available in this case are really not in dispute. And the judgment drawn by critics of U.S. policy are not leaps from those facts or distortions of those facts or subjective impositions on those facts, but rather very simple deductions from the facts, which, were the culprit any other nation, would be obvious to all.

9. How come there are conflicting viewpoints among leftists and progressives, some favoring bombing, some opposing it?

There has been an avalanche of media commentary emphasizing the immense and grotesque crimes in the Balkans for nearly a decade. It is natural that some folks, including many on the left, have become very impassioned about wishing to see those crimes curbed. This desire, perfectly reasonable on the face of it (though at times ignoring other and often worse cases of repression and violence in the world), has left some folks blind to the reality that just saying that a policy helps people doesn't mean that, in fact, the policy does help those people. The desire not to ignore the plight of the Kosovars is worthy. But to advocate policies that end up hurting the Kosovars, Yugoslavia as a whole, international law, the UN, and by the threat-effect all who might oppose U.S. pursuits, on grounds that at least it is doing something, is unworthy.

10. Why do many leftists inside Serbia deny that the Serbs have committed atrocities? Are we being misled about that?

There are many factors at work, no doubt. Ethnic conflicts frequently find leftists on opposite sides, swept up in the myths and distortions of their own ethnic group. (Think of the Palestine-Israeli or the Turkish-Greek conflicts.) Having bombs drop in your neighborhood and

nation, which destroy the daily functioning of your society, has, we know from history, a tremendously galvanizing and homogenizing effect on people's views. More, there is likely also honest confusion. Facts available outside Yugoslavia may not be available inside, or at least may not be comprehensible there.

In matters such as this, testimony from people on the scene, from whatever persuasion, must be understood in context. Single events can be elaborated into whole theses, a common trick of the mass media, but in chaotic situations there are single events demonstrative of pretty much any kind of behavior one might wish to find. What matters most is not single examples or events, but widespread patterns of behavior and broad policies and their broad implications.

11. How come many right-wingers are against this action?

Some rightwingers reflexively oppose anything Clinton does (a draft-dodger can't lead us into war, etc.) But there are two other sources of rightwing opposition. One is the general point that elites can differ in their views as to what best serves U.S. elite interests. If it doesn't work as planned, which is certainly a reasonable projection of likelihoods, this operation may in fact leave NATO and the U.S. in a worse place than at its outset. Therefore, for those who doubt the bombing's capacity to lead to stable results that legitimate NATO, reduce risk of spreading conflict, etc., there is reason to oppose the policy.

Moreover, to some rightwingers, multilateralism -- even if it's NATO rather than the UN -- is suspect because it reduces to some extent U.S. freedom of action. If the situation in Kosovo might cause a crisis in southeastern Europe, let the Europeans deal with it. The right opposes peacekeeping operations ("the United States needs to husband its resources for great exertions, not dissipate them in a thousand stagnant fens" [Charles Krauthammer]). And where left critics of the bombing argue that it will not achieve -- and will in fact exacerbate -- any humanitarian objectives, the right is about as concerned about the suffering in Kosovo as it is about the suffering in America's cities.

12. What is the role of law in international relations and in this crisis? Where is the UN in all this?

U.S. officials frequently proclaim their adherence to international law, except when they don't want to. So, Washington ignored a ruling by the World Court on Nicaragua, vetoed a Security Council resolution calling on all states to obey international law, and more generally acts unilaterally whenever it feels like. The same pattern pertains in this case, too.

The Charter of the United Nations -- which is a treaty signed by the United States and thus part of the "Supreme law of the land" -- prohibits the use or threat of force against other nations except in self-defense to an armed attack or if authorized by the UN Security Council. When the United States can bring along the Security Council it is delighted to do so (for example, during the 1991 war against Iraq), even if it takes blatant bribery to pressure other states to assent. But where such consensus is impossible, Washington has been happy to simply ignore the Security Council, claiming that it has authorization from previous Council resolutions, even though most other countries see no such authorization (the U.S.-British bombing of Iraq in December 1998, for example) or else advancing ludicrous claims that it is acting in self-defense (as in its recent missile strikes on a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant).

Regional organizations like NATO simply do not have the right to act on their own. Article 53 of the UN Charter states that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council." So in

the case of Kosovo, the U.S. and NATO, confronting a problem, turned not to the UN but to the Pentagon. The UN is not entirely under U.S. auspices and could, conceivably, act independently and in a humanitarian manner which would frequently conflict with U.S. interests and require changes in U.S. policies.

13. But aren't borders an abstraction? Shouldn't we be concerned with people rather than with nations? Why does it matter that Yugoslavia is a sovereign nation and that this is an internal conflict rather than between nations?

Borders exist. And the reason to be concerned about their violation even with good motivations much less by a unilateral and illegal force uninterested in the plight of the suffering, is because respect for borders is one of the few impediments to the mighty doing whatever they please with the weak. To establish the precedent that national sovereignty is inconsequential is to remove perhaps the major impediment to one nation sending troops, bombers, or missiles into another. Once that is done, there remains only debate over what is warranted, and in the world as we know it such debate is dominated by the most powerful states and their massive media machines, most particularly the U.S. (Military intervention, Richard Falk has reminded us, is like the Mississippi River: it only flows from North to South.) Thus, to deny the validity of national sovereignty is to effectively give the U.S. carte blanche to intervene when and where it decides -- which is, of course, from the U.S. perspective, a delightful by-product of the current events.

14. What is the right way to deal with crises like this? There are two questions: How can we reduce violence and get settlements, and what rights are national minorities entitled to?

Crises inside sovereign nations are complex problems on the international scene. Should Japan bomb Washington out of solidarity with blacks subjected to horrible conditions and violence in our inner cities? Would that improve or worsen the plight of blacks, have ancillary affects that were positive or negative from the point of view of justice and self-determination? The major means of impacting relations ought to be diplomacy, international opinion, and domestic movements. In some instances (as in the case of apartheid in South Africa) these may be rightly augmented with economic sanctions which are supported by the internal opposition. In other instances, however, sanctions can amount to a deadly and immoral weapon, having as their chief consequence huge and criminal casualties among civilians, as in Iraq in recent years. And yes, one can certainly imagine situations where a powerful state or community can and will devastate a minority ethnic group if there is not some form of more powerful intervention -- but this does not mean bombing by interested parties not seeking true peace and which will only aggravate crimes and divisions.

Most world problems, including most humanitarian crises, don't call for military solutions, but non-pacifists believe that there are some situations where force is the only option. If that force is wielded by the United States, however, it will be used to further U.S. elite interests rather than any humanitarian objective. Other countries, too, look out for their own elite interests, so the way to minimize the influence of the elite-serving agendas of individual governments is to put a humanitarian military force under democratic international control. International control must mean the UN General Assembly, not the Security Council which is set up in the most undemocratic way imaginable, with five countries (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China) having veto power.

Even the General Assembly does not represent real democracy. There's no relation of votes to population, many members states are themselves undemocratic, and even those that are formally democratic are

dominated by elites with money. True democratic control of a humanitarian force must await global social change, but in the meantime the General Assembly provides the best approximation.

Thus, in extreme cases, what is needed to prevent human travail is no doubt a true peace-keeping force, under the auspices of the General Assembly of the UN, prepared to stand between combatants and, if necessary, to defend itself and those being abused, to create conditions for negotiations.

What rights are national minorities entitled to? As a basic position, we must support self-determination as a fundamental democratic right. But there are some tough questions. What if a minority wants to secede, but within their territory live other minorities? Such situations have no simple solution, especially if the minority does not live in contiguous territory. What if a minority wishes to leave a country and take with it the bulk of the country's resources or assets, leaving a majority behind bereft of the means to sustain themselves?

A proper policy regarding national minorities requires a flexible mechanism of international law and adjudication, respected by the peoples and nations of the world, with binding powers that all abide, and with priority attention to ensuring that the powerful do not subjugate or otherwise delimit the options of the weak within or between countries. We are far from having any such mechanism, but U.S. flouting of international law moves us in precisely the wrong direction.

15. What should we demand for the Balkans?

An end to the bombing.

Pursue diplomacy, not rejecting out of hand every diplomatic overture (such as the Russian call for talks or Milosevic's offer of a cease-fire).

An international peace keeping force overseen by the UN General Assembly to stand between the combatants.

An international system, under the auspices of the General Assembly, to adjudicate and make decisions about the use of peace-keeping forces. And an insistence that other atrocities, often perpetrated or abetted or ignored by Washington because they serve U.S. interests, receive the same media visibility and humanitarian attention as the atrocities in Kosovo.

(10)

Global Focus: TALK
ABOUT BALKANS
HISTORY

Me: g g

Live!

Centuries ago, Kosovo was the center of the



Tom Emmert

Serbian empire and site of its most sacred churches and monasteries. Tom Emmert, a professor of history at Gustavus Adolphus College in Minnesota, joined us April 2, 1999 to discuss the historical significance of the southern Serbian province and the Balkans region.

Read the transcript below.

Emmert has a doctorate degree in Balkan history from Stanford University, and has written two books on the subject: "Serbian Golgotha: Kosovo, 1389" (Columbia: 1990) and "Kosovo: Legacy of a Medieval Battle" (Minnesota, 1991).

Washingtonpost.com:
Good morning everyone, and welcome Tom. Can you explain what the word 'Balkans' and 'Balkanization' means,

compartmentalization of this region?

Tom Emmert: Balkan is a turkish word for mountain and it technically refers to a mountain range which divides Bulgaria east and west. Its modern derivation has emerged in recent years. Balkanization means to divide into smaller states that are hostile to each other. The geography is important it tends to be a mountainous region and the people tend to be isolated from each other which certainly encourages this compartmentalization.

Savannah,GA: What is a short history of the opposing local factions in this conflict?

Tom Emmert: The Serbs took this area under their control in the 13th century. It became the cent of their medieval state. They gradually lost control of the territory as Ottoman Turks took control of the territory in the 15th century. When Serbia controlled this region in the medieval world Albanians were a distinct minority. When Serbia regained this territory in the first Balkan War of 1912, Albanians were in a distinct majority. During the course of the 20thc.,

this territory and albanians determined for ever more autonomy and eventual independence.

İstanbul, Turkey: How can we see Ottoman's politic on todays effect in Balkans?

Tom Emmerit: The Ottomans developed a millet system which allowed concessional groups (Jews Orthodox, for example) a degree of autonomy within the Ottoman state. This tended to keep peoples separate, helped peoples to nurture their ethnic and eventual national consciousness. While it provided one aspect of the strength of the empire for some time, ironically helped to cause its demise as well when 19thc. nationalism became a powerful force.

Genova, ITALY: The historical maps of the balkan region are very difficult to read because of the permanent movement of all these ethnic groups. There is nearly no piece of land, that has belong definitely to only one nation during these last few centuries. Do You think it is possible, in spite of that, to say, that KOSOVO was "always" serbian and would You confirm that, historically speaking, KOSOVO can be seen as the heart of

given the fact that this territory was under Ottoman control for over 400 years, it is impossible to suggest that it was permanently in Serbian hands. The very fact that Serbia's long goal has been to regain Kosovo from its Ottoman overlords suggests that even Serbs recognize that it was not permanent Serbian territory. It has only been Serbian since 19123. We must remember this important fact. That does not mean necessarily that it has been Albanian territory since it was under Ottoman control and it was always several territories under various Ottoman administration. There's no doubt that Serbs have an extraordinary emotional attachment to this territory. During the course of the 13th and early 14th century it became the center of their state with many of its most important monasteries and churches. Therefore, they consider it the heart of their territory, even though it has not been an administrative or cultural center in the 20th century.

Johnson city, tn: Is it true that the majority of Kosovo Albanians are Muslims and that Serbia is populated mainly by Orthodox Christians?

Tom Emmert: Yes.

converted to Islam. Most Albanians in the Balkans, if they profess any religion are Muslims. All Serbs are Orthodox.

annapolis, md: has there ever been a "golden era" in the balkans, during which the major ethnic groups were relevantly tolerant -not slaughtering- of each other?

Tom Emmert: Yes, I think that throughout the medieval period, there is not any strong indication of ethnic conflict and during much of the Ottoman period, until the 19th c., we don't see a lot of indication that ethnic conflict is the norm. Certainly the Muslim population had an advantage over the Christian population because of Muslim law. But, yes, there were periods where there were relatively good relations among people. The 20th c. is another story.

→ *Southwest*

Colorado Springs, CO:
How did the Serbs become a minority in Kosovo?

Tom Emmert: Over the course of the Ottoman period, many Serbs left the territory for new opportunities and at times for some refuge in the mountains of Bosnia and eventually to serve

- Croatia. At the end of the 17th c. after an unsuccessful attempt by Austria to take over the region, fear of Turkish reprisals caused a significant number of Kosovo Serbs to move to Hungary. In the 18th and 19th c. as more and more Albanians descended the mountains into Kosovo, the population balance began to shift dramatically so that on the eve of WWI, the best estimates suggests that the Serbs represented only 28% of the population. During the course of the 20th c. the Kosovo Albanian natality rate has been the highest in Europe which has further influenced the uneven demographic balance. Finally, many Serbs have left the region in he 1980s and 90s.
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Cincinnati, Ohio: How does today's situation in the Balkans compare to the situation that existed there in August, 1914?

Tom Emmert: When the Serbs took over Kosovo in 1912, there were clear reprisals against the Albanian population there which left lasting memories. The outbreak of WWI encouraged some Kosovo Albanians to see this as an opportunity for revenge and ousting of the new Serbian regime. As a result, the first part of

Munich, Germany:

How relevant are the orthodox monasteries in Kosovo to common Serbs today?

Tom Emmert: I don't know how "relevant" they are. They are important to them emotionally because they are the epitome of their medieval cultural heritage and a visual sign of their medieval presence there. Clearly Kosovo without its religious and cultural monuments would not hold as much meaning for many Serbs, even though many have not been to these monuments. Serbian controlled media has been trying to make much propaganda out of the fact that supposedly NATO bombers have damaged the jewel of that heritage, Gracanica near Pristina. They remind their viewers that even the Nazis and Italians did not damage these monuments.

Chicago, Illinois: Is it possible that some Serbians see the Kosovars as living reminders of the centuries they lived under Ottoman rule?

Tom Emmert: This is a very interesting question. Whenever we find these moments of extreme crisis in the history of the Serbs, they are quick to see their Muslim neighbors as "the Turk" so that we know that

from the Bosnian conflict, Muslim and Serb neighbors that had once enjoyed each other's company, now found themselves as enemies with their Muslim slav neighbors referring to them as Turks. This is perhaps happening in Kosovo as well, to a certain extent it may be a means of depersonalizing the one time neighbor that is now an enemy and it offers a simplistic interpretation of their whole history. Their greatest 19thc. ethnic poem written by the leader of Montenegro glorifies a massacre of the turks in their region (many of whom were not Turks but Muslims) and admonishes all Serbs to cleanse the region of this alien force. School children still study this poem in public schools.

Washington, D.C.:

Could you please tell us what you know about Roma -Gypsies- in the region?

European press outlets are reporting that Roma are among the refugees fleeing Kosovo.

But the U.S. media do

Clearly one must assume that they are among the refugees. I have seen no interviews or media reports about them specifically.

The 1991 census suggests that there were perhaps 43,000 of them. Some of these figures are perhaps underestimating the true numbers because some of them have referred to themselves as Albanians and even Egyptians. There has been some suggestion that Serbs are leaving Christian Albanians in Kosovo and some Roma are Christians, but I don't have any further information about the fate of the Roma.

Washingtonpost.com:
We're roughly half-way through this live discussion with history professor Tom Emmert. Submit questions using the hyperlink below.

Tirana, Albania: Do you know that slave people are new comers in the Balkans ancient story and Albanians -old Illyrians- are contemporary to greeks or later?

Tom Emmert: While historians continue to debate the origins of the Albanian people, most conclude that they do have a relation to the

the 6th and 7th centuries. Therefore the Albanians have had a longer presence in this region than have the Slavs of course. Nevertheless as far as the territory of Kosovo is concerned as I mentioned in an earlier question, at the height of the medieval state, the Albanians were clearly a distinct minority in the territory. These historical debates about who came first are inevitable, but ultimately not very helpful in resolving these difficult 20th c. problems.

Manchester , England:
There is a view that this war is capable of spreading throughout the Balkans. Do the history and politics of the region suggest that this could happen, and if so how?
Thank you.

Tom Emmert: The first and second Balkan Wars in 1912 and 1913 were regional conflicts designed to deal with the quickly crumbling Ottoman Empire. They don't serve necessarily as an example of what might take place at the end of the 20th c. In the first Balkan war the people found a certain unanimity in fighting the Ottomans, eventually they ended up fighting one another and that of course is a great risk today. Especially if Greece and Turkey found the situation

- war. This is a worst case scenario, but it has to be one that is given some concern. It was certainly a rationale for beginning the NATO campaign in the first place, that is confining this to Kosovo.
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St.Petersburg, Russia:
What was the ethnic situation in Kosovo on the eve of WWII? Thaux

Tom Emmert: In the interwar period, the new Yugoslav government which was of course led by a Serbian king instituted a policy of colonization of Kosovo w/Serbian settlers in an attempt to change the demographics. While it was never a tremendously successful policy, estimates are that about 70,000 Serbs settled in Kosovo with generous gifts of land and up to 150,000 Albanians fled the region. This possibly adjusted the demographic statistics, giving the Serbs an additional 10% of the population, so that by the eve of WWII Serbs made up to 38% of population. the colonization was also a prime reason for the quick revenge that Kosovo Albanians took upon Serbs when the war began there in 1941. Hundreds of Serb colonist villages were burned and destroyed and tens of thousands of

Arlington, VA: I understand this conflict is in a very poor part of Europe. What are the economics of this region? Natural resources? Industries? Education level of the people. Major educational institutions? Differences in the above between these two opposing factions in education and opportunities?

Tom Emmert: Kosovo is, outside of Albania itself, probably the poorest region in Europe. Before the collapse of Yugoslavia, the annual family income in Slovenia (the most prosperous province in Yugoslavia) was 5000 in Kosovo it was 1-200 dollars. The Yugoslav government spent a lot of money in trying to make the region prosperous. I think it's fair to say a lot of that was wasted and used inefficiently. Since the late 1960s Kosovo received a large amount of autonomy. With over half the population under 30, education became an industry. More and more Kosovo Albanians became better educated than any time in history, but employment opportunities remained minimal. These newly educated young people became articulate critics of their situation and this gave rise to the resistance movement. Some of Kosovo is quite fertile so agricultural is good, but could be used

- more efficiently. Kosovo also has some of the best lead and zinc resources. It certainly could be suggested that Milosevic is trying to cleanse the area around those resources so that with any partitioning of the region, Serbs would control them.
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Toledo, OH: What is the reason that nobody is mentioning part of the Kosovo history between Tito's death and 89 when Mislosevic stopped the autonomy? It is well known that during that period, although having autonomy as no other minority in Europe, Kosovar Albanians started with the unrest and political movement for independence. From that perspective Milosevic's actions in 89 seem quite different.
Alex Tasic

Tom Emmert: Tito died in 1980 and in 1981 a period of unrest began in Kosovo that actually began in a demonstration against the food at the University in Pristina. It was symptomatic in that it spread quite quickly with Kosovo to receive republic status. Serbs would not allow this and they argued that there could not be two republics. They said there was also a republic of Albania and feared Albanians would take this as the right to secede (the very right that Slovenia and Croatia claimed 10 years later). Serbia

cracked down on the dissidents and during much of the 80s, this growing animosity toward the Serbs only increased and it is during this time that rumors flooded Serbia that the local Albanians were harassing the Serb population.

There were reports of rapes of Serbian women and destruction of Serb monasteries and Albanians reject this argument, they argue that the rape rate was actually less than the rest of Yugoslavia. They argue that Serbs left for better economic opportunities in the rest of Yugoslavia. Whatever the truth, the rumor syndrome began to encourage Serbs to truly believe that this was the beginning of a really difficult era for Kosovo Serbs. In 1987, the leader of the communist party in Serbia sent his deputy Slobodan Milosevic to deal with a demonstration of angry Kosovo Serbs. Not knowing what he was going to say, he electrified Serbs with an extemporaneous speech that said, "They will never beat you. This is your land." He went back to Belgrade, engineered a coup against Stanolic and became the head of the Serbian communist party.

religious-cultural conflicts such as we are witnessing in the Balkans?

Tom Emmert: Yes I think it does. I think there have been very positive moments, even as recently as the lifetime as the last two generations, during which people in the Balkans have survived tremendous animosity, tragedy and conflict, and have been able to come to the point (as they did in Bosnia) where they enjoyed each other's holidays and spent afternoons on the veranda together. This is the Yugoslavia I knew as a young man. I do not want to subscribe to the idea that these are ancient conflicts to which there is no solution and therefore something we should not be involved in. They solved the problems in 1945-80, albeit under a communist, one-party rule. I think that situation, in the absence of overt hostility, is preferable to anything we've seen in the last few years.

Washingtonpost.com:
That's all the time we have. Thanks to everyone who participated and thanks to Tom Emmert.

g6 VS lieten Iraanse wapens voor Bosnië bewust toe

Door onze correspondent

WASHINGTON, 24 MEI. Zonder wapens uit Iran was de Bosnische regering in 1994 bezweken onder de militaire druk van de Bosnische Serviërs. Daarom liet de Amerikaanse regering de wapenleveranties oogluikend toe, ondanks het VN-wapenembargo dat van kracht was. Dat zei de Amerikaanse plaatsvervangende minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Strobe Talbott, gisteren tijdens een openbare hoorzitting van de commissie voor inlichtingendiensten van de Senaat.

Een vijftal commissies van Senaat en Huis van Afgevaardigden onderzoekt of de regering-Clinton de wet heeft overtreden door de wapenzendingen door de vingers te zien en het Congres niet in te lichten over haar opstelling. De Republikeinen vergelijken de kwestie met de Iran/Contra-affaire, waarbij de VS onder president Reagan wapens verkochten aan Iran, om met de winsten de contra-rebellen in Nicaragua te steunen. De Democraten wijzen die vergelijking als verkiezingsretoriek van de hand. Het is officieel Amerikaans regeringsbeleid om Iran als steunpilaar van internationaal terrorisme waar mogelijk te isoleren.

Uit de getuigenis van Talbott, en twee dagen eerder die van de voor-

malige onderminister Richard Holbrooke, bleek weer eens in wat voor onmogelijk positie het Westen zich gemanoeuvreerd had in de Bosnische oorlog. Dat uitgerekend wapens van het islamistische bewind in Teheran uitkomst moesten bieden in deze Europese oorlog was een pijnlijke constatering voor Washington, een bittere pil die toch maar door geslikt werd. „Het was de minst rechte van een groot aantal beroerde keuzes”, aldus Holbrooke, die indertijd zelf overigens nog niet met de Bosnische kwestie belast was. „Als een patiënt in levensgevaar aan de beademingsapparatuur moet worden aangesloten, verzeker je je er eerst van dat hij zuurstof krijgt, pas daarna vraag je je af waar die zuurstof vandaan komt.”

„We meenden dat het moest gebeuren”, aldus Talbott, ook al zou de Iraanse invloed in Bosnië daarvoor toenemen. Zowel Holbrooke als Talbott onderstreepte dat zonder de Iraanse wapens de krachts-

verhoudingen in Bosnië nooit zodanig waren verschoven dat het vredesakkoord van Dayton gesloten kon worden. In dat akkoord werd bepaald dat buitenlandse islamitische strijders het land moeten verlaten, een bepaling die volgens de Amerikaanse regering speciaal de Iraniërs beoogde die een bedreij-

Republikeinen: regering-Clinton was dubbelhartig

ging zouden vormen voor de NAVO-troepen. Volgens Holbrooke zijn er nu nog enkele tientallen Iraniërs in Bosnië.

De regering-Clinton stelt dat zij niets fout heeft gedaan, al was het maar omdat ze niets heeft gedaan — of alleen stilzwijgend heeft toe-

gezien hoe Iran de Bosniërs van wapens voorzag. De Amerikaanse ambassadeur in Kroatië, Peter Galbraith, was door de Kroatische president Tudjman benaderd met de vraag hoe de VS zouden staan tegenover Iraanse wapenleveranties via Kroatië naar Bosnië. Na overleg met Washington antwoordde Galbraith dat zijn regering hem daarover geen instructies had gegeven.

„Wij verwachtten dat de Kroaten na dit zorgvuldig overwogen antwoord door zouden gaan met wat ze duidelijk van plan waren”, legde Talbott gisteren uit. „We wisten dat er negatieve kanten vastzaten aan ons besluit. Maar de gevolgen van elke andere keuze zouden erger zijn geweest.” Hij weigerde — ondanks aandringen van commissievoorzitter Arlen Specter — de opstelling van zijn regering als een handeling te omschrijven, laat staan als een geheime operatie, zoals een aantal Republikeinen doet. Van een geheime operatie moet een

select groepje Congresleden op de hoogte worden gesteld.

Democraten in het Congres hebben het regeringsbeleid de afgelopen weken onder meer verdedigd door erop te wijzen dat alle Congresleden in 1994 door publicaties in de pers op de hoogte konden zijn van de Iraanse wapenleveranties. „Maar we zeiden niets, we hielden ons stil”, aldus Afgevaardigde James Moran Jr., „omdat we wilden dat de in het nauw gedreven Bosniërs wapens kregen”.

Maar Republikeinen, onder wie Clintons uitdager in de presidentsverkiezingen Bob Dole, verwijten de regering dubbelhartigheid. Terwijl de president de Iraanse wapenleveranties door de vingers zag, weigerde hij naar buiten toe akkoord te gaan met het voorstel de Amerikaanse deelname aan het wapenembargo op te zeggen, zoals Dole en Congresleden van beide partijen bepleitten.

In de loop van 1994 kwam de CIA de leveranties op het spoor, waarna er binnen de regering een intern onderzoek werd ingesteld en de zaak in de pers kwam. Aanvankelijk dacht de toenmalige CIA-directeur James Woolsey dat de Amerikaanse ambassadeur in Kroatië heimelijk zelf het wapentransport verzorgde, aldus Talbott.

We turn now to the second set of questions concerning prospects for stability in the Balkans, with special reference to developments in Bulgarian-Macedonian interstate relations.

Background: The Macedonian Questions Old and New

The name "Macedonia" is a long-standing geographical designation which refers to a region with shifting borders that has always been populated by a variety of races and cultures. Geographically, Macedonia is the territory in the central part of the southern Balkans that is bounded, in the north, by the Šar Mountains; in the east by the Rila and Rhodope Mountains; in the south by the Aegean coast around Thessaloniki and by Mount Olympus; and in the west by Lakes Prespa and Ochrid.

The original Kingdom of Macedonia dates back to the fourth century BC and was governed by Greek-speaking kings of whom the most celebrated are Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great. Since that time, Macedonia (whose ethnic composition was constantly changing) formed part of the Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, the mediaeval Bulgarian and Serbian Empires, and the Ottoman Empire. It was in 1878, after the Congress of Berlin (held in July) dismembered the all-too-short-lived Greater Bulgaria that had been established by the Treaty of San Stefano (in March), that the original Macedonian question came into being. The Treaty of Berlin restored Macedonia to Turkey; the much-reduced, new Bulgarian state became revisionist and revanchist and sought to recover what was lost. At the same time, the newly independent states of Serbia and Greece also coveted Macedonian territory and conducted a vigorous cultural struggle for the allegiance of the Macedonian peoples.

In 1893, two nationalist-minded Macedonian school-teachers, Khristo Tatarchev and Damian Gruev, founded the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (Vätreshnata Makedonska revolutsiyonna organizatsiya), a clandestine separatist movement that sought to liberate Macedonia from Ottoman rule by means of mass insurrection. From the very beginning, however, the IMRO (VMRO) was hamstrung by internal dissension. It soon became divided on the left between those like Gotse Delchev who saw Macedonia as an autonomous unit, as an entity in its own right, either within Bulgaria, or some future Balkan federation, and those on the right who looked towards the Bulgarian state as their most likely means of liberation, and who regarded Macedonia as a natural part of Bulgaria. These latter, primarily Sofia-based so-called Värhovtsi, or Supremists persuaded the IMRO to launch a premature and hurriedly planned uprising in the mountain town of Kruševo on Ilinden (St Elijah's Day), 2 August 1903. However, the Turks ruthlessly crushed the insurgents and the "Republic of Kruševo" fell within a mere ten days.

Following the Balkan Wars of 1912/13, when the Ottomans were finally driven from the region, the Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians partitioned Macedonia among the three states. Bulgaria had to be content with the eastern part, called Pirin Macedonia after the mountain range (a mere 10% of the total territory), Serbia was assigned the north and west, known as Vardar Macedonia named after the river (almost 40%), while Aegean Macedonia, comprising the port of Thessaloniki and its hinterland – the lion's share (more than 50%) – fell to Greece. Each of the three states regarded their newly acquired inhabitants respectively as Bulgarians, Serbs or Greeks – expressions of any other ethnic identity were either ignored or suppressed. During the period of the inter-war Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the first Yugoslavia), Belgrade continued to regard Vadar Macedonia as a part of southern Serbia and decreed, moreover, that Macedonian was not a distinct language, but merely a dialect of Serbian – there was no place for a separate Macedonian identity. In the Socialist Republic of Macedonia within the (now defunct) second Yugoslavia, by way of contrast, language planners created an official written Macedonian language in order to foster the idea of a distinctive Macedonian national identity. The Macedonian Empire of Alexander the Great was claimed as the nation's ancient precursor and leaders of the original, autonomist IMRO, like Gotse Delchev, were elevated to the status of national heroes in order to endow the new republic with historical legitimacy. In 1967, Tito supported the local clergy in the establishment of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church in Skopje as a further affirmation of a separate Macedonian identity – the only time a communist government has founded a new Christian Church!

The mobilisation of Macedonian nationalist sentiment following the collapse of communism throughout Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Yugoslav state led to the formation of a number of outspokenly nationalistic political parties to contest the republic's first democratic elections held in

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/g79NATO_kosovo.htm

18-04-01

grip on the Bulgarian psyche. The Macedonian question appears to be alive and well and Balkan stability remains as problematic as ever.

Macedonia and Albania

In the very beginning, Albania – unlike Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria which, for historical reasons outlined above, were basically hostile to the idea of the Macedonians as a separate Slavic people – broadly welcomed the formation of the new state. Albania supported Macedonia by establishing trading links (importing Macedonian wine, for example) and opened the port of Durres for the passage of exports to the West. Since the position of the Albanian minority in Macedonia compared very favourably with the repression endured by the Albanians in Kosovo (and, for that matter, with the situation of the ± 130,000 strong Macedonian minority in Albania), ethnic issues, initially at least, did not impede the development of good-neighbourly relations between the two states. Diplomatic relations were established in April 1993, though Albania recognised Skopje as FYROM and not under the name "Republic of Macedonia".

According to the results of the 1991 census, Albanians in Macedonia account for 21% of the total population (22.9% according to the 1994 census), though Albanian political leaders put the figure nearer 30%, or even higher. Moreover, the proportion of Albanians (as indeed of the 3.84% Turks and 2.28% Roma in 1994) is certain to increase further given the higher birth-rates that are found in these minority populations. The Albanians of north-west Macedonia constitute a compact community some 450,000 strong in the border region with Kosovo and Albania, where in the towns of Tetovo and Gostivar they have an absolute majority. These geographical and demographic realities tend to fuel rather than dampen Albanian separatist aspirations and, given certain conditions, would facilitate rather than inhibit secession from FYROM. The spectre of a Greater Albania imparts a very special resonance among the political elite in Skopje not only to manifestations of radical Albanian nationalism but also, more generally, to issues that are central to the integration of the Albanian minority into the new Macedonian state (notably educational provision and language use); the Albanian card is dominant in FYROM internal and international politics, and is likely to remain so for quite some time.

The majority of Macedonian Albanians boycotted the original September 1991 independence referendum and in January 1992 (following the proclamation of independence in November) the Albanians in the fledgling Macedonian state organised an unofficial referendum in which the overwhelming majority voted for their own autonomous region in West Macedonia. According to the then PDP leader Nevzat Halili, this showed "that

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/docs99/g79NATO_kosovo.htm

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November 1990.

VMRO-DPMNE, which claimed descent from the original IMRO of Gotse Delchev, called for the reunification of all Macedonian peoples. Such a direct challenge to the governments of Bulgaria and Greece suggested that the emerging democratic Macedonian state was threatening to become a destabilising influence in the region. With 37 seats, VMRO-DPMNE became the strongest party in the 120-strong Sobranie and the government was obliged to adopt a nationalistic agenda. The Sobranie issued a declaration of Macedonian sovereignty in January 1991 and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) became independent in November following the September referendum in the same year.

November 1990 Parliamentary Election Results

(Total number of seats in the Sobranie: 120. Approx no of voters: 1.3 million)

Party/Movement Seats

League of Communists of Macedonia – Party for Democratic Transformation (SKM-PDP)(1) 31

Alliance of Reformist Forces (ARF)(2) 19

Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE)(3) 37

Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP)(4) 25

Others 8

(1) A pro-Yugoslav, reformist communist party.

(2) The pro-Yugoslav, reformist communist party of the former Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovi?.

(3) VMRO-DPMNE campaigned under the slogan of "spiritual and territorial unification of Macedonia".

(4) The national party of the Albanian minority in Macedonia which did not support the reconstruction of Yugoslavia and urged that all Albanians should live in one state.

James Pettifer writes: "All Balkan territorial disputes have their mythologies; that of the Macedonian question is that of the most bloody, complex and intractable of all, in a small peninsula already well burdened." The origin of the Macedonian question goes back, as we have seen, to 1878 and the Congress of Berlin. The term embraces (at least) the conflicts associated with the nineteenth century attempts of newly formed states to lay claim to parts of geographical Macedonia culminating in the Balkan Wars of 1912/13, through the terrorist activities of IMRO in the inter-war period, to the ravages of the Greek Civil War (1943/49). From 1950 to 1990 the Macedonian question was "frozen", though it is by no means true that the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia represented "the final settlement of the Macedonian national question", as stated in official Yugoslav pronouncements of the time.

For with the emergence of a new Macedonian state (FYROM) from the ruins of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the region is again becoming the "cockpit of the Balkans" and a new Macedonian question is taking up position centre stage. Many of the issues that fuelled the old question carry on over into the new – the thorny problem of Macedonian identity, for example, and the traditional fear of the "four wolves" surrounding the country – Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Albania. New are the issues associated with the fragility of Macedonian statehood; moreover, as Pettifer observes, "it is likely that one of the central respects in which the new Macedonian question will differ from the old will have to do with the primacy of economic survival".

The following discussion of the prospects for stability in the Balkans focuses mainly on recent developments in Macedonian-Bulgarian relations, is largely limited to those issues that continue to sustain the Macedonian question, and thus is far from complete. A brief account of Macedonia's relations with three of her neighbours, Albania, Serbia and Greece, is followed by a more detailed look at why Macedonia continues to retain such a grip on the Bulgarian psyche. The Macedonian question appears to be alive and well and Balkan stability remains as problematic as ever.

Macedonia and Albania

In the very beginning, Albania – unlike Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria which, for historical reasons outlined above, were basically hostile to the idea of the Macedonians as a separate Slavic people – broadly welcomed the formation of the new state. Albania supported Macedonia by establishing trading links (importing Macedonian wine, for example) and opened the port of Durres for the passage of exports to the West. Since the position of the Albanian minority in Macedonia compared very favourably with the repression endured by the Albanians in Kosovo (and, for that matter, with the situation of the ± 130,000 strong Macedonian minority in Albania), ethnic issues, initially at least, did not impede the development of good-neighbourly relations between the two states. Diplomatic relations were established in April 1993, though Albania recognised Skopje as FYROM and not under the name "Republic of Macedonia".

According to the results of the 1991 census, Albanians in Macedonia account for 21% of the total population (22.9% according to the 1994 census), though Albanian political leaders put the figure nearer 30%, or even higher. Moreover, the proportion of Albanians (as indeed of the 3.84% Turks and 2.28% Roma in 1994) is certain to increase further given the higher birth-rates that are found in these minority populations. The Albanians of north-west Macedonia constitute a compact community some 450,000 strong in the border region with Kosovo and Albania, where in the towns of Tetovo and Gostivar they have an absolute majority. These geographical and demographic realities tend to fuel rather than dampen Albanian separatist aspirations and, given certain conditions, would facilitate rather than inhibit secession from FYROM. The spectre of a Greater Albania imparts a very special resonance among the political elite in Skopje not only to manifestations of radical Albanian nationalism but also, more generally, to issues that are central to the integration of the Albanian minority into the new Macedonian state (notably educational provision and language use); the Albanian card is dominant in FYROM internal and international politics, and is likely to remain so for quite some time.

The majority of Macedonian Albanians boycotted the original September 1991 independence referendum and in January 1992 (following the proclamation of independence in November) the Albanians in the fledgling Macedonian state organised an unofficial referendum in which the overwhelming majority voted for their own autonomous region in West Macedonia. According to the then PDP leader Nevzat Halilli, this showed "that

the recognition of Macedonia as a state by the world community is premature, as the rights of our minority in this country are trampled underfoot". However, many of the 74.4% of those who did vote and opted for independence (almost all of whom were Macedonian Slavs) not unnaturally regarded such behaviour by the majority of the Albanian minority population towards the highly sensitive issues of Macedonian statehood and its international recognition as little short of betrayal, indeed treason, or, at the very least, as casting serious doubts on the loyalty of Albanians towards the new Macedonian state. In short, the Albanians' prior commitment to their ethnic minority cause plainly challenged the right of the new Macedonian state to exist within its current borders. Such attitudes on the part of the Albanians, to a large extent, were a reaction to what they perceived as the Macedonian majority's aspirations for, and growing insistence upon, a centralised, exclusive state (for example, with respect to legislation on citizenship, educational provision and language). Language featured prominently in the Macedonian authorities' campaign against Albanian nationalism during the 1980s. Albanian names for individuals, cities and towns were banned, teachers were sacked for not insisting on the use of Macedonian, and legislation was introduced which severely reduced the number of Albanians who were able to attend schools in which Albanian was the language of instruction. As happens all too frequently in Eastern Europe, this has produced a vicious circle in which the minority, precisely because it feels itself to be excluded, discriminated against, and not involved in state-building gives prior commitment (which may include demands for autonomy or secession) to the nationalist cause.

As inter-ethnic relations deteriorated during 1992-94, younger members of the PDP adopted a more radical agenda. Following the intervention of Albanian President Sali Berisha in the ensuing PDP leadership struggle on behalf of the radicals, the party split into two in 1994. Abdurman Haliti continued as leader of the original "moderate", pro-Gligorov PDP, while the more radical Democratic Party of Albanians (PDSH) is led by Arben Xhaferi. In early 1995, attempts to establish an Albanian-language university in Tetovo in Western Macedonia led to serious unrest and were condemned by the Macedonian government as a violation of the Constitution and Macedonian laws. Events in Albania have fuelled inter-ethnic tensions and added to instability in Macedonia. The Albanian pyramid banking scandal led to the collapse of TAT, one of the largest Macedonian banks, and thousands of Macedonians lost their savings. The spring 1997 armed uprising against the Berisha government and the subsequent massive looting of weapons from Albanian armouries has added significantly to the quantity of arms that is smuggled into, and circulating illegally in, Macedonia. In July 1997, four Albanians were killed and some 250 injured in a paramilitary police crackdown designed to back up the Macedonian government ban on the decision of local councils to fly the Albanian flag from public buildings in Gostivar and Tetovo. The Albanian mayors of the two municipalities were convicted of anti-state offences and given long gaol sentences.

In late 1997, the nascent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, also known as the Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves, UCK, in Albanian) commenced hit-and-run operations against Serbian forces in Kosovo where the 1.6 million Albanians make up 83% of the total population. The initial fighting escalated into a major armed conflict in central and western Kosovo from February until the temporary ceasefire in October 1998. Most ethnic Albanians in FYROM have connections of one kind or another with Kosovo. Many have friends or family in the province, some were educated at Priština University. A goodly number idolise the KLA which became a rallying cry among Macedonian Albanians in support of their brethren in Kosovo. As the Kosovo crisis intensified, the two main ethnic Albanian political parties (PDP and PDSH) moved closer together and eventually issued a joint declaration of support for the region. The October/November 1998 Parliamentary elections in Macedonia resulted in the victory of a VMRO-DPMNE-led coalition with gains for the parties of ethnic Albanians (PDP 14, PDSH 11).

October/November 1998 Parliamentary Election Results

(Of the 120 parliamentary seats in the Saboranie, 85 were elected from single member election districts using a majority system and 35 were elected from national party lists by a proportional system. Approximate number of voters: 1,570,000)

Party/Coalition Seats

Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation-Democratic Party of Macedonian National Unity – Democratic Alternative (VMRO-DPMNE – DA)(1) 62
 Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM)(2) 27
 Party for Democratic Prosperity (PDP)(3) 14
 Democratic Party of Albanians (PDSH)(4) 11
 Liberal Democratic Party 4
 Socialist Party 1
 Alliance of Roma 1

- (1) The victorious, right-wing coalition "For Change" is led by Ljubčo Georgievski and comprises the VMRO-DPMNE and the newly formed political party Democratic Alternative, whose chairman is Vasil Tupurkovski.
- (2) The SDSM, controlled by ex-communists, was the governing party from 1991-98.
- (3) The PDP was a junior coalition partner in the last government.
- (4) The PDSH is a junior partner in the present government.

Macedonia, like Albania, sought to exploit the Kosovo crisis to push for accelerated integration into Euro-Atlantic structures. Tirana, unsurprisingly, was totally supportive of NATO's Operation Allied Force and had for months been calling for NATO intervention against Serbia. FYROM hosted from December 1998 the French-led 1,700-strong NATO Extraction Force that was to assist the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission in an emergency and later also acted as host nation for some 15,000 KFOR transiting forces and their rear headquarters elements. However, Macedonia's attitude to the conflict in Kosovo was, understandably, given the country's delicate ethnic balance, somewhat hesitant and ambivalent. With some sympathy for the leadership in Belgrade, ageing President Gligorov was rather cautious about Macedonia's support for NATO's military actions against the FRY, while the recently appointed young Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski was more supportive of the West. Generally speaking, Macedonian Slavs (unlike the Macedonian Albanians) were hostile towards NATO military operations against Yugoslavia. Rioters attacked western embassies in Skopje, an anti-NATO movement was established in Kumanovo, and "NATO Troops Out" leaflets appeared throughout FYROM. There were two reasons for Macedonian caution and hostility: fear of becoming embroiled in conflict with another Slavic state; and fear of the consequences of spillover effects in the form of a mass influx of refugees which would upset the country's fragile ethnic balance.

According to NATO figures, 90% of an estimated 1.6 million ethnic Albanians were evicted from their homes in Kosovo and the UNHCR says that over 792,000 were driven out of Kosovo altogether. The great majority – perhaps as many as 700,000 – ended up in neighbouring Albania and

Macedonia. In contrast to FYROM, the Albanian authorities and society as a whole welcomed the refugees from Kosovo though there were fears that the country would not be able to cope with the extra economic burden – the Albanian Finance Ministry estimated refugee costs for 1999 at \$600 million. The influx of 350,000 Albanian refugees across Macedonia's northern border (the figure given by President Gligorov in late June), the manifestly influential presence of the KLA in Macedonian refugee camps together with the discovery of KLA "nests" (arms caches, headquarters, covert operations bases) on Macedonian territory, was profoundly destabilising, palpably sharpened ethnic tensions, and created a condition of national angst throughout the new and fragile state. At the end of April President Gligorov considered asking the National Security Council to declare a "state of imminent danger of war". Deputy Premier Kiprijanova lamented that the flood of Albanian refugees put the country at risk of a "social explosion", but Arben Xhaferi dismissed such fears as being "unfounded" and based on Macedonian "xenophobia" and warned instead of the spread of Albanophobia. Defence Minister Kljusev protested to Tirana about arms smuggling from Albania and admitted that the "bankrupt" Macedonian Army was not in a position to fight to prevent the "Kosovisation" of FYROM. Branko Crvenkovski, formerly prime minister for six years and currently leader of the SDSM opposition party, said the government's worst mistake was accepting "ethnic Albanian extremists" as coalition partners and condemned the policy of allowing refugees to be accommodated with local Albanian families rather than in refugee camps. At a protest rally in late June, under the slogan "For Macedonia" he criticised the government for undermining the state and destroying its identity and called for early elections. Both the PDSH and the PDP have voiced demands that ethnic Albanians be granted the status of a "constituent nationality".

A profoundly traumatised Macedonia – war-related losses amount to \$1.5 billion, unemployment is as high as 40%, ethnic relations remain tense – has survived, for the moment at least, the spillover effects of the conflict of Kosovo. Almost all of the refugees have returned home and Macedonian deputy prime minister and minister for labour and social policy Bedredin Ibrahimović was able to declare, in mid-July, that the crisis is over.

Macedonia and Serbia

Following the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, Vardar Macedonia – the territory of the present-day FYROM – became part of Serbia known as Vardarska banovina, or Southern Serbia, and the territory remained under Serb jurisdiction during the lifetime of the inter-war Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (the first Yugoslavia). Throughout this period, as indeed also during the decades which immediately preceded it, in Serbian eyes, Macedonian Slavs were considered to be devoid of any distinctive ethnic characteristics and there was no room for the development of a separate Macedonian identity. It was only with the advent of the second, post-war Yugoslavia that the Socialist Republic of Macedonia (SRM) became a separate administrative entity. But for many, perhaps most, Serbs the SRM was something of an artificial creation. This perception became increasingly significant following the bitter disputes at the Fourteenth Special Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Belgrade in January 1990, as Serbia struggled to preserve the disintegrating Yugoslav Federation. The Macedonians had never had a state, and not only had they not had a state but, according to the Serbs, it was thanks only to the beneficent leadership of socialist Yugoslavia and, for that matter, the heroic deeds of the Serbian army during the Second World War, that the Macedonians had been granted even the status of a nation. Their national home, moreover, occupied territory that was, in fact, historically speaking, Southern Serbia. In addition, the Macedonian language was contrived, Macedonian historiography was suspect, and Serbia understandably refused to recognise the renegade Macedonian Orthodox Church. It was evident even to moderate Serb nationalists that the SRM had even less of a right to secession than other republics, and very clearly enjoyed no such right without the consent of Serbia. In moderate Macedonian circles, on the other hand, it was becoming equally clear that Serbian resolve to preserve the Yugoslav state at all costs would inevitably lead to Serb dominance in those parts of the Federation which elected (or were forced) to remain. Fear of Serbia nourished burgeoning Macedonian national sentiment throughout 1990/91. Dr Vojislav Šešelj's far-right, ultra-nationalistic Serbian Radical Party (SRS) – motto: 'A real Serb votes SRS'; party organ: Velika Srbija (Greater Serbia) – was founded in Belgrade in early 1991. The SRS backed what were, happily, unsuccessful attempts to establish a "Serbian Autonomous Region" in the Kumanovo Valley and the Skopska Crna Gora which is home to many of Macedonia's Serbs (cf the proclamation, in Croatia, of the so-called "Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina" and the "Serbian Autonomous Region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem"). During 1992 (and subsequently) Milošević as well as Šešelj spoke out against Macedonian independence and in favour of a Greater Serbia that included part of FYROM. In December 1992, in recognition of the potential Serbian threat to Macedonian security, the United Nations established its first preventive mission, in the form of UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force) in Macedonia, following the earlier dispatch, in September 1992, of the OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje. It is probably too soon to suggest that the Macedonian experience should serve as a model for future preventive deployments. But it does seem clear that the OSCE and UNPREDEP missions made it possible to check and contain border incidents between Serbia and FYROM, and to defuse domestic inter-ethnic tensions, while also generally playing a constructive and stabilising role within Macedonia.

The Republic of Macedonia – an "oasis of peace" as it likes to style itself – is the only successor state of the former Yugoslavia which managed to attain sovereignty without a shot being fired in anger. That is a remarkable achievement given the circumstances in which Macedonia broke away from its powerful northern neighbour with which, for more than a generation, it had shared a common ideology and constitution, as well as a wider nationality. But the Serbs regarded the Macedonian breakaway as an act of disloyalty, a form of betrayal, though they found it hard to believe that Macedonia would be able to survive as an independent state. Fear, resentment, rancour and hostility left their mark on developing Macedonian-Serbian relations which remained at low ebb – but with Serbia generally calling the shots – for quite some time. President Gligorov was able to persuade the Yugoslav People's Army to withdraw – peacefully – from Macedonia in March 1992, but the soldiers took everything that could possibly be removed with them when they went. Macedonia – wisely, no doubt – did not press for its rightful share of federal military assets and consequently the infant state was left virtually without any military hardware.

In April 1992, "Rump Yugoslavia", comprising Serbia and Montenegro, adopted the constitution of the new state (the third Yugoslavia), known officially as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on the FRY in May 1992 and the embargo was not suspended until November 1995.

A supplier of cheap food and raw materials, the SRM had been the poorest of the Yugoslav republics (it comprised 9% of the population, 10% of the territory of Yugoslavia, yet contributed less than 6% to GNP in 1990), and its economy was locked in to and highly dependent on the Serbian economy. FYROM (which was admitted to the United Nations in April 1993) officially supported the UNSC resolutions on the blockade against the FRY and suffered enormous economic damage in doing so – there was no provision for any compensation for countries thus affected by the embargo. It is well known, however, that Macedonia, in common with other countries bordering the FRY, also acted as a kind of trading safety-valve for the Yugoslav economy, with sanctions-busting exchanges of goods and smuggling runs taking place across Macedonia's northern border – activity which, though contrary to UN resolutions, was, of course, of benefit to Macedonia's struggling economy as well.

The UN suspended sanctions against the FRY in November 1995 (as did the EU one month later), the Dayton Agreements were signed in December

1995, and Macedonia and Yugoslavia established diplomatic relations in April 1996. FRY recognised Skopje under the name "Republic of Macedonia" – to the fury of the Greeks (Yugoslavia's only true friend during the crisis years of rejection by the international community) who regarded it as an act of betrayal. Belgrade also recognised the Macedonian nation, the language, and the "state continuity" of Macedonia since 1944, the year in which the Titoist People's Republic of Macedonia was established. Macedonia, in return, recognised the continuity of Yugoslavia from 1918. Agreements on economic cooperation and special customs relations were signed and flights were re-established between Skopje and Belgrade, though issues of border demarcation remain unresolved.

There are 39,300 Serbs living in FYROM (many of whom are concentrated in Kumanovo) and they make up 2.04% of the total population (1994 census). Serbia is home for about 50,000 Macedonians and many more have relations, friends and business associates there, or studied in Belgrade. According to a Macedonian poll conducted in 1992, 45% of Macedonians believed that the Serbs were the nationality closest to them. In view of the extensive ties, both official and at grass-roots level, between Macedonians and Serbs, fear of war became more intense as the Kosovo conflict spiralled out of control, and was accompanied, in some quarters, by a deepening sense of guilt at providing support for NATO military actions. However, Georgievski's government "For Change" remained loyal to NATO's policy goals throughout but insisted that NATO forces in Macedonia must not enter Kosovo without the consent of Belgrade. Following Milošević's acceptance of the Ahtisaari-Chernomyrdin agreement and the subsequent passing of a UNSC resolution, the NATO-led KFOR entered Kosovo in a permissive environment. Macedonia welcomed with relief the outcome of the conflict.

Macedonia and Greece

Whatever the overall merits of the slogan "Macedonia – 4,000 years of Greek civilisation", it points up the truth that continuing difficulties in the relations between Skopje and Athens derive, in part at least, from disputes about ancient history and cultural patrimony. Put simply, in Greek nationalist eyes, the ancient Macedonians, including Philip and Alexander, formed part of the Hellenic world and since the Macedonian kingdom of the illustrious warrior-rulers is also coterminous with the present northern Greek province of Macedonia, in the words of another rallying-cry, "Macedonia is Greek", ie the one and only Macedonia is the Greek province of the same name. Consequently, for Slavs to appropriate the name "Macedonia" and use it as the official designation for their new independent state is to usurp the rich heritage associated with the name, as well as being historically pretentious and absurd. Moreover, the use of the toponym "Macedonia" at the very least betrays, and in the view of the more extreme Greek nationalists, confirms the new state's irredentist pretensions. The election successes of the outspokenly nationalistic VMRO-DPMNE political party, the dissemination in SRM/FYROM of irredentist propaganda in the form of maps and car-stickers depicting a "United Macedonia", and graffiti calling for the "Reunification of Macedonia", while proclaiming that "Solun (ie Thessaloniki) is ours" not unnaturally bolstered the Greeks' conviction in the rightness of their cause. For all that, Greek radical nationalism overlooks the highly contentious nature of the exclusive claims that ancient Macedonians are Greek and that Macedonia is Greek, and also conveniently ignores the fact that Greek historians and politicians had long accepted that Macedonia, considered as a geographical region, also included the Vardar and Pirin territories.

In addition to Greek ancestral fears regarding the emergent Macedonian state, twentieth-century history provides for a rich legacy of enmity between Hellene and Slav in Aegean Macedonia/Northern Greece. Modern Greece has consistently denied the existence on Greek territory of the Slav Macedonians as a separate people from the Greeks, referring to them officially as "Slavophone Greeks". During the inter-war period, all-too-familiar patterns of repression in the Balkans included the replacement of Slavonic place-names with Greek ones, the closure of Slavonic schools, population "exchanges", and the internment of Macedonians following the beginning of the Greco-Italian war in 1940. But it is the bitter legacy of the Greek Civil War (1944-49) which especially fuels militant Greek nationalism and keeps the issue of "the neighbouring country's" name alive. During the last phase of the civil war, following the Yugoslav-driven mass mobilisation of the Slav population in North-West Greece for the "Macedonian Liberation Struggle", some 40% (± 40,000 Slavophones) – perhaps, indeed, as many as 50% - of the (reformed) Slavic National Liberation Front communist forces were Slav Macedonians. After the defeat of the communists, thousands of refugee Slavs from Greece (67,000 according to one source) sought exile in Skopje and the SRM. The Greek authorities, meanwhile, who understandably regarded the Macedonians as undesirable aliens, attempted to populate the North-West with newcomers possessed of a "healthy national consciousness". The remaining Macedonians were forbidden to use the Slavonic form of their names, were denied jobs in any sector of the state bureaucracy, while in the sensitive frontier region with Yugoslavia they were confined to their villages, and in some cases required to confirm publicly that they did not speak Macedonian. Many emigrated as a result. Greece later refused to recognise academic degrees awarded at the Kiril i Metodija University in Skopje on the ground that teaching at that institution was in a language, namely Macedonian, that was not internationally recognised.

Of the four post-war Greek constitutions, not one acknowledges the collective rights of national minorities. The emergence of an independent Macedonian state threatened to reawaken demands for autonomy in North-West Greece and perhaps even spelt danger for the unitary nature of the Greek state.

In January 1992, the European Community (EC) Arbitration Committee of the Conference on Yugoslavia (the so-called Badinter Commission, named after its president, the former French Minister of Justice) concluded that Macedonia fulfilled all the necessary requirements for recognition of independence, but postponed recognition of a state called "Macedonia" because of vigorous opposition by Greece. (The EC subsequently recognised the new state under the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1993.) The recognition of FYROM by European countries and by the United States (in 1992 only 5 countries recognised and established diplomatic relations with Macedonia, while in 1993 this number increased to 27) unleashed massive demonstrations in Greece, especially in Thessaloniki. In February 1994 Greece introduced an economic blockade against Macedonia which was not lifted until October 1995, following the normalisation of relations between the two states through the signing of an Interim Agreement in September of that year. (By the end of 1995 Macedonia had established diplomatic relations with 65 other states, had been admitted to the Council of Europe and the OSCE, and had joined NATO's Partnership for Peace). Under the terms of the Interim Agreement both states undertook to respect mutual sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence (with Greece recognising FYROM under the latter's provisional name), and to accept the present internationally recognised borders. Macedonia undertook to remove from its state symbols the Ancient Macedonian "Vergina sun" motif which had been the centrepiece of the Macedonian flag. Negotiations concerning the key issue – the name of Macedonia – were to take place subsequently within the UN framework; they are still ongoing.

In August 1998, during the first visit to Greece by a senior Macedonian official since independence, FYROM's foreign minister Handzinski was welcomed by his counterpart Theodoros Pangalos who spoke of "exceptionally good relations", noting that "commercially, Greece is the third-biggest foreign investor ... politically, ties are very good, and they are getting warmer all the time". There is indeed no doubt that Macedonian-Greek bilateral relations are steadily improving. On a visit to Skopje in December 1998 Pangalos described the new Macedonian government as people "who mean

business", and envisaged even closer bilateral links including the construction of a Skopje-Thessaloniki pipeline. In April 1999 Greece pledged support for FYROM's membership of the EU, NATO and the World Trade Organisation. On 2 August 1999, during National Day celebrations, Macedonian premier Ljubčo Georgievski described the recent improvements in relations with Greece as a "mini-miracle".

Macedonia and Bulgaria

On four separate occasions during this century Bulgaria went to war in order to win back the terra irredenta of geographical Macedonia which, of course, includes the territory of FYROM. The dream of restoring the borders of the all-too-short-lived "Greater Bulgaria" provided for by the Russian-Ottoman Preliminary Peace Treaty of San Stefano (3 March 1878), which encompassed all ethnically Bulgarian territories, (and was dismembered by the Congress of Berlin in July 1878) inspired Bulgaria to fight in the First and Second Balkan Wars (1912/1913) and the First and Second World Wars, all of which, for Bulgaria, ended in catastrophe, humiliation, misery and defeat. Indeed, it was the San Stefano syndrome which underpinned Bulgarian national historiography including her perceptions of Macedonia, while also informing Bulgaria's understanding of national security, throughout the period following the country's liberation from the Turkish yoke in 1878 until the communist seizure of power in 1944. During the communist period (1944-1989), and with the establishment by Tito of the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, the Macedonian question was "frozen", broadly speaking, within the icy grip of communist solidarity or by ideological diktat.

However, the traditional Bulgarian claim that Macedonians are ethnic Bulgarians was modified immediately after the Second World War when Moscow was planning to detach Pirin Macedonia from Bulgaria and unite it with the new Yugoslavian SRM. On Stalin's orders the Bulgarian Communist Party (led by Georgi Dimitrov, both of whose parents were Macedonians) acknowledged the existence of a distinct Macedonian nationality and language. The authorities encouraged contact between the populations of Bulgarian Pirin Macedonia and the Yugoslavian SRM, language teachers from Skopje came to teach the inhabitants of the Pirin "their Macedonian tongue", but the Tito-Stalin split in 1948 and Dimitrov's death in 1949 put an end to any idea of a merger between the two Macedonian territories. According to Bulgarian census figures for the Pirin region, 169,544 people (nearly 70% of the total population) regarded themselves as "Macedonians" in 1946, 187,729 (63.7%) identified themselves as "Macedonians" in 1956, but in 1965 the number who declared themselves to be "Macedonian" fell to a mere 8,750, and since that time Bulgaria has not recognised a separate Macedonian identity. Ordered to "find" a "Macedonian" majority in the Pirin in 1946, census officials went to work under the slogan "If you register as a Romany or a Bulgarian, you are a fascist". In 1956 the Soviet Union was seeking a rapprochement with Tito, and Bulgaria again "found" a majority of "Macedonians" in the Pirin region in order not to offend Yugoslavia. By the mid-sixties, however, a more confident and assertive Zhivkov was increasingly keen to underscore the ethnic homogeneity of the Bulgarian nation, and personal identity cards confirming Macedonian identity had not been issued for some years. The official statistical data given above reveal the potency of "administrative methods" of census registration together with the Party's wholesale disregard for the truth; they testify to the malleability of national self-identification as dictated by political fiat, as well as the primary significance in Eastern Europe of language as the supreme symbol of ethnic identity and independent statehood; and they point up the complete subservience to the Soviet Union during that period of the "Sixteenth Republic" whose clock was set on Moscow time.

Subsequently there were a number of political trials of Macedonian nationalists who were charged with "anti-state agitation and propaganda", and the traditional Bulgarian standpoint that there is no distinctive Macedonian ethnicity remained in force until the collapse of communism. In the view of the Bulgarian Communist Party there was "no reason to grant the status of the national minority to the population of the Pirin region. Such separation ... would amount to the creation of differences that do not exist ... Between the population of the Pirin region and the Bulgarians there are no differences in language, culture, economy; there are no legal or national differences. To transplant the semi-Serbian literary language, which is fabricated in Skopje, to the Pirin region would be tantamount to exerting pressure on the inhabitants of that region."

The greater freedom of expression and association that followed the fall of Zhivkov in November 1989 allowed for the unfreezing of the Macedonian question. While this failed to generate any massive outpourings of Macedonian consciousness in Bulgaria, it did see, in 1990, the emergence of the so-called United Macedonian Organisation – Ilinden (Obedinenata makedonska organizatsiya – Ilinden (OMO – Ilinden)) whose members call for the recognition of Macedonian nationhood, insisting that they are of Macedonian, and not Bulgarian ethnicity. The Ilindentsi also call for autonomy of the Pirin region on the ground that the majority of its Slavic inhabitants are Macedonians. OMO-Ilinden was accused of receiving funding and direction from Skopje and for quite some time the organisation was more or less driven underground. The Ilindentsi, whose rallying-cries include "We are Macedonians and nothing else" and "United Macedonia – a guarantee for peace", probably number no more than 1,500-2,000 people. However, the issue of a Macedonian minority in Bulgaria continues to be a thorn in the flesh of the authorities and in March 1999 sixty-one members of parliament (mostly from the opposition Bulgarian Socialist Party) lodged a petition with the Constitutional Court demanding that the recent registration in Sofia of the Blagoevgrad-based organisation OMO-Ilinden be declared unconstitutional. (A new "traditional" Macedonian organisation under the chairmanship of Georgi Solunski, formerly of OMO-Ilinden, the improbably yet appropriately named Traditional Macedonian Organisation – Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (Independent), had also been registered in August 1998.) The ethnic identity of the non-Muslim population of Pirin Macedonia remains an emotive issue in internal politics both in FYROM and Bulgaria and has seriously complicated inter-state relations.

The unfreezing of the Macedonian question that accompanied the lifting of totalitarian restrictions in 1989 also reawakened the fiercely pro-Bulgarian tradition within the Macedonian Revolutionary movement, most notably in the shape of an organisation known as the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation – Union of Macedonian Societies (Vâreshnata Makedonska revolutsiyonna organizatsiya – Sâyz na Makedonskite druzhestva, VMRO-SMD or IMRO-UMS). In 1990, 3 March (San Stefano Day) replaced 9 September (Liberation Day/Communist seizure of power in 1944) as Bulgaria's national holiday, and the San Stefano syndrome – that potent mix of dream/nightmare, vision/myth of a united Greater Bulgaria – resurfaced within the national political consciousness. Claiming the inheritance of the old, right-wing (Sofia-based) IMRO, while discarding its terrorist past, and wholly dedicated to the idea of "Bulgarianism" (bûlgarshtina), in 1997 IMRO-UMS dropped "Union of Macedonian Societies" from its name and is now known by the traditional designation IMRO. (However, we shall continue to refer to the organisation as IMRO-UMS in order to avoid confusion.)

The principal interest of IMRO-UMS is "the complete solution of the Macedonian question as well as the general progress of the whole Bulgarian people". The organisation denounced the very notion of a separate Macedonian nation as an anti-Bulgarian plot, a Communist-Titoist-Serboman invention, though IMRO-UMS did provide generous support for what was to become the Republic of Macedonia as it detached itself from Yugoslavia. IMRO-UMS appeals strongly to mainstream Bulgarian public opinion: many (perhaps most) Bulgarians tend to regard Macedonians as long-lost brothers who probably will sometime voluntarily return to the Bulgarian fold or, to change the figure, fondly imagine that Daughter Macedonia, kidnapped and raped by Serbia and Greece in 1913, will eventually return to the bosom of Mother Bulgaria after her release from the iron grip of Belgrade. Members of IMRO-UMS were very active in the 1997 "January events" which led to the fall of the Bulgarian Socialist Party government and

the early parliamentary elections held in April, in which the United Democratic Forces (ODS) were swept to power. IMRO-UMS continues to maintain informal links with the Union of Democratic Forces (the dominant partner in the ruling ODS coalition), as well as ties with Bulgarian and pro-Bulgarian Macedonian organisations in FYROM and in the émigré communities in USA, Canada and Australia. IMRO-UMS has some 200 local societies (many in the Pirin) throughout Bulgaria.

Macedonia proclaimed independence in November 1991, and on 15 January 1992 Bulgaria became the first country to recognise the new state, though it specifically denied the existence of a separate Macedonian nationality and language. Later in the same year Bulgaria successfully devoted much effort and energy to persuading Russia to recognise Macedonia. The then Bulgarian President, Zhelyu Zhelev, was the first foreign head of state to visit Macedonia in February 1993, and Macedonian President Kiro Gligorov was warmly welcomed in Sofia in early 1994. During the Greek embargo against the fledgling state Bulgaria provided much needed support for landlocked Macedonia in the shape of an import-export corridor, including transit of goods via the Black Sea port of Burgas. Both countries suffered huge economic losses as a result of the UN sanctions against Serbia, but trading relations flourished and in 1994 Bulgarian-Macedonian trade turnover totalled more than US\$500m.

Sad to relate, these promising beginnings were soon overshadowed by the resurgence of the historical, ethnic and linguistic disputes that animate the Macedonian question, and mistrust, intransigence, and the polarisation of issues became the dominant features of Bulgarian-Macedonian bilateral relations. The primary concern in Sofia was that the recognition of a separate Macedonian people and language would imply the recognition of a Macedonian minority within Bulgaria. Such an admission would foment irredentist pretensions in Skopje – the Macedonian Constitution makes specific mention of support for Macedonian minorities living outside the borders of the Republic – and/or lead to demands for autonomy in the Pirin. In Skopje the governing party, the Social Democratic Alliance of Macedonia (SDSM) (in power from 1991/98), was dominated by former Yugoslav, ex-communist politicians who, given their Titoist legacy, were understandably fearful of "Great Bulgarian chauvinism", as well as being generally hostile towards their eastern neighbour. Sofia's refusal to recognise the Macedonian nation and language merely confirmed their suspicions that Bulgaria had irredentist designs on Macedonian territory. As President Gligorov remarked, "renewed great-state ambitions of neighbouring states [ie Bulgaria] are the greatest danger for the security and sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia". Needless to say, in both countries media coverage of the contested historical, political and linguistic issues tended to focus on hardline, rather than conciliatory positions, thus aggravating the disputes that soured developments in Bulgarian-Macedonian relations until early 1999.

The language issue was particularly intractable and had serious practical consequences. It may well be the case, as the Macedonian President urged, that "every nation has the right to give the language it speaks its own name", but Bulgarian diplomats, following talks with their Macedonian counterparts, insisted on reporting that the two sides had spoken "in our language". The Macedonians, for their part, insisted that bilateral agreements be signed in "Macedonian and Bulgarian", while the Bulgarians proposed the formula "the official languages of the two countries", thus avoiding a clear recognition of Macedonian as anything other than a dialect of Bulgarian. The upshot of this war of words over their highly divisive "common" tongue was that 23 bilateral agreements were not signed, and so remained in limbo, simply because the two states could not agree on what language(s) the documents were to be written in. Indeed, until February 1999, the language dispute had blocked the signing of all but three agreements, many of which were crucial for the conduct of sensible and good-neighbourly inter-state relations.

The return to power in the spring of 1997 of the Union of Democratic Forces, under the premiership of Ivan Kostov, heralded a decisive major shift for the better in Bulgarian internal and international politics, which also included a gradual rapprochement with neighbouring Macedonia. The fresh approach to policy making – and there was more to it than extravagant, post-electoral rhetoric, as subsequent developments have clearly shown – emphasised consensus, democracy, reform, transparency and, above all, Euro-Atlantic integration. Pragmatism combined with a recognition of the new realities supplanted earlier Bulgarian intransigence based on anachronistic, nationalist sentiment. On the Macedonian side, parliamentary elections in autumn 1998 ushered in the right-wing VMRO-DPMNE-led coalition government "For Change", which did not share the anti-Bulgarian orientation of the SDSM which had been in power since 1991. Prime Minister Ljubčo Georgievski's new government sought to introduce "a new Macedonian policy in the Balkans" based on good-neighbourly relations and friendship, while Bulgaria's premier hoped for a "new chapter" in relations with Macedonia.

All these changes bore fruit in early 1999 when the first ever visit of a Macedonian Prime Minister to Bulgaria heralded a new era in bilateral relations. The signing in Sofia, on 22 February, by Prime Ministers Ivan Kostov and Ljubčo Georgievski, of a Joint Declaration committing both countries to close cooperation on a wide range of issues unblocked years of strained relations and found widespread approval. VMRO-DPMNE parliamentary leader Lyuben Paunovski spoke of "a great step forward", Arben Xhaferi, leader of the PDSH, the Macedonian government's Albanian coalition partner, hailed "the new tendency", Georgievski praised the "new, positive spirit and European orientation in the Balkans", Kostov called the Joint Declaration "a European-style solution to Balkan problems", while Bulgarian Foreign Minister Mikhaylova rejoiced that solving Balkan disputes "in a European manner" secured the acclaim of the international community (British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, among others, offered congratulations to the Bulgarian and Macedonian governments on their "remarkable achievement").

The Joint Declaration put an end to the language dispute as it was signed "in the two countries' official languages: Bulgarian according to the Bulgarian Constitution and Macedonian according to the Macedonian Constitution". The Declaration states that neither country has, or will have, territorial claims against the other. Macedonia declares that nothing in its constitution can be interpreted as forming a basis for interference in Bulgaria's internal affairs with the aim of protecting the rights of persons who are not citizens of Macedonia. Neither country will support actions of a hostile nature against the other. The Declaration expresses a wish to develop bilateral relations in all spheres. Agreements were signed on the liberalisation of bilateral trade, on the avoidance of double taxation, on reciprocal investment protection, on military cooperation (a number of Macedonian senior officers will be trained at the G S Rakovski Military Academy in Sofia), on police cooperation (especially with regard to narcotics, car thefts, and the illegal arms trade), on air transport (Macedonian air traffic controllers will train in Bulgaria), on consular relations, and on other matters.

Bulgaria also made a present of 150 T-55 tanks and 150 D-30 122mm howitzers to the Macedonian Armed Forces. Such a gift horse clearly "has teeth", as a Macedonian daily put it – in relative terms, at least – since the Yugoslav Army left the Macedonians with only four T-34 tanks!

As conflict erupted over Kosovo, Bulgaria continued to foster its special relationship with Macedonia by offering both moral support and material assistance with refugees (Bulgaria ran a refugee camp there), by appeals to Bulgarian firms to "buy Macedonian", and through joint appeals to the EU for infrastructure projects. Throughout the month of May, Bulgaria continued to press for Macedonia's need for concrete financial assistance to deal with the humanitarian crisis, which according to Prime Minister Kostov it had not received. Further signs of increased cooperation between the Bulgarian and Macedonian governments were evident on 24 May ("Education Day" in both countries), when both Prime Ministers together attended a commemorative service – "an historic moment", in Kostov's words – at the grave of St Cyril in Rome. In previous years delegations had taken care to miss each other and not to attend the same service for the founder of the Slav alphabet.

"It will be really pathetic if we go parhanding at Europe's door and try to elbow out our neighbours", said Kostov, after the Kosovo peace accord. He added that Yugoslavia, Macedonia and Albania had all suffered an impact that was incomparably bigger, and Bulgaria would be only too happy to see its neighbours recovering quickly, ideally with the participation of the Bulgarian economy. (Losses to the Bulgarian economy since the commencement of operations in the FRY were estimated at 139,470m leva (approximately DM139m)).

"The past three months have seen nothing but progress and economic achievements in Macedonia's relations with Bulgaria", said Primer Georgievski on National Day, 2 August. "If Bulgaria has a government which has brought democracy and prosperity, why not take our chance as well?"

The Macedonian Question Remains Unanswered

It will be clear, hopefully, from what has been said, that the "Macedonian question", that "complex and ever-changing blend of history, geography, ethnography and psychopathology", as Kyril Drezov puts it, is still crying out for an answer.

Just about everything pertaining to the Macedonian question - its origins, its nature and content, indeed, even what might count as an answer - remains, of course, in dispute! But it does seem reasonable to suggest that, above all, the economy, plus a kind of national post-(Kosovo)-traumatic stress disorder combining, paradoxically, a sense of guilt with feelings of good fortune, together with continuing problems associated with the consolidation of recent statehood (if only, perhaps, lack of experience and expertise) be added to the dimensions outlined above. But to the unanswered questions, outstanding problems, and unresolved issues must be added, too, as we have also clearly seen, a more positive balance sheet. The much-hailed Rebirth of Bulgaria took place in spring 1997 when, in the words of President Stoyanov, the country "irrevocably made its choice in favour of reform, democracy and European integration." Since autumn 1998 there have been strong indications that, as Georgievski avers, "a new Balkan spirit" is stirring in Macedonia. A fragile state in just about every way, it may well be, but it has survived remarkably well thus far. And the unanswered questions do not leave us entirely without hopes for its brighter future.

Concluding Remarks

There is a conflict, potentially, between the obligations and commitments of states to respect human rights and the rights of minorities, on the one hand, and the principles of sovereignty and non-intervention in internal affairs, on the other. It seems clear that, on moral grounds, the international community cannot tolerate the will to use violence as an instrument of policy when this results in mass violations of the rights of human beings or groups. However, there are gaps in contemporary international law where the regulation of humanitarian intervention is concerned, and these gaps need to be plugged. Moreover, joint participation in such a project could, and should, act as a catalyst for fruitful developments in international relations, especially, perhaps, as far as NATO and Russia are concerned.

Balkan governments responded very positively to the West's calls for help during the Kosovo crisis - often displaying considerable skill in winning the case for NATO against their own public opinion. Bulgaria (and other Balkan countries) chose, in President Stoyanov's words, "the moral system of values that the countries of the European Union and NATO profess." They incurred very substantial economic damage as a result of this choice. Understandably, South-east Europe now entertains high expectations of the West.

The Balkans stand at a crossroads. For the most part, the Balkan states seem firmly to have replaced their nineteenth and earlier twentieth-century visions of a 'Greater Nation' with an ardent desire to join or, as some would say, to return to Europe. The Stability Pact, an all-embracing initiative and an impressive concept, has been hailed as a "unique document", a 'real chance', a 'sign of hope', indeed as 'the event of the century'. It has also been condemned as 'nothing but empty words'. It remains to be seen whether, in the interests of Balkan security and stability, Western democracy proves to have been better at winning the war than at consolidating the peace. If, for whatever reasons, the states of South-east Europe do not advance now towards greater integration with the Euro-Atlantic community, then NATO may well find itself intervening there again in new conflicts of an old and familiar type.

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Cooking the books - **NATO's ethnic cleansing claims challenged**

by
Michel Chossudovsky (Revised 2-10-00)

Emperors Clothes - www.tenc.net

NATO's justification for bombing Yugoslavia on humanitarian grounds has been refuted by the Western alliance's own official figures and documentary evidence. The recently released OSCE report entitled "As Seen, As Told: Analysis of the Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission" suggests that the allegation of mass deportations is a fabrication. 1

Although heavily slanted in its main conclusions, the OSCE figures suggest that there were proportionately more Serbs (as a percentage of population) fleeing Kosovo than ethnic Albanians which puts an obvious question mark on NATO's assertion that organized mass expulsions of ethnic Albanians were taking place.

According to OSCE numbers and Kosovar Albanian sources on population size and distribution, an estimated 45.7 percent of the Albanian population and 59.5 percent of the Serb population had fled Kosovo during the bombings (i.e. from 23 March to 9 June 1999).2

The OSCE report summarizes the balance-sheet of ethnic Albanian refugees as numbering 862,979. In a secluded footnote at the bottom of the main table, the report nonetheless acknowledges that: "In addition [to the 862,979 ethnic Albanian refugees], more than 100,000 Serb IDPs [Internally displaced persons] are estimated to have left Kosovo and to have been registered in Serbia and Montenegro". 3 Whereas ethnic Albanians (including those who fled to Montenegro) are categorized as "refugees", Serbs who fled Kosovo during the same period are casually identified as "Internally Displaced Persons". The figures for ethnic Albanians are very precise in contrast to those indicated for the Serbs in the footnote. The number of refugees belonging to other ethnic groups who fled the province during the bombings is not even acknowledged.

According to Kosovo Albanian sources, the Province had a total population of 2.1 million of which 90 percent are ethnic Albanians, 8 percent Serbs and 2 percent are other ethnic groups.4 Based on these figures (which are accepted both by NATO and the post-conflict KLA provisional government) there were an estimated 1.89 million ethnic Albanians and 168,000 Serbs in Kosovo.

In accordance with the above population breakdown, the exodus of Serbs (as a percentage of population) was larger than that of the ethnic Albanian population. According to OSCE numbers (from UNHCR sources), it is estimated that 45.7 percent of the Albanian population and more than 59.5 percent of the Serb population fled Kosovo during the bombings (i.e. from 23 March to 9 June 1999).

In other words, Serbs—who ostensibly were not the target of "ethnic cleansing perpetrated by the Serbs"—had also fled the theatre of the war in Kosovo. If there had been a deliberate and cohesive policy of ethnic cleansing and massacres directed against ethnic Albanians, the percentages would have been markedly different and this is something which NATO was cautious not to reveal to public opinion while the bombings were ongoing.

The above estimates depend on the veracity of the OSCE-UNHCR refugee figures as well as on the reliability of the data on population size and

tribution. In estimating these percentages, we have accepted official OSCE-UNHCR refugee numbers at face value, namely that the OSCE Report has not officially "inflated" the number of ethnic Albanian refugees nor has it "deflated" the number of Serbs who fled Kosovo during the bombings with a view to vindicating NATO's claim of ethnic cleansing. We have also taken Kosovar Albanian assumptions pertaining to population size and distribution. In other words, the percentages are derived from their numbers! Moreover, it should be emphasized that the percentage of Serbs who left Kosovo estimated at 59.5 percent is based on the 100,000 figure given by the OSCE. Yet the OSCE report states that the number of Serbs who fled Kosovo during the same period is "more than 100,000".

Accounting for biases in the OSCE-UNHCR figures and margins of error in the data on population, the estimates do not support NATO's allegation of a policy of mass deportation directed against ethnic Albanians.

Ironically, the OSCE Report rather than using Kosovar Albanian sources on population, acknowledges the assumptions of Belgrade's 1991 Census data (also in a discrete footnote) which indicates the ethnic Albanian population at 82 percent of total population. Yet the Census was boycotted by ethnic Albanians and the figures were never recognized by the parallel provisional government of Kosovo. Why does the OSCE acknowledge Belgrade's 1991 Census when NATO and KLA statements repeatedly indicate that the ethnic Albanian population is at 90 percent? Evidently, the use of the 1991 Census data by those who have rejected it, is in this case to their political advantage. Based on the 1991 Census figures, the estimated percentage of each population group which fled Kosovo would be 53.7 percent for the ethnic Albanians and more than 51.5 percent for the Serbs.⁵ Yet even in this case, NATO's claim of mass deportations is not borne out.

The refugee crisis, we were told repeatedly during the War was limited to ethnic Albanians. According to the Western media, Serb civilians had been protected by the Serb police and Armed forces. The large scale exodus of Serbs from Kosovo prior to June 9, 1999 (acknowledged by the figures contained in the OSCE Report) was simply not mentioned. To reveal the numbers would have discredited NATO's main justification for launching its "humanitarian war".

FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH

Other documentary evidence including an official report of the German foreign ministry published prior to the War, confirms that there was no evidence of "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo in the months immediately preceding the bombings. Who is lying? German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer had justified NATO's intervention pointing to a "humanitarian catastrophe", yet the internal documents of his own ministry stated exactly the opposite: "Even in Kosovo an explicit political persecution linked to Albanian ethnicity is not verifiable. The East of Kosovo is still not involved in armed conflict. Public life in cities like Pristina, Urosevac, Gnjilan, etc. has, in the entire conflict period, continued on a relatively normal basis. The actions of the security forces [were] not directed against the Kosovo-Albanians as an ethnically defined group, but against the military opponent [KLA] and its actual or alleged supporters."...⁶

Moreover, a report of the United States Committee on Refugees (USCR) confirms a significant reduction in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons in the period following the signing of the October 13, 1998 agreement between U.S. Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) President Slobodan Milosevic. According to USCR, the overall refugee situation had improved with the entry of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). The USCR report also confirms that "KLA ethnic cleansing of ethnic Serb civilian population pockets intensified in December [1998]" substantiating the results of the German Foreign Office intelligence report. But we were told time and again that the Serbs rather than the KLA had

responsible for ethnic cleansing in the months leading up to the War... 7

OSCE-UNHCR figures on the number of refugees rather than supporting NATO's main justification for waging the war, suggest that more than half the Serb population had also fled Kosovo during the war. This tendency could be explained by the fact that the KLA had been responsible for relaying intelligence to NATO pertaining to potential targets in the bombing operation. Moreover, a history of the war also suggests that the massacres and atrocities directed against the Serbs by the KLA Military Command (amply documented for the period after June 9) had already commenced prior to the arrival of KFOR forces in Kosovo.

NATO'S TWO "HUMANITARIAN PREMISES" INVALIDATED

NATO's pretext for bombing Yugoslavia on humanitarian grounds rests on two central premises: 1) the alleged indiscriminate mass killings of Albanian civilians (premise number one); 2) the implementation of a deliberate policy of mass deportations or "ethnic cleansing" (premise number two). Both these premises have now been refuted by NATO's own evidence and documentary evidence

The alleged indiscriminate mass killings of Albanian civilians had earlier been invalidated by the FBI and European forensic teams working under the auspices of the Hague Tribunal (ICTY) casting doubt on NATO's justification for waging the war. The forensic and police investigators had uncovered several hundred bodies in grave sites in Kosovo as opposed to the 10,000 to 100,000 civilian massacres claimed by NATO and Western governments as a pretext for waging the War. British Prime Minister Tony Blair had announced that President Milosevic was "set on a Hitler style genocide equivalent to the extermination of the Jews during World war II".⁸ "Genocide is starting," stated German Defense Minister Rudolf Scharping.¹⁰...

The Hague Tribunal (ICTY) (while upholding the war crimes indictment against members of the Yugoslav government), has acknowledged the exhumation "the allegations of indiscriminate mass murder, rape camps,...crematoriums, mutilation of the dead have not been borne out" by the police investigations and forensic evidence. ¹²

NO REMAINING LEG TO STAND ON Since the release of the forensic reports—which have invalidated premise number one—the policy of mass deportations against ethnic Albanians (premise number two) is now being upheld by NATO and the Western media as "a sufficient justification" for launching the war. In the words of Madeleine Albright "opposing ethnic cleansing is central to our values... We are reaffirming NATO's core purpose as a defender of democracy, stability and human decency on European soil."¹³ Yet NATO's claim of mass deportations has now also been refuted by the figures contained in the OSCE report. NATO has no remaining leg to stand on. Official documentary evidence (including the forensic reports and the data on the number of refugees) unequivocally refute NATO's two central postulates for waging the war. What then was the justification for the humanitarian bombings? What was the hidden agenda? Ultimately the truth must prevail, public opinion must be informed and those who are responsible for waging this criminal war must be brought to trial.

NOTES

1. OSCE, Kosovo/ Kosova, As Seen, As Told, An analysis of the human rights findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission, October 1998 to June 1999, Warsaw, 1999.

2. Ibid

3. Ibid.

figures for 1993. See Albania Worldwide Web, GOTOBUTTON BM_1_ [p://www.albanian.com/main/](http://www.albanian.com/main/). See also Musa Limani, Pristina, The Association of Lawyers of Kosova, 1992. Kosovar Albanian estimates place the population of Kosovo at 2.3 million for 2000.

5. The Government of Yugoslavia 1991 Census data for Kosovo identified a total population of 1,956,196 of which 82.2 % are Albanians, 9.9 % Serbs and 7.9 % other ethnic groups. The Census was boycotted by the ethnic Albanian population. During the 1990s, the evidence suggests that Kosovar Serbs left the Province in large numbers.

6. Intelligence Report from the German Foreign Office, January 12, 1999 to the Administrative Court of Trier.

7. See USCR GOTOBUTTON BM_2_ <http://www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/europe/yugoslavia.htm>

8. Quoted in Peter Gowan, Kosovo; the war and its aftermath, Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, no. 64, 1999, p. 26.

9. CBS , May 17, 1999.

10. Quoted in Peter Gowan, op. cit.

11. Reuters, 10 November 1999.

12. Wall Street Journal, 31 December 1999.

13. Quoted in Time Magazine, May 17, 1999, p. 25-26.

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Diana Johnstone: Censored truth on Kosovo and Metohija

June 06, 2000

June, 5th 2000.

NATO flies to the Aid of "Greater Albania"

Respectable American journalist Diana Johnstone in the awarded story writes about "American administration that brutally pushed and provoked armed conflict with the aim to break Serbia as a last bastion of independence in Balkan and to bring NATO afterwards as an occupator and arbiter"

New York, June 2nd

By Diana Johnstone

Spring-Summer 1999

On March 24, NATO launched its first full-scale aggressive war against a sovereign state. It was certainly not meant to be the last. NATO, it was repeatedly stated, had to prove its "resolve." The action was meant to be exemplary, a model for future NATO actions elsewhere and a warning to the world.

Yugoslavia had neither attacked nor threatened any other country. NATO acted illegally, without any mandate from the United Nations Security Council. By flouting the basic principles that underlie the fragile structure of international legality, the Clinton administration and NATO chose "might is right" as the law of the new millennium.

This appalling adventure, presented by servile media and ignorant politicians as a "humanitarian" necessity, set off precisely the "humanitarian catastrophe" its apologists claimed it was meant to prevent. Countless thousands of frightened ethnic Albanian civilians fled over rough terrain into neighboring countries. They were fleeing from the NATO bombing and Serb reprisals, in proportions it was not possible to measure.

Both NATO and its armed Albanian allies in the Kosovo Liberation Army (UCK or KLA) needed to persuade the world that "Milosevic" (the semi-fictional personification of evil on the one hand, and Serbia on the other) was carrying out "genocide" in Kosovo. The "genocide" story was necessary to justify both the bombing and the next phase of the NATO-KLA scenario, the invasion of Serbia to "liberate" Kosovo.

After a week of bombing, this much could be said with certainty: NATO leaders had lied so blatantly about things that could be checked, that there was no reason to believe anything they say about things that could not. Among the many lies in the current torrent, one lie played a key role in the justifying of the NATO bombing, the "no alternative" lie: Since Milosevic refused peace negotiations, we had no choice but to bomb. (1)

The "no alternative" lie incorporated several falsehoods in one. Milosevic had not refused peace negotiations. For months, the Serbian government had been offering to negotiate, while the ethnic Albanian leaders refused. The Serb side had presented quite comprehensive and reasonable proposals for extensive self-government in Kosovo.

For years, but especially during recent months, both the Serbian government and non-governmental groups have made compromise proposals for Kosovo, all including autonomy, democracy and extensive cultural rights, while the nationalist leaders have insisted on only one demand: secession.

The "Rambouillet peace agreement" was in reality an ultimatum to Yugoslavia to accept a NATO protectorate on its soil. It was designed by State Department official Christopher Hill to satisfy KLA leaders, and was "agreed" upon only by those two parties and the European Union representative, not by the entire Contact Group (including Russia) which was theoretically sponsoring it. No sovereign state in the world could accept such an ultimatum.

Top U.S. officials openly coaxed reluctant Albanians into signing the agreement by telling them that their signatures were needed in order to justify NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia. The "peace agreement" was thus in reality a war agreement.

The War Agreement of Rambouillet

The conflict between ethnic Albanians and Serbs is a very old one, which can be traced back over three centuries. It is older than the Israeli-Palestinian or Northern Ireland conflicts, not to mention countless other ethnic conflicts in the world. The "peace process" in such cases is expected to be long and delicate. Only in Kosovo, governments and media suddenly decided that the conflict had to be settled in two weeks, at Rambouillet, on terms laid down by the United States.

Why the hurry? Because the United States was keen to lock in NATO's new mission as global intervention machine with a show of force prior to the 50th anniversary of NATO summit in April.(2) NATO had carefully planned the operations six months in advance. Peace negotiations "broke down" just when NATO was all set to go.

For many months, the Serbian government had offered to negotiate. High-level government teams went repeatedly to the provincial capital, Pristina, to hold talks with Ibrahim Rugova and other non-violent ethnic Albanian leaders. On one pretext or another, the Albanians refused to negotiate.

It is probable that two factors weighed heavily in their refusal: fear of going against the rising armed rebel movement, the "Kosovo Liberation Army," (UCK/KLA), hostile to any compromise and ready to assassinate "traitors" who dealt with the Serbs; and expectations That strong U.S. pressure on Yugoslavia would bring them more than negotiations with Belgrade.

At Rambouillet, the older generation of nationalist leaders such as Rugova never had the slightest opportunity to enter negotiations with the multi-ethnic official Serbian delegation, which included members of the various ethnic communities in Kosovo. They were flanked and overshadowed in the ethnic Albanian delegation by KLA outlaws, who by then were assured of United States support. Rambouillet was a charade staged by the United States in order to provide a pretext for a NATO demonstration of force on the eve of the Alliance's fiftieth anniversary.

A genuine negotiation would have at least paid attention to the Extensive 10-page proposal of the Serbian government side, calling for, notably:

- Equality of all citizens and guaranteed human rights.
- Facilitated return of all citizens to their homes.
- Safe unhindered access of all international and national or non-governmental humanitarian organizations to the population for purposes of aid.
- General amnesty for all political crimes related to conflict in Kosovo except for persons properly convicted of crimes against humanity and international law.
- Widest possible media freedoms.
- Preservation and promotion of the national, cultural, and linguistic identity of each national community.
- The commune (county) as basic unit of local self-government.
- An Assembly of 130 members, 95 elected directly by citizens through proportional representation and 35 elected by national communities of Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Romani (Gypsies), Egyptians, and Gorani (mountain Serbs of southwestern Kosovo, converted to Islam), five members each.
- Election by the Assembly of a President and 6 vice presidents, at least one from each national community, for a four-year term.

- Responsibility of the Assembly for: budget and taxes; educational arrangements, with respect for the authorities of national communities and communes; electing judges; establishing a framework for local self-government; protecting the environment where intercommunal issues are involved; adopting regulations governing medical institutions, urban planning, agriculture, elections, property ownership, as well as economic, scientific, technological and social development, among other things.
- The right of citizens to choose whether to be tried in a Kosovo court or in a court of the Republic of Serbia, and the right to request that members of the panel hearing their case be chosen from their own national community.
- Voluntary establishment of courts of national communities to settle disputes among members of a national community who accept separate national community rules.

This last point is clearly designed for the Albanian community which, particularly in rural areas of Kosovo as in neighboring northern Albania, has never fully accepted any governmental law and prefers to be guided by the archaic traditional "Qanun" based on family honor and clan loyalty.

Other measures, such as the provision for election to the Assembly, reflect fear of oppression by the Albanian majority of non-Albanians in Kosovo. No doubt this proposal is inadequate. But in any normal negotiation, it would have at least been acknowledged as a basis for discussion. This did not occur. As for the Albanian side, it was interested in only one thing: secession from Serbia and total independence, if not today, then certainly in three years' time. The stubbornness of the Albanian delegation surprised Madeleine Albright. Perhaps the U.S. sponsors of the KLA hadn't realized that the purpose of the armed rebellion was to seize power in any future "independent Kosovo," and did not fully trust the United States to give it to them under the ambiguous terms of Rambouillet. For that purpose, war is a better method than any peace agreement, even one specially designed to detach Kosovo from Serbia. The KLA finally agreed to sign the Christopher Hill document once it was clear that Belgrade could not possibly agree to it, and that the KLA would thus get the war it wanted, complete with air cover.

It was evident that Belgrade could not accept the U.S.-drafted two-part Rambouillet ultimatum, not only because it was a thinly veiled plan to detach Kosovo from Serbia, but also because it contained provisions even worse than loss of that historic province, provisions no country in the world could possibly accept. This has been clearly analyzed by Jan Oberg, director of the Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research in Lund, Sweden.(3) The Rambouillet ultimatum came in two parts, civilian and military. In the civilian part, three aspects stand out as obviously unacceptable.

- Kosovo would in effect be independent of Serbia, but Serbia would not be independent of Kosovo. Kosovo would be able to influence Yugoslavia as a whole by sending its representatives to both Yugoslav and Serbian parliaments, governments, and courts, whereas Yugoslavia would be barred from influencing Kosovo's internal affairs. This is precisely the aspect of the 1974 version of the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia that made major economic reforms impossible in Serbia in the 1980s and led to virtually unanimous Serbian demands for a return to pre-1974 terms of Kosovo's autonomy.(4) The Albanian veto made Serbia ungovernable.
- "Self-governing" Kosovo would actually be run by a NATO imperial proconsul, with the title of Chief of the OSCE/EU Implementation Mission, or CIM. The CIM, who would effectively be chosen by the United States, would have the authority to issue binding directives on all important matters, hire and fire officials and security personnel, and overrule election results. During the three-week period between Rambouillet I and Rambouillet II, while the Clinton administration and ex-Senator Robert Dole were scrambling to cajole the Albanians into signing up for NATO bombing, the "High

- Representative" in Bosnia, model for the CIM, demonstrated his powers by dismissing the democratically elected President of the Serbian entity. (5)
- Economically, the Rambouillet ultimatum would continue to drain economic resources from Serbia to Kosovo. In Tito's Yugoslavia, Kosovo was the main recipient of development aid from the Federation. Nevertheless, due in part to population growth (by far the highest birthrate in Europe,(6) as well as clandestine immigration from Albania), per capita income in Kosovo remained the lowest in Yugoslavia. The Rambouillet ultimatum demanded that Yugoslavia give Kosovo an "equitable" share of benefits from international transactions, without indicating what might be Serbia's share of state or social property there. Since Kosovo would have its own "constitution," overruling the Yugoslav and Serbian constitutions, making it a "free market economy," it is to be expected that formerly Serbian resources would flow rapidly into the hands of the rich Albanian mafia as well as any interested buyers from the NATO countries. The agreement did not even mention suspending economic sanctions against Serbia, much less any economic aid or help to the 650,000 refugees in Serbia. But substantial economic aid was promised to Kosovo.

The only operational remnant of the formal Yugoslav "sovereignty" supposedly retained by this proposal would be the obligation for Serbia to keep paying for Kosovo. Dr. Oberg points out that the civilian side of the "agreement" lacked any reference to confidence building, reconciliation, peace or human Rights education-measures vitally needed to enable the ethnic communities to live together. In short, there was nothing to suggest any serious effort to prevent "ethnic cleansing" of the Serb minority by the triumphant Albanian majority. Still, the Serbian negotiating team at Rambouillet was ready to Consider seriously this extremely unjust arrangement. The real sticking point was the military side of the ultimatum. This amounted to nothing less than unconditional surrender of Kosovo to NATO.

- Kosovo would be occupied by a NATO force called "KFOR" headed by a Commander, COMKFOR, who would "have the authority, without interference or permission of any Party, to do all he judges necessary and proper, including the use of military force, to protect KFOR" or to order cessation of any activity he judges to be a "potential threat." Judging from experience in Bosnia, that could include forcibly shutting down media that differ with NATO doctrine.
- No ceiling is set on COMKFOR forces.
- The government had to disarm, but disarmament of the armed rebels, considered dangerous terrorists by the Serbs, was left up in the air. Yugoslav defenses within Kosovo would be withdrawn except for 1,500 border guards supported by up to 1,000 logistics personnel placed in predetermined barracks. On the other hand, the "Other Forces," apparently meaning the KLA (never mentioned by name), would be called on to "publicly commit themselves to demilitarize on terms to be determined by COMKFOR." This meant that the Yugoslavs had no way of knowing to what extent or how the KLA might ever be disarmed.
- COMKFOR would have full control of airspace over Kosovo as well as 25 kilometers into Serbia and Montenegro along the borders with Kosovo.
- NATO would not be liable for any damages to local property, would be immune from all local jurisdiction or legal process, and would be ensured free and unrestricted access through all of Yugoslavia. This amounts to a license to invade other parts of Yugoslavia.

"The military provisions," said Dr. Oberg, "have nothing to do with peacekeeping." The more appropriate term, he suggested on March 18, the day the Albanians signed, would be "peace-prevention." Dr. Oberg observed that among all the leading media, commentators, scholars, and diplomats condemning the Yugoslav side for refusing to sign, none was examining what the accords contained. Having studied earlier versions of Christopher Hill's text and the final February 23 version, Dr. Oberg came to the conclusion that "this document has been adapted to be acceptable to the Albanian delegates to such an extent that the Yugoslav side- ready to

accept the political parts at an earlier stage-now find the changed document unacceptable both in terms of political and military aspects."

Why this change? "Because the worst case for the international community would be Yugoslavia saying yes and the Albanians saying no," concluded Oberg. So the Serbs were given an offer they could not accept. Although KLA leaders were not enthusiastic about this agreement either, the United States apparently obtained their consent by promising a privileged role for the rebel gunmen as military partners of the United States.

Eliminating the Alternative

It is preposterous to suggest that there was no alternative to unconditional surrender of Yugoslavia to CIM and COMKFOR. It would have taken time to work them out, and bringing the intransigent KLA into the negotiations made matters vastly more difficult. But that intransigence was largely the result of their certitude that they ultimately commanded full United States and NATO support.

During the time needed for a peace process, the presence of truly neutral peacemakers could have played a constructive and indispensable role. Last October 12, Richard Holbrooke got Belgrade to allow 2,000 "verifiers" to enter Kosovo to monitor compliance of the Yugoslav side only with a cease-fire the KLA had never been obliged to keep. This was already an extreme oddity: a one-sided cease-fire, in which the legal police of a country agrees not to pursue armed groups which, whether called "liberation army" or "terrorists," had been murdering citizens for well over a year and showed no inclination to stop. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) was chosen to organize this Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM). In Western Europe, since the demise of the 1980s peace movement, objections to the qualitative and geographical expansion of NATO have tended to take refuge in proposals to strengthen the OSCE which, unlike NATO, involves Russia and indeed all European countries except, since 1992, Yugoslavia. Early suspicions in some pro-OSCE circles, confirmed by later events, suggested that this assignment was used largely to discredit the OSCE as a viable "alternative" to NATO. Although the champions of OSCE had seen it as less U.S.-dominated, the U.S. put one of its own "dirty war" specialists, William Walker, in charge of the KVM. The "verifier" force never approached 2,000, and it was widely assumed that many of the verifiers were agents of various NATO intelligence services, in particular U.S. military or civilian intelligence. Walker's "diplomatic" experience in assisting the Contra guerrillas to mount a spoiling war against Sandinista Nicaragua was good background for cooperation with the KLA, the only "liberation" movement in the world (so far) which enthusiastically calls for NATO bombing of the territory it is out to conquer. In mid-January, Walker himself broke the fragile peace his force had been sent to solidify by endorsing the KLA version of the extremely controversial events in the village of Racak. Walker's hasty and unquestioning condemnation of a "Serbian massacre" which many believe (and on the basis of solid evidence) was a propaganda set-up, arranging battlefield dead to give the appearance of an execution, discredited the KVM as a neutral observer. Some of the resulting dissension within the OSCE has come into public view. In particular, the German vice-president of the OSCE, Christian Democratic Bundestag member Willy Wimmer, called the KVM a "fairly hopeless mission" because some people "apparently did not at all want it to succeed." Who? "For instance the UCK. For instance those who are behind the UCK and pull the strings." Wimmer said that the international OSCE observers had unambiguously agreed that the Yugoslav side had kept to the October cease-fire agreement, while the UCK had "systematically evaded it" and engaged in provocations.(7) Asked by Deutschlandradio Berlin whether he considered the NATO military assault a mistake, Wimmer answered: "I personally consider it a very big mistake. And I am in agreement with the OSCE parliamentary assembly, which with a majority of nearly 90% has repeatedly stated that military engagements can be

undertaken only with a mandate from the United Nations Security Council." However, the interests of the United States and Britain were "diametrically opposed to us." From "Greater Albania" to Greater NATO

The war against Yugoslavia has been sold to the public as a humanitarian necessity, when in reality it is a political project. For the Albanian leaders, the purpose was always clear: Albanian rule over Kosovo, not "human rights" and certainly not "peace." Veton Surroi, publisher of the leading Kosovo Albanian newspaper Koha Ditore, financially supported by the Soros Foundation and the National Endowment for Democracy, is often mentioned as the West's dark horse to be President of "independent" ethnic Albanian Kosovo. He was a member of the Albanian delegation that signed the Rambouillet war agreement with the U.S. and the EU. He told the New York Times a week later that when he signed, he "also accepted that there would be consequences for the people of Kosovo, that if the Serbian side did not agree to the pact, it would have to be imposed by force-even at risk to the civilian population." He continued: "...these kinds of political arrangements require war, both as the driving force and as the action that seals them." Surroi also recognized the political interest of NATO: "The inhabitants of southeastern Europe will have to face the fact that NATO has created a security umbrella over them...." In reality, the whole thrust of U.S. policy has been toward a violent conflict in Yugoslavia that would shatter Serbia, the last bastion of old-fashioned independence in the Balkans, and bring NATO in as occupier and arbiter. The United States did not want to bring Yugoslavia into NATO, but NATO into Yugoslavia. To most people, it seems incredible that the apparently blundering Clinton administration could have hatched and carried out such a Machiavellian plot. And no doubt it didn't. The monstrous policy seems, from what one can discern, to have grown more or less by chance out of a strange encounter between two very different interest groups: Balkan revanchist lobbies, both Croatian and Albanian, on the one hand, and a circle of strategic policy planners looking for the means to transform NATO from a West European defense alliance focused on containing the Soviet Union into the military arm of U.S. global hegemony, able to act anywhere in the world without regard to national sovereignty, the United Nations or international law. The Albanian Lobby First came the lobbies. Already in the 1980s, when Albanians were actually running Kosovo, and the mainstream press was reporting that Albanians were harassing Serbs in order to establish "an ethnically clean Albanian republic" before merging with Albania to form "a greater Albania,"⁽⁸⁾ the Albanian lobby in the United States was working to reverse the image. The center of this lobby was New York Republican Congressman Joseph DioGuardi, of Italian-Albanian background. On June 18, 1986, Representative DioGuardi and Senator Bob Dole introduced Concurrent Resolution 150, "Expressing Concern over the Condition of Ethnic Albanians Living in Yugoslavia." This was an early significant victory for the Albanian lobby. Of course, neither Dole nor, probably, any other congressman had the slightest idea of conditions in Kosovo, if they could tell where it was, but it's a rare politician who isn't ready to "express concern" over the condition of an ethnic minority that has an active lobby operating in Washington. This sort of resolution can then be used as documentary proof of whatever it alleges. The reward was not long in coming. In May 1987, Dole and DioGuardi attended an Albanian-American fund-raiser in New York City that raised \$1.2 million for Dole's campaign and \$50,000 for DioGuardi's.⁽⁹⁾ Even so, DioGuardi lost his seat, whereupon he formed the Albanian-American Civic League to pursue lobbying for the Albanian cause. Cuba has long been the most striking illustration of how a relatively small ethnic lobby-that of the counter-revolutionary Cuban exiles in Florida-could have a long-term negative influence on U.S. foreign policy. The Balkans provide a second, even more surprising, example. Ethnic lobbies offer mediocre politicians two precious assets. The most obvious is money in the form of campaign contributions. The other is the semblance of an idealistic cause: Championing some obscure "oppressed people" seeking American support for its "righteous cause" can provide a glow of international vision to mediocre provincial politicians with not a glimmer of

understanding of the outside world. The ethnic lobbies are not partisan. Republicans and Democrats are eligible to support their causes. For the 1996 elections, the Democrats "established nine steering committees to concentrate on Albanians, Arabs, Croatians, Greeks, Irish, Hungarians, Italians, Lithuanians and Poles.... An energetic 31-year-old Albanian American, Ilir Zherka, was put in charge of the drive, which was called Ethnic Outreach," The European reported.(10) Once upon a time ethnic lobbies were concerned with the social welfare and advancement of their constituents. To some extent, that may still be the case, but since America became top superpower, the focus has shifted to bringing that power in on the side of exile groups with an agenda. The Clinton administration, Zherka told The European, "has concentrated on trying to solve age-old problems in Ireland, Bosnia, and the Middle East. In addition, Clinton has worked on expanding NATO, and the Poles, Hungarian, and Baltic citizens appreciate his efforts. He has also supported Ukrainian independence." Here is where the agendas of exile groups and the post-Cold War problem of finding a new "mission" for NATO have dovetailed dangerously. With the collapse of the communist "enemy," a small number of very special interests have rushed in to fill the foreign policy void. "Minority groups have leverage because their support can mean the difference between a candidate winning or losing an entire state," according to William Kimberling of the Federal Election Commission.(11) Smaller ethnic groups can be more effective than big ones because they are more compact. "One of the problems of American politics is that the two biggest groups, Blacks and Hispanics, are the least organized and don't vote." The lesson he drew is that "if you vote together, candidates will pay attention." The leading role of the Albanian lobby in the Clinton campaign's "Ethnic Outreach" program is striking, as is the absence of any Serbian lobby. One can assume that this is not because there are no Americans of Serbian origin in the United States, but because Serbian-Americans have not, in recent decades, been united by an activist revanchist agenda. Serbs identified totally with the victorious Allied side in both world wars; many considered themselves Yugoslavs first and foremost, and if they opposed Tito, the changes they hoped to see in Yugoslavia were political and democratic, not a reshaping of the Balkans with help from the U.S. Superpower. In contrast, right-wing Croatian exile groups in particular nursed dreams of restoring the fascist Ustashe "Independent Croatian State," which had existed only during World War II thanks to the occupation and dismantling of Yugoslavia by Germany and Italy. In 1993, it was reported that "Croatia has built up the most effective lobbying and public relations network on Capitol Hill since the days when the Israeli and Greek lobbies were at their peak." (12) Croatian lobbying efforts, congressional investigators were quoted as saying, "could well exceed \$50 million." Culturally, there is little in common between Croats and Albanians. But extreme Croatian and Albanian exiles nursing the hope of restoring the Greater Croatia and the Greater Albania that had existed only thanks to the Axis Powers during World War II shared something very important: a common enemy. That common enemy was multi-national Yugoslavia, which deprived them of their ethnically defined independent states. Politically, it was more effective to define that enemy as the Serbs, the people who had played the leading historic role in creating multi-cultural Yugoslavia. Denouncing the Serbs as communist oppressors was the formula for winning support from American politicians. Serbian-Americans were without a well-funded revanchist agenda, and politically divided: no clout. A key role in the joining of the anti-Serb forces was reportedly played by a young aide of Senator Dole, Mira Radievolic Baratta. Within the "small circle of those who monitor U.S. policy toward the Balkans," The Weekly Standard reported in 1995, "her influence and her expertise are widely recognized." Richard Perle, an informal Dole adviser who worked on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims at the Dayton peace talks, says that "other than Richard Holbrooke, Baratta has been the most influential individual in shaping U.S. policy." (13) Baratta began working for Dole in June 1989 and in May 1995 received the "Award for Excellence in Politics" from the National Federation

van holst en steijnen

From: global reflexion <office@globalreflexion.org>
To: <office@globalreflexion.org>
Sent: dinsdag 3 april 2001 08:08
Subject: Washington finances ethnic warfare in the Balkans

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Tuesday, april 3, 2001

1. Washington finances ethnic warfare in the Balkans
2. The hoax that started a war
3. Statement of the Socialist Party of Serbia

WASHINGTON FINANCES ETHNIC WARFARE IN THE BALKANS

by Michel Chossudovsky [3 April 2001]

Professor of Economics, University of Ottawa, author of The Globalization of Poverty, second edition, Common Courage Press, 2001.

Synopsis

While Washington supports the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, it is at the same time --behind the scenes-- funneling money and military hardware to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) now engaged in a border war with the Macedonian Security Forces. In a cruel irony, Washington is arming and advising both the KLA attackers and the Macedonian defenders under military and intelligence authorization acts approved by the US Congress. Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), a mercenary outfit on contract to the Pentagon, is helping Macedonia --as part of a US military aid package-- "to deter armed aggression and defend Macedonian territory." But MPRI is also advising and equipping the KLA, which is responsible for the terrorist assaults. In this war, the American military-intelligence apparatus is pulling strings "on both sides of the fence". What is the hidden agenda?

"[The] United States of America and the Kosovo Liberation Army stand for the same human values and principles ... Fighting for the KLA is fighting for human rights and American values." (Senator Jo. Lieberman, quoted in the 'Washington Post', 28 April 1999)

-- M.C.

WASHINGTON FINANCES ETHNIC WARFARE IN THE BALKANS

by Michel Chossudovsky [3 April 2001]

The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) --transformed in September 1999 into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) under UN auspices-- is behind the terrorist attacks in the Tetovo region of Macedonia as well as in Southern Serbia. In Macedonia, these assaults are waged by the KLA's proxy: the Ushtria Clirimtare Komtare (UCK) or National Liberation Army (NLA). The terrorists operate from KLA bases inside Kosovo under KFOR protection.

Supported by the US, the KLA and its various proxies are well equipped. According to Carl Bildt (special UN coordinator for the Balkans), the Macedonian Security Forces "are no match" for the rebels: "the guerrillas are a competent military organization. They have a core of very experienced fighters. They are well fortified, evidently well

prepared, and in all probability they control substantial parts of the hinterland."

But where did they get the money? The Western media conveys the impression that the National Liberation Army (NLA) developed into a modern rebel force overnight, spontaneously "out of thin air" and that NATO leaders have no contacts with the KLA.

UN PEACE-KEEPING FINANCES TERRORISM

According to the (London) 'Sunday Times',

"American intelligence agents have admitted they helped to train the Kosovo Liberation Army before NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia".(1)

A review of US Congressional documents would suggest that CIA support was not discontinued after the war.(2) Moreover, while the KLA maintains its links both to the CIA and criminal syndicates involved in the Balkans narcotics trade, the paramilitary organisation -renamed the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) has been elevated to UN status, implying the granting of legitimate sources of funding through UN as well as through bilateral channels.

Procurement of military supplies, training of the KLA and military advisers has been entrusted to Military Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI), a US based mercenary outfit linked to the Pentagon. The pattern is similar to that followed in Croatia and in the Bosnian Muslim-Croatian Federation where so-called "equip and train" programmes were put together by the Pentagon.

MPRI's training concepts --which had already been tested in Croatia and Bosnia- are based on imparting "offensive tactics... as the best form of defence".(3) In the Kosovar context, this so-called "defensive doctrine" applied in terrorist assaults in Southern Serbia and Macedonia is intent upon transforming the KLA paramilitary into a modern military force which serves the Alliance's strategic objectives. MPRI listed in 1999 "ninety-one highly experienced, former military professionals working in Bosnia & Herzegovina".(4) The number of military officers working on contract with the KLA has not been disclosed.

There is, however, a consistent thread: KLA Chief of Staff Agim Ceku (previously with the Croatian Armed Forces) has been involved in a long-term relationship with the MPRI. Ceku started working with MPRI in 1995 in the planning of "Operation Storm" in Croatia, which led to ethnic massacres and the expulsion of more than 200,000 Serbs from the Krajina region of Croatia. The fact that Ceku is "an alleged war criminal" -- according to the files of the Hague Tribunal (a body reporting to the UN Secretary General)-- does not, however, seem to bother anybody in the "international community".(5)

Ceku holds a UN passport (Laissez-Passer) which provides him with diplomatic immunity within Kosovo. According to ICTY prosecutor Carla del Ponte, Ceku's reputation and integrity, however, are unstained because the Hague tribunal's "inquiries ... relate to atrocities committed [by Ceku] in Krajina ... between 1993 and 1995... Ceku's record in Kosovo itself is not thought to be in question".(6)

Behind to polite façade of international diplomacy, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has --on Washington's instructions-- knowingly and willfully approved the appointment of "an alleged war criminal" to participate in a UN peacekeeping operation. In other words, the UN system is "financing terrorism," creating an ugly precedent in the history of a respected international body: "The United Nations is paying the salaries of many of the gangsters," who are now involved in the terrorist assaults into Macedonia.(7)

RECYCLING NARCO-DOLLARS

US support to the KLA is only one among several sources of KLA financing. Various Islamic organisations have channeled money and military equipment to the KLA. Prior to the 1999 war,

"German, Turkish and Afghan instructors were reported to be training the KLA in guerilla and diversion tactics."(8)

Mujehadeen mercenaries recruited in a number of countries fought against Serb Security forces alongside the KLA in Kosovo. According to the 'Sunday Times,' the recent assaults by the KLA's proxy in the Tetovo region of Macedonia have been "encouraged by mercenaries from Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia."(9)

Amplly documented, the Balkans drug trade is used to finance ethnic warfare with the complicity of the US and NATO. The pattern of covert support —through the recycling of narco-dollars— has been an integral part of CIA covert operations since the Soviet-Afghan war. According to documents of the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), "members of the notorious Albanian mafia have links to a drug smuggling cartel" based in Kosovo's capital, Pristina. This cartel is allegedly manned by ethnic Albanians who are members of the Kosovo National Front (KNF) whose armed wing is the KLA. The DEA documents apparently show it is one of the "most powerful heroin smuggling organisations in the world" with its profits being diverted to the KLA to buy weapons.(10)

In the words of former DEA agent and author Michael Levine:

"Ten years ago we were arming and equipping the worst elements of the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan - drug traffickers, arms smugglers, anti-American terrorists. Now we're doing the same thing with the KLA, which is tied in with every known middle and far eastern drug cartel. Interpol, Europol, and nearly every European intelligence and counter-narcotics agency has files open on drug syndicates that lead right to the KLA, and right to Albanian gangs in this country."(11)

While US aid —combined with drug money— is channeled to the KLA, Washington and Brussels perfunctorily condemn the NLA-Tetovo instigated terrorist assaults while casually denying the links of the attackers to the KLA. In the words of former NATO Secretary General Javier Solana: "it would be a mistake to negotiate, the terrorists have to be isolated. All of us have to condemn and isolate them. Nothing can be achieved through violence".

NATO has pledged to "starve" the rebels by cutting supply lines from neighboring Kosovo".(12) While condemning the terrorists, NATO —through the UN— has also been "raising the urgent need for restraint by the Macedonian forces".(13)

This double talk is of course a form of political camouflage: you say that you are against the terrorists and then support them via the KLA with guns, ammo and military advisers paid by the US public purse.

FINANCING BOTH SIDES

But there is something else even more terrifying which has not been revealed to public opinion. The guerilla war in the Tetovo region of Macedonia is being financed and therefore controlled by Washington "on both sides" of the border. While Washington pumps money into the KLA, the FYR of Macedonia —which has been an obedient client state— is also the recipient of US military aid and training. Macedonia is a member of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and aspires to acquire full NATO membership.

The same group of US military advisers on contract with the KLA is also "helping" the Macedonian Armed Forces. The MPRI —while assisting the KLA in its terrorist assaults— is also present behind enemy lines in Macedonia under a so-called "Stability and Deterrence Program". The later is intent upon "assisting the Macedonian Armed Forces . to deter armed aggression and, should deterrence fail, defend Macedonian territory."(14) What is happening is that the US mercenary company with a mandate "to defend the border" is also advising the KLA on how best "to attack the border".

Is this not crystal clear: The military-intelligence ploy is to finance

both sides of the conflict, provide military aid to one side and finance the other side. And then "make them fight". It's a sinister military-intelligence game, an "insider operation" with US military advisers on both sides from the same mercenary outfit (the MPRI). Macedonia's "Stability and Deterrence Program" is in fact largely supported by US foreign military sales (FMS), namely MPRI is in charge of delivering (i.e. dumping) to the Macedonian Armed Forces obsolete weapons and hardware which the US Department of Defense wants to get rid of.

Moreover, with its various sources of financing (drugs, Islamic organisations, US military aid, contributions from the US-Albanian community), the KLA and its Macedonian proxy the Ushtria Chirimtare Komtare have the upper edge. The money channeled from various sources including the drug trade far exceeds the meager FMS allocations granted in the form of surplus military equipment to the Macedonian Ministry of Defence. (15)

The friendly and cordial meetings held in Skopje (July 2000) between General Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Macedonian counterpart, General Jovan Andrevski, constitute an obvious smoke screen. While America's top brass pays lip service to its PIP partner and ally, the KLA –with the support of the Albanian American community– is actively recruiting US citizens to fight as volunteers against the Macedonian Security Forces.(16) Bear in mind that this pattern of "financing both sides" is not limited to the Balkans: since the end of the Cold War, Washington has been involved in channeling covert financing and triggering civil conflicts in different parts of the World including Central Africa, the Caucasus and Central Asia. By financing both sides of the conflict, the US controls the outcome of the war.

MPRI OVERSEES THE SHOW

While recruiting a wide range of military and intelligence expertise from its data bank of former military personnel, MPRI is controlled by a handful of former generals and ex-CIA officers. MPRI General (retired) Rich Griffiths –responsible for MPRI's program in Macedonia– is talking to the Macedonian Chief of Staff. He also talks to KLA Commander Agim Ceku –with whom he has established a longstanding relationship since Operation Storm in Croatia in 1995. Ceku is part of the MPRI's "old boys network"; in collaboration with MPRI, he was one of the main architects of "Operation Storm". In this capacity, he also acted as Commander of the Artillery division, which ruthlessly shelled Krajina Serb civilians.(17)

Whether MPRI personnel stationed in Kosovo is in direct contact or communication with their colleagues in Macedonia is not the issue: all MPRI military staff in the field report back to Rich Griffith, Crosbie Saint and Carl Vuono (President of MPRI) at the company's headquarters in Alexandria, Virginia. Crosbie Saint –in charge of the company's "International Group"– coordinates MPRI's various operations in Kosovo and Macedonia as well as in Croatia and Bosnia. In turn, Saint –who is a former director of military intelligence– is in permanent contact with the Pentagon, KFOR and the CIA.(18)

HIDDEN AGENDA

So what kind of war is this? Both sides in the Macedonia border war are controlled by the US. American military personnel from the same private mercenary company are stationed on "both sides of the fence" assisting their local counterparts to fight a war on Washington's behest.

If this war is allowed to continue, it will inevitably lead to the escalation of ethnic hatred, civilian casualties and refugees. This in turn will result in political destabilization and social unrest in both Macedonia and Yugoslavia, thereby providing a pretext to Washington and NATO to directly intervene under the guise of "peace-keeping" and "confidence building." The hidden agenda also consists in the mobilization of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia to support or become part of the KLA'S structure.

In other words, Washington is "financing ethnic warfare" as a means to achieving broad geopolitical, strategic and economic objectives using the KLA as proxy force. Meanwhile, the "international community" –warning of an impending "humanitarian disaster"– has sent in an army of observers and

human rights experts, with a mandate to protect the political and social rights of ethnic Albanians. This brokered "reconciliation" --imposed by NATO under UN auspices-- is based on the premise that ethnic Albanians in Macedonia are an oppressed social minority. It not only fosters socio-ethnic divisions within Macedonia; it also provides legitimacy to the KLA sponsored "freedom fighters" as well as international media sympathy. It tends to discredit the Macedonian Security Forces, thereby weakening their ability to fight the KLA.

While Washington continues to support the terrorists behind the scenes, the military alliance presents itself as an impartial mediator. In turn, NATO's informal mouthpiece, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), is placing the blame on the Skopje government, calling upon:

"the legal authorities in the FYR of Macedonia, Presevo and Kosovo to act to restore peace and security, . all sectors of the Macedonian society [should] co-operate peacefully and . build inter-ethnic confidence."(19)

The dispatching of Bulgarian troops into Macedonia (under NATO's "Partnership for Peace" Program) to fight the rebels could (if implemented) contribute to triggering a much broader conflagration in the region. Similarly, ethnic clashes --also engineered by Washington-- have been triggered in Montenegro, which has a sizeable Albanian ethnic minority. And in Montenegro, the MUP, Montenegro's highly partisan police force is being assisted by the Croatian Armed Forces, which in turn are being trained by the MPRI under the so-called Croatian Armed Forces Readiness and Training System (CARTS). Similarly, demanding "autonomy" for ethnic Hungarians in the North of Vojvodina is part of NATO's ploy with large numbers of NATO troops stationed on the Hungarian side of the border. More generally, the various military aid packages provided to Croatia, Bosnia and the KLA are ultimately directed against Serbia.(20)

Despite the compliance of the Belgrade and Skopje governments to Washington's demands, US foreign policy purports to eventually dismantle political institutions and get rid of political parties which resist US-NATO domination. Their objective is to eventually break up what remains of Yugoslavia into what UN Balkans envoy Carl Bildt has called a "patchwork of protectorates" on the "Kosovo-Bosnia model under UN "peace-keeping", - namely under military occupation. (21)

A Dayton-style agreement is the chosen framework for displacing and destroying existing State institutions including a fragile yet functioning parliamentary system. With regard to Macedonia, the OSCE has appointed Ambassador Robert Frowick to work with the Skopje government. His terms of reference are clear. In 1996, Frowick was put in charge of implementing "democracy" in Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Dayton agreement: the Bosnian "Constitution" -- previously drafted by American lawyers at the US Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio-- was appended to the 1995 US brokered "General Framework Agreement."(22)

DISARMING THE NEW WORLD ORDER

The terrorist assaults in Macedonia and Southern Serbia are serving Washington's strategic goals in blatant violation of international law. NATO is increasingly discredited in the eyes of World public opinion. The lies and falsehoods are surfacing and the people of Yugoslavia are determined to reserve their sovereignty in the face of American aggression.

US foreign policy directed against so-called "rogue states" lacks credibility both in the US and internationally. Around the World, citizens are looking to Yugoslavia and the courage of its people who have resisted the imposition of the New World Order. The lies concerning the war against Yugoslavia have been uncovered and revealed to millions of people.

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 22. For a discussion see Michel Chossudovsky, Dismantling Yugoslavia, Recolonizing Bosnia, Covert Action Quarterly, Spring 1996, also published by Emperors Clothes at <http://emperors-clothes.com/indexe.htm>. The text of the Bosnian Constitution is available at <http://www.bosnia.co.uk/dayton.html>

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<http://emperors-clothes.com/articles/choss/fin.htm>

... Corps (KPC) under UN auspices-- is behind the terrorist attacks in the Tetovo region of Macedonia as well as in Southern Serbia. In Macedonia, these assaults are waged by the KLA's proxy: the Ushtria Clirimtare Komtare (UCK) or National Liberation Army (NLA). The terrorists operate from KLA bases inside Kosovo under KFOR protection.

Supported by the US, the KLA and its various proxies are well equipped. According to Carl Bildt (special UN coordinator for the Balkans), the Macedonian Security Forces "are no match" for the rebels: 'the guerrillas are a competent military organization. They have a core of very experienced fighters. They are well fortified, evidently well

KOSOVO & METOHIA

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TERRORISM IN KOSOVO AND METOHIA

Why a New Albanian State?


The main characteristics in Kosovo and Metohija are the absence of dialogue and a deep division between the ethnic groups. In spite of the fact that the Albanians achieved an enviable standard of living and a demographic explosion (the highest birth rate in Europe) in the FR of Yugoslavia, the Albanian separatists do not want the normalization of the life in Kosovo and reject every kind of dialogue which could contribute substantially to the normalization of the situation and to the lessening of the tensions.

The high degree of autonomy and of national rights did not satisfy the Albanian nationalists. They organized a separatists' rebellion in 1981, with "Kosovo Republic" as their main slogan (separatist's demonstrations have been repeated a number of times until 1989). The slogan "Kosovo Republic" represents the main strategy of the Albanian separatism - the transformation of the Autonomous Province of Kosmet into a Republic which would have the right of secession. The Albanian separatist leaders in Kosmet never mention the question of the rights of national minorities, let alone the question of human rights and liberties. They request openly and unequivocally an independent state.

The Albanian separatist leaders organized elections in 1991, and established institutions of the "parallel authorities" which represent a "state alternative" of the FRY.

The selective non-recognition of the state in which they live and work is reflected in the:

- refusal to serve in the army
- non-participation in the elections - had they participated in the elections, the Albanians would have, bearing in mind the population, more than 30 out of 250 deputies in the Republican Parliament, around 12 out of 178 deputies in the Federal Parliament, and some 80% of the deputies in the Parliament of the Province.. It is quite obvious that the members of the Albanian national minority would have practically the entire power in the Province.
- non-payment of all state taxes and duties. At the same time, they regularly pay to the "Parallel authorities" 3% of their income (very often that is a pure and simple blackmail of their compatriots).
- the establishment of "parallel schools", exclusively for the members of the Albanian national minority. The teaching is performed according to nationalist and separatist programmes, in non-adequate premises. The level of the knowledge acquired is best shown by the fact that their diplomas are not recognized anywhere in the world. Generations of the Albanian youth are handicapped educationally at the very start, and the "parallel schools" resulted in the final ethnic division among the young, in the closing of the young members of the Albanian national minority in the dogmas of extreme nationalism and separatism and the creation of the consciousness that common life with Serbs is impossible. The demonstrations and requests to return to the school buildings have as objective only the seizure of the buildings, and not the



The Map of a Greater Albania – demonstrations in Brussels in April 1991.

acceptation of the valid curriculum - as a matter of fact, they want to continue the "parallel schools" in the school buildings. The boycott of the educational system of the Republic of Serbia, which guarantees and assures conditions for teaching in Albanian prevents the application of the Declaration on the Rights of National, Ethnic, Religious and Language minorities, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1992. The manipulation of the young for the achievement of separatist objectives violates the UN Declaration on the Rights of Children and the International Convention on the Rights of Children.

Such a behaviour represents a violation of the provision 37 of the Final Document of the 2nd Meeting of the Conference on Human Dimension of the OSCE (Copenhagen, 1990), and of the Para.9 of the Preamble, of the articles 20 and 21 of the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe on the Protection of National Minorities. These provisions do not allow to the minorities any activities which would be contrary to the principles of the UN Charter, of the OSCE, and especially to the principle of respect of the territorial integrity, of the Constitution and the laws of the countries in which the minorities live.

At the same time, the Albanian minority uses all the benefits given by the state and the system they do not recognize, but which are suitable for them:

- health insurance
- employments in public and private sectors
- all rights in the field of information
- passports
- vaccination of the population, etc.
- the Albanian national minority has the Albanian Drama, a Section of the Academy of Science, an Authors' Association, a Musicians' Association and over 100 cultural and artistic associations. These institutions are financed by the Republic of Serbia.

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Oorlog na Rambouillet al zeker

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De vraag of de Serviërs aan het begin van de oorlog om Kosovo bezig waren de Kosovaren systematisch te verdrijven, is moeilijk te beantwoorden. Een humanitaire ramp door het optreden van de Serviërs was er wél. En de oorlog was toen al onvermijdelijk.

Door onze redacteur PETER MICHIELSEN

ROTTERDAM, 9 FEBR. Was in Kosovo vóór 24 maart 1999, toen de NAVO haar bommenwerpers op het Joegoslavië van Slobodan Milosevic afstuurde, sprake van systematische etnische zuiveringen jegens de Albanese bevolking? Ja, zegt de NAVO. Er was sprake van een humanitaire ramp. 360.000 Kosovo-Albanen waren verdreven, binnen negen maanden. Was er geen Plan-Hoefijzer, dat voorzag in de systematische verdrijving van alle Albanen uit Kosovo? Was de razendsnelle verdrijving van honderdduizenden Albanen ná 24 maart geen bewijs dat dat plan volop werd uitgevoerd? Had Milosevic zelf niet herhaaldelijk gezinspeeld op zijn vermogen, Kosovo in twee weken 'schoon' te kunnen vegen?

Nee, er was géén systematische etnische zuivering, zegt de Duitse generaal b.d. Heinz Loquai: er waren vluchtelingen - Albanen en Serviërs - voor het geweld van een burgeroorlog. Een Plan-Hoefijzer? Heeft iemand het plan ooit gezien? Een verzinsel, zegt Loquai (hoewel zijn eigen minister Scharping heeft gezegd het te hebben).

Of de 360.000 Kosovaarse vluchtelingen per 24 maart 1999 het slachtoffer waren van een bewuste verdrijvingscampagne laat zich ook twee jaar na dato moeilijk met zekerheid vaststellen. Een Plan-Hoefijzer is nooit boven water gekomen - maar dat het bestond is vrijwel zeker: daarvoor verliep de wel degelijk systematische verdrijving van een miljoen Kosovaren te snel, te soepel: die verdrijving was zonder twijfel georganiseerd en dan ligt de veronderstelling voor de hand dat er een plan klaar lag - of het nu op 24 maart al uit de la was gehaald of niet. Daar komt bij dat Milosevic inderdaad eind 1998 en begin 1999 herhaaldelijk opschepte over een mogelijke massale verdrijving, tegenover de Duitse minister Joschka Fischer (die zich later publiekelijk voor de kop sloeg omdat hij de verhulde waarschuwing niet serieus had genomen), en tegen NAVO-militairen, tegen wie hij zei dat de Serviërs de problemen met de Albanen in de Drenica, het hartland van Kosovo, in 1946 heel simpel hadden opgelost: door alle Albanen te doden.

In wezen is de vraagstelling - was de campagne per 24 maart een georganiseerde of niet? - in wezen niet zo relevant, want een simplificatie van het probleem. Vast staat dat er in Kosovo wel degelijk een humanitaire ramp bestond: die 360.000 vluchtelingen zijn niet weg te redeneren. Vast staat ook dat in lang niet alle gevallen de Serviërs lokale Albanen eerst vriendelijk waarschuwden voor een naderende militaire operatie en hen daarna even vriendelijk uitnodigden naar hun woningen terug te keren: in de meeste gevallen was het optreden van de Servische politie genadeloos. Het UÇK - óók genadeloos overigens - was een guerrillaleger, en een guerrillaleger bestrijdt men het best door de zee waarin het zich moeiteloos beweegt, te legen. Dat betekent verdrijving van burgers. Duitse rechtbanken kunnen hebben geoordeeld dat in Kosovo Albanen niet als etnische groep werden vervolgd, ze werden wél als etnische groep vervolgd in delen van Kosovo waar het UÇK door de Serviërs werd bestreden.

De vraagstelling is ook niet zo relevant omdat generaal Loquai geheel voorbij gaat aan de politieke ontwikkelingen: het akkoord tussen Milosevic en de Amerikaanse diplomaat Holbrooke van oktober 1998 werden stelselmatig door Milosevic gesaboteerd; in Rambouillet werd in februari 1999 duidelijk dat de Serviërs geen akkoord wensten - ze wensten zelfs geen onderhandelingen; in maart mislukte eerst de nieuwe missie - Holbrooke, vervolgens de Parijse vervolgconferentie van Rambouillet en daarna de derde

missie-Holbrooke. De conclusie (zie bijvoorbeeld het recente boek *Winning Ugly* van Ivo H. Daalder en Michael E. O'Hanlon): de Serviërs wensten de confrontatie met de NAVO, in de verwachting dat zij uiteindelijk niet zou durven aanvallen of dat de cohesie binnen de NAVO het zou begeven. Systematische zuiveringen of niet: de oorlog was na Rambouillet al onvermijdelijk.

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Vluchtelingen




Foto NRC Handelsblad, Maurice Boyer

Als gevolg van de NAVO-aanvallen zijn honderdduizenden etnische Albanese uit Kosovo weggevlucht naar de buurlanden Macedonië, Albanië en het in Joegoslavië gelegen Montenegro. De Kosovaren vertellen gruwelijke verhalen over moord en etnische zuivering.



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'UNCHR in Kosovo-crisis veel te traag'

(12 februari 2000)

De vluchtelingenorganisatie van de Verenigde Naties heeft vorig jaar te traag gereageerd op de Kosovo-crisis. Dat is de conclusie van een onafhankelijk onderzoek dat in opdracht van de VN is uitgevoerd en dat gisteren werd gepresenteerd.

Amnesty

(20 mei 1999)

Amnesty International heeft in een gisteren gepubliceerd rapport kritiek geuit op de regering van Macedonië, wegens de wijze waarop gevluchte en verdreven Kosovaren worden behandeld.

Hulp EU Kosovo kost 1,6 mld extra

(17 april 1999)

De hulp voor vluchtelingen uit Kosovo gaat de Europese Unie nog eens 1,6 miljard gulden kosten. De EU heeft al ruim een half miljard gulden voor humanitaire hulp bij de Kosovo crisis vrijgemaakt.

'Bij hulp ontbreekt centrale coördinatie'

(12 april 1999)

Het hoofd van de OVSE in Albanië, Daan Everts, heeft felle kritiek op de hulpverlening aan de vluchtelingen uit Kosovo. „Iedere centrale coördinatie ontbreekt.“

In kampen Macedonië loopt spanning op

(19 mei 1999)

Kosovaarse vluchtelingen in Macedonië klagen over de Macedonische politie; de politie klaagt over 'provocaties' van de vluchtelingen.

Bitter welkom bij de grenspost

(19 april 1999)

Bij duizenden stromen vluchtelingen uit Kosovo Macedonië binnen. Ze gaan naar kampen die door de NAVO - tot haar ongenoegen - worden overgedragen aan de hulporganisatie UNHCR en de Macedonische politie.

Kosovo dreigt snel leeg te lopen

(17 april 1999)

De VN-vluchtelingenorganisatie UNHCR waarschuwde gisteren dat binnenkort alle Albanese uit Kosovo zijn gedeporteerd. De

vluchtelingenstroom, die de afgelopen week afnam, zwelt weer sterk aan.

'400.000 Kosovaren houden zich nog schuil'

(12 april 1999)

Volgens de Britse minister van Buitenlandse Zaken, Robin Cook, zijn binnen Kosovo 400.000 mensen op de vlucht. Ze houden zich verborgen in de bergen, bang voor de Serviërs en niet in staat naar het buitenland te vluchten. Hoe Cook aan die schatting kwam, werd niet toegelicht. Andere schattingen over het aantal verdreven Kosovaren die zich in de regio verborgen houden belopen aantallen tot 260.000.

UNHCR telt 520.000 vluchtelingen

(10 april 1999)

Hoeveel Kosovaren zijn inmiddels naar het buitenland gevlucht? Bijna 520.000 telde de VN-vluchtelingenorganisatie UNHCR er gisteren: 304.000 in Albanie, 122.200 in Macedonie, 60.000 in Montenegro, 24.300 in Bosnie, 8.061 in Turkije.

Onenigheid over vluchtelingenkampen; Spanningen in Macedonie

(10 april 1999)

Tussen de vluchtelingenorganisatie van de Verenigde Naties (UNHCR) en de NAVO-commandant in Macedonie groeit een conflict over de dagelijkse verantwoordelijkheid voor de vluchtelingenkampen in de grensstreek met Kosovo.

In Albanië smokkelt men Kosovaren met korting

(9 april 1999)

Nog maar weinig Kosovaren zijn van Albanië naar Italië getrokken. De regering in Tirana ontmoedigt dan ook het vertrek van de vluchtelingen. „De evacuaties dragen alleen bij aan Milosevic' strategie om Kosovo te zuiveren.“

Rond tienduizend Kosovaren zoek

(8 april 1999)

De UNHCR, de vluchtelingenorganisatie van de VN, is op zoek naar rond tienduizend vluchtelingen uit Kosovo. Ze worden vermist sinds de ontruiming van het kamp in het niemandsland bij Blace tussen Macedonië en Kosovo gisterocht uit de hand liep. Veel families werden tijdens deze operatie van elkaar gescheiden.

We pakten onze tassen en trokken de schemering in

(29 maart 1999)

Grote aantallen vluchtelingen stromen uit Kosovo Macedonië binnen. Hun komst leidt tot spanningen en geruchten.

Grote vluchtelingenstroom uit Kosovo 'verrast' velen

(6 april 1999)

Albanie en Macedonie dreigen te worden overspoeld met vluchtelingen uit Kosovo. Intussen kampen de hulporganisaties met logistieke problemen. „Er is geen gebrek aan goede wil.“

Uitgeputte mensen liggen dagenlang in modderpoel

(6 april 1999)

Woensdag kwam de eerste grote groep vluchtelingen uit Kosovo aan bij de Macedonische grensplaats Blace. Ze leggen de laatste kilometers te voet af en strijken na het passeren van de grens tussen Kosovo en Macedonie neer op een grasveld. Vier uur later zitten ze in een bus op weg naar gezinnen die hun opvangen.

?Humanitaire ramp' in Kosovo

(29 maart 1999)

De NAVO concentreert sinds gisteren haar luchtaanvallen op Joegoslavië vooral op Servische doelen in Kosovo. Bij de NAVO groeit de zorg over de 'ethnische zuivering' door de Serviërs in Kosovo. Ruim 80.000 Kosovaren zijn naar buurlanden gevlucht met gruwelijke verhalen over moord en ethnische zuivering. De Russische premier Primakov gaat morgen naar Belgrado voor een bemiddelingspoging.



Een etnische Albanees pauzeert even nadat hij zijn grootmoeder op een kar naar Albanië heeft gebracht (28 maart 1999). (AP Photo/Santiago Lyon)

'Ist gut, ist gut, ist gut!'
(29 maart 1999)

Na de NAVO-aanvallen is zij samen met haar drie kinderen direct op de vlucht geslagen. Haar man bracht haar in de richting van de Macedonische hoofdstad Skopje. Halverwege pikte ze haar moeder en vader op en ging haar man terug. „Wanneer het land in oorlog is, moet de man vechten voor de vrijheid van zijn land”, prevelt ze en wendt haar hoofd af om haar tranen te verbergen. Via kleine landwegen ging ze uiteindelijk bij Globocica de grens over.

In Kosovo tekent zich humanitair drama af
(4 oktober 1998)

In Kosovo tekent zich bij het naderen van de winter een humanitaire ramp af: vele tienduizenden vluchtelingen bivakkeren in de bergen en bossen zonder enige vorm van onderdak of hulp.

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Etnische zuivering

NRC Webpagina's
20 JULI 1999

Er lijkt in Kosovo sprake te zijn geweest van een georganiseerde campagne van etnische zuivering.

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Duitse KFOR-soldaten onderzoeken nabij Prizren in Kosovo een graf. (Foto Reuters)

[Scotland Yard vergaart in Kosovo de bewijzen](#)
(20 juli 1999)

Wat gebeurde er eind maart in het Kosovaarse dorp Celina? Een team van Scotland Yard heeft 73 lichamen van door de Serviërs vermoorde dorpelingen opgegraven en onderzocht. Er zullen meer lichamen worden gevonden: in Celina vermist men nog bijna driehonderd dorpelingen.

[Al voor de oorlog lagen de plannen klaar](#)
(28 juni 1999)

De etnische zuivering onder Kosovaren was goed voorbereid: de plannen lagen al klaar lang voordat de NAVO-aanval begon.

['Zuivering zorgvuldig georganiseerd'](#)
(28 juni 1999)

In Kosovo zijn Servische documenten gevonden die volgens het Britse blad *The Observer* aantonen dat de etnische zuivering van Kosovo zorgvuldig is gepland en voorbereid.

[Wie weet hoeveel lijken daar als vuil zijn ingegooid](#)
(21 juni 1999)

Kogelgaten, graven, bloed; overal in Kosovo zijn sporen te zien van wreedheden. Op stap met een 'gids des doods'.

[Bewijzen moord stapelen zich op](#)
(18 juni 1999)

Bewijzen van massamoorden en systematische foltering door Servische ordetroepen stapelen zich op in Kosovo. De Britse staatssecretaris van Buitenlandse Zaken, Geoff Hoon, schat het aantal vermoorde Kosovaren sinds het begin van de NAVO-luchtacties op ten minste 10.000.

[Steeds meer massagraven ontdekt](#)

(16 juni 1999)

De oprukkende soldaten van de internationale vredesmacht (KFOR) ontdekken steeds meer bewijzen van massagraven in Kosovo. Forensische experts van het Joegoslavië-tribunaal zullen de komende weken zestien plaatsen onderzoeken, waarvan, op basis van ooggetuigenverslagen, het vermoeden bestaat dat er massagraven zijn.

Britten stuiten op massagraf

(14 juni 1999)

Het Kosovo Bevrijdingsleger UÇK is op verschillende plaatsen in botsing gekomen met terugtrekkende Serviërs. Bij Suva Reka sloegen UÇK'ers twee Servische agenten dood. UÇK-troepen bezetten zaterdag het mijnstadje Belacevac. Bij Kacanik in Zuid-Kosovo stuitten Britse troepen op een vers massagraf.

Het Joegoslavië-tribunaal

(27 mei 1999)

Het tribunaal voor oorlogsmisdaden in voormalig Joegoslavië is in Den Haag gevestigd op basis van een resolutie van de Veiligheidsraad van 25 mei 1993. Het kreeg een mandaat om op te treden tegen grove schendingen van de conventie van Genève (1949), schending van het oorlogsrecht, genocide en misdaden tegen de menselijkheid. Alle VN-lidstaten hebben de verplichting mee te werken aan de uitlevering van verdachten.

UNHCR: etnische zuivering bijna voltooid

(26 mei 1999)

De versnelde exodus van Kosovaren naar Macedonië lijkt het resultaat te zijn van een georganiseerde Joegoslavische poging de 'etnische zuivering' van Kosovo te voltooien. Dat heeft de VN-hulporganisatie UNHCR gisteren gezegd nadat opnieuw bijna tienduizend Kosovaren over de grens met Macedonië werden gezet.

NAVO heeft 'bewijs van massagraven'

(19 april 1999)

De NAVO zegt fotografisch bewijsmateriaal te hebben over het bestaan van 43 massagraven in Kosovo, waarvan een aantal onder dwang van de Serviërs door Albanese gevangenen zou zijn gegraven. De OVSE zegt van haar kant geen bewijzen over massagraven of massa-executies te hebben.

Reconstructie van een etnische zuivering

(17 april 1999)

Om tien uur 's avonds hoorden de inwoners van Pec, in het westen van Kosovo, explosies. Dat is de Navo, dachten ze. Maar het waren de Serviërs.

'Mladic en Arkan zuiveren Kosovo'

(15 april 1999)

Ratko Mladic, leider van het Bosnisch-Servische leger in 1991-1995 en gezocht voor genocide, zou weer actief zijn. Volgens de Britse minister van Defensie George Robertson leidt de 'Napoleon van de Balkan' momenteel een militia die bloedig huishoudt in Kosovo

Rechter schiet eerst en confisqueert dan de lijken

(19 januari 1999)

Een Servische onderzoekrechter „creeerde de voorwaarden" voor een onderzoek naar de massamoord in Racak door beschietingen op het dorp. Even later waren alle lijken weg.

Na de slachting van Racak telt de OVSE de lijken

(18 januari 1999)

Westerse waarnemers of niet, Servische ordetroepen doen in Kosovo gewoon wat ze willen. Dat weet nu ook het Albanese Racak, waar de politie 45 inwoners afslachtte. De rest van het dorp werd gisteren weggejaagd.

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Blair: Westerse media helpen Serviërs

(11 mei 1999)

Een beetje katterig na een doorwaakte nacht maar blij, vertelde Tony Blair vorige week wat hij dacht over de uitslag van de lokale en regionale verkiezingen. In Glasgow zag het er zo uit: middenin een zin snoerde de Schotse televisie Blair de mond en schakelde over naar Donald Dewar, aankomend premier van de semi-onafhankelijke Schotse regering.

Bommen op staatstelevisie zijn niet misplaatst

(26 april 1999)

De NOS, de Nederlandse journalistenvakbond NVJ, de Internationale federatie voor journalisten en de Europese Omroepunie protesteren tegen de luchtaanvallen van de NAVO op de Servische staatszender RTS. Journalisten, zo heet het, mogen geen doel zijn in een militair conflict.

Journala veroordeelt bombarderen tv-zender

(24 april 1999)

Het NOS Journaal heeft bij minister F. de Grave (Defensie) geprotesteerd tegen het NAVO-bombardement van het gebouw van de Servische staatstelevisie in Belgrado.

Servische televisie blijft doelwit Navo

(24 april 1999)

De NAVO zal de Servische staatstelevisie blijven bestoken. Woordvoerder Ken Bacon van het Pentagon noemde de staatszender RTS gisteren „evenzeer onderdeel van Milosevic' moordmachine als het leger.“

Blair leent zijn mediastrateeg uit aan NAVO

(21 april 1999)

Alistair Campbell, *spin doctor* van premier Blair, moet de NAVO gaan behoeden voor nieuwe mediablunders.

NAVO slaat terug met 'psy-ops'

(21 april 1999)

De NAVO laat zich, wat propaganda betreft, niet onbetuigd. Video-banden ontbreken net zo als details over geraakte doelen. Maar de NAVO praktiseert ook een meer actieve vorm van propaganda: de *psychological operations*, ofwel *psy-ops*.

Turbopropaganda in sandwichformule

(21 april 1999)

De gelijkgeschakelde Servische media brengen met hun verslaggeving over de oorlog hun lezers en kijkers in een wereld van magisch-realisme.

Actie voor Kosovo getuigt van grote vindingrijkheid

(16 april 1999)

In een gezamenlijke tv-actie op drie van de negen Nederlandse zenders is gisteravond bijna 42 miljoen bijeengebracht voor de vluchtelingen uit Kosovo.

Slavko Curuvija: Te lastig, te goed geïnformeerd

(12 april 1999)

Een eerste ontmoeting, op een herfstavond in 1991, in de deprimerende en naargeestige sfeer van de stationssnackbar van Hollands Spoor vóór de verbouwing, vaal neon, kroketten, loempia's, patat: Slavko curuvija, een rijzige man met zwart haar en een zwart baardje, flamboyant, elegant: de verkeerde man op de verkeerde plaats.

Laatste journalist in Kosovo zit in de val

(31 maart 1999)

De laatste Westerse journalist in Pristina heet Antonio Russo, van de Italiaanse zender Radio Radicale. Via een krakende telefoonlijn slaagt hij er af en toe in contact te leggen met zijn thuisbasis. Het zijn dramatische gesprekken, waarin Russo vertelt dat zijn vrienden, zijn Albanese collega's, de schrijvers en fotografen met wie hij heeft gewerkt, allemaal zijn verdwenen. Dood of gevlucht? Russo heeft geen idee.

Internet

Het Internet moet Kosovaren herenigen

(25 mei 1999)

Het Internationale Rode Kruis heeft extra middelen ingezet om uiteengerukte families uit Kosovo weer bij elkaar te brengen: Internet en mobiele telefonie.

Boem, boem uit de chatroom

(17 mei 1999)

Terwijl de NAVO intensieve luchtaanvallen op Servië uitvoerde, werd dit weekeinde in Amsterdam een bescheiden feestje gevierd voor de jarige Servische radiozender B92.

Serviërs ook op Internet geïsoleerd

(14 mei 1999)

Internet is voor veel Joegoslaven het belangrijkste informatie- en communicatiemedium geworden. Door bombardementen en boycotacties wordt e-mailen en surfen steeds moeilijker.

Vuile cyberwar tegen de NAVO

(30 maart 1999)

Make love, not war. Dat is nog de aardigste van de honderden anti-oorlog e-mails die de NAVO dagelijks ontvangt. Verwensingen, vloeken en bedreigingen worden via elektronische post naar Brussel gestuurd. Ook veel beeldmateriaal: verwoeste huizen, een verminkt lijk, Clinton die verandert in een duivel of in een aap, hakenkruisen en porno.

Anoniem surfen lukt ook op de Balkan niet

(14 april 1999)

Surfen op het Internet zonder sporen achter te laten is aantrekkelijk, vooral in Joegoslavië. Maar gebruikers kunnen door lekken toch worden geïdentificeerd, zo heeft een Amerikaanse beveiligingsdeskundige vastgesteld.

Onafhankelijk B92 definitief gesloten

(6 april 1999)

De onafhankelijke nieuwszender B92 is definitief gestopt met uitzenden via Internet. De Belgradose radiozender werd 24 maart jl. verboden en slaagde er tot 2 april in om via Internet uit te zenden. Servische overheidsambtenaren en politie-agenten hebben de redactie gesloten. De directeur van B92, Sasa Mirkovic, is vervangen door de regeringsgetrouwe Aleksander Nikacevic.

Inventief B92 omzeilt Milosevic

(29 maart 1999)

Servische journalisten worden al jarenlang in hun bewegingsvrijheid beperkt, maar de laatste dagen is de situatie nijpend geworden: hoofdredacteurs worden aangehouden voor verhoor, zenders worden gestoord door de Servische autoriteiten en contact met correspondenten in de regio wordt onmogelijk gemaakt. Via Internet (www.b92.net) is B92 nog wel te beluisteren, voornamelijk door steun uit Nederland.

De oorlog op Internet

(26 maart 1999)

Het vliegveldje van Sombor mag door de NAVO deernisgevoelend zijn - dat heeft de bakkers van deze Noord-Servische stad er niet van weerhouden om de bevolking naar behoren van brood te voorzien. Dat weten we dankzij het Belgradose radiostation B'92, waarvan de zender eerder deze week door de Joegoslavische autoriteiten werd gesloten, maar dat gisteren nog steeds via Internet zijn signaal naar de rest van de wereld zond.

HOME - BACK

Panorama, BBC1 TV Panorama the BBC's Foreign Affairs Editor, John Simpson follows the controversial peacekeeping mission of General Sir Michael Rose through some of the worst scenes of fighting experienced in Bosnia
Panorama, BBC1 TV 23 January 1994 21:30 GMT

Now on BBC1 in tonight's Panorama the BBC's Foreign Affairs Editor, John Simpson, follows the controversial peacekeeping mission of General Sir Michael Rose through some of the worst scenes of fighting experienced in Bosnia.

Tonight, General Sir Michael Rose completes one of the toughest military missions in the world - commanding the UN in Bosnia. His critics say he's just an appeaser - he says he is a peace-maker, and a successful one. Panorama reports on Rose's War.

[Rose: "To be a good peacekeeper, you've also got to be a good warfighter."] [Panorama theme music]

General Rose is heading out on one of his final tours of inspection.

When he arrived in Sarajevo, 1200 shells a day were falling on the city.

The people here were the victims of medieval siege fought with modern weapons.

But today it is peaceful, and that is largely due to him. He's taking us up to a place where, until three weeks ago, you couldn't possibly have stood out in the open. The Jewish cemetery, on the front-line above Sarajevo.

Rose: "This area was probably the most dangerous area, you know, when there is fighting going on this Jewish cemetery and the line that goes up to the hill behind us is probably the most dangerous and difficult area in the whole of Sarajevo."

[Rose talking, in French, to a French UN soldier] But not for the moment. French troops are keeping the peace up here.

Rose, the only British general of his rank with fluent French, is both a man of action, as former head of the SAS, and one of the army's intellectuals. He seemed ideal for the job.

Despite the ceasefire, his bodyguards remain wary. Several snipers are on the Serbian front-line only 50 yards away. They've spotted a man there who, even though he's wearing a blue helmet, it doesn't belong to the UN.

Rose: "Is that a Serb? In the blue helmet? I shouldn't bother to film him too much, [laughing] he probably... 'Strawdinary, so, I mean things are never quite as they seem here, are they?'"

That could be the epitaph for General Rose's difficult year in Bosnia.

The difference between what the UN has achieved and how it has been presented couldn't be more stark.

His problem is no-one believes he or the UN are really neutral.

Rose "Well I think that people sometimes are subject to a lot of rhetoric and propaganda, they don't always understand the true situation, and I think that it is probably as much my fault as any that people don't understand."

His chief bodyguard is a legendary character known as "Goose", from his exploits at Goose Green in the Falklands War, who acts as his eyes and ears in various unorthodox ways.

Rose himself relishes "no-nonsense" decisive action.

Rose: "Just where we're going by now, a sniper fired from across the road there and hit a woman on the pavement to our right. Well the vehicle screeched to a halt, the driver got out and saved the woman's life by putting a shell dressing to her neck and the escort got out, saw the sniper who was still in the window, laughing, and fired at him and hit him - and that's what I consider to be a legitimate and proper use of force in a peacekeeping mission."

The trouble is, Rose's critics say, he hasn't acted with anything like that kind of robustness here. In the lethal politics of the Balkans, the UN soldiers maintain a peace which is deeply unfair to the Bosnians - since it's based on the huge amount of Bosnian territory the Serbs have captured. Worse, the UN arms embargo has prevented Bosnia, a UN member, from buying weapons to defend itself - a right enshrined in the UN charter.

Silajdzic: "The United Nations did not treat Bosnia as it should in accordance with the UN charter, did not treat Bosnia as a country victim of an aggression, which it is, it treated Bosnia-Hercegovina mostly as a humanitarian catastrophe."

Within days of Rose's arrival in Sarajevo the most terrible incident of the war took place. A mortar bomb had hit a crowded market and killed 68 people.

It was never finally proved that the Bosnian Serbs had fired it, but it is the natural assumption. Their mortars, based on the hills overlooking the city, had killed 10 people only the day before.

The world-wide revulsion gave Rose and Mr Akashi, his political counterpart, the backing they needed to take action. They would now protect Sarajevo from the Serbian artillery which had been responsible for this horror.

Rose: "Sadly, in history one needs these awful events for people to re-motivate themselves and to try to take up again the cudgels on behalf of Bosnia, which at that moment, if you remember, had rather dropped out of the headlines."

Now it was back in the headlines with a vengeance. The UN, with Nato airpower to back it up, threatened to attack the Serbian positions encircling Sarajevo.

At long last the UN was starting to look as though it really meant business and Nato, who's planes would actually be doing the bombing, were keen to get started. As for the Bosnian Serbs, they were distinctly nervous and eventually, with Russian diplomatic help, they agreed to withdraw their guns from the hills around Sarajevo. The strategy had worked.

But General Rose and the UN were determined not to get drawn in to fighting a war. They wanted the threat of force to remain just that. A threat.

Sarajevo was far safer now, yet the Bosnian government wasn't satisfied, it wanted more action and became increasingly hostile towards him. For his part he was getting suspicious of all politicians in the former Yugoslavia.

Rose: "I think one of the things which was a surprise to me was the resonances that I detected from the old communist leaderships here, ever though many of the people now who are leaders now on either side weren't communists themselves, nevertheless they have the characteristics and those demonstrated in their extraordinary secrecy, their paranoia, their use of propaganda, their bureaucracy, refusal to decentralise - all these things - and the fact that they will never take anything for what it is in itself, they will always look for some trade-off, some bit of leverage, some advancement they can make."

It was also becoming increasingly clear to him that when officials and politicians, or anyone else, for that matter, came to his residence everything that was said was being listened to by somebody else.

The old communist leader, President Tito, used to have important guests to stay in this house and he liked to know what they were saying in private, so apparently do Tito's successors.

Rose: "I don't think it is us just being bugged by one side, I think the other side then bugs the side that is bugging us and I'll give you an example of this. General Galvin, who came here as a special ambassador for President Clinton, looking at the military situation here. This was in about April time, maybe slightly later, and at dinner one night about eight o'clock he said that he thought it might be worth him having a word with the Bosnian Serb side, because his programme at that point had only included the Bosnian government forces, so I said I'm sure that would be quite easy to arrange. At ten o'clock that evening I had a note from General Mladic saying "we would be delighted to see General Galvin tomorrow and we will see him at the airport at seven o'clock, which curiously enough was exactly when his programme ended" (Simpson "But how...") "and the meeting took place."

After we'd recorded this interview in Rose's office we noticed some faint red flashes, particularly on the left side of the screen, every few seconds. The BBC engineers think they're caused by an electronic bugging device, which has been planted in the room.

Everywhere General Rose travels in Bosnia, his communications vehicle rumbles after him. It enables him to contact the UN headquarters and Nato at any time in case he needs to call down an airstrike. Something he doesn't do enough of, according to his critics.

We came to a Serb checkpoint, and had to stop. In this country it seems anyone with a rifle and a ragged uniform can stop any car, any convoy, no matter how important. These weren't impressive soldiers - it was sometime before they even noticed they were being filmed.

When we headed on, I asked General Rose why he simply didn't sweep away roadblocks like this, which could be used to stop vital supplies for the people of Bosnia.

Rose: "Of course we could do that, I mean we could put in APC's or even get the Danish tanks to come in, we could even use F-18's on airstrikes, but of course it would be totally counter-productive to the overall policy of the mission. It would stop all convoys running throughout the length and breadth of this country."

Simpson: "Do you understand, though, when people back home think perhaps this is weakness rather than strength?"

Rose: "They haven't had it properly explained to them what the limitations of peacekeeping is. If the world had wanted to come here and fight a war in Bosnia they'd have come with a very different force package and with very different rules of engagement than those of peacekeeping."

And that, in a nutshell, is why the UN force is so vulnerable here. It is not an army. I haven't got any artillery so it couldn't possibly fight the Bosnian Serbs. From their headquarters in Pale the Serbs can do whatever they want to the UN at any time.

Silajdzic: "They are hostages here, those people in Pale can order their imprisonment, to call it that way, anytime, and they call them guests. We all know that so they have to be very nice to those who are the stronger party."

Simpson: "Too nice to them."

Silajdzic: "Yeap."

Simpson: "Are they too nice to them?"

Silajdzic: "Of course. What else, that's the way to survive."

And because the Serbs always have to be placated, Rose's critics say, that means he's too friendly to Serbian leaders like General Mladic, who'd been accused of being a war criminal.

Simpson: "When you have lunch, for instance as you did the other day, with General Mladic and you shake his hand, do you think 'this is a war criminal?'"

Rose: "Well, no I don't because I'm the United Nations and my job is to make contact with both sides so that we can act as intermediaries in bringing this war to an end, and although morally and politically of course we're not indifferent to the predicament of the Bosnian people to the things that have happened here in the past, or indeed to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina which is a fellow member of the United Nations, but whether General X or General Y is a war criminal or not is not a matter for me to judge in my role as peacekeeper. I may have my own personal opinions about it but I would never them be known publicly because of course that would undermine my position as a neutral, impartial intermediary."

Simpson: The Bosnian government regards everything that is happening here in the clearest moral terms. This was a small, undefended, multi-racial society which was brutally attacked by a well-trained army. Only those who actually support the aggressors, the Bosnian Serbs, could possibly question that.

But the government here, predominantly Muslim, and increasingly good at getting its message across abroad, has a particular agenda. To get the international community to intervene on its side.

As the world watched the Serbs attacking yet another poorly defended Muslim town, the Bosnian government hoped that here at last the West would come in on its side. This was a critical moment for General Rose.

[Martin Bell: "The Serbian front-line, south of Gorazde, 11:30 this morning. The Serbs were advancing with infantry and tanks. There was no ceasefire."]

The hospital was hit repeatedly. The wounded were forced to huddle in the basement.

Relief worker in press conference: "At times there were shells falling in the inner city and in the hospital area every few seconds. There was constant sniper fire."

The Bosnian Serb commander, General Mladic, turned up to watch. His political colleagues promised they'd end the attack. It was just a ploy. This was the reality.

General Rose was obliged to call in the Nato planes, just as the Bosnian government had hoped. Rose had sent SAS men in as forward air-controllers and the bombing was remarkably accurate.

The Serb offensive was halted just as the town seemed about to fall.

But Mladic and the Bosnian Serbs refused to give up. They even shot down a British plane. Nato wanted more airstrikes. Rose wouldn't allow it.

He was losing the propaganda war. Back home he was called a 'chocolate soldier', but his diplomacy worked. Gorazde didn't fall, and the Serbs pulled back voluntarily for the first and only time during the war. He felt he'd avoided being manipulated by the Bosnian government.

Silajdzic: "You know what happened in Gorazde. Total fiasco for the United Nations and Nato. All that encouraged, practically, the aggressor and the aggression. The international community and the institutions lost credibility and that will have grave consequences."

Any assessment of Rose's record requires a first-hand look at Gorazde. A place no television crews have managed to reach since last summer. The only way we could get there was by going with Rose and his team on board a UN helicopter.

Rose has always maintained that Gorazde wasn't too badly damaged in the fighting. Further proof, his enemies say, that he's pro-Serb. As we flew over, it seemed completely devastated. Once again, though, things weren't quite what they seemed. Even though a Pentagon adviser criticised Rose recently and said that satellite pictures showed that practically every house here had been damaged.

Rose: "The answer to that is, yes - practically every house in Gorazde has been damaged. But most of the damage that was done to Gorazde had taken place in the fighting some two years before when the Bosnian government forces drove the Serbs from this town. And there were 12,500 Serbs living here at that time and they were all driven off. The way to distinguish a house that's been damaged by fighting, where a shell has hit it, and a house that's been damaged by ethnic cleansing is: if it's got no roof, no doors, no window frames, nothing in the house at all and there are burn-marks up it and bullets sprayed around the walls, that is a house that has been damaged by ethnic cleansing. A house that has been damaged by shelling has a shell-hole in it and there are still people trying to live in that building with their furniture, because they've got nowhere else to go. That's something you can't see from satellites and of course at that time the international image of what was happening in Gorazde was very different from the reality. What was dangerous was that policies were beginning to be put together, on both sides of the Atlantic, about what we should do in Gorazde, but these policies were being put together on totally flawed information."

We went on to visit the British soldiers on the front-line who are keeping the two sides apart.

To get to them, we had to cross a bridge that the Muslims had mined.

The mines were quite hard to spot, domed shapes under the snow.

Rose: "One night Goose and I were driving along in a vehicle down a road which was supposed to have been cleared early on, and we suddenly started swerving all over the road, and I said to Goose 'what's happened, have we got a blow-out or what?' and he said, 'no I'm just trying to dodge the mines, sir, just trying to dodge the mines' and we were zig-zagging through this mine-field, rather like this one you see beside you here, except of course there wasn't any snow on the road, we'd come round the corner and the brutes had left mines all over the road." [Rose laughs]

a, BBC1 TV Panorama the BBC's Foreign Affairs Editor, John Simpson follows the controversial peacekeeping mission of General.. Page 4 of 6

Some of the British soldiers actually live below the mined bridge.

[Rose: "I bet you guys never thought when you joined the army you'd live under the arches."

Soldier: "No sir."

Rose: "How's it all going?"]

They're from the newly amalgamated Royal Gloucester, Berkshire and Wiltshire regiment - already nicknamed the M4's.

Conditions everywhere along the front-line are primitive. The men call this position 'the Blackadder experience'.

For the British army, it's a throwback to the kind of soldiering from the time of the First World War.

[Rose: "Probably how your grandfather lived, you know, in the battle of the Somme, or being your age probably your great-grandfather [laugh], which is where they were up to their knees in mud all the time slipping on duckboards and if they stuck their head above the parapet they got it shot off by some sniper." [laughter]]

As Rose strode through the marketplace in Gorazde it was plain that the worst of the horror was over here, at least for the time being. But the town's still under siege: there's not much food and the Serbs still won't allow the aid agencies to bring in medical supplies. People have to rely on the UN for practically everything.

[Rose, about a harness on some cattle: "Ah, it's made out of parachute straps from the airdrop programme."]

Everyone seemed to know who General Rose was, and he was given a friendly reception. The UN may not have lifted the siege, but it has at least succeeded in feeding people here.

You could get some glimpse from the children's faces of what they'd gone through.

Their shoes had been provided by British soldiers.

At this point we were stopped by the local Muslim police, who'd been drafted in from outside. Even though we were with the UN commander and there was no possible reason for us not to film the marketplace they still wanted to stop us. We didn't have written permission, they said.

They wanted to take the cameraman away, but the General intervened.

Having shaken off the police, we paid a courtesy visit on the political boss of the town. Mr Murasovic (sp?) provide to be distinctly warmer to General Rose than his political masters back in Sarajevo, but he had to be careful. His military counterpart was recently moved out for getting too friendly with the UN.

They spoke of the day the town nearly fell to the Serbs. Only eight Muslim soldiers had been left to hold off the Serb tanks.

Rose, pausing for interpreter: "I telephoned General Mladic." "I said to him if those tanks continue down that road." "And after all it is only about three kilometres from where we're sitting now" "If you don't turn those tanks back, I'll destroy them" "And he said 'give me fifteen minutes'" "And he turned them back and they went away."

Murasovic (through interpreter): "Personally" "I'm satisfied" "Primarily because of that television camera" "That we have a British commander in charge, here in Gorazde."

[Outside walking on the street, Rose to Simpson]

Rose: "Right now, that's interesting isn't it, the entirely different atmosphere that prevails in a place like that, extraordinary, and what he was saying, you know I wasn't prompting him when he said [indistinct] though I was leading round to that subject. The difference between that and some of the propaganda that's been emerging on occasions is in stark contrast."

[In Silajdzic's office]

Simpson: "People seemed very grateful to General Rose for the way the United Nations had partly broken the siege of Gorazde in the end, do you feel that that was..."

Silajdzic: "If you take a man out of the death cell he is grateful even to those who hold the keys. Everybody."

Simpson: "Does the UN hold the keys?"

Silajdzic: "I don't know, but I'm telling you those people were sentenced to death. They're saved. We should not emphasise that fact, because that is their right we should emphasise the fact that they are still living in the ghetto."

There's a propaganda war going on between the Bosnian government and the UN and the UN isn't winning it. The journalists who make the daily pilgrimage to the press centre of the UN's redoubt in Sarajevo often have a particular sense of commitment. It's hard to live and work in a city which's gone through such suffering without identifying strongly with it.

The UN is regarded by large sections of the press corps as ineffectual and often less than truthful. Its spokesmen can expect to receive a hard time.

Today they're getting a roasting over the lack of reliable news from Bihac.

[Journalist 1: "How can you possibly know what is going on there, when you don't know what is going on here?"]

Journalist 2: "How much territory does Abdic and the RSK forces hold around VK? Is that possible to know? Well could you find out then?"]

Over at the Bosnian government's headquarters, by contrast, what the press corps jostles for are highly quotable expressions of moral outrage .

[Journalist to Silajdzic: "You've used the word appeasement before now..."]

The Bosnians don't have many weapons in this war, but one of the most effective of them is the soundbite.

[Silajdzic: "We are betrayed by decision makers in the United Nations, yes. They are back to the appeasement of the Serbs, yes."]

Simpson: "Do you feel you've ever manipulated the media in any way in your own interests?"

Silajdzic: "The question is whether we have told the truth. I think we told the truth. Yes, it's true that you can tell the truth in many ways, and of course we always chose the way the most beneficial for us.

There's no doubt about it."

Up to now, General Rose has been inclined to keep his disputes with the Bosnian government to himself. But at the end of his time as UN commander he's decided to make a few things public. He's taking us up to a UN position in an old Turkish fort overlooking Sarajevo. He's got a remarkable story to tell.

Last September, inside this armoured personnel carrier, a British team was operating an elderly but effective piece of equipment called Cymbeline, which tracks the firing of mortars.

Soldier: "We started locating, rounds, to start with it was five or six at a time, then it was going on to 30-plus. In total we located about 250 rounds which lasted for about half hour, the actual bombardment, [indistinct] actually small arms fire hitting the sides of the fort."

It was, by far, the worst outbreak of violence since the ceasefire in February seven months earlier. Nobody knew who was responsible, but they assumed it was the Serbs. The UN, though, realised it was Bosnian government troops. Firing mortars from closed beside some of the most sensitive places in the city, including Rose's headquarters and the hospital.

Soldier: "We could actually locate this to smack on the firing baseplate, depending on how good the operator is who is actually on the equipment at the time."

Simpson: "Smack on, I mean literally [Soldier: "Yes."] you could actually know precisely ["Yes."] where it was."

Rose: "By demonstrating who was firing and from where people were firing we were able to go down and see President Izetbegovic and explain to him the consequences of what his army were doing. Of course, one doesn't necessarily say that President Izetbegovic had anything to do with this strategy but he looked sufficiently concerned to stop the firing immediately and indeed it stopped the firing and we got no more mortar or artillery fire again."

Simpson: "But what was the purpose of firing out of the city like that?"

Rose: "Well I can only suppose it was to try and create images of war which would help some political purpose. And it was the demonstration of where the firing positions were coming from, it that it was mainly the Bosnian government forces that had provoked this action that caused President Izetbegovic to take immediate action to stop it .

Simpson: "But the idea was to get the Serbs to fire back."

Rose: "I guess that would have been one of the purposes of opening fire, yes."

The UN found the timing of this sudden outbreak suspicious. The Bosnian president was going to America the next day to lobby for an end to the arms embargo. It all looked like more ammunition in the propaganda war .

Simpson: "Do your forces do that kind of thing?"

Silajdzic: "Well, everything is possible in the war. But not the intention. So we shell them so they will shell us. To do what? Why should we get them kill us?"

Simpson: "I think President Izetbegovic was going to the United States the following day."

Silajdzic: "So what? Do you really think that we are so naive to believe that that could do something?"

Simpson: "There was a ceasefire on at the time"

Silajdzic: "Yeah. Well there are many cease... there's a ceasefire today, people are killed in Bihac do you hear the United Nations yell? No."

The Serbian assault on Bihac was to show up all the weaknesses of the UN mission in Bosnia. It was also a Public Relations disaster for General

Rose.

[Martin Bell: "According to latest reports the Serbs are within 200 yards of the towns hospital and civilians are fleeing on the one road out to the north. Even by the UN's own account, the once Safe Area is at the mercy of the Serbs."]

There was noting "safe" about the Safe Area. The Serbs forced their way into it, despite the protestations of the UN and they remain there to this day .

UN Spokesman at press conference: "It's quite clear that we have failed to deter an attack on the Safe Area fullstop."

HOME - BACK

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van holst en steijnen

From: Despotovic Ruza <despot@wishmail.net>
To: <michel.collon@skynet.be>; Nico /Neeltje Steijnen <n.h.van.holst@freeler.nl>
Sent: zondag 25 maart 2001 12:54
Subject: Fw: - Ljudska prava - Scott Laurie's reporting on the Balkans

----- Original Message -----

From: "petar" <petar@mail.cyberus.ca>
 To: <Recipient list suppressed>
 Sent: Sunday, March 25, 2001 5:29 PM
 Subject: - Ljudska prava - Scott Laurie's reporting on the Balkans

>
 >>Mr. Kirk LaPointe,
 >>C.T.V. News,
 >>Toronto, On.
 >>
 >>Dear Mr. LaPointe:
 >>
 >>I wish to draw to your attention a shocking case of reporting I heard
 while
 > listening to Mr. Scott Laurie late Saturday night, March 24,2001.
 >>
 >>In reporting on the demonstration by members of the Serbian community
 > before the American consulate in Toronto. Mr. Laurie stated that NATO had
 > intervened to stop the Serbs from "wreaking havoc on the Albanians in
 Kosovo".
 >>
 >>Later, in reporting on the present-day conflict in Macedonia he stated
 > that the Macedonian military were "hammering rebel forces"
 >>
 >>Ironically the Macedonian security forces are doing exactly the same
 thing
 > that the Serbian security forces were doing in their Serbian province of
 Kosovo.
 >>
 >>In his reference to Kosovo, Mr. Laurie was simply mouthing the tired
 propaganda
 >>Line created by professional P.R. firms, government propagandists and
 NATO
 > official spokesmen i. e. Jamie Shea.
 >>
 >>We all know that the first victim in any war is always the "truth" .P.R.
 > firms and there government propagandists earned "big bucks" sanitizing
 news
 > reports and disseminating misinformation. Since the conflict in Kosovo we
 > know that there were no 200,000 bodies that Louise Arbour, in her most
 > dramatic flair came to Kosovo to personally investigate. There were no
 > bodies heaped in mines or burned in smelters and two years after the
 > incident the Finnish forensic team reported that all the victims of the
 > so-called "Racak massacre" staged by the former American Ambassador to El
 > Salvador, William Walker, were proven to be K.L.A. terrorists killed in
 > conflict with Serbian security forces on the previous day. The stories of
 > this conflict had been reported truthfully by reporters from LeMonde and
 > Figarro. Some of the official observers also saw the actual conflict.
 The
 > voices of truth, however, were drowned out by the clamour of the
 propagandists.
 >>
 >>Most 'Balkan watchers' and analysts of events in the Balkans are aware
 > that the real difference in these two conflicts lies in the interests of
 the
 > United States.
 >>
 >>The American-Albanian lobby, through large donations to American
 > politicians and especially to Senator Bob Dole had won their support for
 the

> Albanians in Kosovo. The Americans intervened precisely when the Serb and
 > Yugoslav security forces had virtually wiped out the K.L.A. They could
 not
 > allow that.
 >>
 >> Furthermore, it is now obvious that ,in its "New World Order" the
 > United States would require a military presence in the Balkans to protect
 > the oil pipelines being built to transport the Caspian Sea oil to
 "Western"
 > and in particular "American markets. Immediately following the NATO
 > occupation the Americans began the construction of Camp Bondsteel on
 > church-owned lands near Orosevich in Kosovo. When finished it will be the
 > United States' second largest military base in Europe. It will even have
 a
 > golf course. Obviously the plans for this camp had been in the works for
 > years. The K.L.A. was now providing the Americans with the opportunity to
 > move into Kosovo and establish their military base.
 >>
 >>Milosevich and his Socialist party were anathema to the Americans. They
 > would not 'privatize' as the American dominated international business
 > community wished.
 >>Yugoslavia was blocking the big NATO push Eastward and were too close and
 > sympathetic to Russia. The American will had to prevail in Kosovo even if
 > NATO had to be dragged into a bombing campaign. It has often been stated
 > that 'Yugoslavia needed a war'.
 >>
 >>The situation in Macedonia is quite different. The Macedonian government
 > co-operated with NATO (even though the majority of its citizens were
 > opposed.) The Americans and other NATO countries have troops in
 Macedonia.
 > Macedonia may well be part of the route for an oil pipe-line carrying
 > Caspian Sea oil. It is in the interests of the United States that this
 > conflict be contained as quietly as possible.
 >>
 >>It is totally irresponsible for the C.T.V. to continue to propagate the
 > "NATO - line" now that the conflict is over and the truth about the KOSOVO
 > war has been emerging through books, writings and the inter-net.
 >>
 >>It is my hope that Mr. Laurie desist from being a NATO apologist by
 > disseminating tired propaganda lines and rely instead, on up-to-date
 > information.
 >>
 >>
 >>
 >>
 >>Rev. William J. Hutton,
 >>2017-411 Cumberland Ave.,
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 >>
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 >
 >
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Etnische versplintering

In de zomer van 1991 begon de bemoeienis van de EU (toen nog EG) met de Joegoslavische tragedie. De Luxemburgse politicus Poos sprak over het 'uur van Europa.' Na de Europese afgang in de Golfoorlog tegen Saddam Hoessein, toen Europa slechts een bijrol speelde, zouden de Europeanen dit probleem in hun eigen achtertuin voortvarend aanpakken. Poos waarschuwde tegen het onafhankelijkheidsstreven van de Slovenen en Kroaten omdat deze mini-staatjes door hun geringe omvang niet levensvatbaar zouden zijn. De Sloveense vertegenwoordiger



KOCH

wees de Luxemburger er fijntjes op dat Slovenië vele malen groter was dan Luxemburg. Onze Hans van den Broek bereikte in anderhalve dag een akkoord, maar was vergeten de overeenkomst ook door de betrokkenen te laten ondertekenen, zodat hij na een week weer terug moest om het nog eens over te doen. De waarnemer kreeg niet de indruk dat Europa het Joegoslavische conflict echt serieus nam, noch ook de ernst van het conflict begreep. In die zomer wilde Europa Joegoslavië bijeen houden, geen opsplitsing in kleine, etnisch homogene staten gedomineerd door wraakzuchtige nationalistische leiders. De democratische en economische transformatie van Joegoslavië zou misschien gelukt zijn wanneer de EG aan het eind van de jaren tachtig gehoor had gegeven aan de smeebeden van de hervormingsgezinde Joegoslavische regering om royale steun. Europa was niet bereid die steun te verlenen. De waarschuwingen dat Joegoslavië door het drijven van nationalistische politici op gewelddadige wijze uiteen zou spatten, legde men terzijde. Zo'n vaart zou het niet lopen. Maar toen de Europese troika's in 1991 naar Belgrado begonnen af te reizen, was het al te laat. Bijna tien jaar later zien we waartoe

de spanningen van Europa om Joegoslavië als een democratische, multi-etnische politieke gemeenschap te behouden hebben geleid. Joegoslavië versplinterde in steeds kleinere, etnisch gezuiverde eenheden. Slovenië en Kroatië werden onafhankelijk. In Kroatië, waaruit tenslotte honderduizenden Serven weggevlucht zijn, heerst nog steeds de nationalistische potentiaat Tudjman, die de democratische beginselen zo met voeten treedt dat de EU nog steeds weigert met hem besprekingen over eventuele toetreding te beginnen. Bosnië is opgedeeld in drie etnisch zuivere politieke entiteiten, ongeacht de formele afspraken dat Bosnië als politieke eenheid zou blijven bestaan. Wat ook de goede bedoelingen van de Navo in Kosovo zijn geweest, het feitelijke resultaat lijkt een voortzetting van het gevestigde patroon te worden. Door de massale vluchtelingenstromen, nu van Servische kant, wordt een etnische deling van Kosovo gerealiseerd, waarbij de formeel erkende territoriale integriteit van Joegoslavië de feitelijke onafhankelijkheid van de Albanese Kosovaren niet kan maskeren. Dit was niet de bedoeling van de Navo-interventie, maar is wel het gevolg. Terwijl telkens door het Westen geprobeerd wordt de strijdende partijen te bewegen een oplossing te aanvaarden die een democratische, multi-etnische samenleving mogelijk maakt, is de uitkomst dat wij uiteindelijk steun verlenen aan de vijanden van het Servisch nationalisme, die er overigens net zulke *Blut und Boden*-denkbeelden op na houden als hun Servische tegenvoeters, en dat wij de democraten die tegen elk etnisch nationalisme zijn in de steek laten. De etnische versplintering gaat door, de democratische idealen van Europa verdwijnen achter de horizon. In dit patroon zien verongelijkte nationalist de mogelijkheid hun verwerpelijke dromen te realiseren. In het succes van hun Kosovaarse broeders zullen de Albanezen in Macedonië een aansporing zien hun eisen krachtiger te stellen. Voor het lot van Macedonië moet gevreesd worden.

Koen Koch

Handkes pro-Servisch vuurwerk blijft uit in Weense Burgtheater

Theater

Michael de Werd

WENEN – Het was een première waar heel Oostenrijk vol verwachting naar uitkeek. Een toneelstuk over de oorlog in het voormalig Joegoslavië, en dat terwijl in Kosovo nog een echte oorlog aan de gang was. Bovendien tekende voor de tekst niemand minder dan Peter Handke, het 'enfant terrible' van de Oostenrijkse literatuur, en zou Claus Peymann met het stuk afscheid nemen als directeur van het Burgtheater.

Uiteindelijk liep het stuk anders dan werd verwacht. 'Die Fahrt im Einbaum oder Das Stück zum Film von Krieg' ('De vaart in de holle boom' ofwel het stuk naar de film over de oorlog) werd niet het grote schandaal, waar het nog een paar weken geleden naar uit had gezien. Terwijl Handke in interviews op botte wijze zijn pro-Servisch standpunten had verkondigd, geeft hij in zijn toneelstuk juist een uitermate genuanceerd beeld van de oorlog en alles wat hiermee samenhangt. Dat was echter zo'n beetje het enige positieve wat er over de première te zeggen viel.

Wat in het Burgtheater te zien was, was in wezen een eindeloze serie monologen van mensen die op de één of andere manier met de oorlog te maken hebben. Dat kan interessant leesvoer opleveren, maar geen toneelstuk dat vierenhalf uur lang kan boeien.

In hun gespletenheid tussen menselijkheid aan de ene kant en irrationaliteit aan de andere kant leken alle personen veel te veel op elkaar. En van dramatische ontwikkeling of interactie was nauwelijks sprake.

Ook Claus Peymann slaagde er niet in om Handkes tekst wat meer leven in te blazen. Wat niet wil zeggen dat er geen mooie momenten waren. Roman Kaminski als massamoordenaar of Johann Adam Oest als journalist leverden bewonderenswaardige acteerpresetaties. Af en toe klonk zelfs iets door van de poëtische melancholie die Handke waarschijnlijk bedoeld had. Dat was echter te weinig. Terwijl opvallend veel toeschouwers de zaal voortijdig verlieten, beloonde de rest het stuk met een mager applaus en enkele boeroepen.

Ook de Oostenrijkse pers had voor het stuk amper een goed woord over. 'Vermoeiend' vond de Presse, terwijl de Standaard de opvoering als 'kabbelende opzeggerij' bestempelde. De Kronenzeitung was nog scherper: „Een regisseur die anders in staat is om achter de woorden en in de zielen te kijken, laat Handke van blad spelen.“ „De constructie van het stuk is er aan de haren bijgetrokken,“ vond de Salzburger Nachrichten, die nog wel enige sympathie toonde voor Handkes goede bedoelingen. Hij zou er goed aan doen wanneer hij bij zijn volgende stuk wat meer aan het publiek en niet alleen aan zijn politieke stokpaardjes denkt.

En Claus Peymann had een mooier afscheid van Wenen verdiend.

Jenny Ligtenberg
Krijtmolen 3
1703 NJ Heerhugowaard
ph./fax 072-5740273.

Cofie
Heerhugowaard 1406'99

Geachte Heer Kok,

"Nooit meer 40-45" hoor ik U roepen Kerstmis '94-'95 en toch....

Na de dood van Tito ontspoon Genscher met zijn fascistische kornuiten een plan waaraan Amerika zijn bijdrage leverde en de beruchte wet 5 Nov. '90 afkondigde die alle handelsbetrekkingen en credieten lam legde in v.h. Joegoslavië, waar het volk reeds 45 jaren bezig was een multi-culturele samenleving op te bouwen en daarin voortreffelijk slaagde.

In 't complot van Amerika, nazi-fascist Genscher, Kohl+ Kinkel, beiden besmet met het 40-45 virus, kwam Tudjman (en hoe?) aan de macht in Kroatië, Susak, de pizzaboer uit Canada wierp drie raketten op Borovo Selo om de 'geplande' oorlog uit te lokken. De erkenning van Kroatië werd binnen een jaar voltooid. Als eerste bood het vatikaan, tijdens WOII ook niet zuiver, haar geloofsbrieven aan plus 'n schenking van 4 biljoen dollar, 1991 Kerstmis! Terwijl 27 Servische dorpen werden platgebrand, mensen vermoord en bestolen. HOE christelijk!!

In 't draaiboek van de nazies zou CIA, Milosevic vermoorden maar die wilde daarmee wachten, want zij hadden hem nog nodig om te onderhandelen(= dictaten voorleggen) die, niemand zou tekenen!!

Vervolgens zou men een oorlog in Bosnië uitlokken, waar v.den Broek (Coalitie Duitsland Achterna) zich voor leende en onder druk van Kohl, Kinkel en Clinton werd op 6 april 1992 Bosnië erkend met..... een minderheid van 2/3 van de stemmen.

Het hoofddoel van deze hele operatie was: Servie al zijn deelrepublieken met geweld afnemen.

Anno 1996 had men Bosnisch Servie en de Krajina al te pakken, anno 1999 stond Kosovo gepland, waar de autonomie gedeeltelijk opgeheven werd in 1989 doordat deze niet goed functioneerde omdat de Albanese baas wilde spelen in deze Servische deelstaat die hen zo gastvrij onthaald had in 1948, na de moordpartijen door de Albanese Dictator Hodja. Door hun geboorte explosie 1:10 kwamen zij in de meerderheid en begonnen zich te roeren i.p.v. te leven met de regels in dit gastvrij land. 700.000 Serven werden in de jaren 80 weggepest of vermoord zoals ook hun eigen volk dat sinds bijna een eeuw in Kosovo woonden, Schipetaren geheten.

Vooraf Amerika zag de kans schoon om in te grijpen, er zou onderhandeld worden (op z'n amerikaans, corrupt dus).

Jana Korbelt, dat monster van B.Z. uit Amerika liet Rambouillet en Parijs MET OPZET mislukken: 'Tekenen of bommen' luidde haar monsterlijke stem, 79 dagen gooide NAVO-fascisten Servie plat, de eerste levensbehoeften, water en licht, werden niet ontzien door deze barbaren van een oververzadigde consumptie maatschappij, waar inmiddels de criminaliteit DE voedingsbodem van is geworden.

Waarom Kosovo gebombardeerd werd is mij nog een raadsel; om de vluchtelingen stroom in gang te zetten, de Serven ervan te beschuldigen zoals men dat in Bosnië flikte? Of, Kosovo moest leeg zodat Amerika Europa kan bezetten en uitmaken

wereid-opinie was door het criminele werk van CNN P.R. Kuder
Finn Agency D.C. Washington toch allang vergiftigd t.a.v.
het Servische volk.

De G8 voorwaarden, POLITIEKE, zijn door Servie ondertekend. Een
van die voorwaarden is, dat UCK hun wapens in moeten leveren.
De NAVO voorwaarden, MILITAIRE, spreken enkel over het terug-
trekken van Servische troepen uit n.b. HUN eigen land. Over het
inleveren van wapens door UCK? GEEN WOORD!

CONCLUSIE:

De Serven trekken weg, verdreven uit hun eigen land=genocidi-
de omdat UCK de wapens mogen houden (tegen de afspraak) en
er niet 'n VN vredesmacht maar NAVO-fascisten aanwezig zijn
Het fascisme heeft dus WEER gezegevierd, Servie is ontman-
teld, Montenegro jaren geladen OMGEKOCHT met miljoenen dus,
lekker slapen, gewetenloze mensen kunnen dat zo gemakkelijk
Welaan Wim Kok, nooit meer 40-45 ??? Velen met mij hebben ons
vergist in de geloofwaardigheid van jullie betrouwbaarheid.
Hitler heeft WOII alsnog gewonnen in de gedaante van Genscher,
Kohl, Kinkel, Clinton, de NAVO/Amerika plus zijn collaborateurs
en niet te vergeten, monster Jana Kōrbel, min.B.Z. van Amerika,
die vol moet zitten met Hitler-ideeën, haat- en wraakgevoelens
jegens 't Servische volk, dat van haar spookgezicht AF-druipt!!
En Hitler... zelfs de oorlog in Bosnie en Kosovo heeft laten
winnen.

Vanaf mijn verblijf in Pale '93 heb ik aldoor gezegd: WOII
was smerig, maar de oorlog in Bosnie? 10x smeriger.

→ Rob de Wijk v. Clingendaal hoorde ik dit bevestigen: inter-
venieren in etnische conflicten ontaardt in niet 'n conven-
tionele oorlog, maar een smerige, vuile emotionele oorlog.
Dat is de reden ook dat de vluchtelingen 'misbruikt' zijn
geworden door de NAVO/Amerika en zijn handlangers om de
emoties bij 't publiek op te roepen en de haat nog dieper
in te laten werken, Kosovo mee schoon te vegen, UCK de
wapens laten houden zodat men het Servische volk uit hun
EIGEN land kan verdrijven.

HOE... Pedagogisch van: z.g. welopgevoedde mensen, wel crimineel
in mijn optiek. Ik houd van vrede en vredelievendheid.

Na de deportatie v.d. Krajina door fascist Tudjman heeft
men HUN ellende in de doofpot gestopt, de NAVO/Amerika
heeft Zagreb noch Kroatie gebombardeerd.

Alleen al DIT verschil geeft aan hoe smerig fascisten en
hun aanhang NOG steeds actief en levend zijn.

OK, de NAVO/Amerika met al hun wapentuig/handlangers mag gewon-
nen hebben? Het geweten, het moreel, de rechtvaardigheid,
de eerlijkheid, de betrouwbaarheid en de humaniteit van
dit mensen-tuig heeft zwaar, heel zwaar bankroet geleden.

En de RECHTSPRAAK in Nederland? Verdient een TIEN met een grif-
fel voor de AFhankelijke rechtspraak die gevoerd wordt. Schande!
Arme Hugo de Groot! Hij heeft zich beslist al tien keren omge-
draaid in zijn graf, ook nadat zo weinig of geen aandacht be-
steed is geworden aan de Vredes-conferentie. Was dat, omdat de
geachte gasten de openings-rede v.v. Aartsen de rug naar hem
toekeerde? Arme Hugo de Groot zelfs doden worden 'verkwanseld.'

a.u.b. Stuur GEEN derde cliché-brief op mijn dak waarin
alleen MACHT zich manifesteert.

Ik ben een respectabel mens en heb thuis heel wat betere
omgangsvormen geleerd.

15-6-99

GEOPOLITICS OF THE WAR? One member of the audience wanted to know what the real reasons were for NATO's starting this war.

The speaker explained the geopolitical aspects of it (see the "Green Interstate - <http://www.truthinmedia.org/Bulletins/tim95-11.html>), and then pointed out that the first NATO expansion into Eastern Europe was not Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, as most people seem to think; it was Bosnia, where NATO arrived in 1995, using similar methods to those applied to Kosovo.

Despotovic, Ruza

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Datum: vrijdag 9 juli 1999 0:37

-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----

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Datum: dinsdag 06, juli 1999 20:56
Onderwerp: Analiza balkanskih prilika

>TEKST KOJI DOLE SLEDI JE POSLAT MEDIJIMA I TV PROGRAMIMA. Beba

>

>Behind the Headlines

>by Justin Raimondo

>

>HOW DO YOU SPELL 'RELIEF'?

>

>In an apparent attempt to provoke the Chinese into new paroxysms of rage, the U.S. government is now claiming that two of the three Chinese journalists killed at their nation's Belgrade embassy were "spies, not journalists," according to the New York Times. "It is true they were not "journalists," said an anonymous government official. "Two were intelligence agents." What a relief! And here we thought all the really dangerous Chinese spies were here in the United States,

>stealing nuclear secrets by the bushel-full. How reassuring to know that the real Chinese threat is centered in Belgrade " of all places!

>

>TAKE YOUR PICK

>

>Why is the administration leaking this bizarre story? While I am no expert in abnormal psychology, there are two possibilities: they believe that this accusation somehow justifies the embassy bombing, and/or they are admitting that, yes indeed, they bombed the embassy deliberately, alright, and what of it?

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>RETURN OF THE CREDIBILITY GAP

>

>According to the London Telegraph, "NATO had carefully singled out the most sensitive section of the embassy complex for attack." But if they didn't know it was the Chinese embassy, how could they have singled it out? The New York Times, which broke the story, quotes their Pentagon source as saying "that's exactly why [the Chinese] don't buy our explanation," all while reiterating the US government official line that the whole thing was a terrible mistake. During the Vietnam War, there was a name for the cognitive dissonance between what we saw and what we heard,

>the split between the obvious facts and what the government was telling us.

We called it the

>"credibility gap," and it has returned with such a vengeance during the reign of our perjurious and

>warlike President that it has become a veritable credibility chasm.

>

>TRANSLATION, PLEASE

>

>"I had no earthly idea our system would permit that kind of mistake," said Clinton, in the aftermath of the bombing, adding: "I'm terribly sorry about the embassy." While the Chinese supposedly have this country honeycombed with a vast spy network, I doubt whether they are familiar with the special translation software that most Americans require to understand what their President is saying. Every sentence must be parsed, every word examined under a microscope, before the real meaning can be meticulously teased out. Keeping this in mind, note the curious formulation: Clinton had "no earthly idea" " to the veteran Clinton-hater (welcome to the club, all you >Chinese students!) this opens up a vast range of possibilities, all of them distinctly unearthly if not >downright eerie in their cold-blooded ruthlessness. Remember, with Clinton, anything is possible: let your imagination roam free, untrammelled by restraint or any sense of moral decency.

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>AGENTS OF INFLUENCE

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>Bob Novak reports the latest wrinkle in the Cox Report scandal: that "the White House fought attempts to label the government of China 'communist' in the select House committee's report revealing espionage in US nuclear labs." The preferred phrase was "Chinese leadership." Cox met them halfway, agreeing to "PRC [People's Republic of China] leadership." >According to Novak, the Clintonians invoked national security concerns and argued "that use of the word communist could jeopardize US intelligence gathering in China." In other words, the US has its own spies and agents of influence within the Chinese Communist Party, and "who knows?" perhaps within the PRC leadership itself.

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>COMMIES FOR CAPITALISM

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>Certainly that is the argument orthodox Maoists would make about such "capitalist-roaders" as China's prophet of reform, the late Deng Xiaoping, and his successors. What else are we to think of a Chinese "Communist" leader whose philosophy was best summed up in the famous maxim: "To get rich is glorious!" If the Great Helmsman of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" wasn't an American agent in the sense of being on the CIA payroll, the consequences of his dramatic reforms were no different than if he had been. In the years since the Cultural Revolution and the fall of the "Gang of Four," billboards advertising Coke have replaced posters exhorting the workers and peasants to smash revisionism and learn from Mao Zedong Thought.

>"Socialism with Chinese characteristics," as the Beijing ideologists like to describe the Chinese

>system, turns out to be far freer in many ways than capitalism with American characteristics. With no income tax, no affirmative action, and no labor unions, China today is far closer to the laissez faire ideal, at least in terms of economics, than the ostensibly "capitalist" West. This point is made at length in my article on "China and the New Cold War," but there is yet another odd post-Soviet role reversal to report before I depart from this subject.

>

>ROLE REVERSAL

>

>It used to be that it was the Communists of every variety who were the internationalists, and the >Western democracies who upheld the principle of national sovereignty. Today, in the era of the New World Order, with the USSR just a memory, it is Tony Blair and Bill Clinton who raise the banner of militant internationalism triumphant and disdain national sovereignty as an atavistic myth. Conversely, ex-Stalinist dinosaurs like Slobodan Milosevic

and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) staunchly defend the right of sovereign nations to control their own internal affairs.

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>COSMIC CONVERGENCE

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>In a world where "globalization" is the primary issue, the old ideological categories are beginning to break down completely: whether or not they know it, left and right are no longer locked in combat, but united in common cause against the center. The main battle in the world today is between those who yearn for a world government, and those who abhor the very idea. The evolution of transnational institutions such as the World Court, the International Tribunal, the EU,

>NATO, and the UN into a world government is a trend abhorred by American nationalists as well as Chinese "communists," by Pat Buchanan as well as the CCP.

>Blind to the real danger, the Buchananites are railing about some illusory threat from China, a Third World nation with a fourth-class military, when the main danger is on the other side of the Atlantic . . .

>

>A UNITED NATIONS ARMY?

>

>Britain's recent announcement that it is raising a "standby" force of thousands for United Nations

>"peacekeeping" operations ought to set off alarm bells from Beijing to Buchanan campaign headquarters in Fairfax, Virginia. UN Secretary General Kofi Annan greeted the news with hosannas, and opined that in the future it might be possible for the UN to "nip the problem in the bud." 8,000 Brits will be available to be dispatched anywhere in the world at a moment's

>notice. How long before the US is asked to match that number, and more?

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>RECRUITING DRIVE

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>For the first time, the Air Force is running television ads in search of new recruits. Could it be that the Coward's War, in which American pilots rained death on Serbia at 30,000 feet, was such a success that they are planning a sequel?

>

>THE SEQUEL: VOJVODINA

>

>I awoke yesterday morning to the news, posted prominently on Antiwar.com, that the Serbian

>province of Vojvodina, with its sizeable Hungarian minority, is now seeking "autonomy," just as I

>predicted in my June 3th "War Diary" column. The story, from the London Telegraph, was written in the breathless propagandistic tone that has afflicted the Brit press (except for the Independent): while admitting that "there have been no human rights violations" in the province, the article nevertheless goes on to state without equivocation that "the 300,000 ethnic Hungarians there are demanding the return of the wide-ranging autonomy they held until 1991." We are told that "in the aftermath of the Kosovo conflict, ethnic Hungarian leaders have now enlisted the support of Hungary in their efforts to persuade Belgrade to restore their autonomy." Vojvodina was part of Hungary before World War I, and the cause of Hungarian irredentism recently received a big boost when Andras Agoston, chairman of the Hungarian Democratic Party of Vojvodina, met with Viktor Orban, Hungary's Prime Minister. Both called for the restoration of autonomy. A hint that Vojvodina could well be the next NATO target was raised at a recent NATO meeting where the Hungarian Prime Minister stated that "the protection of minority rights in Vojvodina enjoys a special place in the settlement of the crisis."

>

>JUST THE FACTS, PLEASE

>

>The jingoistic drivel that passes for journalism in the Mother Country these days is really quite

>appalling. No news story is without its NATO-esque spin, every line dripping with contempt for all things Serbian, without regard for facts or common sense: the Telegraph goes on to report that "recent threatening statements from Serb hard-line nationalists have persuaded ethnic Hungarian leaders of the need to regain autonomy. During the Kosovo conflict, for example, Istvan Csurka, leader of one ultra-nationalist party, said in a television interview that action should be taken to foil alleged attempts by the Hungarian minority in Vojvodina to secede from Serbia and seek >unification with Hungary." This sounds perfectly plausible: after all, those nasty nationalistic Serbs probably didn't learn their lesson, and no doubt what they need is another good bombing to drive it home " except for the fact that Istvan Csurka, far from being a Serbian nationalist, is a Hungarian irredentist, and does not even live in Vojvodina. He is indeed an "ultra-nationalist," but of the Hungarian and not the Serbian variety. As I noted in my "War Diary" of June 3rd, no sooner had the war sputtered to a halt than the Hungarian far-right leader, Istvan Csurka, called for >the annexation of Vojvodina by Hungary. Csurka's "Party of Hungarian Life and Justice" declared that any Kosovo peace treaty must also redress Hungary's territorial claims. In the rush to demonize the Serbs, the only nationalism that seems to exist is headquartered in Belgrade: it is inconceivable that Hungarian or Albanian nationalism could ever equal (let alone surpass) the Serbian sort in its virulence. But, even so, don't they employ fact-checkers at the Telegraph?

>

>SURRENDER DOROTHY

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>Like the Wicked Witch of the West skywriting "Surrender Dorothy" and buzzing the Emerald City on her broomstick, Madeleine Albright's State Department is demanding that the Serbs hand over Sloba to the International Tribunal. To sweeten the deal, US officials have announced that they are offering a \$5 million reward for information leading to Sloba's arrest and conviction. Albright may get her man much sooner than she or anyone else expected. If and when Vojislav Selsej and his Serbian Radical Party stage a coup, or take power in the next elections, they will gladly hand over the man who sold out the Serbian cause and gave up Kosovo to NATO and the >KLA without a real fight " free of charge.

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>LIBERATION AND IMMIGRATION

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>You didn't have to be Nostradamus to predict that the Kosovar refugees who were granted asylum in the United States would never go back to their homeland regardless of the war's outcome. Well, now that Kosovo has been "liberated" by NATO, are the refugees returning to rebuild their communities and enjoy life under the KLA? Not a chance.

>

>NO RUSH

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>"I think I'll stay here three or five years, and later go back," said Sabit Trupi, a 33-year-old economics student who fled the fighting and arrived in Fort Dix, New Jersey, with thousands of other refugees. With lavish government subsidies, free housing, free medical care, extensive educational services, and automatic citizenship, the Kosovar refugees are nearly

>unanimous in their reluctance to leave: "I love my country," says Bekin Shala, 17, "but I'd like very much to stay in this country. I want to stay here forever."

>And so she will, along with most of the other refugees, who show no signs

of giving up the good life: Paul Herbert, of the International Rescue Committee, confirms that, of the half dozen Kosovar families who settled in Georgia, "none of them are even considering it. I just don't think anybody's in a real rush to go back."

>

>GOD IS A DEMOCRAT

>

>Nezhdet Loxha is raring to become an American, and the Clinton administration can hardly wait to

>oblige him and the 13 other Kosovar refugees living in an apartment house in Rhode Island. Why is the Clinton administration opening the floodgates?

Here's one explanation: "If anyone is God right now for us Albanians, averred Mr. Loxha, "it is Mr. Clinton." If they sign them up for citizenship right off the boat, they can have them registered and in the voting booth by the

>time Hillary announces her bid for the White House.

>

>

> Justin Raimondo is the editorial director of Antiwar.com. He is also the author of Reclaiming the American Right: The Lost Legacy of the Conservative Movement (with an Introduction by Patrick J. Buchanan), (1993), and Into the Bosnian Quagmire: The Case Against US Intervention in the Balkans (1996). He is an Adjunct Scholar with the Ludwig von Mises Institute, in Auburn, Alabama, a Senior Fellow at the Center for Libertarian Studies, and writes frequently for Chronicles: A Magazine of American Culture.

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7-7-99

World Socialist - Aggression on FR Yugoslavia as Neocolonial War
July 07, 1999

Michigan, July 6 (Tanjung) - It was a neocolonial war of the coalition of the greatest imperialist forces against a small, half-developed country, a war that was to destroy the sovereignty and ruin the territorial integrity of the state whose people consider freedom and independence to be the greatest values, states the editorial of the electronic medium of the Socialist International, which has branches all around the world, the World Socialist.

Astounded by the mild reactions and all but silent protest of the world public opinion because of the aggression and engagement of the most monstrous war machine, yet unseen in history, against a small country and concerned with the future of such a world, the commentator of the World Socialist pays special attention to the manner in which the NATO and the bribed Western media justify the attack on Yugoslavia as an alleged "humanitarian operation with the goal stopping the repression of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija".

"The clumsy and cynical character of the propaganda campaign that threatened with bombing reflects in its own way the conspicuous contradictions of the NATO in the attempt to justify the aggression."

The rough demonization of the Yugoslav President and the Serb

people is highly contradictory. The claims, backed up with nothing, of Serb massacres and killings of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija, the endless accusations of "genocide" and the torrent of TV images of suffering refugees, were not thought of to convince through arguments so much as they were conceived for "exhausting, numbing and intimidating the public", emphasizes the World Socialist.

Opposition to the NATO action is represented as support for the forceful exodus and mass killing of ethnic Albanians, state the politicians of the establishment and corrupted media people, states also the editorial of the same medium.

The commentator reminds that, in the mobilization of the public opinion for the bombing of Iraq, the American administration incessantly used the phrase of the "arms for mass destruction". Washington kept stating that it was only through the daily bombing of Iraq that the world could be saved of Saddam's invisible arsenal of war poison gasses and chemicals.

In the war against Yugoslavia, the phrase of the "arms for mass destruction" was replaced with the more powerful and daring phrase of "ethnic cleansing". The basic value of this phrase was the bringing back of images of nazi Germany, states the analysis of the medium of the Socialist International. It also states that the "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo and Metohija, according to the NATO evaluation, represents a modern version of the nazi pogrom of the Jewish people.

"Such a comparison is so deceiving and historically incorrect that it is shameless and dirty", evaluates the commentator and reminds that the pogrom of the Jewish consisted of taking millions from territories under occupation and control of the nazis to concentration camps.

The nazis killed six million helpless Jews and this is compared with the two thousand people killed in Kosovo and Metohija last year, according to the statement of the American State Department. It must be emphasized that the recent claims of 250 thousand ethnic Albanian men killed are unhealthy lies that even the eyewitnesses of the Western press themselves denounce, states the American newspaper.

Even if the number of killed in Kosovo and Metohija were doubled, writes the World Socialist, the number of victims would still be smaller, considering the difference in the magnitude of the population, than in similar conflicts around the world (in Sri Lanka or Turkey, for instance).

The newspaper emphasizes that such a comparison is no argument in favour of the indifference for the suffering in Kosovo and Metohija, but

reveals the rough, cheating character of the claims that the NATO uses in order to justify the bombing of Yugoslavia.

It must be pointed for just another moment to the context of violence in Kosovo and Metohija, states the newspaper: in started in 1998 with the breaking out of the civil war between the Ethnic Albanian nationalist and separatist so-called KLA and the Yugoslav authorities, which tried to maintain control.

The international Comity of the Fourth International opposes all forms of national chauvinism, but the claim that the violence that preceded the NATO aggression is exclusively Serb working represents flagrant forging of political reality, emphasizes the medium of the Socialist International and reminds that the so-called KLA, which is financed with drug money and is secretly supported by CIA advisors, has been terrorizing both the Serbs and the ethnic Albanians.

A not-so-small degree of hypocrisy characterizes the NATO coming forth as defender of the ethnic Albanian minority from Serb repression, continues the World Nationalist and states that many NATO members or close countries performed much larger campaigns of "ethnic cleansing".

"Two hundred thousand Serbs were expelled from Croatia in 1995 with the support of the USA, and Croatia became an ally of the USA and one of the "states in the first NATO ranks" in the war against Serbia right then and there. During the past fifteen years, more than a million Kurds were expelled from their villages in Turkey, with the support of the USA, but that does not stop Turkey from remaining a NATO member and even participating in the bombing of Serbia. The newspaper writes that, in the punishing of the ethnic Albanian population, Serbia is far behind the French rampages in Algeria or American rampages in Vietnam."

The NATO states that the basic reason for its offensive is to bring back eight hundred thousand ethnic Albanian refugees into Kosovo and Metohija, but cynicism reaches new heights in this claim, since the real course of events leading to the refugee crisis denounces such claims:

Mass running away started after, not before March 24th, emphasizes the World Socialist and states that it was exactly the NATO bombing that created the mass refuge (from the fifty thousand before the bombing, the number has risen to more than eight hundred thousand during and after the bombing).

As for the refugees themselves, they were used in a cynical fashion: After the ethnic Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija left their homes

due to the bombing, the NATO used their trouble for gaining public support for the war, while giving them only minimal aid.

In this war, the NATO violence against the Yugoslavs demanded the demonization of the Serbs, emphasizes the newspaper and underlines that the number of killings committed by the NATO far surpasses the number of killings committed by the forces of the Serb government and the so-called KLA before the intervention of the Alliance.

Before March 24th, the number of killed in Kosovo and Metohija in the one-year civil war came up to some two thousand. Since March 24th, the number of Serbs and ethnic Albanians killed by the NATO far surpasses two thousand. However, the NATO merely makes "mistakes", while Serbia commits "crimes", emphasizes the World Socialist ironically.

Besides, every new NATO claim of Serb killings follows quickly after the latest proof of civilian casualties of the NATO bombing. To every remark that the NATO is a medicine worse than the illness, the representatives of the Alliance become even louder.

"Is the real enemy forgotten", wonders the World Socialist and states that the category of "enemy" seems to be expanding quickly. At the beginning, the killing and suffering of ethnic Albanians were exclusively attributed to the Serb regime but, with time, an even more menacing and poisonous thesis in this propaganda war surfaces: the whole of the Serb people is to blame.

In the new and even more arduous wave of propaganda it is put through that the "Serb people has become rotten, organically indifferent to the suffering of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija and obsessed with the almost unreasonable feeling that it is actually the victim", writes the newspaper, pointing out to the statements of numerous NATO propagandist, who uncover mass graves and massacres daily in order to hide the crimes of the Albanian separatists and their gradual taking over of the reins of power in Kosovo and Metohija from the responsible officials of the UN.

Propaganda demands simplifying, demands that the complexity of great political conflicts is pushed aside and the public opinion faced with the difficult question, which allows only one answer. Until a few days ago, this question was: "Should not the ethnic cleansing be stopped?"

Now that the ethnic cleansing is performed by ethnic Albanian separatists and that the danger of Serbs disappearing from Kosovo and Metohija is lurking, new and new alleged mass tombs and massacres are uncovered every day, instead of appealing for the stopping of

the ethnic Albanian separatist cleansing.

Such a simplification allows the media to go on representing Belgrade, and not the NATO as the aggressor. The World Socialist writes that, in the full turn over of reality, the NATO is essentially represented as leading a defense war in the name of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija.

However, this is an imperialist, aggressive war of the NATO. The USA and the European forces forming the essence of the NATO are the most developed capitalist countries in the world and in every one of them the state politics articulates the interests of finance capital, based upon great transnational corporations and financial institutions.

In the attempt to answer the question of why the war against Serbia and Yugoslavia was even led, the commentator of the newspaper emphasizes in the end that, once the cheating claims of the NATO and the media forges are cast away, what remains is the "bare war of powerful imperialist countries against a small federation, and the official reasons for the attack are a mere smoke curtain. Without this senseless and hysterical propaganda, it would be much, much harder to prevent the public from investigating the real reasons because of which the imperialist forces started the aggression".

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g-2-ys

organization has

which

close ties with the American Administration,

is a trust of brains.

security

are

the

in

The KLA tactics is based on attacks on

forces and attempts to make ambushes. Members

obsessed by their idea and carry out orders of

superiors without a word. They are organized

groups of three to five members which is characteristic for terrorist organizations.

4-7-99

>Aid Bill Listing Yugoslavia as Terrorist Passes

>By TIM WEINER

>

>WASHINGTON -- The Senate Wednesday night overwhelmingly passed a \$12.7 billion foreign aid bill that designates Yugoslavia a terrorist state.

>

>The measure also acknowledges American support for one of the world's most notorious intelligence services, in Peru.

>

>The vote was 97 to 2. The bill eliminates \$1.9 billion from President Clinton's request for foreign operations, cutting money for counterterrorism, peacekeeping operations, carrying out Mideast peace accords and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

>

>The White House called it grossly inadequate and threatened a veto.

>

>The provision to declare Yugoslavia a terrorist state would bar American aid there and let Kosovars sue President Slobodan Milosevic for damages in American courts. The bill includes \$20 million for training and equipping a Kosovo security force that its authors say could include members of the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army.

>

>The White House opposes giving guns or money to the rebel army, because NATO is trying to disarm the force. The Administration also objected to designating Yugoslavia as a terrorist nation, a traditional State Department role.

>

>Senator Mitch McConnell, a Kentucky Republican who is chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, said he saw no difference between Yugoslavia and nations officially designated as state sponsors of terrorism like Iraq and Libya.

>

>"Frankly," McConnell said, "I am hard pressed to understand the difference between thugs' blowing up a village with car bombs and thugs' shelling and burning a village to the ground."

>

>Each year, the foreign aid bill seeks to use dollar diplomacy to compel political change in allies and enemies alike. Congress cannot make foreign policy, but it uses the power of the purse and the force of law to shape it.

>

>=====

>DESIGNATION OF SERBIA AS A TERRORIST STATE

>

>SEC. 525. (a) HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS-

>

>(1) CONGRESSIONAL DETERMINATION- Congress determines that the Government of

>the Federal

>Republic of Yugoslavia is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross

>violations of internationally recognized human

>rights.

>

>(2) FULL ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS- All provisions of law that impose

>sanctions against a country

>whose government is engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of

>internationally recognized human rights

>shall be fully enforced against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (other

>than Montenegro and Kosova).

>

>(b) SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM-

>

>(1) IN GENERAL-

>

>(A) CONGRESSIONAL DETERMINATION- Congress determines that the Federal

>Republic of

>Yugoslavia (other than Montenegro and Kosova) is a country which has

>repeatedly engaged in acts of

>terrorism, a country which grants sanctuary from prosecution to individuals

>or groups which have

>committed an act of terrorism, and a country which otherwise supports

>terrorism.

>

>(B) FULL ENFORCEMENT OF SANCTIONS- The provisions of law specified in

>paragraph (2) and

>all other provisions of law that impose sanctions against a country which

>has repeatedly provided support

>for acts of terrorists, which grants sanctuary from prosecution to an

>individual or group which grants

>sanctuary from prosecution to an individual or group which has committed an

>act of terrorism, or which

>otherwise supports terrorism shall be fully enforced against the Federal

>Republic of Yugoslavia (other than

>Montenegro and Kosova).

>

>(2) SANCTION LAWS SPECIFIED- The provisions of law referred to in paragraph

>(1) are--

>

>(A) section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780);

>

>(B) section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371);

>

>(C) section 528 of this Act (and the corresponding sections of predecessor

>foreign operations

>appropriations Acts);

>

>(D) section 555 of the International Security and Development Cooperation

>Act of 1985; and

>

>(E) section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. app.

>2405(j)).

>

>(c) MULTILATERAL COOPERATION- Congress calls on the President to seek

>multilateral cooperation--
>
>(1) to deny dangerous technologies to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
>(other than Montenegro and Kosova);
>
>(2) to induce the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to
>respect internationally recognized human
>rights (other than Montenegro and Kosova); and
>
>(3) to induce the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to allow
>appropriate international
>humanitarian and human rights organizations to have access to the Federal
>Republic of Yugoslavia (other than
>Montenegro and Kosova).
>
>(d) FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF YUGOSLAVIA DEFINED- The term 'Federal Republic of
>Yugoslavia' does not
>include Montenegro and Kosova.
>
>=====

>SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA
>
>SEC. 578. (a) CONTINUATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH SANCTIONS- The sanctions
>listed in subsection (b)
>shall remain in effect until January 1, 2001, unless the President submits
>to the Committees on Appropriations and
>Foreign Relations in the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and
>International Relations of the House of
>Representatives a certification described in subsection (c).
>
>(b) APPLICABLE SANCTIONS-
>
>(1) The Secretary of the Treasury shall instruct the United States
>executive
>directors of the international financial
>institutions to work in opposition to, and vote against, any extension by
>such institutions of any financial or
>technical assistance or grants of any kind to the government of
>Serbia-Montenegro.
>
>(2) The Secretary of State should instruct the United States Ambassador to
>the Organization for Security and
>Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to block any consensus to allow the
>participation of Serbia-Montenegro in the
>OSCE or any organization affiliated with the OSCE.
>
>(3) The Secretary of State should instruct the United States Representative
>to the United Nations to vote against
>any resolution in the United Nations Security Council to admit
>Serbia-Montenegro to the United Nations or any
>organization affiliated with the United Nations, to veto any resolution to
>allow Serbia-Montenegro to assume the
>United Nations' membership of the former Socialist Federal Republic of
>Yugoslavia, and to take action to
>prevent Serbia-Montenegro from assuming the seat formerly occupied by the
>Socialist Federal Republic of
>Yugoslavia.
>
>(4) The Secretary of State should instruct the United States Permanent
>Representative on the Council of the
>North Atlantic Treaty Organization to oppose the extension of the

>Partnership for Peace program or any other
 >organization affiliated with NATO to Serbia-Montenegro.
 >
 >(5) The Secretary of State should instruct the United States
 >Representatives
 >to the Southeast European
 >Cooperative Initiative (SECI) to oppose and to work to prevent the
 >extension
 >of SECI membership to
 >Serbia-Montenegro.
 >
 >(c) CERTIFICATION- A certification described in this subsection is a
 >certification that--
 >
 >(1) the representatives of the successor states to the Socialist Federal
 >Republic of Yugoslavia have successfully
 >negotiated the division of assets and liabilities and all other succession
 >issues following the dissolution of the
 >Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia;
 >
 >(2) the government of Serbia-Montenegro is fully complying with its
 >obligations as a signatory to the General
 >Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
 >
 >(3) the government of Serbia-Montenegro is fully cooperating with and
 >providing unrestricted access to the
 >International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, including
 >surrendering persons indicted for war crimes
 >who are within the jurisdiction of the territory of Serbia-Montenegro, and
 >with the investigations concerning the
 >commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosova;
 >
 >(4) the government of Serbia-Montenegro is implementing internal democratic
 >reforms; and
 >
 >(5) Serbian, Serbian-Montenegrin federal governmental officials, and
 >representatives of the ethnic Albanian
 >community in Kosova have agreed on, signed, and begun implementation of a
 >negotiated settlement on the future
 >status of Kosova.
 >
 >(d) STATEMENT OF POLICY- It is the sense of the Congress that the United
 >States should not restore full
 >diplomatic relations with Serbia-Montenegro until the President submits to
 >the Committees on Appropriations and
 >Foreign Relations in the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and
 >International Relations in the House of
 >Representatives the certification described in subsection (c).
 >
 >(e) EXEMPTION OF MONTENEGRO- The sanctions described in subsection (b)(1)
 >should not apply to the
 >government of Montenegro or Kosova.
 >
 >=====

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 >TITLE I--EXPORT AND INVESTMENT ASSISTANCE
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 >ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

either

>>another lapse in military intelligence or another disturbing example of a
>>military and media disinformation campaign.

>>=====

>>NOTES:

>>+ You haven't been missing the Kosovo Facts Project Updates! The most
>>recent one before this Update was sent out on June 21.

>>+ The Kosovo Facts Project website will soon be updated, with new,
post-war

>>information. Stay tuned - our work is not yet done!

>>=====

>>

>>Stephen Abbott

>>Coordinator, The Kosovo Facts Project

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>>

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>

- >OVERSEAS PRIVATE INVESTMENT CORPORATION
- >NONCREDIT ACCOUNT
- >PROGRAM ACCOUNT
- >TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
- >TITLE II--BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
- >AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- >DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
- >(INCLUDING TRANSFER OF FUNDS)
- >CYPRUS
- >BURMA
- >INDONESIA
- >CONSERVATION FUND
- >CONFLICT RESOLUTION
- >INTERNATIONAL DISASTER ASSISTANCE
- >MICRO AND SMALL ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM ACCOUNT
- >URBAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL CREDIT PROGRAM ACCOUNT
- >PRIVATE AND VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
- >PAYMENT TO THE FOREIGN SERVICE RETIREMENT AND DISABILITY FUND
- >OPERATING EXPENSES OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
- >OPERATING EXPENSES OF THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF
- >INSPECTOR
- >GENERAL
- >Other Bilateral Economic Assistance
- >ECONOMIC SUPPORT FUND
- >ASSISTANCE FOR EASTERN EUROPE AND THE BALTIC STATES
- >ASSISTANCE FOR THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION
- >Independent Agency
- >PEACE CORPS
- >Department of State
- >INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
- >MIGRATION AND REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
- >UNITED STATES EMERGENCY REFUGEE AND MIGRATION ASSISTANCE FUND
- >NONPROLIFERATION, ANTI-TERRORISM, DEMINING AND RELATED PROGRAMS
- >Department of the Treasury
- >INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
- >DEBT RESTRUCTURING
- >TITLE III--MILITARY ASSISTANCE
- >INTERNATIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AND TRAINING
- >FOREIGN MILITARY FINANCING PROGRAM
- >PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS
- >TITLE IV--MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
- >FUNDS APPROPRIATED TO THE PRESIDENT
- >INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
- >THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
- >CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
- >CONTRIBUTION TO THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY
- >CONTRIBUTION TO THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT GUARANTEE AGENCY
- >LIMITATION ON CALLABLE CAPITAL
- >CONTRIBUTION TO THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
- >CONTRIBUTION TO THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
- >CONTRIBUTION TO THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT FUND
- >CONTRIBUTION TO THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK
- >CONTRIBUTION TO THE EUROPEAN BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
- >LIMITATION ON CALLABLE CAPITAL SUBSCRIPTIONS
- >International Organizations and Programs
- >TITLE V--GENERAL PROVISIONS
- >OBLIGATIONS OF FUNDS
- >PROHIBITION OF BILATERAL FUNDING FOR INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
- >LIMITATION ON RESIDENCE EXPENSES
- >LIMITATION ON EXPENSES
- >LIMITATION ON REPRESENTATIONAL ALLOWANCES

- >PROHIBITION ON FINANCING NUCLEAR GOODS
- >PROHIBITION AGAINST DIRECT FUNDING FOR CERTAIN COUNTRIES
- >MILITARY COUPS
- >TRANSFERS BETWEEN ACCOUNTS
- >DEOBLIGATION/REOBLIGATION AUTHORITY
- >AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS
- >LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES IN DEFAULT
- >COMMERCE AND TRADE
- >SURPLUS COMMODITIES
- >NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
- >LIMITATION ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS
- >STINGERS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION
- >PROHIBITION ON FUNDING FOR ABORTIONS AND INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATION
- >FUNDING FOR FAMILY PLANNING
- >EL SALVADOR REPORT
- >SPECIAL NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
- >DEFINITION OF PROGRAM, PROJECT, AND ACTIVITY
- >CHILD SURVIVAL, AIDS, AND OTHER ACTIVITIES
- >PROHIBITION AGAINST INDIRECT FUNDING TO CERTAIN COUNTRIES
- >DESIGNATION OF SERBIA AS A TERRORIST STATE
- >NOTIFICATION ON EXCESS DEFENSE EQUIPMENT
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- >COMMERCIAL LEASING OF DEFENSE ARTICLES
- >COMPETITIVE INSURANCE
- >DISTINGUISHED DEVELOPMENT SERVICE AWARD
- >DEBT-FOR-DEVELOPMENT
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- >COMPENSATION FOR UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS TO INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
- >COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAQ
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- >POLICY ON TERMINATING THE ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT OF ISRAEL
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- >ELIGIBILITY FOR ASSISTANCE
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- >PROHIBITION ON PUBLICITY OR PROPAGANDA
- >PURCHASE OF AMERICAN-MADE EQUIPMENT AND PRODUCTS
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- >CONSULTING SERVICES
- >PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS--DOCUMENTATION
- >WITHHOLDING OF ASSISTANCE FOR PARKING FINES OWED BY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
- >LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE FOR THE PLO FOR THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
- >WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS DRAWDOWN
- >LANDMINES
- >RESTRICTIONS CONCERNING THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
- >PROHIBITION OF PAYMENT OF CERTAIN EXPENSES
- >SPECIAL DEBT RELIEF FOR THE POOREST
- >AUTHORITY TO ENGAGE IN DEBT BUYBACKS OR SALES
- >LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE FOR HAITI
- >REQUIREMENT FOR DISCLOSURE OF FOREIGN AID IN REPORT OF SECRETARY OF STATE
- >HAITI
- >LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO SECURITY FORCES
- >CAMBODIA
- >LIMITATIONS ON TRANSFER OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO EAST TIMOR

- >RESTRICTIONS ON VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES
- >RESTRICTIONS ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES PROVIDING SANCTUARY TO INDICTED WAR
- >CRIMINALS
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- >ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO STOCKPILING OF DEFENSE ARTICLES FOR
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- >GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
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- >CUSTOMS ASSISTANCE
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- >INTERNATIONAL
- >DEVELOPMENT
- >LIMITATION ON ASSISTANCE TO THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY
- >SANCTIONS AGAINST SERBIA
- >CLEAN COAL TECHNOLOGY
- >June 17, 1999
- >

4-7-99

>"HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION" IS THE LATEST BRAND NAME OF COLONIALISM AS IT BEGINS A RETURN TO RESPECTABILITY

>

>by John Pilger
>The New Statesman
>June 28, 1999

>

>In Newsweek last week Tony Blair described the "new moral crusade" that is to follow NATO's

>attack on Yugoslavia. "We now have a chance to build a new internationalism based on values

>and the rule of law," he wrote. George Robertson was more blunt. The "Rubicon has been

>crossed," he said, paving the way for the end of the UN charter that protects the sovereignty of

>nations. Robin Cook chimed in, making threats towards "governments using aggression against their own people." This warning did not apply to the government of Turkey, a NATO member, whose aggression against its own people has left 3,000 Kurdish villages ethnically cleansed, 30,000 people dead and three million refugees. Atrocities committed by the authorities in Indonesia, Israel, Colombia and other countries where western "inter-ests" are in safe hands will also be exempt.

>Those who recognize the standard hypocrisy will easily translate the euphemisms. In these

>days of political disorientation, translation is all important; for colonialism is not part of the

>modern lexicon in the west. In the best Stalinist tradition, it no longer exists. What western

>power does is always benevolent. Blair can spout his breathtaking drivel about internationalism and morality while zealously enforcing genocidal sanctions that kill 4,000 Iraqi infants every month, and the connection is seldom made. NATO's aggressive expansion into eastern Europe, the Balkans and the oil-rich Caucasus, attended by a \$22 billion Anglo-American arms bazaar, is unworthy of mainstream discussion.

>

>This is understandable. Since fascism expounded its notions of racial superiority, the imperial

>"civilizing mission" has had a bad name. Since the end of the cold war, however, the economic

>and political crises in the developing world, precipitated by debt and the disarray of the

Despotovic, Ruza

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Datum: vrijdag 9 juli 1999 0:36

-----Oorspronkelijk bericht-----

Van: rienbeza <richardenbeba@wxs.nl>
Aan: nature lovers <nature_lovers@egroups.com>; Ruza Despotovic
<despot@wishmail.net>
Datum: zondag 04, juli 1999 23:25
Onderwerp: Americicki Senat o Srbiji

>Vazno saopstenje! Saljem tekst, ili samo njegov kraci deo koji je dostupan
>javnosti, a koji pretstavlja zvanicnu odluku americkog Senata o vrsti
>sankcija
>protiv Srbije i kojim se SRJ proglasava teroristickom drzavom.
>Tekst nisam stigla ranije da posaljem...a ako je nekome interesantan i uspe
>da pronadje vise informacija na ovu temu, bilo bi dobro da ih stavi na
>grupu.
>Pozdrav Beba
>
>From: Stephanie Niketic <sutra@ultranet.com>
>Subject: Senate Designates Serbia Terrorist State
>
>The comprehensive Senate appropriations bill which provides \$20 million for
>Kosovo arms also designates Serbia a "terrorist state," defines 'Federal
>Republic of Yugoslavia' as not including Montenegro and "Kosova," and
>contains a section on sanctions against Serbia. From the www.senate.gov
>site the following is posted:
>
>1. Summary of bill passed Wednesday by Senate
>2. Text of section designating Serbia a terrorist state
>3. Text of section on sanctions against Serbia
>4. Table of Contents of entire bill
>
>I could not find the text which provides \$20 million for Kosovo "security
>force" arms and training.
>
>Two senators voted against this bill, Smith (NH) and Byrd (WV).
>
>=====

>S.1234
>SPONSOR: Sen McConnell, Mitch (introduced 06/17/99)
>
>TITLE(S):
>
>SHORT TITLE(S) AS INTRODUCED:
>Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations
>Act, 2000
>
>OFFICIAL TITLE AS INTRODUCED:
>An original bill making appropriations for foreign operations, export
>financing, and related programs for the fiscal year
>ending September 30, 2000, and for other purposes.
>

>liberation movements, have served as retrospective justification for colonialism. Although the word remains unspeakable, the old colonial project's return journey to respectability has begun.
>New brand names have been market tested.

>"Humanitarian intervention" is the latest to satisfy the criterion of doing what you like where you like, as long as you are strong enough. The killing or maiming of 10,000 civilians in Serbia and Kosovo by a bombing-machine representing two-thirds of the world's military power and the clear provocation of the "entirely predictable" Serb atrocities - all of it avoidable, since Slobodan Milosevic had agreed in effect to give up Kosovo six weeks before the bombing began - is called a "moral victory." George Orwell could not better it.

>The ideological climate and disorientation among those on the liberal left, created by the western powers' hijacking of "human rights," is especially dangerous. The other day Mikhail Gorbachev sought to interrupt the victory celebrations with a speech in which he warned that NATO's assault on Yugoslavia had given impetus to a new global nuclear arms race. He said: "Smaller countries - among them the 31 'threshold' states capable of developing nuclear weapons - are looking to their own security with growing trepidation. They are thinking they must have absolute weapons to be able to defend themselves, or to retaliate if they are subjected to similar treatment."

>Under Blair's "internationalism" any country can be declared a "rogue state" and attacked by the U.S. and Britain, with or without NATO. Read the NATO and U.S. planning literature; it is all on the record. There is a Pentagon strategy called "offensive counter-proliferation," which means that, if the Americans cannot prevent a "rogue" country developing and building types of weapons of which they disapprove, they may well nuke them. North Korea is a likely candidate, allowing Washington to settle a historical score.

>The Russians fully understand the dangers.

>The defense ministry in Moscow has already announced plans to deploy new tactical nuclear

>weapons near Russia's western border. Russia's National Security Council has quietly dropped

>its long-standing doctrine of "no first use" of nuclear weapons. In the U.S., Clinton has sent to

>Congress a nuclear weapons rebuilding program unmatched since the early Reagan years. If we

>are to speak of truly "rogue" powers, the U.S. leads the pack.

>Blair's reference to the new "rule of law" is quite obscene. One of the world's nuclear flashpoints

>is the Indian subcontinent, where India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers, are on the edge of

>all-out war over Kashmir. In the first year after coming to power, Blair and his government

>approved 500 licenses for the export of weapons to the two countries - they also approved 92 licenses for arms shipments to the Indonesian military, which is currently arming and training death squads to prevent East Timor achieving its independence.

>New Labour's fake internationalism is part of "economic globalization," a project as old as

>gunboats. The gathering assault on the principle of the sovereignty of nations, however, marks

>a new phase in the global war against democracy. Blair, essentially an opportunist, and his

>spinners trust that his cold-war-style belligerence will invoke the Thatcher factor and ensure him

>a long reign. There are important differences.

>In the midst of the 1982 Falklands war, Thatcher did well in local elections. In striking contrast, Blair has just been crushed in the Euro elections by a lame-duck Tory leader. More significant, Labour voters stayed at home in record numbers, just as they did in the Scottish and Welsh devolutionary polls. They are not apathetic, as reported. They are on to him at last; and their growing awareness is crucial as he aspires to lead us across the Rubicon.

>

3-7-94

BUYING AN INTERVENTION: KOSOVO AND ALBANIAN PAC MONEY IN CONGRESS
By Benjamin Works, Director, The Strategic Issues Research
Institute

Hack and I, along with a select group of others, have been at war with the KLA over its heroin and terrorist connections. We also knew something about how political money bought this war policy. Here's the story.

Back in 1995, late in the Bosnian war, I got a reference to a 1986 Senate Resolution proposed by Senator Bob Dole of Kansas, decrying Yugoslavian official oppression of the Albanian population of Kosovo --that's 1986, when the Albanian Autonomous government was still fully operational. Joseph DioGuardi, a New York Republican, sponsored the companion House Resolution, both of which never emerged from committee.

I got a copy of that Senate Resolution Nr. 150 from the Congressional Register of June 19, 1986 and then let it sit in my file for a long time, while the NATO occupation of Bosnia appeared to keep things calm. Meanwhile, Bob Dole managed to lose the 1996 Presidential Election, then vigorously supported Mr. Clinton's year-by-year extensions for keeping some 6900 US soldiers in Bosnia.

As the KLA insurrection in Kosovo reached civil war levels, I began to think about that resolution and how it misrepresented history. I had done considerable reading on the origins of the Yugoslav conflicts, pulling Washington Post, New York Times and other reports from the 1980s, bearing on Kosovo and the collapse of the Federative Republic's communist government under the pressure of ethnic-nationalism.

Well, pieces fit together showing that all along it has been the ethnic nationalist fascist losers of World War II in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo who have been exploiting the political process in Germany and the United States. Their goal has been to effect the division of Yugoslavia and the cleansing of Serbian populations from their territories, while purporting that "Greater Serbia" was the menace to European security and not the post-fascist "Greater Croatia" and "Greater Albania."

Survivors of the Croat Ustashe movement in southern Germany began their work in the 1960s, but Joseph DioGuardi must be given credit for a sustained campaign to influence Congress beginning in the mid-1970s. DioGuardi, an Albanian American whose ancestors came from an Albanian transplant community in the heel of Italy, sat in Congress for several years in the mid-1980s as a Conservative Republican from New York's Westchester County, but creating a Greater Albania was his agenda as a map on his website shows (www.aapac.com). His Political Action Committee (PAC) activities are easy to follow from 1988 on.

What makes the PAC and individual contributions to campaigns more interesting is the demonstrated connection between the Kosovo Heroin Mafia, its "pizza connection" distribution ("inherited" from the Gambino crime family) and money-laundering networks, and the number of pizzeria owner-contributors listed in DioGuardi's filings. The Croats and Albanians came up with big pots of laundered money, then spread it around selectively, with American politicians helping to persuade other members in Congress.

I have indications of a political alliance between DioGuardi and Bob Dole going as far back as the early 1970s, but have not yet got all the evidence in hand. What I do have is sufficient to reach tentative conclusions about how foreign policy, in a democracy, can be "bought" --that is precisely what happened in the case of the Kosovo Air War.

In early 1987, kicking off his 1988 bid to wrest the GOP nomination from then-vice president George Bush, Dole received \$1.2 million from Albanian American supporters in New York City, while DioGuardi received \$50,000 at the same dinner. I expect the funding trail goes back further, at least to Dole's 1976 campaign. It certainly continued from 1987 through to the present.

As the collapse of Yugoslavia loomed, the Croatian and Albanian lobbies continued their campaign: Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Mar 31, 1993 issue, reported as much as \$50 million was larded around Capitol Hill in a two-year period which saw the defeat of George Bush and led to Bob Dole's control of the Republican party:

The United States Congress, still reeling from a series of financial scandals involving representatives and senators, is now bracing for a new problem: the massive financial "contributions" which have been made to election funds of politicians by Croatian sources over the past two to three years. One Congressional investigator told Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy that the donations and expenditures on Washington lobbying by the Croats over the past two years "could well exceed \$50-million." Much of this came directly from Croatian lobbyists, and some from Croatian American businessmen...

"Many of the campaign contributions have been recorded legally," the investigator said, "but many are questionable. But what is more important is that there has been a pervasive attempt to push the United States along a line defined by foreign powers-Croatia and Germany-and it has not been subtle. Elected officials are being told to either support the Croatian line or face either a removal of funding or are told that funding will be given to their opponents. Or they are literally bribed into supporting the Croatian line. This was going on long before Croatia even made its open bid for recognition as an independent state."

Now, as to individual contributions, there are campaign contribution limits on individuals, then there are Political Action Committees (PACs), "Soft Money" contributed to the parties and fed back to candidates, and there is the time-honored custom of passing bundles of hundred dollar bills in brown paper bags to favored candidates. Federal Election Commission (FEC) records are on-line (<http://www.tray.com/fecinfo/>) and I have been able retrieve records for Joseph DioGuardi's PACs going back to the 1988 election cycle, and have also tested Bob Dole's 1996 Campaign and Liddy Dole's Campaign-2000. It is all there in the lists of candidates and contributors.

KWARTAALUITGAVE
14e jaargang No. 61
ZOMERNUMMER
juni 1996

Uitgave: Stichting VOLK VOOR VREDE - ONAFHANKELIJKE ANTI-KERNWAPEN-BEWEGING
Ingeschreven onder nr 41231406 i/h Stichtingenregister Zaanstreek.



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DE BALKAN ALS KRUITVAT VAN EUROPA

Het volledig bewapende opereren van de Amerikanen vooral in Bosnië heeft bij diverse politieke instanties in Europa een soort jaloerse afgunst opgewekt. Het wordt bekeken als een verzuim van Europa dat in het verleden o.a. nog de vlag van de Verenigde Naties gebruikte en dat als een handicap heeft ondervonden om hetzelfde te doen.

De vraag is of dit spijtgevoel vooral ook bij de politieke instanties van Nederland terecht is. Want de centrale vraag is hier aan de orde: - heeft de met veel chantage door de Amerikanen afgedwongen overeenkomst van Dayton en de daarop gevolgde militaire interventie, de vrede en veiligheid op de Balkan en vooral ook in Europa vergroot, ja of nee?

De nieuwe secretaris-generaal van de W.E.U. het Europese beleids Pact van de NAVO -, de Portugees Cutileiro, volgens het NRC-Handelsblad van 23 maart jl. een man met een "aan drang voor poëzie" en "fijn besnaard diplomaat" - hoe krijg je de slijmerige hielen-likkerij op papier! - verkaarde in het interview met die krant dat de Amerikanen met meer militaire middelen het beleid voortzetten van de Europese Unie. Hoe "fijn besnaard" die Portugees in werkelijkheid is, kunnen we niet beoordelen. In ieder geval is hij een politieke fantast. Want geleidelijk aan wordt de laatste tijd duidelijk dat de Amerikanen in de Joegoslavische affaire een eigen zeer dubieuze rol spelen.

Terwijl aan het begin van de gewelddadigheden in Joegoslavië de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties o.a. een wapenembargo afkondigde tegen alle partijen in dat land, stond volgens een artikel in de Washington Post van 12 mei jl. de opmerking dat de Amerikanen aan de achterdeur bevorderden dat acht landen de Moslims van Bosnië tot de tanden bewapenden, compleet met geschoolde militairen, o.a. uit landen als Iran, Turkije, Pakistan en Argentinië. Meer nog: uit de geleidelijk los komende berichten blijken die geheime wapenleveranties een gevolg te zijn van geheime overeenkomsten van de Amerikanen met de huidige Kroatische

VREDE

Vrede spreid gij uw zachte vleugels
Over de donkere aarde heen -
Over de moeden en de gewonden,
Over de duizenden, die verzwonden,
Over al de snikkende monden,
Die verbleekt zijn van geweën!

Vrede daal gij uit de lichte sferen,
Waarheen gij vluchtet voor deze
wereldsmart,
Daal over hen, die u hebben verraden,
En over de dwazen, die op u smaadden,
En over de blinden, die om u baden,
Daal - daal gij weder in ons hart!

Opdat uw liefde daar weder wone,
Opdat uw liefde ons weer genas -
Liefde bove' onze ijdele wensen,
Liefde over alle ijdele grenzen,
Liefde alleen, van mensch tot menschen,
Die eindelijk leerden wat liefde was!



C.A. Adama
Van Scheltema

president Tudjman. Erger nog: volgens berichten uit Amerikaanse bronnen zullen de Kroaten en Moslims hun wapenarsenaal gebruiken om in Bosnië een "nationaal" leger te vormen.

DE EEUWIGE VIJAND

Daaraan valt niet meer te twifelen: de Serviërs, of wat men daaronder wil verstaan, zijn het mikpunt en dreigen opnieuw het slachtoffer te worden van de Atlantische bemoeienis op de Balkan en met Joegoslavië in het bijzonder. Opnieuw, omdat een ieder die bekend is met de eeuwenlange belangenstrijd op of via de Balkan, weet,

Kosovo and Metohija - Centre of Criminals

June 28, 1999

Tirana, Pristina, June 28 - Since the arrival of the members of the international peace forces of the United Nations, Kosovo and Metohija have turned into the centre of Albanian criminals and mobsters who, as well as the terrorists of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, are arriving into Pristina for their dirty business, under the alleged flag of the "fight for freedom".



The border towards Albania was left completely open after the withdrawal of the Yugoslav security forces. The Albanian mobsters and criminals are now using it. They move into our country en gros and rob everything they can get their hands on.

Something like this could have been expected, since members of these groups, which are protected by the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, have been having their way in northern Albania for quite some time now. There, they steal humanitarian aid, rob the Albanians who had escaped there from the NATO bombings, even foreign reporters.

The terrorists are now trying, using the insufficient activity of the members of the KFOR, to move the chaos reigning in Albania for years now into Kosovo and Metohija. Regrettably, it is succeeding. The everyday killings and maltreatment of civilians and the robbing of Serb, Montenegrin, Turkish and Gypsy property in Prizren, Pristina, Pea and other towns and villages in the province prove this.

"They represent themselves as heroes fighting in the Kosovo Liberation Army's ranks. However, many of these people who appear in Pristina are clearly gangsters", writes the prominent London Times journal. British officers within the KFOR are afraid that these good-for-nothings "will try to take over the enterprises that the Serbs had abandoned and to hook into the ambitious plans for the reconstruction of Kosovo and Metohija".

As in many other conflicts around the world, in Kosovo and Metohija criminal and terrorism go hand in hand. International police has started arriving into the province, but even foreign monitors notice that it will not be armed as well as "the local Albanian mob".

Numerous examples confirm that bloody showdowns between Albanian mobsters and Serbs, Montenegrins and members of other nationalities preceded the robberies. This is justified before the members of the KFOR with vengeance towards alleged members of the Serb security forces, who have allegedly merely taken off uniforms

Those who follow the happenings in Kosovo and Metohija from day to day notice that mobsters arrive into the province not only from Albania, but from Western Europe as well: Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, France, America. They are all trying to do dirty business. Thus the taking over of the building of the Municipal Assembly of Pristina is explained, since these good-for-nothings are trying to get "papers" so that they could forge them and falsely prove that they are owners of the stolen property.

Since the arrival of the KFOR, word gets around more and more of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army allegedly having some twenty thousand "fighters" - that is to say, a few times more than there had been before the signing of the peace agreement. However, this latest development confirms that these are criminals and mobsters now trying to declare themselves "fighters for the freedom" of the Albanian people. No matter that, up till now, they had been into robberies, drug dealing and arms dealing, that many of them had been living in Western Europe and America and had never seen Kosovo and Metohija.

"They put the red-and-black badge of the Kosovo Liberation Army on their caps or black jackets and everyone treats them like heroes coming back from war", state the Western military sources in Pristina.

Secretary General of the NATO Xavier Solana, facing the difficult situation of the Serbs, Montenegrins, Gypsies and members of other nationalities in Kosovo and Metohija, recently promised that "all the Albanians who take vengeance on the Serbs will be punished". This statement has been well received, but it is not clear what the KFOR is waiting for, why does it not stand in the way of the brazen Albanian gangs roaming the province at once.

NATO Learns - Too Late - for Whom it Won a War

June 24, 1999

Source: Surafor.com

It is becoming harder by the day to justify NATO's continued collaboration with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). A front page article in the June 25 New York Times cites KLA commanders, former Albanian government officials, and Western diplomats who claim KLA leader Hashim Thaci and two of his lieutenants led purges of the KLA ranks to root out and kill potential challengers to Thaci's leadership. No one has come forward to say they witnessed Thaci or his associates, Azem Syla and Shkëlqë Haliti, personally carrying out the killings, though reports to this effect have circulated for years. Moreover, there have been numerous documented accounts of people killed shortly after criticizing or being threatened by Thaci and his associates, whose reputations for ruthlessness and intimidation are legendary.

Among Thaci's alleged victims listed in the New York Times was rebel commander Ili Krasniqi - killed in KLA held territory after accusing Haliti of siphoning a profit off arms sales to the KLA. His death was blamed on the Serbs. Another was Ahmet Krasniqi, a former Yugoslav Army colonel who, sponsored by the administration of moderate Kosovar Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova, brought 600 troops and \$4.5 million to assist the KLA against the Serbs. Krasniqi, who Rugova hoped would bring legitimacy to the moderates on the battlefield, was assassinated in Tirana in September 1998, allegedly at the orders of Thaci and with the cooperation of the Albanian government. Two more KLA officers, Agim Ramodani and Sali Celiku, were killed in April of this year after opposing Thaci, and their deaths were blamed on the Serbs. Thaci did publicly threaten Rugova's life, after the moderate leader fell for Italy and refused to back Thaci's self-declared for government. However the New York Times' allegations have been denied by Thaci and his associates and challenged by State Department spokesman James Rubin.

What Thaci and Rubin have not been able to deny is the wave of reprisals against Serbs carried out by Kosovar Albanians, including members of the KLA. Serbs have been kidnapped, beaten, and killed, their houses and businesses looted and burned, and NATO has been unable to stop the campaign. KLA soldiers were arrested by KFOR after they were discovered with bound, beaten, and dead prisoners in a police station in Kosovo. A Serb professor and two Serb workers were found bound and shot to death at the University of Pristina. KLA troops reportedly overran the Devic monastery, looted and vandalized

members and donning the uniforms and insignia of the group. They do not explain why Albanian civilians would want to frame the KLA for such crimes.

The Serb press raises more questions about the advisability of cooperating with the KLA in reports that the KLA, unhappy with Italian troops' defense of Serbs in Pece, fired at visiting Italian foreign Minister Lamberto Dini. This report has not been confirmed by other sources. Also, according to a reporter for Jane's Intelligence Review, evidence recovered last December from Osama bin Laden-linked terrorists in Yemen includes video footage of the terrorists training with the KLA in either Kosovo or Albania. While adding these new reports, allegations, and evidence to previous reports of KLA links to Middle East terrorists and drug and gun trafficking, one can only question the willingness and speed with which NATO has come to accept the KLA's de facto leadership role in Kosovo.

The problem is, NATO simply has no options. It has so elevated the KLA throughout Operation Allied Force, so marginalized Rugova and the moderates, and so demonized the Serbs, that it can not now tear down Thaci's organization. NATO was successfully manipulated into waging a war on behalf of the KLA and its backers in the Albanian government. NATO is now learning that it is impossible not to take sides in a conflict. Unless it is now willing to combat the KLA and take complete and sole military and political control of the province, it has just handed control of Kosovo to a group no more nor less ethical and humane than Arkan's Tigers. NATO attempted to wage an even-handed humanitarian war to impose a peaceful tie between hostile camps engaged in a very messy, centuries-old blood feud. Now, too late, it learns what it stepped into.

Le Monde Diplomatique on the American Strategy against FR Yugoslavia

June 30, 1999

Paris, June 30 (Paris) - French monthly publication *Le Monde Diplomatique* publishes in its July issue the analysis of French Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, who proves that the systematic destruction of the infrastructure in Serbia had prevailed over the originally proclaimed military goal of the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia.



"The NATO was fending a campaign of systematic destruction of the infrastructure in Serbia, destruction that did not appear among the declared goals", writes Admiral Sanguinetti.

He especially insists on the fact that the Americans' strategy as the leaders of the NATO was even in the aggression on Yugoslavia based on a doctrine that had been "born in the head of Italian General Douhet back in 1921". The essence of this doctrine comes down to the using of airforces as a "leading instrument in the resolving of conflicts".

Admiral Sanguinetti reminds that the same doctrine was applied first by the Germans, during the Spanish Civil War in Guernica, then in Coventry in England, and later by the British and before all others by the Americans, in the form of the classic mass bombings of cities in Germany and Japan, but without decisive results!

Looking back on the two parallel actions of the NATO during the bombing of Yugoslavia - on the action against the Serb forces in Kosovo and Metohija and on the "political-strategic demonstration of force" that had proven itself dominant - the French Admiral especially criticizes the Americans as leaders of the NATO because of their treatment of the population of Serbia.

"If the evacuation of the Serb forces from Kosovo and Metohija was necessary to enable the return of the Kosovar Albanians, the treatment of the Serb people was less acceptable", he writes and concludes: "As from now, for the first time in history, the whole planet is within grasp of a single country's (the USA) attacks in the function of interests it itself defines" from its hegemonist positions.

"It is upon the leaderships of the richest and technologically most developed countries to establish legitimate control - the rule of the United Nations - once again", writes Admiral Sanguinetti, reminding that it had been, in the end, done in the case of the conflict with Yugoslavia.

1-7-yy

Aid Bill Listing Yugoslavia as Terrorist Passes
The New York Times July 1, 1999

By TIM WEINER

WASHINGTON -- The Senate Wednesday night overwhelmingly passed a \$12.7 billion foreign aid bill that designates Yugoslavia a terrorist state.

The measure also acknowledges American support for one of the world's most notorious intelligence services, in Peru.

The vote was 97 to 2. The bill eliminates \$1.9 billion from President Clinton's request for foreign operations, cutting money for counterterrorism, peacekeeping operations, carrying out Mideast peace accords and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons.

The White House called it grossly inadequate and threatened a veto.

The provision to declare Yugoslavia a terrorist state would bar American aid there and let Kosovars sue President Slobodan Milosevic for damages in American courts. The bill includes \$20 million for training and equipping a Kosovo security force that its authors say could include members of the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army.

The White House opposes giving guns or money to the rebel army, because NATO is trying to disarm the force. The Administration also objected to designating Yugoslavia as a terrorist nation, a traditional State Department role.

Senator Mitch McConnell, a Kentucky Republican who is chairman of the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, said he saw no difference between Yugoslavia and nations officially designated as state sponsors of terrorism like Iraq and Libya.

"Frankly," McConnell said, "I am hard pressed to understand the difference between thugs' blowing up a village with car bombs and thugs' shelling and burning a village to the ground."

Each year, the foreign aid bill seeks to use dollar diplomacy to compel political change in allies and enemies alike. Congress cannot make foreign policy, but it uses the power of the purse and the force of law to shape it.

In a striking passage, another chapter of the bill criticized "U.S. support for the Peruvian National Intelligence Service," known by its Spanish acronym, SIN. The United States has not openly acknowledged a liaison

Despotovic, Ruza

Afzender: despot@wishmail.net
Aan: Despotovic, Ruza
Onderwerp: Serbs are leaving, Albanians are coming
Datum: zaterdag 3 juli 1999 1:07

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CIVIL ISSUES
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CULTURE AND RELIGION
SPORT

Serbs are leaving, Albanians are coming
July 02, 1999

At least 71,400 Serbs left Kosovo-Metohija

Blic, July 2, 1999

Geneva, Belgrade (Beta/AFP-Tanjug) - The U.N. High Commissariat for Refugees gave a statement that at least 71,400 Serbs had left and over 500,000 Albanian refugees had returned to Kosovo. Only yesterday, UNHCR registered 23,500 new Albanian repatriates.

There are 7,155 registered refugees from Kosovo in Kragujevac. The local government has warned there is food and hygienic items for only a couple of days. In the Pirot municipality there are about 200 exiled Serbs and Romanies. The authorities say they do not want to go back to Kosovo.

In Mladenovac, there are about 1,000 displaced persons. About 30 refugees from Suva Reka were accommodated at a local school.

A group of exiled Serbs and Montenegrins who had been received in Pomoravlje region, returned yesterday to their homes in Kosovska Kamenica and Gnjilane. It is expected that another group will return soon.

A group of 60 refugees who had found shelter in Nis, set off to

with SIN.

The executive director of the Americas division of Human Rights Watch, Josi Miquel Vivanco, called the admission shocking.

The service has a reputation as an instrument of violent right-wing repression and, despite its ostensible role as a counternarcotics force, as an institution corrupted by cocaine.

"It's really indefensible for us to be supporting a corrupt and repressive organization like the Peruvian intelligence service," said Elliott Abrams, who as Assistant Secretary of State for Latin America in the Reagan Administration defended ties to right-wing forces. "The Congress ought to cut off this relationship now, before more damage is done to Peruvian democracy and to the reputation of the United States. You cannot fight drug trafficking by supporting a corrupt and repressive organization that is destroying the bases for a democratic Peru."

The bill also provides \$50 million for training foreign troops, although it warned against abuses by Indonesian forces schooled under that program.

On a 55-to-43 vote, the Senate set aside an amendment to lift the ban on travel to Cuba by Americans. Many Republicans and some Democrats forcefully opposed the amendment, citing longstanding loathing for President Fidel Castro of Cuba and his policies.

"Give no quarter to the oppressive Government," said Senator Bob Graham, Democrat of Florida.

A sponsor of the amendment, Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont, the ranking Democrat on the subcommittee, said the rationale for the ban was long gone. "Let's have the courage to admit the cold war's over," Leahy said.

In many aspects, the bill provides less money, with more restrictions, than the White House wanted. For example, it threatens to cut economic aid to Moscow if Russian troops interfere with NATO's operations in Kosovo.

The measure allots \$1.92 billion in military aid and \$960 million in economic aid to Israel, \$1.3 billion in military aid and \$735 million in economic aid to Egypt and \$150 million in economic aid for Jordan. But it eliminated \$350 million that the Administration had sought to help put into effect the peace accords that Israel and the Palestinians signed last year.

The legislation includes \$150 million in aid to Kosovo, \$85 million for Albania, \$60 million for Romania, \$55 million for Macedonia, \$45 million for Bulgaria and \$35 million for Montenegro.

It would spend \$220 million on the Peace Corps, \$20 million less than the White House sought, and \$175 million for antiterrorism programs, a cut of more than \$30 million.

It would provide \$610 million for the Red Cross and the United Nations to help refugees, with \$60 million for those settling in Israel. It listed \$10 million for Iraqi opposition groups and \$6.5 million to support democracy advocates in Burma.

The House has not acted on its version of the bill.

1-7-99

Nothing Went According to Plan
LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR (Paris) 1 July 1999

Report by Vincent Jauvert

(Translated from French)

Now that the war is over, a dozen men who were at the heart of the Atlantic alliance's military and diplomatic machinery agreed to reveal many concealed facts about this conflict, whose intensity and duration nobody could have predicted. And they said enough to show that the war against Milosevic did not go as NATO's spokesmen claimed during its 79 days.

We Thought Two Nights Would Be Enough

It emerges clearly from various sources that the alliance's diplomats and several of its political leaders believed that they could make Milosevic submit very quickly, after just a few strikes. "We thought that two nights of bombardments would be enough," one senior NATO diplomat said. For that matter, Bill Clinton has just admitted this for the first time: "I thought," he confided last Friday, "that Milosevic would give in after two or three days..."

Another diplomat in Brussels also made the following disclosure: "The initial strike plan -- the real one, the one that nobody talks about officially -- entailed first and foremost a warning blow: two nights of bombardments in all directions. Its aim was to persuade Milosevic within a matter of a few hours. The targets for those nights were more political than military (the outskirts of Belgrade, for instance.) They were negotiated directly with Clinton, Blair, Chirac, and their chiefs of staff, without anyone in NATO, apart from General Clark, knowing anything about it."

One NATO official commented: "They had Bosnia in mind, where Milosevic had collapsed very soon. Keep in mind that the resources deployed at the beginning were exactly the same -- 400 aircraft for some 50 targets." Another diplomat said: "The operation began on the evening of Wednesday 24 March. We thought that by Friday morning at the latest Milosevic would make it known somehow or other that he accepted the Rambouillet accord. We awaited a signal: a telephone call from the Yugoslav chief of staff, a meeting of the Belgrade parliament -- as happened two months later -- or who knows what else. But nothing materialized."

Diplomats Fooled Themselves

Why such bad forecasts? One senior NATO military official explained: "The politicians fooled themselves. They were trapped in a

diplomatic funnel. The misinterpreted what happened at Rambouillet." According to several diplomats, the French, the Americans, and especially the British present at Rambouillet thought that the Yugoslav delegation was inciting them to move on to military action, that Milosevic was merely awaiting such an opportunity in order to yield with honor. "They told us indirectly: the package (the agreement -- is good, but Milosevic must be able to show his public that he did his utmost to salvage Kosovo." Furthermore some intelligence services -- and especially Britain's MI5 -- had sources in the Belgrade despot's very entourage who "conveyed the same message: just a tiny push is needed to make Milosevic yield."

Fortunately Refugees Came

When, during the weekend following the initial strikes, thousands of Kosovar refugees appeared at the Blace and Morina border posts, the Western capitals were half surprised and half relieved. Surprised? One French intelligence service official said: "Our sources caused us to fear massacres among the civilian population, and we spoke about this to the political leaders on several occasions. But even in our most pessimistic scenarios we did not forecast the ethnic cleansing."

What about the massing of troops along the Kosovo border a few days before the first strikes? "All the alliance's secret services had the same hypotheses: either Milosevic was preparing to counter a NATO intervention on the ground, or he was about to clear away the two or three main centers of the UCK (Kosovo Liberation Army) as soon as the bombardments began. Nobody imagined the deportations. It was a major failure of intelligence." The famous "horseshoe plan" presented by the Germans in mid-April as proof that the cleansing was premeditated was not discovered until after the war had begun, by Austrian agents. It was distributed only to some of the allied secret services within the framework of "Totem" exchanges.

Once their surprise had passed, it took the Europeans several days to realize what was really going on in Kosovo. "Neither the DGSE (General Directorate of External Security) nor the other services had any agents on the ground at that time," the same intelligence officer said. "The Helios (France's spy satellite) photographs did not show anything either. And the Americans were not saying what their own 17 reconnaissance satellites above the region revealed to them. We were in the dark. It was necessary to send in drones and reconnaissance aircraft very quickly."

Relief? One senior NATO official explained: "Following the fiasco of the lightning strikes, the refugees provided us with a new objective for the war. That was crucial. Without them, we would have very quickly have cobbled together an agreement with Belgrade in exchange for an end to the bombardments. To allow the Kosovars to leave was Milosevic's greatest mistake." One French military official asked: "Do you remember the little wounded 10-year-old Kosovar who was unable to save his little sister from the flames? Well, the evidence of his pictures broadcast throughout the world was worth more than 50 divisions..."

Shameful Half-Day

What was to be done about the refugees? "For half a day, a shameful half-day," a diplomat in Brussels said, "the NATO countries hesitated: should we help them or not? There was a scandalous exchange of remarks about the advisability of abandoning them to their fate. Then, fortunately, they decided to establish the camps. The democracies did

brilliantly in this respect!"

However, a few days later a similar debate ended differently: it concerned the provision of supplies to the refugees of the interior, the thousands of men, women, and children wandering the forests of Kosovo. "It was Chirac who broached this issue," a senior French military official recalled. "But NATO did not want to do it. Such operations would have upset the military campaign: transport aircraft would have to be protected, fly very low, and above all they would have occupied precious air corridors. So the Americans claimed that it was impossible to know where the displaced persons were, that the food supplies could have benefited the Serbs... That was an ignoble episode in the humanitarian war." At last a single such operation was carried out: an Antonov aircraft laden with supplies and piloted by Moldavians -- who were paid the earth -- overflew Kosovo, but the pilots were unable to deliver the crates to their proper destination.

multinational aggression on a sovereign country. Such as "Today Serbia, Tomorrow Russia"-idea, for example.

Well, guess what... It's happening. Despite the apparent agreement between the quisling Yeltsin and the murderous NATO governments about the deployment of some 3,600 Russian troops in Kosovo.

"NATO's campaign to halt Serb repression in Kosovo has resonated beyond the Balkans to the troubled Caucasus, where governments are grappling with the implications of the Yugoslav war for their own minorities," the Agence France Presse reported on July 6.

Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia are all laying claim to the role of victim, arguing that if NATO were to intervene, it would be to support them against aggression.

"I believe that a NATO operation in the Caucasus would be desirable," the Azeri foreign policy aide, Vafa Gulizade, told AFP. "Azerbaijan has undergone its own ethnic cleansing."

"Thanks to a NATO operation, the Kosovo refugees are returning home," he added. "I think that if NATO forces were brought into the region, the Armenians would be forced to leave our occupied territories."

Baku and Yerevan fought a six-year war over the breakaway territory of Nagorno Karabakh, a predominantly ethnic Armenian region in Azerbaijan that declared independence in 1988.

Gulizade said that he would ask NATO troops "to stand on the ... border while we conduct peace talks."

Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze echoed Goulizade's statements recently and compared Belgrade's aggression against the Kosovars to Georgia's refugee problem after the war in the northwestern republic of Abkhazia, the AFP reported.

"Genocide and ethnic cleansing are unacceptable and should be punished," Shevardnadze, a former communist Soviet foreign minister, said.

Some 250,000 people fled the fighting in 1993, as Abkhaz separatists overwhelmed Georgian forces and achieved de facto independence."

Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian, speaking to an audience in Washington last week, compared the Karabakh Armenians to Kosovar Albanians in their fight for independence, the Turan News Agency reported. Oskanian, unlike Goulizade and Shevardnadze, did not call for NATO involvement in the Karabakh conflict, but said that if comparisons were to be made, NATO would have to bomb Baku.

Speaking after a meeting in Brussels with Armenian President, Robert Kocharian, NATO's civilian secretary general, Javier Solana, said that the alliance was not thinking of deploying any troops and that it enjoyed good relations with all countries in the region.

TiM Ed.: Right. Just as NATO did with "all countries in the region" of the former Yugoslavia, prior to 1989. Who do these NATO turkeys think they are fooling? Except for the turkeys, of course?

5. A Letter to the "Death Merchants Journal"

2-7-99

New maps, old wishes
July 02, 1999

Albanian terrorists retailor the Balkans borders

Kosovska Mitrovica - Members of the KLA terrorist organization have been distributing to foreign journalists at border crossings between Macedonia and Yugoslavia, new Kosmet maps with distinct borders of the "Great Albania" with the towns' names in the Albanian language.

The new map shows the "Great Albania" consisting the parts of Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Several foreign journalists who visited Kosovska Mitrovica yesterday, expressed their astonishment seeing that Podgorica belongs to Albania. The Serbian towns of Pec, Urosevac, Srbica and Vucitrn were renamed to Peje, Ferizaj, Skenderaj and Vuctri.

3-7-99

The articles in these two renowned journals confirms that the American administration, unsatisfied for not achieving with military means the aggressor aims, tries now to realize them with other criminal methods.

New instigator plans are substantiated by the latest step of Senate which proposed to provide 100 millions of dollars for different instigator actions, bribing of the fifth column and operations of interior destabilization of Yugoslavia.

Concerning Kosmet, Clark didn't speak much about the situation in the southern Serbian province, nor commented information issued in America that the NATO military action and bombardment, which alleged success he was proud of, did not cause major damage to the Yugoslav army.

3-7-99

U.S. SEEKS OVERTHROW OF MILOSEVIC

There is a political and strategic motive behind U.S. and NATO support for the KLA terror campaign.

Clinton and the other NATO leaders are hoping that a huge influx of Kosovan Serb refugees into Serbia will help destabilize the Yugoslav government of Slobodan Milosevic.

The U.S. hopes that the anger of the Serb refugees from Kosovo will be deflected from NATO to Milosevic for his signing of the agreement that NATO forced on him.

This strategy involves a most insidious calculation. The CIA hopes to manipulate the most direct victims of the NATO bombing campaign into an anti-Milosevic political opposition movement orchestrated by the same Western governments that bombed them in the first place.

The top priority for Clinton and the other imperialist leaders is to engineer his overthrow. They have authorized CIA operations to carry out this destabilization campaign while telling the people of Yugoslavia they "will not get one red cent" to rebuild their devastated country until they topple the government.

In fact, war-torn Yugoslavia will be the victim of economic sanctions.

The massive bombing of Yugoslavia's factories, bridges, communications systems and electrical grid is a specific military tactic designed to enhance the destructive impact of post-war economic sanctions.

This is precisely the strategy that U.S. military planners carried out against Iraq. Nine years later more than 1.7 million Iraqi civilians have perished from hunger and malnutrition-related diseases.

Why is U.S. imperialism hell bent on overthrowing the Milosevic government?

Milosevic is not a revolutionary communist or an intransigent opponent of imperialism. But he presides over a social system that was birthed during a great revolutionary upsurge against the fascist occupation of 1941-1945.

The remnants of socialized property remain, although badly corroded from decades of a "mixed economy." Imperialism wants a full-scale counter-revolution that will replace Milosevic with a

Yeltsin-type regime. In a word, the imperialists desire a puppet government in Belgrade that is fully committed to privatizing all of Yugoslavia.

The indictment of Milosevic as a "war criminal" by a specially created U.S.-dominated kangaroo court in The Hague should be understood by progressives as part of the larger imperialist plan to crush Yugoslavia and any other Eastern European country that resists the U.S./NATO take over of the region.

One can look at Kosovo today to get a clear understanding of what kind of government the U.S. would create if it succeeds in ousting Milosevic

Communistische mores vieren hoogtij in Servië

door onze redacteur
RANK WESTERMAN
BELGRADO, 4 MAART. In Servië zijn de tradities van het communisme in ere hersteld. Achttienduwerd paar handen klaptten zaterdag in de door Tito gebouwde avacongreszaal in Belgrado ritmisch en aanhoudend voor Slobodan Milošević, de man die de oorlog op de Balkan begon en — onder Amerikaanse druk — beëindigde.

Op het eerste naoorlogse congres van de Socialistische Partij in Servië (SPS) liet het Servische staatshoofd zich met 1.795 van de 1.796 stemmen herkiezen als partijleider. Niet het Servische, maar het uit de mottenballen gemaakte pan-Joegoslavische volkshed klomk op uit de kelen, als het in onbruik geraakte *Druže* (Kameraden).

Nog niet zo lang geleden zou de president zijn begonnen over de tafelmanieren van de Serviërs in de dertiende eeuw, die als eerliken in Europa met mes en vorkten, of over de door islamitische orden vertrapte bakermat van de Servische beschaving, Kosovo. Maar Milošević is sinds kort exationalist en net als destijds Jop Broz Tito treedt hij hard op tegen 'elementen' die de etnische maat aanwakkeren. Sinds de onertekening van de akkoorden van Dayton praat de president niet meer over de Slag op het Mereld van 1389, alleen nog over de ederopbouw en het jaar 2000, oekend naar woorden die passen ij zijn nieuwe imago van vrede-lich. „We staan aan de vooraond van een nieuw tijdperk”, zei ij zaterdag, staand op een reuschtig podium tegen een front an 96 videoschermen met beelen in vogelvlucht van toekomstige stuwdammen, metrotunnels en hogesnelheidstreinen. „De vrede is getekend, de sancties zijn opgeeven. Servië moet nu zijn ontikkeling ter hand nemen.”

Nieuw te bouwen snelwegen naar Boedapest, Sofia en Athene roeten Belgrado uit het isolement halen. De boodschap luidt: ookzij het leiderschap van onze resident is Servië niet langer een aria in de wereldgemeenschap. Bij de gratie van het Westen, at hem nodig heeft voor een staele Balkan, is Milošević op de oppen van zijn macht”, zegt Bratislav Grubačić, SPS-kenner en hoofdredacteur van de nieuws-ienst VIP. „Ook al heeft hij de

oorlog niet gewonnen, hij gedraagt zich als een overwinnaar.”

De dagen dat het Amerikaanse weekblad *Time* Milošević portretteerde als 'de slager van de Balkan' zijn vergeten. Samen met zijn vrouw Mirjana, een hoogleraar in de sociologie die nimmer van de marxistische leer is afgeweken, werkt de Servische president aan de renovatie van een strak geleide, bijna totalitaire maatschappij. Het oppositionele weekblad *Vreme*, dat door zesduizend van de 6 miljoen Serviërs wordt gelezen, spreekt van 'het regerende echtpaar Milošević'.

Hoe vergaand de invloed van

de presidentsvrouw is bleek vorige week nog eens. In haar column in het tijdschrift *Duga* schreef zij dat Belgrado, wil het in de wereld meetellen, eigenlijk een Chinatown zou moeten hebben. Prompt liet de krant *Politika* ingenieurs aan het woord die in alle haast een 'Zijdestraat' met Chinese restaurants hadden ontworpen. De terloops geopperde gedachte van Mirjana had de uitwerking van een decreet.

Terwijl haar man zich in de jaren tachtig op de golven van de etnische haat naar het presidentschap liet voeren, bleef zij trouw aan het verguisde gedachtegoed

van de partizaan Tito. Al in 1993 kondigde ze aan de partij van haar man, de SPS, te zullen 'zilveren van nationalist'. Daartoe richtte ze de Joegoslavische Unie van Links (YUL) op, een netwerk dat meer lijkt op een geheim genootschap dan op een politieke partij.

Op het heetst van de oorlog leefden de president en zijn vrouw in onmin, maar tegelijk met het sluiten van de vrede zou de periode van echtelijke kilte zijn afgesloten. De kus die Slobodan Milošević haar bij terugkeer uit Dayton gaf hangt in een lijstje op het Belgradose perscentrum.

Begin november heeft de first lady via haar YUL-aanhang (volgens de journalist Grubačić de meerderheid van het 185 leden tellende SPS-bestuur) vier nationalistische ideologen en raadgevers van haar man uit het centrum van de macht gewerkt.

„Niemand kan volhouden dat er geen nationalistische excessen en misstappen van het kader hebben plaatsgevonden”, zo hield Milošević de bijeenkomst van de nomenklatoera voor. „De foute elementen zijn geïdentificeerd en verwijderd zonder pathetisch geweklaag.” In de aanloop naar het congres hadden de afgevaardig-

den, veelal directeuren van staatsbedrijven, zich in allerlei bochten gewrongen om aan te tonen dat ze al in een heel pril stadium de vredesretoriek van hun partijchef hadden overgenomen.

Milošević had de afgelopen dagen zijn greep op de macht verder verstevigd door het werk van de joods-Hongaarse filantroop George Soros in Servië te verbieden, vooral wegens diens logistieke steun aan de onafhankelijke media. In februari had hij *Studio B* al hardhandig onder staatscontrole gebracht, het enige tv-station waarop het vrije woord nog een kans kreeg. „Het is alsof Milošević het licht heeft uitgedaan”, klagen de kijkers. In plaats van het vaste politieke debat op prime time vermeldt de tv-gids tegenwoordig het programma 'Slaap zacht, kinderen'.

De Serviërs in Servië zijn meer dan murw geslagen. „Hou op, we kunnen geen enkele opinie meer aanhoren, laat staan op papier zetten. We hebben een collectieve kater”, zegt de schrijver Dragan Velikić, die tijdens de oorlog nog een aantal het regime onwelgevalige essays heeft geproduceerd. „Ik ben de hypocrisie van Dayton spuugzat”.

Bratislav Grubačić, de verzorger van de dagelijkse VIP-nieuwsbrief, zegt dat Milošević ieder restje energie uit de bevolking heeft geperst. „Wie nu nog een daad van verzet zou willen stellen, moet van de weermotstuit nationalist worden”, zegt hij schertsend. „In Servië tekenen zich de contouren af van een corporatieve staat, beheerst door een kliek van SPS- en YUL-loyalisten. Meer dan een verdomhoekje voor de privésector zal er niet zijn.”

De videovertoning van de beloofde hogesnelheidstreinen en metronetwerken zal vermoedelijk een luchtspiegeling blijken. In het post-sanctietijdperk mag de sortering in de schappen ruimer zijn geworden, de reële prijzen van de goederen zijn fors gestegen. „Servië is uitgeput”, erkent Milošević. Maar in plaats van af te stevenen op een pluriforme samenleving met een markteconomie lijkt hij zijn land te willen dichttimmeren. Van de 60 buitenlandse delegaties die het partijcongres in Servië bezochten, kregen de Cubanen het luidste applaus, ritmisch en aanhoudend, als in de beste communistische traditie.

Ingezonden mededeling

„Ik wil een beleggingsfonds met een goed rendement.”

Thuisbankiers stappen in één van de vier Postbank fondsen.

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From: Cecile van <cecile110276@yahoo.com>
Subject: THIRD WORLD WAR?
To: cecile110276@yahoo.com
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Dear Friends,

This is not junk mail.

I'm sorry that I sent you such a long message but I think it's important that you become aware of what certain people are thinking of the situation we have right now in Europe. I don't mean to impose this on you, but I would like to raise an awareness. Maybe it's useful that I mention here that these are not the only two intellectual people I know who are sceptical (at least) about the actions taken so far. I have spoken to professors at my university as well, who feel that they cannot accept this. Unfortunately, there is little we can do.

The first message is from Noam Chomsky, professor at MIT in Linguistics, who has not only laid the foundation for linguistic theory in the past thirty years, but also has written some books/articles on philosophy, politics.

The second is from a professor at the University of Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, who has addressed this message to one of my friends here in Holland.

I hope you'll read it and think about it the issue. Cecile

>

>March 27. Bombing Yugoslavia

>

>There have been many inquiries concerning NATO (meaning primarily >US) bombing in connection with Kosovo. A great deal has been >written about the topic, including Znet commentaries. I'd like >to make a few general observations, keeping to facts that are not >seriously contested.

>

>There are two fundamental issues: (1) What are the accepted and >applicable "rules of world order"? (2) How do these or other

>considerations apply in the case of Kosovo?

>

>(1) There is a regime of international law and international
>order, binding on all states, based on the UN Charter and
>subsequent resolutions and World Court decisions. In brief, the
>threat or use of force is banned unless explicitly authorized by
>the Security Council after it has determined that peaceful means
>have failed, or in self-defense against "armed attack" (a narrow
>concept) until the Security Council acts.

>

>There is, of course, more to say. Thus there is at least a
>tension, if not an outright contradiction, between the rules of
>world order laid down in the UN Charter and the rights
>articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UD), a
>second pillar of the world order established under US initiative
>after World War II. The Charter bans force violating state
>sovereignty; the UD guarantees the rights of individuals against
>oppressive states. The issue of "humanitarian intervention"
>arises from this tension. It is the right of "humanitarian
>intervention" that is claimed by the US/NATO in Kosovo, and that
>is generally supported by editorial opinion and news reports (in
>the latter case, reflexively, even by the very choice of
>terminology).

>

>The question is addressed in a news report in the NY Times (March
>27), headlined "Legal Scholars Support Case for Using Force"
>in Kosovo (March 27). One example is offered: Allen Gerson,
>former counsel to the US mission to the UN. Two other legal
>scholars are cited. One, Ted Galen Carpenter, "scoffed at the
>Administration argument" and dismissed the alleged right of
>intervention. The third is Jack Goldsmith, a specialist on
>international law at Chicago Law school. He says that critics of
>the NATO bombing "have a pretty good legal argument," but "many
>people think [an exception for humanitarian intervention] does
>exist as a matter of custom and practice." That summarizes the
>evidence offered to justify the favored conclusion stated in the
>headline.

>

>Goldsmith's observation is reasonable, at least if we agree that
>facts are relevant to the determination of "custom and practice."
>We may also bear in mind a truism: the right of humanitarian
>intervention, if it exists, is premised on the "good faith" of
>those intervening, and that assumption is based not on their
>rhetoric but on their record, in particular their record of
>adherence to the principles of international law, World Court
>decisions, and so on. That is indeed a truism, at least with
>regard to others. Consider, for example, Iranian offers to
>intervene in Bosnia to prevent massacres at a time when the West
>would not do so. These were dismissed with ridicule (in fact,
>ignored); if there was a reason beyond subordination to power, it
>was because Iranian "good faith" could not be assumed. A
>rational person then asks obvious questions: is the Iranian
>record of intervention and terror worse than that of the US? And
>other questions, for example: How should we assess the "good
>faith" of the only country to have vetoed a Security Council
>resolution calling on all states to obey international law? What
>about its historical record? Unless such questions are prominent

>on the agenda of discourse, an honest person will dismiss it as
>mere allegiance to doctrine. A useful exercise is to determine
>how much of the literature – media or other – survives such
>elementary conditions as these.

>
>(2) There has been a humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo in the
>past year, overwhelmingly attributable to Yugoslav military
>forces. The main victims have been ethnic Albanian Kosovars,
>some 90% of the population of this Yugoslav territory. The
>standard estimate is 2000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of
>refugees.

>
>In such cases, outsiders have three choices:

>
>(I) try to escalate the catastrophe

>
>(II) do nothing

>
>(III) try to mitigate the catastrophe

>
>The choices are illustrated by other contemporary cases. Let's
>keep to a few of approximately the same scale, and ask where
>Kosovo fits into the pattern.

>
>(A) Colombia. In Colombia, according to State Department
>estimates, the annual level of political killing by the
>government and its paramilitary associates is about at the level
>of Kosovo, and refugee flight primarily from their atrocities is
>well over a million. Colombia has been the leading Western
>hemisphere recipient of US arms and training as violence
>increased through the '90s, and that assistance is now
>increasing, under a "drug war" pretext dismissed by almost all
>serious observers. The Clinton administration was particularly
>enthusiastic in its praise for President Gaviria, whose tenure in
>office was responsible for "appalling levels of violence,"
>according to human rights organizations, even surpassing his
>predecessors. Details are readily available.

>
>In this case, the US reaction is (I): escalate the atrocities.

>
>(B) Turkey. By very conservative estimate, Turkish repression of
>Kurds in the '90s falls in the category of Kosovo. It peaked in
>the early '90s; one index is the flight of over a million Kurds
>from the countryside to the unofficial Kurdish capital Diyarbakir
>from 1990 to 1994, as the Turkish army was devastating the
>countryside. 1994 marked two records: it was "the year of the
>worst repression in the Kurdish provinces" of Turkey, Jonathan
>Randal reported from the scene, and the year when Turkey became
>"the biggest single importer of American military hardware and
>thus the world's largest arms purchaser." When human rights
>groups exposed Turkey's use of US jets to bomb villages, the
>Clinton Administration found ways to evade laws requiring
>suspension of arms deliveries, much as it was doing in Indonesia
>and elsewhere.

>
>Colombia and Turkey explain their (US-supported) atrocities on
>grounds that they are defending their countries from the threat

>of terrorist guerrillas. As does the government of Yugoslavia.

>

>Again, the example illustrates (I): try to escalate the
>atrocities.

>

>(C) Laos. Every year thousands of people, mostly children and
>poor farmers, are killed in the Plain of Jars in Northern Laos,
>the scene of the heaviest bombing of civilian targets in history
>it appears, and arguably the most cruel: Washington's furious
>assault on a poor peasant society had little to do with its wars
>in the region. The worst period was from 1968, when Washington
>was compelled to undertake negotiations (under popular and
>business pressure), ending the regular bombardment of North
>Vietnam. Kissinger-Nixon then decided to shift the planes to
>bombardment of Laos and Cambodia.

>

>The deaths are from "bombies," tiny anti-personnel weapons, far
>worse than land-mines: they are designed specifically to kill and
>maim, and have no effect on trucks, buildings, etc. The Plain
>was saturated with hundreds of millions of these criminal
>devices, which have a failure-to-explode rate of 20%-30%
>according to the manufacturer, Honeywell. The numbers suggest
>either remarkably poor quality control or a rational policy of
>murdering civilians by delayed action. These were only a
>fraction of the technology deployed, including advanced missiles
>to penetrate caves where families sought shelter. Current annual
>casualties from "bombies" are estimated from hundreds a year to
>"an annual nationwide casualty rate of 20,000," more than half of
>them deaths, according to the veteran Asia reporter Barry Wain of
>the Wall Street Journal – in its Asia edition. A conservative
>estimate, then, is that the crisis this year is approximately
>comparable to Kosovo, though deaths are far more highly
>concentrated among children – over half, according to analyses
>reported by the Mennonite Central Committee, which has been
>working there since 1977 to alleviate the continuing atrocities.

>

>There have been efforts to publicize and deal with the
>humanitarian catastrophe. A British-based Mine Advisory Group
>(MAG) is trying to remove the lethal objects, but the US is
>"conspicuously missing from the handful of Western organisations
>that have followed MAG," the British press reports, though it has
>finally agreed to train some Laotian civilians. The British
>press also reports, with some anger, the allegation of MAG
>specialists that the US refuses to provide them with "render
>harmless procedures" that would make their work "a lot quicker
>and a lot safer." These remain a state secret, as does the whole
>affair in the United States. The Bangkok press reports a very
>similar situation in Cambodia, particularly the Eastern region
>where US bombardment from early 1969 was most intense.

>

>In this case, the US reaction is (II): do nothing. And the
>reaction of the media and commentators is to keep silent,
>following the norms under which the war against Laos was
>designated a "secret war" – meaning well-known, but suppressed,
>as also in the case of Cambodia from March 1969. The level of
>self-censorship was extraordinary then, as is the current phase.
>The relevance of this shocking example should be obvious without

>further comment.

>

>I will skip other examples of (I) and (II), which abound, and
>also much more serious contemporary atrocities, such as the huge
>slaughter of Iraqi civilians by means of a particularly vicious
>form of biological warfare — "a very hard choice," Madeleine
>Albright commented on national TV in 1996 when asked for her
>reaction to the killing of half a million Iraqi children in 5
>years, but "we think the price is worth it." Current estimates
>remain about 5000 children killed a month, and the price is still
>"worth it." These and other examples might also be kept in mind
>when we read awed rhetoric about how the "moral compass" of the
>Clinton Administration is at last functioning properly, as the
>Kosovo example illustrates.

>

>Just what does the example illustrate? The threat of NATO
>bombing, predictably, led to a sharp escalation of atrocities by
>the Serbian Army and paramilitaries, and to the departure of
>international observers, which of course had the same effect.
>Commanding General Wesley Clark declared that it was "entirely
>predictable" that Serbian terror and violence would intensify
>after the NATO bombing, exactly as happened. The terror for the
>first time reached the capital city of Pristina, and there are
>credible reports of large-scale destruction of villages,
>assassinations, generation of an enormous refugee flow, perhaps
>an effort to expel a good part of the Albanian population — all
>an "entirely predictable" consequence of the threat and then the
>use of force, as General Clark rightly observes.

>

>Kosovo is therefore another illustration of (I): try to escalate
>the violence, with exactly that expectation.

>

>To find examples illustrating (III) is all too easy, at least if
>we keep to official rhetoric. The major recent academic study of
>"humanitarian intervention," by Sean Murphy, reviews the record
>after the Kellogg-Briand pact of 1928 which outlawed war, and
>then since the UN Charter, which strengthened and articulated
>these provisions. In the first phase, he writes, the most
>prominent examples of "humanitarian intervention" were Japan's
>attack on Manchuria, Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia, and
>Hitler's occupation of parts of Czechoslovakia. All were
>accompanied by highly uplifting humanitarian rhetoric, and
>factual justifications as well. Japan was going to establish an
>"earthly paradise" as it defended Manchurians from "Chinese
>bandits," with the support of a leading Chinese nationalist, a
>far more credible figure than anyone the US was able to conjure
>up during its attack on South Vietnam. Mussolini was liberating
>thousands of slaves as he carried forth the Western "civilizing
>mission." Hitler announced Germany's intention to end ethnic
>tensions and violence, and "safeguard the national individuality
>of the German and Czech peoples," in an operation "filled with
>earnest desire to serve the true interests of the peoples
>dwelling in the area," in accordance with their will; the
>Slovakian President asked Hitler to declare Slovakia a
>protectorate.

>

>Another useful intellectual exercise is to compare those obscene

- >justifications with those offered for interventions, including
- >"humanitarian interventions," in the post-UN Charter period.
- >
- >In that period, perhaps the most compelling example of (III) is
- >the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, terminating
- >Pol Pot's atrocities, which were then peaking. Vietnam pleaded
- >the right of self-defense against armed attack, one of the few
- >post-Charter examples when the plea is plausible: the Khmer Rouge
- >regime (Democratic Kampuchea, DK) was carrying out murderous
- >attacks against Vietnam in border areas. The US reaction is
- >instructive. The press condemned the "Prussians" of Asia for
- >their outrageous violation of international law. They were
- >harshly punished for the crime of having terminated Pol Pot's
- >slaughters, first by a (US-backed) Chinese invasion, then by US
- >imposition of extremely harsh sanctions. The US recognized the
- >expelled DK as the official government of Cambodia, because of
- >its "continuity" with the Pol Pot regime, the State Department
- >explained. Not too subtly, the US supported the Khmer Rouge in
- >its continuing attacks in Cambodia.
- >
- >The example tells us more about the "custom and practice" that
- >underlies "the emerging legal norms of humanitarian
- >intervention."
- >
- >Despite the desperate efforts of ideologues to prove that circles
- >are square, there is no serious doubt that the NATO bombings
- >further undermine what remains of the fragile structure of
- >international law. The US made that entirely clear in the
- >discussions leading to the NATO decision. Apart from the UK (by
- >now, about as much of an independent actor as the Ukraine was in
- >the pre-Gorbachev years), NATO countries were skeptical of US
- >policy, and were particularly annoyed by Secretary of State
- >Albright's "saber-rattling" (Kevin Cullen, Boston Globe, Feb.
- >22). Today, the more closely one approaches the conflicted
- >region, the greater the opposition to Washington's insistence on
- >force, even within NATO (Greece and Italy). France had called
- >for a UN Security Council resolution to authorize deployment of
- >NATO peacekeepers. The US flatly refused, insisting on "its
- >stand that NATO should be able to act independently of the United
- >Nations," State Department officials explained. The US refused
- >to permit the "neuralgic word 'authorize'" to appear in the final
- >NATO statement, unwilling to concede any authority to the UN
- >Charter and international law; only the word "endorse" was
- >permitted (Jane Perlez, NYT, Feb. 11). Similarly the bombing of
- >Iraq was a brazen expression of contempt for the UN, even the
- >specific timing, and was so understood. And of course the same
- >is true of the destruction of half the pharmaceutical production
- >of a small African country a few months earlier, an event that
- >also does not indicate that the "moral compass" is straying from
- >righteousness – not to speak of a record that would be
- >prominently reviewed right now if facts were considered relevant
- >to determining "custom and practice."
- >
- >It could be argued, rather plausibly, that further demolition of
- >the rules of world order is irrelevant, just as it had lost its
- >meaning by the late 1930s. The contempt of the world's leading
- >power for the framework of world order has become so extreme that

>there is nothing left to discuss. A review of the internal
>documentary record demonstrates that the stance traces back to
>the earliest days, even to the first memorandum of the
>newly-formed National Security Council in 1947. During the
>Kennedy years, the stance began to gain overt expression. The
>main innovation of the Reagan-Clinton years is that defiance of
>international law and the Charter has become entirely open. It
>has also been backed with interesting explanations, which would
>be on the front pages, and prominent in the school and university
>curriculum, if truth and honesty were considered significant
>values. The highest authorities explained with brutal clarity
>that the World Court, the UN, and other agencies had become
>irrelevant because they no longer follow US orders, as they did
>in the early postwar years.

>
>One might then adopt the official position. That would be an
>honest stand, at least if it were accompanied by refusal to play
>the cynical game of self-righteous posturing and wielding of the
>despised principles of international law as a highly selective
>weapon against shifting enemies.

>
>While the Reaganites broke new ground, under Clinton the defiance
>of world order has become so extreme as to be of concern even to
>hawkish policy analysts. In the current issue of the leading
>establishment journal, Foreign Affairs, Samuel Huntington warns
>that Washington is treading a dangerous course. In the eyes of
>much of the world – probably most of the world, he suggests –
>the US is "becoming the rogue superpower," considered "the single
>greatest external threat to their societies." Realist
>"international relations theory," he argues, predicts that
>coalitions may arise to counterbalance the rogue superpower. On
>pragmatic grounds, then, the stance should be reconsidered.
>Americans who prefer a different image of their society might
>call for a reconsideration on other than pragmatic grounds.

>
>Where does that leave the question of what to do in Kosovo? It
>leaves it unanswered. The US has chosen a course of action
>which, as it explicitly recognizes, escalates atrocities and
>violence – "predictably"; a course of action that also strikes
>yet another blow against the regime of international order, which
>does offer the weak at least some limited protection from
>predatory states. As for the longer term, consequences are
>unpredictable. One plausible observation is that "every bomb
>that falls on Serbia and every ethnic killing in Kosovo suggests
>that it will scarcely be possible for Serbs and Albanians to live
>beside each other in some sort of peace" (Financial Times, March
>27). Some of the longer-term possible outcomes are extremely
>ugly, as has not gone without notice.

>
>A standard argument is that we had to do something: we could not
>simply stand by as atrocities continue. That is never true. One
>choice, always, is to follow the Hippocratic principle: "First,
>do no harm." If you can think of no way to adhere to that
>elementary principle, then do nothing. There are always ways
>that can be considered. Diplomacy and negotiations are never at
>an end.

>

>The right of "humanitarian intervention" is likely to be more
>frequently invoked in coming years -- maybe with justification,
>maybe not -- now that Cold War pretexts have lost their efficacy.
>In such an era, it may be worthwhile to pay attention to the
>views of highly respected commentators -- not to speak of the
>World Court, which explicitly ruled on this matter in a decision
>rejected by the United States, its essentials not even reported.

>

>In the scholarly disciplines of international affairs and
>international law it would be hard to find more respected voices
>than Hedley Bull or Louis Henkin. Bull warned 15 years ago that
>"Particular states or groups of states that set themselves up as
>the authoritative judges of the world common good, in disregard
>of the views of others, are in fact a menace to international
>order, and thus to effective action in this field." Henkin, in a
>standard work on world order, writes that the "pressures eroding
>the prohibition on the use of force are deplorable, and the
>arguments to legitimize the use of force in those circumstances
>are unpersuasive and dangerous... Violations of human rights are
>indeed all too common, and if it were permissible to remedy them
>by external use of force, there would be no law to forbid the use
>of force by almost any state against almost any other. Human
>rights, I believe, will have to be vindicated, and other
>injustices remedied, by other, peaceful means, not by opening the
>door to aggression and destroying the principle advance in
>international law, the outlawing of war and the prohibition of
>force."

>

>Recognized principles of international law and world order,
>solemn treaty obligations, decisions by the World Court,
>considered pronouncements by the most respected commentators --
>these do not automatically solve particular problems. Each issue
>has to be considered on its merits. For those who do not adopt
>the standards of Saddam Hussein, there is a heavy burden of proof
>to meet in undertaking the threat or use of force in violation of
>the principles of international order. Perhaps the burden can be
>met, but that has to be shown, not merely proclaimed with
>passionate rhetoric. The consequences of such violations have to
>be assessed carefully -- in particular, what we understand to be
>"predictable." And for those who are minimally serious, the
>reasons for the actions also have to be assessed -- again, not
>simply by adulation of our leaders and their "moral compass."
>Noam Chomsky

>

Second message from:
Olga Miseska Tomic
>Department of English
>Faculty of Philosophy
>University of Novi Sad
>YU 21000 Novi Sad

>

>tel. 381 11 135 961

>

>Victor Frieman has asked me to tell him whatever I can about the
>situation in Yugoslavia: the are no first hand reports, since the
>journalists have been expelled from the country. So, he is asked for
>information. Here is my insiders view of the situation. I think it

would

>be of interest for all Slavists, since the existence of a Slavic people

>is at stake. Could you disseminate it?

>

>On March 20th the Belgrade opposition weekly "Vreme" stated that

>Milosevic has made it possible for America to strengthen its

>domination, to NATO to show its force, and to Russia to pretend to be

>more important than it really is.

>

>Yes, Milosevic made it possible for Clinton, Madelene, Blair, NATO to do

>what they wanted but did not have an excuse to do. NATO is not bombing

>Milosevic. And the "International Community" (whatever that is) is not

>saving the Albanian people. They are hitting both Serbs and Albanians.

>So far, ten soldiers (young 18 year-olds) and two policemen have been

>killed and more than fifty civilians, both Serbs and Albanians.

>

>We hear that five NATO planes have been destroyed (two of them last

>night on Fruska Gora.) I haven't seen the planes, but I do hope that

is

>>true (the pilots have been saved, they say). If there are losses,

>Clinton and Madelene might be forced to reconsider what they are doing!

>The major result from the bombing seems to be that fighting in Kosovo

is

>ferocious and all the Serbs have come to hate America, England, France

>and Germany. People DO enlist. The husbands and sons of many people I

>know have enlisted voluntarily. The country is invaded. We are doomed

>anyway. All normal activities have been suspended. Schols and

>universities are closed. Food stores were emptied. No gas. No

>transportation. We still have electricity - I do not know for how long.

>There is no heating; but that we do not need so much: spring has come,

>and that is the only good thing that has happened to us..

>

>During the first night (24th-25th of March) 24 cities or towns in

>Yugoslavia were bombed. In Belgrade, the alarm was sounded at 7.20 and

>went off at 11, then was sounded at 3.30 and went off at 7. in the

>morning, to be sounded again at 8.30 (It went off sometime in the

>afternoon). Last night we had alarm at 8.30 - it went off at 11. It is

>quieter since. Most people are in their houses. There are no proper

>shelters. At this moment I hear on the radio that Fruska Gora is being

>bombed and that two planes were hit there.

>

>I had classes in Novi Sad on Wednesday and at 5 p.m. I drove home to

>Belgrade passing by the police school in Novi Sad which was hit at

8.30

>p.m. Several houses around it were destroyed. The people of Novi Sad

was

>taken at a surprise, because it was generally believed that Novi Sad

and

>Podgorica would be spared. So, the population of Novi Sad have spent

the

>whole night and the whole day in shelters (Novi Sad has good shelters;

>unlike Belgrade). I kept telephoning the whole day yesterday, none of

my

>colleagues was at home. This morning I got on the phone the father of
>one of my assistants and he told me that they have been sleeping in
the
>shelters.. He was indignant. He says that the people in the shelters
were
>indignant. No hope. NATO does whatever they want with us! We are
doomed!
>(Mind you, he is not a Milosevic man; rather, he sympathised with
>Coalition for Vojvodina, which wants greater autonomy for
Vojvodina.).
>
>The missiles are not as precise as NATO purports they are. Three
schools
>have been hit in the industrial section of Belgrade, Rakovica. In
>Kursumlija a missile hit the section of the town where the refugees
from
>Bosnia lived and many were killed. A missile hit and destroyed and
>Albanian village and a Serbian one. Many TV transmitters and telephone
>connections have been damaged. The army barracks are vacated, so the
>result of all the bombing of barracks was that they killed the wives
and
>children of several army officers who withdrew from Bosnia, and whose
>families were living near the barracks in Pristina. The airport to the
>north of Belgrade which was the target of the first attack has been
>displaced. So, all the missiles fell there in vain. The only non-civil
>targets destroyed are three factories producing plastic material
(which
>is connected with the army). The air-bases have all been displaced.
The
>army changes its position permanently. So, the missiles cannot hit the
>targets which they have planned to hit. The only way for them to be
>"successful" is to start bombing without any planning (which I
sincerely
>hope they do not want to do).
>
>The prospects are gloomy. Madelene expects Milosevic to give in, but
he
>will not. Now he has the whole people united in the resistance to the
>NATO attacks. The people know that it is impossible to win a war
against
>such a power. But they are still resolute to fight. This is the
>beginning of the end of the Serbs. "Striving to save the Kosovo
>Albanians", NATO is initiating the extermination of the Serbs.
>
>As for me, I am trying to work but it is difficult. I spent the past
two
>nights watching the news from all parts of Europe and CNN (I have a
>satelite television). Yesterday, while they were bombing, I spent the
>day running around for food. I have food for several weeks now (some
of
>it will go bad if electricity goes off). It is good I did that, since
>today the shops are empty today. We are completely paralyzed.
>
>Will contact you again if I can. Tell people that both Serbs and
>Albanians are suffering after the bombing. There has to be another way
>to resolve the Kosovo problem. Not through Milosevic! He does not care
>for the pressure. He gloats on it.

>Olga

>

>P.S. The American journalists would not give you the right picture of
>the situation anyway. The other night I watched the reporting of the
>journalists on CNN, BBC and two German stations. They were seeing some
>orange balls in the distance and guessing what that might be. What is
>the use of this? I am somehow glad they were asked to leave the
country.

>WE FEEL LIKE BEING THROWN IN THE ARENA TO BE EATEN BY THE NATO
>GLADIATORS TO OFFER PLEASURE TO THE TV WATCHERS IN AMERICA AND WESTERN
>EUROPE.

>—

Thanks for reading all of this. I know that at the moment there is
little we can do about the situation. However, it is in your abilities
to make other people aware. Think about that.

Cecile

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