

JOINT CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE

**HOW NATO DESTROYED YUGOSLAVIA AND TRIED TO BLAME
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC**

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CHAPTER 1

THE WESTERN NARRATIVE: SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC'S NATIONALISTIC AMBITIONS OF A "GREATER SERBIA"

The Western portrayal of Slobodan Milosevic is that of a rabid Serb nationalist hell-bent on creating an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia". Politicians and journalists alike have often accused him of "starting four wars" in the Balkans.

The Los Angeles Times summed up the typical Western line when it wrote that "Slobodan Milosevic unleashed four wars in a bloody decade of 'ethnic cleansing' that recast the map of Europe... His sinister nationalism propelled a vicious campaign throughout the 1990s... His quest for a 'greater Serbia' brought the 20th century to a messy end in Eastern Europe."¹

New York Newsday's Roy Gutman echoed those claims when he asserted that "Milosevic instigated four wars between 1991 and 1999 in his drive to create a 'greater Serbia' on the ruins of the multiethnic Yugoslav state."²

Former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright took her rhetoric a step further when she declared that Milosevic posed a threat to the America's national security. She said: "We know that America will never be fully secure if Europe is not stable; that Europe will never be fully stable until its southeast corner is at peace; and that southeast Europe will never be at peace until Slobodan Milosevic -- who has now started four wars -- is stopped."³

Republicans and Democrats alike accuse Milosevic of being the chief cause of the Balkan wars of the 1990s. Senior Republican senator, and former presidential candidate, John McCain echoed the claims of his Democratic counterparts when he said that "Slobodan Milosevic's regime has started four wars in the last ten years [and] is infamous for its brutal racism."⁴

Some journalists have even gone so far as to compare Milosevic with Hitler. The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel opined that "Adolf Hitler and Milosevic were unspeakably vile. Milosevic, wholly without principle, was a moral and political chameleon, faithful to nothing and no one but himself and his own survival and vanity."⁵

I could cite thousands of similar descriptions of Milosevic, but you've probably got the picture by now. Western Political leaders and journalists have assiduously nurtured the idea that Slobodan Milosevic is the main reason why war broke-out in the former Yugoslavia.

With few exceptions Western politicians, pundits, and journalists recite the same story. They claim that Milosevic's virulent Serb nationalism provoked fear among Yugoslavia's non-Serb population thereby giving birth to secessionist movements in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and later Kosovo.

According to their story, the fears of the non-Serb population were well founded because Milosevic had plans to ethnically cleanse large swaths of Yugoslavia with the aim of creating an ethnically pure "Greater Serbia."

The Hague Tribunal's prosecution encapsulated the Western narrative in their motion to fuse the Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo indictments into a single trial. They cited the Greater Serbia allegation as the paramount issue in the Milosevic trial.

The prosecution held that "the three indictments were all part of a common scheme, strategy or plan on the part of the accused [Milosevic] to create a 'Greater Serbia', a centralized Serbian state encompassing the Serb-populated areas of Croatia and Bosnia and all of Kosovo, and that this plan was to be achieved by forcibly removing non-Serbs from large geographical areas through the commission of the crimes charged in the indictments. Although the events in Kosovo were separated from those in Croatia and Bosnia by more than three years, they were no more than a continuation of that plan, and they could only be understood completely by reference to what had happened in Croatia and Bosnia."⁶

In order for the Western narrative to hold-up two things must be established. First, it must be established that Milosevic actually had a plan, or participated in a plan, to create a Greater Serbia. Secondly, it must be established that Milosevic espoused a nationalistic political view capable of inciting fear among the non-Serb population in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

GREATER SERBIA

The most significant accusation leveled against Milosevic is that he sought to create a Greater Serbia.

The London Daily Telegraph called the alleged Greater Serbia plan a "hideous creature of Milosevic's paranoid imagination", while the Boston Globe blames the outbreak of war on "Milosevic's polluted vision of a 'Greater Serbia'".⁸

The Financial Times echoed that assertion claiming that Yugoslavia was ruined by "Mr. Milosevic's bloody attempts to create a greater Serbia".⁹

Western politicians have been equally emphatic in their assertions that Milosevic sought a Greater Serbia. In 1999 Bill Clinton referred to "A decade-long campaign by Mr. Milosevic to carve out a greater Serbia [that] left more than a quarter of a million people dead, uprooted millions more and undermined the stability of [the] entire region."¹⁰

During his testimony against Milosevic at The Hague, Peter Galbraith, the former American ambassador to Croatia claimed that "Slobodan Milosevic was the architect of a policy of creating Greater Serbia".¹¹ Galbraith asserted the American Government's view that Milosevic's objective was to "create a Greater Serbia carved out of most of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as a sizeable part of Croatia."¹²

NATO's former Supreme Commander, Wesley Clark, also referred to Milosevic's "dreams of a greater Serbia" and his "vision of a greater Serbia" in an editorial that he wrote for The Wall Street Journal.¹³

The legend of "Milosevic's quest for Greater Serbia" is the keystone of the entire Western narrative on Yugoslavia. Without it the narrative is at a loss to explain what caused war to break-out in Yugoslavia.

The majority of the Western media, and most Western political leaders, assert that Slobodan Milosevic sought the creation of a Greater Serbia, but assertions are a funny thing. An assertion does not equal a fact. It is possible to assert something that is wrong. For example, one can assert that it's Friday when it's actually Monday.

In order to test the accuracy of the assertion that Milosevic sought to create a Greater Serbia one must examine his speeches and his actions to determine whether they coincide with a plan to create a Greater Serbia or not.

Geoffrey Nice, the lead prosecutor in Milosevic's trial at the Hague Tribunal, admitted, on August 25, 2005, that Milosevic never espoused a Greater Serbia philosophy in any of his speeches or public statements.

Mr. Nice told the judges: "Had we ever alleged in specific terms that [Milosevic] espoused in philosophical terms Greater Serbia, it would have been probably unwise and probably wrong, because he would have been able to say the words never fell from his lips and nor they did."¹⁴

Not only did Milosevic never espouse a Greater Serbia philosophy in his public statements; he actively denied that he was pursuing a Greater Serbia policy.

On August 7, 1991, he had the following exchange with Arnot Van Linden of London's Sky News. Van Linden asked, "Your opponents claim that you want a Greater Serbia. You claim that this is not so." Milosevic replied saying, "No, it is not so. We want to keep Yugoslavia and that is all." ¹⁵

On October 9, 1992 Milosevic was interviewed by Radio-Television Serbia and he told the reporter point blank: "The official policy pursued by Serbia has never had this idea of Greater Serbia and, as is known, we have stressed this publicly on several occasions and in the most official way possible. I know that the memory of political events tends to be short, particularly in times of crisis, but it must not be so short as to ignore the fact that it was official Serbian politicians who insisted very categorically that this approach never existed, either as a concept or as a policy we advocated." ¹⁶

On December 16, 1998 Elizabeth Weymouth of the Washington Post interviewed Milosevic and asked, "You never had the program of Greater Serbia in mind?" Milosevic replied, "No. We advocated that Yugoslavia should be preserved and still believe, as I believed then, that South Slavs should have been happy with Yugoslavia instead of separating into five different states. But it was their right to decide and there is no use to be sorry now. We considered that Yugoslavia was a good solution for the national interest of the Serbs, because in the former Yugoslavia all Serbs lived in one state in different republics. But they were in one state. The Muslims were also in one state in former Yugoslavia. The Croats were in one state and Macedonians and others. That was the interest of all, not only of the Serbs." ¹⁷

Slobodan Milosevic never advocated the establishment of a Greater Serbia in any of his public statements. However, as I said earlier, assertions don't prove facts. Just because he said he wasn't pursuing a Greater Serbia that doesn't prove he wasn't. The only thing we can positively assert at this point is that he never espoused a Greater Serbia ideology.

One must analyze Milosevic's actions to determine whether or not he was trying to establish a Greater Serbia. Only when one establishes that his acts did not coincide with an objective of creating a Greater Serbia can one positively assert that he never had a plan to create a Greater Serbia.

One example is the fact that Milosevic supported the Cutileiro Plan for Bosnia. The Cutileiro plan was signed by Bosnia's Serbs, Croats, and Muslims before the war broke out, and it called for Bosnia to be a unified state separate from Serbia.

When Milosevic asked Lord Owen, the European Union's Special Negotiator for Bosnia, about this fact at his trial. Owen conceded that Milosevic's support for the Cutileiro Plan could be interpreted as "concrete evidence" that he "never believed in Greater Serbia." ¹⁸

Owen confirmed that all of the peace plans Milosevic supported in Bosnia "always had Bosnia-Herzegovina's boundary maintained, the same boundary that had been accepted by the Security Council in May 1992 as the definition of Bosnia-Herzegovina." ¹⁹

What's more, on May 25th 1992, the Yugoslav Assembly passed a special declaration stating that Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had no territorial pretensions towards its neighbors, including Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that it would not thwart the admission of the secessionist Yugoslav republics into the international legal system. ²⁰

Obviously, Milosevic was not pursuing a Greater Serbia policy in Bosnia; otherwise he never would have supported peace plans that envisioned Bosnia as an independent country separate from Serbia, but what about Croatia?

On April 1, 1991 Krajina-Serb Prime Minister Milan Babic announced his intention to conjoin the Krajina region of Croatia (where Serbs were the majority population) to Serbia. ²¹

Less than two months later, on May 16, 1991, the Krajina-Serb assembly passed a resolution stating that "the territory of Krajina is a part of the state territory of Serbia, whose

constitution and laws apply on this territory." ²²

If Slobodan Milosevic were trying to establish a Greater Serbia, then he certainly would have welcomed such a declaration because it offered him Greater Serbia on a silver platter.

But according to Babic, who testified against Milosevic at The Hague, Milosevic wasn't happy with the declaration, on the contrary he was angry about it.

Take a look at the following excerpt from Babic's testimony ²³:

PROSECUTOR: Did [the Krajina-Serb decision to join Serbia] provoke a reaction from Belgrade? Did Mr. Milosevic, in particular, react?

BABIC: There was very sharp reaction on Mr. Milosevic's part, and he telephoned through the military base in Bihac, and he called me up in my flat and asked me to deny all this and to have the decision rescinded.

PROSECUTOR: Did he give you -- did he give you a reason why he was opposing it? What did he say?

BABIC: He said that we have to come out in favor of Yugoslavia, declare ourselves in favor of Yugoslavia and not in favor of Serbia.

So there it is from the prosecution's own witness. Milosevic opposed the idea of linking Krajina up with Serbia, and when the Serbian Assembly met on May 29, 1991 they refused to even put the Krajina-Serb proposal on the agenda. ²⁴

Senior government officials in Serbia rejected the proposal out of hand, Serbian Assembly Vice-President Borivoje Petrovic, told reporters on May 31, 1991 that it would be "imprudent" to accept the decision of Krajina to join Serbia. ²⁵

Milosevic's speeches and his actions contradict the assertion that he was pursuing the creation of a Greater Serbia.

James Bisset, Canada's former ambassador to Yugoslavia, put it best when he testified at the Milosevic trial. He said, "The idea that Serbia or [Milosevic] entered into any sort of criminal conspiracy to establish a Greater Serbia is pure fantasy." ²⁶

NATIONALISM

Aside from the nonsensical claims that Milosevic's "dreams of a Greater Serbia" unleashed war in the Balkans, the second most serious allegation is that he destroyed Yugoslavia by inciting rabid Serbian nationalism with his "fiery speeches" and "nationalistic outbursts".

The Houston Chronicle once branded Milosevic "the political patron of Serbian nationalism" ²⁷ while The Washington Post asserted that "Milosevic unleashed the demons of nationalism in Yugoslavia." ²⁸

Not to be outdone, The New York Times claimed that "Slobodan Milosevic's embrace of Serbian nationalism set off almost a decade of Balkan warfare" and to ensure that their readers got the message they printed a photo of Milosevic, along with a caption reading "The Nationalist: His nationalist dreams plunged the Balkans into war." ²⁹

What was the effect of Milosevic's alleged nationalism?

The Christian Science Monitor claimed that "The Serb nationalism that Slobodan Milosevic incited in order to cling to power led to Yugoslavia's demise." ³⁰ and Britain's Sunday Business Post asserted that "Milosevic's embrace of extreme nationalism" along with his "cynical

manipulation of nationalistic fervor ... created millions of victims of murder, war and ethnic cleansing." ³¹

According to the Western narrative, Milosevic's "Serb nationalism" destroyed Yugoslavia because it incited fear and gave rise to secessionist movements in the other Yugoslav republics.

The London Guardian wrote that "[Milosevic's] strident Serbian nationalism drove three Yugoslav republics - Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia - to secede in 1991" ³²

The New York Times reported that "Mr. Milosevic bears chief blame for the bloodletting [because] he whipped up Serbian nationalism, driving out [the] other [Yugoslav] republics." ³³

Similar claims were printed by the London Independent which wrote that, "Milosevic's nationalistic campaign terrified the other Yugoslav republics, who feared rampant Serb nationalism would wreck the fragile power balance that the late President Tito bequeathed." ³⁴

The Toronto Star added its two cents claiming that "the rise of [Milosevic] an avid and unapologetic Serbian nationalist alarmed everyone else in the Yugoslav federation ... Slovenes, Croats, Macedonians, Albanians and others began looking for an exit." ³⁵

The Financial Times also chimed in claiming that "[Milosevic] ruthlessly exploited the political potential of nationalism... responding to mounting Serb nationalism, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia in 1991 declared independence. Muslims and Croats tried to do the same in Bosnia." ³⁶

The allegation that Milosevic was a Serb nationalist has been repeated ad-nauseum in the West. There is an overwhelming unanimity of opinion that Milosevic's nationalism was the main factor that led Yugoslavia to its demise.

The Western narrative asserts that Milosevic's "vicious Serb nationalism" scared the non-Serb population into seceding from Yugoslavia. But what if Milosevic wasn't a Serb nationalist? What would happen to the Western narrative then?

If Milosevic wasn't a Serb nationalist then one could not claim that the secessionist movements in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were reactions to his "Serb nationalism."

Allegations of Milosevic's nationalism are rarely accompanied by evidence in the West. For the most part it is simply asserted that he was a nationalist and left at that.

However, there are two events that are most often cited as proof of his alleged nationalism. The first event is his visit to Kosovo Polje on April 24, 1987, and the second event is a speech that he gave on June 28, 1989 at the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo.

The Los Angeles Times reported that "On April 24, 1987, Milosevic found the voice that would propel his political ascent. As a Communist Party leader, Milosevic traveled to Kosovo to lend support to minority Serbs complaining of abuses by the majority population of ethnic Albanians. During his meeting, Serbs clashed with local police and Milosevic stepped outside and proclaimed, 'No one should dare to beat you.'" ³⁷

New York Times reported almost exactly the same thing. Their coverage read: "'Nobody should dare to beat you,' Mr. Milosevic declared in Kosovo on April 24, 1987, to thunderous cries of 'Slobo' from the Serbian crowd ... the words had a ring to them and set a bloody tide in motion." ³⁸

Washington Post parroted the same line claiming that "One phrase, delivered in 1987 ... set [Milosevic's] career on a path of destruction. 'No one will ever beat you again,' he told a throng of Serbs who were complaining that the majority ethnic Albanians in [Kosovo] were

persecuting them." 39

The coverage in Western Europe is almost exactly the same as the coverage in the US. London's Sunday Times reported that: "In 1987, in an impromptu televised address that made his reputation overnight, Milosevic promised Serbian demonstrators in Kosovo that 'no one dare to beat you again'." 40

Other European papers ran similar stories. The Sun reported that "The real turning point [in Milosevic's career] came in 1987, when he visited the Albanian-majority province of Kosovo to deal with protesting Serbs. Instead of seeking to calm them, he told them: 'Nobody shall dare to beat you. We shall win.'" 41

The Irish Times gave a similar account. They reported that "Milosevic rose to power on the back of a single, extraordinary event, 19 years ago in a place called Kosovo, a province in what was then the communist state of Yugoslavia. Milosevic, then a Communist official, was dispatched there to order Serbs and Albanians to stop squabbling in the interests of socialism. But instead of praising communism, he came to Kosovo to bury it: standing on the balcony of a meeting house, he told the Serbs: 'Nobody should dare beat you.'" 42

The wire services reported in lock-step with the newspapers. The Associated Press claimed that "Milosevic first made his mark in this southern Serb province on a visit to Kosovo Polje in 1987 to hear Serb complaints of abuses by the ethnic Albanian majority. In a fiery speech, he told the Serbs, 'No one should dare to beat you.'" 43

Agence France Presse reported events exactly the same way. According to their account, On April 24, 1987 Milosevic "was summoned to help calm a crowd of Kosovar Serbs protesting mistreatment by the province's Albanian majority. As riot police beat back the throng, Milosevic was anything but calming. 'No one has the right to beat you. No one will ever beat you again,' he raged from a platform. The Serb battle cry was born and ethnic hatreds that had been welling up since Tito's death in 1980 were unleashed." 44

The Hague Tribunal also used this event to accuse Milosevic of nationalism. Paragraph 76 of the Kosovo indictment asserted that Milosevic "endorsed a Serbian nationalist agenda" on that occasion.

However, in the courtroom, the prosecution was far less certain of the indictment's assertion. During his opening statement the lead prosecutor, Geoffrey Nice, rhetorically asked, "Was the accused a nationalist? Maybe; maybe not. In the same way as he most probably was not in any way a racist." 45

While it is an uncontested fact that Milosevic visited Kosovo Polje on April 24th 1987 to hear citizens' concerns about the effects of violent Albanian nationalism in Kosovo, it is not true that he used the occasion to promote Serbian nationalism.

Milosevic did make a speech on that occasion. That speech was videotaped and the tape was played at the Hague Tribunal on Tuesday, January 25, 2005.

Milosevic is seen on the videotape doing exactly the opposite of what he is accused of. He said: "I know that the vast majority of those who are present here and those outside of it will side with me on this, that we must not allow such gatherings of citizens to be abused by nationalists. All honest people have to stand up against this, because we must guard our brotherhood and unity like the apple of our eye. This is the only way. Especially nowadays when the brotherhood and unity are threatened. We must and we can win."

"We neither wish nor we can classify people into Serbs and Albanians, but we should distinguish among the honest and progressive people fighting for brotherhood and unity and national equality on the one hand and nationalists and counter-revolutionaries on the other hand. If we do not create and strengthen that front, Comrades, then there will be no Kosovo, no Serbia, and no Yugoslavia either." 46

As the videotape of his speech makes perfectly clear, he did not incite or endorse any form of nationalism. In fact, he explicitly warned against ethnic nationalism.

As for Milosevic's alleged statement that "nobody will dare beat you again!" this is a mistranslation of his words. Fortunately, this event was videotaped too.

Milosevic made the statement outside of the building where the meeting was being held, and contrary to the media's assertions he was not standing on a platform or a balcony, nor was he shouting, nor was he addressing the crowd or making a speech, nor did he use the words "dare" or "again".

Unrest had broken out because the turnout for the meeting was much larger than anticipated. Between 10,000 and 15,000 Kosovo residents turned out to voice their concerns, but there was only enough room for 300 people in the meeting hall.

The police tried to clear the crowd away from the meeting hall by beating them with truncheons, and the crowd responded to the abuse by throwing stones at the police. All told the unrest lasted for about 10 minutes. In order to bring the situation under control Azem Vllasi, the president of the Kosovo League of Communists (and an ethnic Albanian), asked Milosevic to go outside to see if he could calm the crowd down.

Mitar Balevic, a local official who had helped organize the meeting, followed Milosevic outside and can be seen on the videotape standing next to him.

When Balevic testified at The Hague in 2005, he described the event. He said, "there was a huge racket, cries and shouts of Yugoslavia, the singing of the hymn, people shouting 'We want freedom,' and the first people who came up to [Milosevic] said 'We are being beaten, President.' And [Milosevic] answered that little group around [him], 'They must not. They must not beat you.'" ⁴⁷

Balevic's memory of events was borne out when the videotape of the event was played at the Tribunal on Wednesday, February 9, 2005. It is absolutely clear from the tape that Milosevic wasn't addressing the crowd or making a speech when he made the now infamous remark. He was simply responding to a small group of people who complained that the police had beaten them.

Because Milosevic was not speaking into a microphone, or addressing the camera, the court interpreters complained that the audio on the tape was difficult to make out, but their best interpretation of Milosevic's words was "You will not be beaten." ⁴⁸

It is interesting to note that this videotape came from a BBC program entitled "The Death of Yugoslavia". The subtitles on that video falsely ascribe the words "Nobody will beat you again!" to Milosevic.

The tribunal's interpreters, on the other hand, translated the statement directly from the audio on the tape. They explicitly stated that the word "again" never fell from Milosevic's lips, nor was the word "dare" ever mentioned. ⁴⁹

When Milosevic told that small group of people "You will not be beaten" he was not inciting nationalism, he was simply trying to reassure some frightened people - people who had just been beaten - that they weren't going to be beaten any further. It was a perfectly logical thing to say under the circumstances.

When Milosevic addressed the crowd he did not incite nationalism. He just told them all to go home. He is seen on the videotape telling the crowd, "Comrades, we have to work to hear out all your delegates. Under the circumstances, we will be discussing what you have entrusted your people to say. Do, however, allow us to hold a meeting, not a rally. There will be no use from any rallies. But we can agree about a meeting." ⁵⁰

Milosevic's 1989 speech at the commemoration of the 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo is the other event that the Western narrative cites as proof of his nationalism.

According to The London Independent, Milosevic "first won international notoriety for a viciously nationalistic speech in Kosovo Polje, near Pristina, in 1989".⁵¹

New York Times claims that the speech struck fear in the hearts of Yugoslavia's non-Serb population. The Times reported that "Mr. Milosevic, as Serbia's Communist Party chief, had little popular following. But after he traveled to Kosovo in 1989 and made a fiery speech about the rights of Serbs, he unleashed a wave of nationalist feeling. Fear of this resurgent nationalism fueled independence movements in four of the other five Yugoslav republics, which had no desire to trade a Communist yoke for a Serbian one."⁵²

The San Francisco Chronicle wrote that "In June 1989 Slobodan Milosevic delivered his celebrated speech in Kosovo calling for Serbian rights -- igniting the most virulent nationalist firestorm to sweep Europe in half a century. The flames burned their way through Croatia and Bosnia, before they returned to the countryside where they were lit by Milosevic."⁵³

So what did Milosevic say that unleashed no less than "the most virulent nationalist firestorm to sweep Europe in half a century"?

The London Guardian reported that Milosevic told Serbs "to prepare for war"⁵⁴ and The Christian Science Monitor told its readers that he "spoke of the 'talismanic power' of nationalism, and the need to fight for 'Greater Serbia'".⁵⁵

Is the media telling the truth? Did Milosevic deliver a nationalistic speech? Did he advocate Greater Serbia? Did he tell the Serbs to prepare for war? The answer to all four of these questions is no.

Here is what Milosevic said in his speech⁵⁶: "Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. National composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together more and more frequently and more and more successfully."

Milosevic used the speech to stress the need for ethnic equality in Yugoslavia. He said: "Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can survive only under the conditions of full equality for all nations that live in it. ... Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its economic and social prosperity."

In this allegedly "nationalistic" speech Milosevic explicitly warned against ethnic nationalism. He said: "The crisis that hit Yugoslavia has brought about national divisions, but also social, cultural, religious and many other less important ones. Among all these divisions, nationalist ones have shown themselves to be the most dramatic. Resolving them will make it easier to remove other divisions and mitigate the consequences they have created."

"For as long as multinational communities have existed, their weak point has always been the relations between different nations. The threat is that the question of one nation being endangered by the others can be posed one day -- and this can then start a wave of suspicions, accusations, and intolerance, a wave that invariably grows and is difficult to stop. This threat has been hanging like a sword over our heads all the time. Internal and external enemies of multi-national communities are aware of this and therefore they organize their activity against multinational societies mostly by fomenting national conflicts."

The only thing he said that could even remotely be considered threatening is this: "Six

centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without resolve, bravery, and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle now concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people will live in the 21st century. For this battle, we certainly need heroism, of course of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which nothing serious and great can be achieved remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary."

Of course Milosevic made it perfectly clear that he was speaking of a battle to implement "economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity", but he did say that that armed battles "cannot be excluded."

Why couldn't armed battles be excluded? They could not be excluded because Croatian secessionist groups had carried out armed attacks both inside and outside of Yugoslavia since the 1970s, and Kosovo-Albanian secessionists had been carrying out violent attacks in Kosovo throughout the 1980s. So, when he made the speech in 1989, armed clashes could not be ruled out because they had already been happening.

Anybody with common sense can see that Milosevic was not inciting nationalism with that speech. He was doing exactly the opposite. He explicitly spoke out against ethnic nationalism.

The media, the politicians, the so-called "intellectuals" -- almost all of them got it wrong. They got it wrong when they accused him of nationalism for his 1987 speech in Kosovo Polje, and they got it wrong again when they accused him of making a nationalistic speech in 1989. In both of those instances Milosevic forcefully spoke-out against ethnic nationalism.

For those still having trouble believing that so many well-respected Western sources could all get the story wrong, I have the complete transcripts from both of these speeches printed in the appendix of this book. ⁵⁷

Milosevic consistently opposed nationalism throughout his political career. In 1991, just prior to the outbreak of war, he rebuked the Serbian Assembly for remarks that certain opposition MPs had made against members of other Yugoslav ethnicities.

In a statement to the Serbian Assembly Milosevic said: "I would like to say immediately that I am personally not bothered by the critical remarks about my speech. However, what bothered me greatly in the debate, actually only in certain speeches, were some general accusations at the expense of other nations Slovenes, Croats, Muslims and others. This bothered me because of truth and justice and also because of the fact that Serbia, its citizens and the Serbian people do not wish to realize their interests at the expense of any Yugoslav people, or against them. The Yugoslav crisis can only be resolved by respecting the principle of national equality and I believe that any other approach cannot have any future." ⁵⁸

Once the war broke-out in Bosnia Milosevic continually stressed that equality among Bosnia's ethnic groups was the only way to solve the conflict. In 1992 he told Radio-Television Serbia "I would like to remind you that from the very beginning we have been striving for the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and relations in it to be regulated on the basis of consensus and equality of all three nations. We even said before all this that to help such a process and such a principled approach we would respect any solution that these three peoples reached on an equal footing. This is the beginning and the end. I do not see any other solution. I do not see any other solution to this agony in Bosnia-Herzegovina other than for hostilities to stop immediately and for the conference that was in fact based on this principle of equality and consensus of the three constituent nations to resume immediately." ⁵⁹

After the wars in Croatia and Bosnia ended Milosevic was still stressing the principle of ethnic equality. In 1998 he told Washington Post reporter Elizabeth Weymouth that, "Bosnia was resolved in Dayton only because the formula was reached to equally protect the interests of all

three peoples living there. That was our approach since the beginning of the crisis in Bosnia. You can see the papers from that period and see that. Since the beginning of crisis in Bosnia, our approach was that there is only one formula, which can bring peace, and that is the formula which will equally protect the interests of all three peoples - Serbs, Muslims and Croats. So, that was achieved in Dayton." ⁶⁰

When it came to Kosovo, Milosevic held exactly the same views as he did for Bosnia and Croatia. During the same interview he said, "The approach of the Serb Government and all political parties and citizens of Serbia is that [the] nationalities living [in Kosovo] have to be equal. So, when we speak of the solution to the problem of Kosovo [it] can be resolved only on the basis of the principle of equality of all citizens living in Kosovo and all national communities living in Kosovo." ⁶¹

Even during the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Serbia he maintained his view that ethnic equality was the only way to solve the Kosovo crisis. On April 21, 1999 he told an American television station, "Our approach, from the very beginning of the talks, was that the problem of Kosovo and Metohija could be solved on the basis of the principles of equality for all citizens living in the region and equality for all national communities living in the region. So, our approach is multiethnic, multicultural, multireligious and insists on equality of national communities. No matter how many of them there might be." ⁶²

Webster's dictionary defines nationalism as "loyalty and devotion to a nation; especially: a sense of national consciousness exalting one nation above all others and placing primary emphasis on promotion of its culture and interests as opposed to those of other nations or supranational groups."

Milosevic's belief that all ethnic groups needed to be equal is antithesis of nationalism. If he were a nationalist then he would have insisted that the interests of the Serbian people be placed above those of others.

In all of Milosevic's speeches, and in all of his public statements, he never said anything that could even remotely be construed as racist or nationalistic. The thesis that the secessionist republics left Yugoslavia because of the fear provoked by his "Serbian nationalism" is absolute rubbish.

CHAPTER 2

SEPRATISM, WAR, AND NATIONALISM IN SLOVENIA

From 1918 until 1991 Slovenia was a republic in the country of Yugoslavia. It was part of Yugoslavia in much the same way as California is part of the United States.

On June 25, 1991 Slovenia announced its secession from Yugoslavia triggering a brief war that lasted for roughly 10 days. The Slovene conflict had the fewest casualties of all the Yugoslav wars. On the Slovene side 18 lost their lives and 182 were wounded. On the Yugoslav side 44 were killed and 146 were wounded in the conflict.

In spite of its low casualty figures, the Slovene conflict was not without its war crimes. Slovenia has the dubious distinction of committing the first war crime of the Yugoslav crisis of the 1990s.

The Austrian public broadcaster, ORF, filmed Slovene troops at the Holmec border crossing on June 28, 1991. The video shows of a group of Yugoslav soldiers walking slowly with raised hands, holding up a white sheet in an attempt to surrender to the Slovene troops. Moments later, gunfire is heard and the Yugoslav soldiers are seen falling to the ground.

On May 21, 2003, during his trial at the Hague Tribunal, Slobodan Milosevic confronted Slovene president Milan Kucan with the evidence of this crime. Kucan attempted to deny the incident, but when confronted with overwhelming evidence he was forced to concede that he was wrong. Kucan said, "I asserted that these soldiers were not killed and executed as prisoners of war, but unfortunately, they were executed."¹

The Western narrative asserts that Slobodan Milosevic started the war in Slovenia. The New York Times summed up the typical Western line when it wrote that "[Slobodan] Milosevic started four wars, Slovenia was the site of the first."²

The assertion that Milosevic started the war in Slovenia, although common in the West, is simply wrong.

Warren Zimmerman was the American ambassador to Yugoslavia when Slovenia seceded in 1991. In an article, published by the magazine *Foreign Affairs*, Zimmerman wrote: "Contrary to the general view, it was the Slovenes who started the war. Their independence declaration, which had not been preceded by even the most token effort to negotiate, effectively put under their control all the border and customs posts between Slovenia and its two neighbors, Italy and Austria. This meant that Slovenia, the only international gateway between the West and Yugoslavia, had unilaterally appropriated the right to goods destined for other republics, as well as customs revenues estimated at some 75 percent of the Yugoslav federal budget."³

Slovenia's independence declaration was illegal. It was annulled and ruled to be "unconstitutional in its entirety" by the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia.⁴

Slovenia's unilateral secession violated Article 5 of the Yugoslav constitution, which read as follows: "The territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a single unified whole and consists of the territories of the Socialist Republics. The territory of a Republic may not be altered without the consent of that Republic, nor the territory of an Autonomous Province without the consent of that Autonomous Province. The territory of the Socialist Federal Republic may not be altered without the consent of all Socialist Republics and Autonomous Provinces. Boundaries between the Republics may only be altered on the basis of mutual agreement; and, if the boundary of an Autonomous Province is involved, on the basis of the latter's agreement."⁵

When Slovenia seceded it did not obtain the constitutionally mandated "consent of all Socialist Republics and Autonomous Provinces." Slovenia made the decision to secede unilaterally, and as such, it altered Yugoslavia's borders without the consent of the rest of the country.

On June 25, 1991, the day Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia, its prime minister, Lojze Peterle, announced that Slovenia would take over Yugoslav border crossings from Italy, Austria and Hungary and that signs bearing the name Yugoslavia would be taken down and replaced by signs welcoming travelers to Slovenia.⁶

The very next day, Slovenia seized control of federal Yugoslav border posts, and set-up eight new border checkpoints on the Croatian border.

In response to Slovenia's seizure of its border posts, the Yugoslav Government ordered the army to retake control of the state border in Slovenia.

THE ACTIVATION OF THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES' ARMY (JNA) IN SLOVENIA

Clearly, Slovenia provoked the war by illegally proclaiming its secession from Yugoslavia and forcibly seizing federal border posts. The idea that Milosevic started the war can be dismissed out of hand.

Unfortunately, there is some confusion about who ordered the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) into action in Slovenia. The Toronto Star told its readers that when "Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia, Milosevic sent tanks to Slovenia's borders, triggering a brief war that ended in Slovenia's secession."⁷

The Toronto Star is by no means alone in that assertion, but like so many other Western news outlets it simply has its facts wrong. Milosevic did not order tanks to Slovenia's borders. Milosevic could not order tanks anywhere, because he had no authority over the army. Milosevic was the president of Serbia. The army was subordinated to the federal Government of Yugoslavia, not to the Government of Serbia.

The man who ordered the JNA into action against the Slovenes wasn't even a Serb. Ante Markovic, an ethnic Croat, was the president of Yugoslavia's Federal Executive Council (FEC), and he ordered the army to retake the border.

In 1991, as the events were unfolding, the Western media was well aware of this fact. During the war the Associated Press reported that "Federal Premier Ante Markovic's government ordered the army to take control of Slovenia's borders."⁸

On June 27, 1991 the BBC Monitoring Service, in its daily summary of World news, published the full text of Markovic's orders. The orders called for the Yugoslav People's Army and the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs to "directly take over" and "control services" at Yugoslavia's federal border crossings in the Republic of Slovenia.⁹

On October 23, 2003, Markovic was at the Hague Tribunal to testify against Milosevic. One of the exhibits used during his testimony was Prosecution Exhibit 427, Tab 6, which was a transcript of a Yugoslav presidency session, held on August 21, 1991. Milosevic, Kucan, and Markovic all attended the meeting along with other senior Yugoslav officials.

Far from starting a war with Slovenia, Milosevic is on record opposing the use of force. According to the transcript, Milosevic was critical of Markovic's use of the army. Milosevic told Markovic, "On the basis of this approach, you began the war in Slovenia. About customs, dues, and borders, customs mostly."¹⁰

Slovene President, Milan Kucan, accused Markovic and the Federal Executive Council of starting the war in Slovenia. According to the transcript, he told Markovic: "I don't have to convince you that you're not going to find a single man in Slovenia ... who would go back to the Federal Executive Council ... It is a Federal Executive Council which we all know about in Slovenia and we know that it began the war in Slovenia."¹¹

When Kucan testified at The Hague, on May 21, 2003, he verified the accuracy of that transcript. In particular he verified the accuracy of the passage quoting him as saying that the Federal Executive Council "began the war in Slovenia".¹²

The war in Slovenia was between the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) on one side, and Slovene paramilitary troops on the other. Ante Markovic, as the President of the Federal Executive Council, ordered the JNA to retake the border crossings that Slovenia had seized.

Slobodan Milosevic was the President of Serbia and did not have a single soldier under his command. He had absolutely nothing to do with the war in Slovenia.

THE ORIGINS OF SLOVENIA'S SEPARATIST MOVEMENT

When Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia's communist leader, died in 1980 he left behind a national debt of nearly 18 billion dollars, a substantial sum for a country of 22 million people with an annual per capita income of only \$2,140.¹³

Pressed for cash, Yugoslavia turned to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for help. The IMF agreed to issue stand-by credits, and in exchange Yugoslavia was required to implement a series of tough austerity programs which called for, among other things, a sharp devaluation of Yugoslavia's currency.¹⁴

During 1980-81 the Yugoslav dinar was devalued by more than 30%, and the result was an increase in an already high rate of inflation.¹⁵

By the beginning of 1985 Yugoslavia was in serious economic trouble. It had to re-pay 3.45 billion dollars to the IMF, but it only had \$700 million.

The IMF agreed to extend more stand-by credits in exchange for more austerity programs. These programs forced Yugoslavia to abandon the communist practice of price freezing. After meeting with IMF representatives in Paris Yugoslavia's Finance Minister, Zivorad Kovacevic, told London's Financial Times, "The time of price freezes is definitely over."¹⁶

With the value of the dinar in free-fall, and government price controls gone, inflation went through the roof. By 1987 Yugoslavia's annual inflation rate had reached 116.6%.¹⁷

Slovenia was the most economically developed region in Yugoslavia, and as such it was required to subsidize economic development programs in poorer regions of the country.

By the mid-1980s unemployment was approaching 50% in some parts of Yugoslavia. The Slovenes realized that if they left Yugoslavia, they would no longer have to subsidize impoverished regions like Macedonia and Kosovo.

In 1987 the Associated Press cited economic concerns as the chief cause of the Slovene secessionist movement. AP reported that "leading Slovenian intellectuals have publicly called for secession from the other five republics and two autonomous regions that make up Yugoslavia ... many people in Slovenia, which has the highest living standards in Yugoslavia, are assailing the federation as an arrangement under which they subsidize poorer regions."¹⁸

This problem was coming to the fore as early as 1982 when the Financial Times reported that "the richer republics, such as Slovenia, [do] not want the fruits of their exports to subsidize the less successful regions of the country."¹⁹

According to a public opinion poll taken in Slovenia in 1988, 57.8% of Slovenes believed that new economic opportunities could only be created if Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia.²⁰

SLOVENE NATIONALISM

In addition to economic motives, ethnic nationalism is another factor that played into Slovenia's decision to secede from Yugoslavia.

Shortly after Slovenia seceded from Yugoslavia it implemented a decision to revoke the citizenship of certain ethnic minorities. Non-Slovenes, even if they had been living in Slovenia for years, lost their citizenship and all rights associated with it.

On February 26, 1992 Slovenia simply erased the citizenship of certain ethnic minorities. Slovene public opinion has been overwhelmingly supportive of this mass-revocation of minority citizenship. In a 2004 opinion poll, commissioned by the Slovene broadcaster Pop TV, only 3% of Slovenes supported restoring citizenship to ethnic minorities; 82% opposed restoring citizenship, and 15 per cent abstained. ²¹

Slovenia's policy towards ethnic minorities has been far from equal. Serbs, Croats, Muslims, Albanians, and Gypsies were stripped of their citizenship. While other ethnic minorities, no doubt considered "more desirable" by the Slovenes, such as Italians and Hungarians were allowed to retain their citizenship.

The Slovenes call the people whose citizenship they've revoked "izbrisani", which literally means "the erased".

Any nation that strips people of their citizenship based on ethnicity can fairly be called nationalistic. In this regard the Slovenes are surely nationalists. The Slovenes seceded from Yugoslavia because of their own ethnic nationalism, not because they were afraid of Milosevic or Serbian nationalism.

Open calls for Slovenia's secession began to surface all the way back in 1985. At its November 1985 session the Slovene branch of the Yugoslav League of Communists went out of its way to condemn what it called growing "nationalist separatism" in Slovenia. ²²

Speaking at a conference of Slovenian and Serbian intellectuals, held in Ljubljana in the Fall of 1985, France Bucar, the man who would later become the President of the Slovenian National Assembly, said "Today the Slovenians feel that the idea of belonging of Slovenes in Yugoslavia is dead or if nothing else dying. People feel disappointed and disillusioned and deceived in their expectations. We have nothing to expect any longer. We do not feel that we are in our own country. As a state product Yugoslavia is dead in the minds of the people." ²³

Bucar went on to say, "Are the Serbs nationalists? If they are, good for them. Unfortunately, there is a major difference between the Slovenians and Serbs as nationalists. To our mind, the idea of Yugoslav-hood is of secondary importance. To you it is of primary importance. We want autonomy and for you, Yugoslavia has been and still is the road to the solution of the Serb question. What interest could we have in common then?" ²⁴

Bucar made the issue crystal clear all the way back in 1985. As far as nationalism entered into the equation, it was Slovene nationalism that drove the separatist movement. The question of Serb nationalism didn't matter to the Slovenes. Bucar's attitude was "Are the Serbs nationalists? If they are, good for them."

Yanez Urbancic, another prominent Slovenian intellectual, addressed conference and said, "The fundamental thing for me is that I am a Slovene, that I love my people and my language, and I want to remain that. I have no visions about future Yugoslavia." ²⁵

Taras Kermaner, a famous Slovenian writer, also addressed the conference and expressed his negative attitude towards Yugoslavia. Already in 1985 he was speaking about Yugoslavia in the past tense. He said, "Yugoslavia promoted brotherhood and unity which was a substitute for the autonomy and civil society, but brotherhood always means terror and demagoguery and

unity means homogenization." 26

Kermaner's attack on the concept of "brotherhood and unity" is significant because "brotherhood and unity" was the fundamental philosophy of post-World War II Yugoslavia under Tito.

The thesis that Slobodan Milosevic "started a war with Slovenia" or that his alleged "Serb nationalism" drove the Slovenes out of Yugoslavia is nonsense. Nobody even knew who Slobodan Milosevic was in 1985, yet the Slovene separatist movement was already well under way.

The Slovenes seceded from Yugoslavia for their own economic and nationalistic reasons.

Slovenia was not the victim of an aggression. Slovenia provoked the war itself with its flagrant disregard for the Yugoslav constitution and its forcible seizure of Yugoslav border crossings.

In spite of its racist treatment of ethnic minorities, Slovenia has been rewarded with a good international reputation as well as membership in NATO and the European Union.

CHAPTER 3

WAR ERUPTS IN CROATIA

Like Slovenia, Croatia was a republic within the nation of Yugoslavia. Croatia was a Yugoslav republic from 1918 until 1941 and again from 1945 until its violent secession in 1991.

When full-blown war broke-out in Croatia, the Western political establishment sought to lay the blame on Slobodan Milosevic. In a White House press release Bill Clinton asserted that Milosevic "chose aggression over peace" and "started the war against Croatia".¹

British Prime Minister Tony Blair wrote that Yugoslavia was "blighted by the conflict born of Milosevic's policies of ethnic hatred." According to Mr. Blair, "Croatia was his target."²

Like the politicians, nearly the entire Western press corps jumped on the "blame Milosevic" bandwagon. The Boston Globe referred to "Milosevic's war in Croatia"³ and not to be outdone, the Ottawa Citizen described the conflict as "Milosevic and his genocidal war in Croatia."⁴

The Christian Science Monitor claimed that Milosevic was single-handedly responsible for the war. It wrote that "Milosevic instigated Serb revolts that ignited war in Croatia."⁵

According to the London Observer, The war in Croatia was "largely prosecuted by Serbian terrorists loyal to Milosevic."⁶

Of course making accusations is easy; the question is whether Slobodan Milosevic actually caused the war in Croatia? Was the war born of his policies or was it something that was building-up over time? To answer this question one must understand what went on in Croatia during the fifty years leading up to the war.

WORLD WAR II

Fifty years before the fighting broke-out in 1991, World War II was raging in Yugoslavia. From 1941 until 1945 Croatia was known as the Independent State of Croatia (NDH - *Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska*). The NDH was comprised, roughly, of the territories that make-up present-day Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The leader of the NDH was a man named Ante Pavelic.

The NDH was controlled by a pro-Nazi regime called the Ustasha. The Ustasha was established by Pavelic in 1930 as the armed wing of the Croatian Party of Rights, which was founded in 1861 by Ante Starcevic.

Starcevic, whose picture is still printed on Croatia's 1,000 Kuna bank note, is widely revered by Croats as the "father of the Croatian homeland". Starcevic is known to Serbs for his anti-Serbian views. Starcevic wrote that the only way to deal with Serbs was with an "axe to the neck". He wrote that for "that impure race, everyone is the judge and executioner, like for a rabid dog".⁷

During the Second World War, Croatian Ustashes killed hundreds of thousands of Jews, Serbs and Gypsies, and forced hundreds of thousands more to either flee Croatia, or convert to the Roman Catholic religion.⁸

In 1941 the NDH constructed the notorious Jasenovac extermination camp, one of the largest in Europe. According to the Wiesenthal Center, some 600,000, predominantly Serb, prisoners were killed there together with scores of Jews and Gypsies.⁹

On April 10, 1941, the day the NDH was established, Pavelic's deputy, Slavko Kvaternik, explained how an ethnically pure Croatia would be created. He explained that one third of the Serbs should be forced to leave Croatia, one third forcibly converted to Catholicism, and one third should be exterminated. Following Kvaternik's directive the Ustasha began a campaign of

mass slaughter, killing any Serbs who were unfortunate enough to have remained in Croatia. The enormity of such criminal behavior shocked even the conscience of German commanders.¹⁰

USTASHA ATROCITIES SO VILE THEY SHOCKED THE NAZIS

The main victims of the Ustasha were the Serbian population. The issue of Ustasha war crimes was well known to the Allied powers, but the Ustasha's crimes were so depraved that they even shocked their staunchest allies -- Germany and Italy.

A 1942 Gestapo report submitted to Heinrich Himmler noted that "Increased activity of the bands is chiefly due to atrocities carried out by Ustasha units in Croatia against the Orthodox population (i.e. Serbs). The Ustashes committed their deeds in a bestial manner not only against males of conscript age, but especially against helpless old people, women and children. The number of the Orthodox that the Croats have massacred and sadistically tortured to death is about three hundred thousand."¹¹

One Italian commander was so shocked by the Ustasha's abuse of young Serbian girls that he wrote, "The horrors that the Ustashi have committed over the Serbian small girls is beyond all words. There are hundreds of photographs confirming these deeds because those of them who have survived the torture: bayonet stabs, pulling of tongues and teeth, nails and breast tips - all this after they were raped."¹²

POST WAR

In 1945 the Axis powers surrendered, the Ustasha collapsed, and the territory occupied by the NDH was taken over by Tito's Partisan army and reintegrated into a new Yugoslav state.

Post-war Yugoslavia was ruled by Josip Broz Tito until he died in 1980. During the war, Tito established the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ). This communist organization decided what form Yugoslavia would take after the war ended.

AVNOJ decided that Yugoslavia would be divided into six republics and two autonomous provinces. Yugoslavia's internal borders were arbitrarily drawn-up by five members of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav Communist Party at an AVNOJ meeting in 1943.¹³

The fact that Yugoslavia's internal borders were based on nothing more than Communist decree was of little significance when Yugoslavia was a unified country. No matter which Yugoslav republic one was in, one was subject to the absolute authority of Tito and the Yugoslav Communist party. The boundaries between the Yugoslav republics were almost purely administrative in nature. The borders were so insignificant that the Communist authorities did not even bother to place signs on the road when motorists crossed from one Yugoslav republic to the next.

Unlike most Communist leaders of his era, Tito permitted private property ownership, allowed religious worship, and permitted Yugoslav citizens to work and travel abroad.

Tito pursued an independent policy. Yugoslavia was not a member of the Warsaw Pact, nor was it a member of NATO. Yugoslavia was a founding member of the non-Aligned movement. Yugoslavia enjoyed a good international reputation, and its citizens generally had a good standard of living.

In spite of Tito's efforts to establish a Yugoslav identity based on "brotherhood and unity", ethnic nationalism was always bubbling just beneath the surface, this was especially true among the Croatian population.

CROATIAN NATIONALISM AND SEPRATISM DURING THE 1970s AND 80s

The biggest outburst of Croatian nationalism to take place during Tito's rule erupted during the early 1970s with the Croatian Mass Movement, sometimes referred to as the "Croatian Spring". The persecution of ethnic Serbs living in Croatia increased dramatically when this movement took hold. ¹⁴

The Croatian Mass Movement's initial objective was to turn the Yugoslav federation into a loose confederation in which Croatia would be a sovereign state with its own representation in the United Nations and its own army. ¹⁵

However, as time went on, the movement evolved into a more violent separatist movement. In 1971 a Croatian nationalist named Miro Baresic assassinated Vladimir Rodovic, the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden. ¹⁶

Baresic was released from prison in 1972 after Croatian terrorists hijacked a Scandinavian Airlines System jetliner and demanded his release. ¹⁷

Baresic returned to Croatia in 1991 and joined the Croatian police only to be killed by Krajina-Serb police manning a barricade near Benkovac during the 1991-1995 war. ¹⁸

Dr. Milan Bulajic, an expert witness at Slavko Dokmanovic's trial in The Hague, testified that links were established between members of the former Ustasha government and members of the Croatian Spring movement during the trial of Ambassador Rodovic's killers. ¹⁹

Dr. Bulajic testified that the Ustashas supported the Croatian Spring movement because it "reflected a certain continuity in the fact that pure Croatian States should be established." ²⁰

On June 21, 1972 the Yugoslav authorities fought a group of armed Ustashas on Mount Radusa near the town of Bugojno in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The group had fled Yugoslavia at the end of World War II, but returned with the objective of raising an armed rebellion against Yugoslavia. During the fighting 14 Ustashas were killed, and 4 were captured. On the Yugoslav side 13 soldiers lost their lives. ²¹

Again in 1972, a group of independence-seeking Croatian terrorists blew-up a Yugoslav airliner over Czechoslovakia in an attack that killed 29 people. ²²

In an attempt to quell the violence, Tito imprisoned several Croatian nationalists who were responsible for the Mass Movement. Among those arrested in the crack-down were the two men who would ultimately lead Croatia's war of secession in the 1990s -- Franjo Tudjman and Stepan Mesic. ²³

To calm tensions following the Croatian mass movement, Tito re-worked the Yugoslav federation by passing a new constitution in 1974. The new constitution gave greater powers to Yugoslavia's republics and autonomous provinces.

Unfortunately, the new constitution had little success in calming separatist passions in Croatia. By the late 1970s separatist sentiment was still strong in Croatia. In 1977 U.S. News & World Report warned that "the strong separatist movement among Yugoslavia's 4.4 million Croats - one fifth of the total population - is the Trojan Horse Inside Yugoslavia." ²⁴

Violent Croatian terrorism flourished throughout the late 1970s. It spilled over Yugoslavia's borders and into Western Europe and the United States.

In 1976 Croatian terrorists detonated a bomb in New York's Grand Central Station. The blast killed New York City police officer Brian Murray, and seriously wounded his colleague Sgt. Terence G. McTigue. ²⁵

On September 11, 1976 a group of five Croatian terrorists hijacked a TWA flight with 86

passengers from New York's Kennedy Airport and forced the plane to fly to Paris, where they surrendered after demanding that Western newspapers publish a series of anti-Yugoslav texts that they had written. ²⁶

In 1978 Croatian terrorists again planted bombs in Grand Central Station, and at a UN building in New York. Fortunately, the New York Police were able to defuse the bombs before they went off. Notes found near the bombs said that they were planted by a group that sought the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia. ²⁷

Less than a week after being thwarted in their New York bombing attempts, armed Croatian terrorists seized the West German Consulate building in Chicago and took six members of the consulate staff hostage. ²⁸

In 1980, shortly after Tito's death, a New York City police report listed 60 "significant" acts of Croatian terrorism since 1962. According to the report, at least 50 persons died in Croatian terror attacks between 1972 and 1980. ²⁹

The goals of the Croatian terrorist campaign were clear to one and all. Reporting on a 1979 Croatian terror bombing at a travel agency in New York, the Associated Press wrote, "Croatian nationalists are seeking the separation of Croatia from Yugoslavia" ³⁰

In 1977 Croatian terrorists shot their way into the Yugoslav UN mission in New York. Again they made their views known by scattering leaflets demanding Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia. ³¹

The goal of the Croatian terrorists was clear as far back as 1972 when the New York Times reported that "Croatian terrorists have been organizing bombings and shootings to harass Tito Government for years ... their common goal is a separate Croatian national state." ³²

Croatian terrorism continued throughout the 1980s. On June 6, 1980 New York City police officials announced that Croatian terrorists had detonated a bomb at the Statue of Liberty. ³³

In 1981 Croatian terrorists detonated a bomb at the New York State Supreme Court Building in lower Manhattan. ³⁴

Following the bombing of the court house several members of a Croatian terrorist group were convicted on federal charges for plotting to bomb a number of other public buildings in New York City. ³⁵

In 1983 the Manhattan Second Circuit Court of Appeals, found that five members of a Croatian terror group named Otpor had entered into a conspiracy to bomb a Yugoslav independence celebration in New York City in order to "advance the goal of Croatian independence." ³⁶

In 1988 Canadian authorities thwarted a plot by a group of Croatian terrorists to assassinate athletes at the 1988 Winter Olympics in Calgary. The Washington Post reported that the goal of the terrorists was "Independence for Croatia". ³⁷

FRANJO TUDJMAN AND THE HDZ RISE TO POWER

In April and May 1990, Croatia held its first multi-party elections since World War II. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) won a plurality of votes and secured a majority of seats in the Croatian Sabor (parliament). The new Sabor then elected HDZ candidate Franjo Tudjman to be the President of Croatia.

Speaking at a conference in Cleveland, Ohio in February 1990 Tudjman laid out the platform of the HDZ. He explained that "The basic goal of the HDZ is to separate Croatia from Yugoslavia." He said that once the HDZ took power, "The Serbian Orthodox Church will be abolished in Croatia and it will be declared Croatian for those who do not move to Serbia." ³⁸

In 1989 Tudjman wrote a book entitled "Wastelands of Historical Truth" (*Bespu'ca -- povjesne zbiljnosti*). In his book Tudjman writes that the figure of 6 million Jews killed during the Holocaust is "founded too much on both emotional biased testimonies and on exaggerated data".³⁹ In Tudjman's estimation the real number of Jews to lose their life in the Holocaust was about one million.⁴⁰

According to the Wiesenthal Center, some 600,000, predominantly Serb prisoners were killed at the Jasenovac concentration camp during World War II.⁴¹ Yet according to Tudjman, the number was less than 60,000.⁴²

Not only did Tudjman accuse the Jews of exaggerating the Holocaust, he accused them of being responsible for it. According to Tudjman, the Jasenovac concentration camp was largely run by a coterie of its Jewish inmates who used their power to rob and murder their Serb and Gypsy fellow prisoners.⁴³ The New York Times quoted Tudjman as saying, "A Jew is still a Jew. Even in the camps they retained their bad characteristics: selfishness, perfidy, meanness, slyness and treachery".⁴⁴

As if Holocaust denial weren't enough, Tudjman went on to equate the state of Israel with Nazi Germany. Tudjman wrote that "[Even] in the mid-Eighties, world Jewry still has the need to recall its 'holocaust' ... And precisely for this reason the example of the Jewish people has remained historically instructive in many ways. After everything they suffered in history, particularly the hardships in World War Two, the Jewish people soon afterwards became so brutal and conducted a genocidal policy towards the Palestinians that they can rightly be defined as Judeo-Nazis."⁴⁵

In 1990, as a presidential candidate of the HDZ, Tudjman declared that the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), established by the Ustasa during World War II, "was not simply a Quisling creation and a fascist crime, it was also an expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian people." He made no effort to hide his racist views saying at one point, "Thank God, my wife is neither a Serb nor a Jew."⁴⁶

Tudjman's Holocaust denial and his bigoted attitudes towards Serbs and Jews provoked fear and anger among the Serbian population. Already in March 1990 it was clear that Tudjman's election would provoke a war with Croatia's Serbian population. One week after Tudjman declared his support for the Independent State of Croatia, Serbian protesters gathered in the Croatian town of Petrova Gora and chanted "We will kill [Franjo] Tudjman".⁴⁷

A RESURGENCE OF CROATIAN FASCISM

When the HDZ and Tudjman took power in April and May of 1990, the Serbian population was outraged. The Serbian population had suffered horribly at the hands of Croatian fascists during the Second World War, and feared living under another fascist Croatian regime.

As time went on it became clearer and clearer that Serbian fears of Croatian fascism were well founded. According to the New York Times, Tudjman's HDZ party was heavily financed by members of the Croatian diaspora, especially by remnants of the Ustasa movement in the United States, Canada and Australia.⁴⁸

Under the Croatian constitution, Tudjman had the power to appoint five people to seats in the Parliament. In 1993 he used that power to appoint Vinko Nikolic, a former official of Croatia's World War II era Ustasha regime.⁴⁹ Nikolic had remained a close associate of Ante Pavelic even after the Ustasha leader's defeat, and subsequent escape to South America.⁵⁰

In Croatian schools, textbooks were rewritten to gloss over crimes committed by the Nazis. In a history book for eighth graders, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill is ridiculed by being depicted as a bulldog sitting on the British flag.

On the same page, there is a photograph of a yellow Star of David, and a caption saying, "The Jews had to wear a special mark, the Star of David. This is a six-pointed star. It consists of two triangles, which symbolize the sky and the earth." There is no mention of the discrimination suffered by those forced to wear the symbol.

The same history book shows a picture of Ante Pavelic. The accompanying caption describes him as "a jurist, politician and the founder of the Ustasha movement," but makes no mention of the war crimes committed under his rule. ⁵¹

Not only were textbooks re-written to gloss over Croatia's fascist past, but schools and streets were re-named after leading members of Croatia's World War II era fascist regime.

Shortly after Tudjman took power in 1990, an elementary school in Zagreb was named after Mile Budak, the Ustasha minister of justice who signed racial laws banning Jews from schools, factories and government positions. ⁵²

In 1992 a street in the Croatian city of Split was also named for Budak. The name of the street was eventually changed, but as the Croats were changing the name of the street, they were erecting a plaque in memory of Juraj Francetic, the commander of a notorious Ustasha "Black Legion," in the city of Slunj. ⁵³

During Tito's rule, holocaust memorials were built throughout Croatia. In Zagreb, Tito had dedicated the central town square to the victims of fascism.

Once Tudjman took power, many holocaust memorials were torn down in Croatia. The "Victims of Fascism Square" in Zagreb was re-named the "Square of Croatian Giants" ⁵⁴ and monuments on the site of the former concentration camp in Jadovno, and at other sites of mass Ustasha crimes were taken down. ⁵⁵

Fascist symbolism became stylish in Tudjman's Croatia. On Zagreb's streets, and in cities and towns throughout the republic, newsstands openly sold Ustasha paraphernalia -- swastikas, the Fascist coat-of-arms, pictures of Ante Pavelic and other trinkets. ⁵⁶

The desire of Tudjman's regime to re-write and pervert the history of the Second World War reached epic proportions in 1996.

The Agence France Presse wire service carried a disturbing report from the Croatian town of Omis. On October 27, 1996, the Croatian parliamentary commission for victims of World War II actually dug-up a Partisan cemetery and re-buried the remains of Ustasha fascists there along with the remains of the anti-fascist Partisan soldiers who had died fighting the Ustasha. ⁵⁷

The ceremony was led by the deputy bishop of Split, Marin Barisic. Croatian soldiers and sailors carried the remains of 110 Ustashas to their new graves. ⁵⁸

Vice Vukojevic, who was the head of the parliamentary commission in charge of the re-burial, said in a speech that the ceremony was "a symbol of the reconciliation of the Croat people."

"Croatia is no longer divided between victors and vanquished," he said.

Vukojevic, a member of Tudjman's HDZ party, said that the aim of his commission was to establish the "truth" about what happened during World War II. He said that "The number of victims of fascism has been systematically overstated, creating a feeling of guilt among the Croat people". ⁵⁹

Tudjman first proposed the idea of "posthumous reconciliation of the Croat nation" when he said Ustashas and their victims should be buried together on the site of the Jasenovac concentration camp. ⁶⁰

The Simon Wiesenthal Center sent an open letter to the Croatian regime saying, "This ceremony is not an act of reconciliation, but a perverse lesson to younger generations on the continuity of Ustasha militias and the Croatian army today". ⁶¹

In 1990 the names and symbols of the World War II era Independent State of Croatia were re-introduced into the Croatian militia. ⁶²

In 1991, in the Croatian town of Osijek, at an official military funeral held for four Croatian guardsmen, the Ustasha salute was reputedly used. A Croatian policeman shouted "Za Dom!" and hundreds of mourners shouted back "Spremni!" The "Za Dom - Spremni" salute is the Croatian equivalent of "Sieg Heil!" ⁶³

In addition to the "Za Dom - Spremni" salute, a group of Croatian guardsmen came to the funeral with the Ustasha "U" symbol stenciled on their helmets. ⁶⁴

Soon after Tudjman's regime took power, the Croatian flag was changed to resemble the one flown by the Ustasha during World War II. ⁶⁵

In 1994 Croatia revived the fascist-era currency that it had used during the Second World War. Fittingly, Croatia had its "Kuna" bank notes printed in Germany. ⁶⁶

Fascists from around the world flocked to Croatia when Tudjman took power. In 1995 Ante Pavelic's son-in-law, a former Ustasha officer named Srecko Psenicnik, returned to Croatia from Canada. ⁶⁷

Psenicnik founded a fascist political party (HOP), and began printing an outspoken fascist newspaper called "The Independent State of Croatia." Psenicnik said that his paper rallied like-minded Croats and was on the line of the policy pursued by its first editor-in-chief Ante Pavelic. ⁶⁸

It is logical that Psenicnik would feel welcome in Croatia. In 1998 two requiem services were held for Pavelic. One mass was held in Croatia's capital city of Zagreb and the other was held in the town of Split. ⁶⁹

The services were not only attended by Pavelic's followers and relatives, but also by several Croatian parliamentary party leaders. ⁷⁰

Tudjman himself proposed bringing Pavelic's bones back to Croatia for re-burial. Tudjman said: "I support the idea that the bones of every Croatian man who lived for Croatia should be returned to Croatian soil. Why leave Pavelic out of it?" ⁷¹

THE LOG REVOLUTION

The Serbian revolt against Tudjman's government began on the 17th of August 1990 when Croatian paramilitary police from Korenica attempted to carry-out an attack on Serbian town of Benkovac. The Croats were stopped because Serbs from the village of Lika blocked their path by putting logs across the roads. From that point forward the Serbian revolt was known as "The Log Revolution". ⁷²

From August 19th until September 2nd 1990, Croatian Serbs held a referendum on the issue of Serb "sovereignty and autonomy" in Croatia. The vote took place in predominately Serb areas of Croatia. The result of the vote was overwhelmingly in support of Serb autonomy.

On September 30th 1990, the Serbian National Council, presided over by Milan Babic, declared "the autonomy of the Serbian people on ethnic and historic territories on which he lives and which are within the current boundaries of the Republic of Croatia as a federal unit of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia".

On December 21, 1990, Croatian Serbs in Knin announced the creation of a Serbian Autonomous District and declared independence from Croatia. These Serbian Autonomous districts later became known as the Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK).

Although there was sporadic fighting, all-out war did not break out until the spring and summer months of 1991 when Croatia formally declared its independence, even though the Croatian intent to declare independence was known far earlier.

THE 1991-1995 WAR

The 1991-1995 conflict basically boils down to this: The Croats wanted to secede from Yugoslavia, while the Serbs who lived in Croatia wanted to keep living in Yugoslavia and did not want to live under Tudjman's fascist rule.

Like Slovenia, Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia was illegal. Article 5 of the Yugoslav Constitution read as follows:

The territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is a single unified whole and consists of the territories of the Socialist Republics.

The territory of a Republic may not be altered without the consent of that Republic, nor the territory of an Autonomous Province without the consent of that Autonomous Province.

The territory of the Socialist Federal Republic may not be altered without the consent of all Socialist Republics and Autonomous Provinces.

Boundaries between the Republics may only be altered on the basis of mutual agreement; and, if the boundary of an Autonomous Province is involved, on the basis of the latter's agreement.

When Croatia announced its secession, it did not obtain the constitutionally required consent from any of the other republics -- let alone all of them. The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia ruled that Croatia's independence declaration was anti-constitutional and rendered it "null and void". In its ruling the court warned that "to carry out the said decision, as an act of Croatia's secession, may give rise to unavoidable consequences harmful to Yugoslavia." ⁷³

On May 24, 1992 Franjo Tudjman made a statement that serves to validate the court's warning. He said, "...And some people, some individuals in Croatia and especially abroad, who were not friends of Croatia, were saying that there shouldn't have been war, that we were to blame for the war. And I said yes, there would be no war if we had given up our aim, creating self-reliant and independent Croatian state." ⁷⁴

The conclusion is clear; Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia, which was illegal, caused a full blown war to break out. Tudjman himself said that there would not have been a war if Croatia had not declared its independence. Therefore, the Western thesis that Slobodan Milosevic was responsible for the war falls flat.

CROATIAN WAR OBJECTIVES

In 1990, before widespread conflict broke-out, Croatia's intention to wage an aggressive war against Yugoslavia was exposed. Between October and December of 1990, the 12th department of the KOS (Yugoslav military intelligence) secretly videotaped Croatia's Defense Minister, Martain Spegelj and Croatia's Interior Minister, Josip Boljkovac. The two were filmed planning to kill Yugoslav soldiers and ethnically cleanse Croatia's Serbian population. The video was shown on Yugoslav TV in January of 1991, and it was played at Slobodan Milosevic's trial in The Hague in 2006.

The authenticity of the videotape was established during the prosecution's case against Milosevic. Prosecution witness Aleksandar Vasiljevic testified that the video was 100% authentic. He told the tribunal, "There's absolutely no doubt that this is absolutely trustworthy material because I filmed it myself and I had it in my own possession." 75

Spegelj is seen on the videotape telling Boljkovac how Yugoslav soldiers should be killed. Spegelj says they should be killed "on the spot, in the street, in the compound, in barracks, anywhere. Just pistol and into the stomach. That will not be a war; it will be a civil war in which there is no mercy towards anyone, women or children. Into homes, family homes, quite simply grenades."

Regarding Knin (the capital city of the Krajina-Serbs), Spegelj went on to say; "We are going to resolve Knin in that way, slaughter. We have international recognition for that, and then we slaughter them, especially now that this whore won in Serbia."

Boljkovac asks, "Milosevic?"

Spegelj responds, "Yes. Now, the Americans, the second day after he won, offered us all possible assistance on the very next day, and until then all were speculating they would or they wouldn't; now it's going to be this way, now it's going to be that way. Thousands of combat vehicles, this kind and that kind of cars, what do I know, for 100,000 soldiers complete arming free of charge."

He goes on to say, "We are going to use all resources. We're going to [use] weapons as well. Serbs in Croatia will never be there again for as long as we are there and we hope until now too their supremacy is a thing of the past. Their Knin will never be Knin again. We are going to enter Knin too. Knin has to disappear as Knin. All Croats should bear this in mind and we are going to create a state created at all costs, if necessary, at the cost of shedding blood." 76

Croatia's intentions couldn't be clearer. Croatia's objectives were two-fold, it would secede from Yugoslavia and it would ethnically cleanse the Serbian population.

This videotape also provides a clue as to why Western officials are so keen to blame Milosevic for the outbreak of war. The fact that the Croats started the war with the active support of the United States does not suit the interests of the Western political establishment. So, rather than take responsibility for their actions, they simply try to pin the blame on Slobodan Milosevic instead.

CROATIA'S WAR WITH THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES ARMY (JNA)

When Croatia illegally proclaimed its independence from Yugoslavia it deemed the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) to be an "occupying army" on its territory. In reality the JNA was stationed on the same territory that it had always been on -- territory which was still internationally recognized as part of Yugoslavia. 77

In order to deal with the so-called "occupation" Croatia established armed units known as the HOS (*Hrvatske Obrambene Snage* - Croatian Defense Forces) and ZNG (*Zbor Narodne Garde* - National Guards Corps).

The HOS was formed as the paramilitary wing of the Croatian Party of Rights⁷⁸ -- the same party that had established the Ustasha as its armed wing during World War II.

In December 1991 Milan Vukovic, the vice-president of the Croatian Party of Rights, confirmed that HOS units were in actual fact "part of the Croatian National Guard Corps and subsequently part of a single Croatian defense system." 79

The Croatian Government officially announced the establishment of the ZNG on April 12, 1991.⁸⁰ The ZNG was under the direct command of the Croatian Defense Ministry.

Regardless of what these units were called, they were illegal. Croatia was an internationally recognized part of Yugoslavia. In 1991, when the fighting between the Croatian paramilitaries and the JNA broke out, the only lawful armed force in Yugoslavia was the JNA, and the only internationally recognized country was Yugoslavia.

The Croatian government's actions were unlawful on every level. Croatia illegally proclaimed its independence from Yugoslavia and then it established illegal paramilitary groups to carry-out its secession.

By September 1991, Croatian paramilitaries had captured about 20 federal army barracks across the republic. ⁸¹

Obviously the JNA couldn't be expected to just sit around while Croatian paramilitaries attacked them in their own barracks and took over sovereign Yugoslav territory. The aggressive actions of the Croatian side made war unavoidable.

During the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, Yugoslavia's former President, Borislav Jovic, was called to testify by the Prosecution. Jovic explained the mission that the Yugoslav state presidency had given the JNA in Croatia.

Jovic testified that "The position of the Presidency was [that] we did not want to use the army in order to overthrow the Croatian government or to conquer Croatia that had decided to secede from Yugoslavia. Quite simply, we wanted there to be protection. We wanted to have a buffer between the Serb territories and the Croatian units in order to protect the Serb territories until a political solution is found for this issue." ⁸²

The Yugoslav Presidency was desperate to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. Branko Kostic, the Montenegrin representative of the SFRY state presidency, testified during the Milosevic trial that the SFRY state presidency sought to end the bloodshed by taking the JNA out of Croatia and inviting the UN to send peacekeepers in their place so that a political solution could be found. ⁸³

THE VANCE PLAN

The Vance Plan was named for the former US Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, who was the UN secretary-general's special envoy for Yugoslavia. In line with the request of the SFRY Presidency, Vance drew-up a plan to stop the fighting in Croatia, and on November 23, 1991 the Vance Plan was accepted by both the Croatian and Yugoslav governments. ⁸⁴

Under the Vance Plan, the JNA vacated Croatia and the Serblan districts in Croatia were turned into UN Protected Areas (UNPAs). The Krajina-Serbs were required to turn-over their weapons to the UN, and in return the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was supposed to guarantee their safety.

Pursuant to the Vance Plan, as UNPROFOR troops arrived as the JNA withdrew. The objective of the Vance Plan was to stop the war by demilitarizing the conflict zone and stationing UN peacekeeping troops on the territory until the Croatian Government and the Krajina-Serbs could negotiate a political settlement.

The JNA began to leaving Croatia on November 30, 1991. ⁸⁵ The last JNA soldier left Croatia in October 1992, 11 months after the Vance Plan was adopted however most of them were out by May.

This process was not without its problems. The Croatian side did not abide by the terms of the Vance Plan. On several occasions the Croatian Army attacked the JNA as it was attempting to leave Croatia. ⁸⁶

GERMANY GETS INVOLVED

As Cyrus Vance was attempting to implement the agreement in Croatia; the European Community (EC), led by Germany, cut him off at the knees.

On December 17, 1991 The EC agreed to extend diplomatic recognition to Croatia and Slovenia no later than January 15, 1992. Most of the EC Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels balked at moves to recognize Croatia and Slovenia as independent states. However, they acceded to German demands in order to preserve the unity of the EC after Germany threatened to recognize the rebel republics with or without the EC. ⁸⁷

UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar was alarmed by the EC decision. He said, "I am deeply worried that any early, selective recognition could widen the present conflict and fuel an explosive situation, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and also Macedonia. Indeed, serious consequences could ensue for the entire Balkan region." ⁸⁸

Unfortunately de Cuellar's warnings fell on deaf ears; Germany's Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher announced that the recognition door was open to any Yugoslav republic wishing to secede. He told reporters "No one will be turned away". ⁸⁹

Cyrus Vance told the New York Times that he was "very disappointed" in Germany's actions. He said, "Premature recognition could very well have negative consequences, that it could intensify and widen the war." ⁹⁰

By granting Croatia unconditional recognition as a sovereign and independent country, the EC removed any leverage that Vance could use against the Croatian Government to negotiate a peaceful settlement.

By extending recognition to Croatia, Slovenia, and to any other part of Yugoslavia that wanted to secede; the German-led EC violated international law. Germany, Yugoslavia, and all of the EC member states were signatories of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act which states in chapter 1.4 that "The participating States will respect the territorial integrity of each of the participating States. Accordingly, they will refrain from any action inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations against the territorial integrity, political independence or the unity of any participating State."

Under international law, Yugoslavia's unity and territorial integrity were to be respected, but the Germans and the European Community ignored all of that. In stead of striving for peace in Yugoslavia, they chose to pour fuel on the fire.

MEDAK POCKET

Even though every last JNA soldier had left Croatia, and UN peacekeeping troops were deployed in Serb-majority areas to secure the territory until a peace agreement could be reached, the Croatian regime could not resist attacking the Serbian population.

One such attack occurred in September 1993 in a Serbian region of southern Croatia known as the Medak Pocket. At about 6 AM on September 9, 1993 Croatian troops attacked the pocket. A detachment UN peacekeepers from the 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry was stationed in the area and counted 525 shells falling on the Serbian village of Medak during the first 24 hours of the operation. ⁹¹

The Croatian attack was indiscriminate. The civilian casualties were heavy, and four Canadian peacekeepers deployed in the area sustained shrapnel wounds during the attack. ⁹²

The Croatian attack was condemned by the UN, and on September 15, 1993 the Croatian government agreed to withdraw from the captured territory, but not until after the Croatian

Army had burnt-down several Serbian villages in the area. ⁹³

Once the cease-fire was negotiated, Canadian UN troops were ordered to create a buffer zone between the Croatian Army and the Krajina-Serb positions. However, as they were attempting to deploy, they came under attack from the Croats.

At first the Canadians thought this was a mistake so they put bigger UN flags on their vehicles, but this did not deter the Croats. Col. Jim Calvin, the commander of the Canadian troops, testified to the Canadian Standing Committee on National Defense and Veterans Affairs that "it became evident that this was not an accident but actually a concentrated attempt to fire at the United Nations." ⁹⁴

At that point a fierce fire-fight ensued between the Croatian Army and the Canadian UN Peacekeepers. This was Canada's largest combat operation since the Korean War. The Canadians fought brilliantly and managed to kill 27 Croatian soldiers during the fighting without taking any losses on their side.

Eventually an agreement was negotiated with the Croatian artillery commander whereby the Croatian army would have until 12 PM the next day to move its equipment and let the Canadians pass.

Col. Calvin recounted what happened next. He testified that by 8 AM the next morning "we knew that we had made a tragic error in allowing [the Croats] until noon to prepare to move, because as we looked out over the kilometer that separated us from the Croats we could see nothing but billowing smoke starting to go up from every one of the villages that we could plot on our maps and we started hearing large explosions and we started hearing small arms fire coming from all over the villages within the pocket itself."

"It was clear to us in our own minds, based on our past five months' experience, that the Croatian army had now started a serious ethnic cleansing session within the pocket, and we were required to sit there and watch for four hours, until noon, before we could actually move to the other side." ⁹⁵

At the time, UNPROFOR released a statement condemning the killing of Serb civilians as a "deliberate action and not as collateral damage from military operations." ⁹⁶

General Jean Cot, the commander of the UN Protection Force in Croatia, confirmed the destruction of the villages. He described the destruction as "total, systematic and deliberate". Cot told reporters that he had "found no sign of human or animal life" when he inspected the villages. ⁹⁷

Once the Canadians gained access to the villages they found evidence of crimes perpetrated by the Croatian Army against the Serbian civilian population in the pocket. Col. Calvin testified that "As we slowly drove into the village [of Citluk], there were Croatian soldiers with bags of loot jumping on trucks and buses and laughing as they evacuated themselves out of the pocket. We began to see at first hand our evidence of ethnic cleansing." ⁹⁸

The Canadian soldiers recorded videotapes and took photographs of what they found. Col. Calvin played a video of one particularly egregious incident for Canadian officials. He showed them a videotape of two Serbian girls who had been held prisoner and undoubtedly raped by the Croats. As the grizzly images on the videotape played he gave a commentary. He said, "these two women [were found] the first evening in the dark. They were between the ages of 16 and 25. It was very difficult to determine. They'd been held prisoner for 4 or 5 days by the Croatian army in a barred room in a farmhouse. They must have been shot and set on fire just before the Croats moved back, because when we actually found them, the bodies were so hot that before they could be put in the body bags the soldiers had to douse them with water to cool them down so they wouldn't melt the plastic of the body bags." ⁹⁹

Describing the general situation in the Medak Pocket, Col. Calvin recounted that "All of the

livestock in the area had been killed. Every well had been poisoned with oil or animals thrown down into them. In fact, in the broadest sense of ethnic cleansing, they had made sure that the people who had lived there could not return to that area, either by killing them, by destroying their property, or by poisoning their wells." ¹⁰⁰

One would think that the eyewitness testimony of an entire battalion of Canadian soldiers backed-up with hundreds of photographs and videotapes would have prompted the Hague Tribunal to file war crimes charges against Agim Ceku, the Croatian commander who carried out the ethnic cleansing operation. Unfortunately, the Hague Tribunal is an instrument of politics -- not an instrument of justice, and indicting Ceku would only embarrass the Western officials who supported him.

During the Croatian war, Ceku was trained by American instructors.¹⁰¹ Ceku, a Kosovo-Albanian, was chosen to the head-up the UN-financed Kosovo Protection Corps for five years following the Kosovo war. In 2006 the Kosovo-Albanians elected him to be their Prime Minister.

James Bissett, Canada's former ambassador to Yugoslavia, told the Washington Times, "As for Agim Ceku, the so-called prime minister of Kosovo, the Canadian military knows what crimes he is guilty of even if the Hague Tribunal refuses to indict him." ¹⁰²

OPERATION FLASH

Over the course of 36 hours on May 1-2, 1995 the Croatian Army carried out an all-out offensive called "Operation Flash". The operation killed hundreds of Serbs and thousands more were made refugees as the Croatian Army rolled into the so-called "UN Protected Area" known as Western Slavonia and began their assault.

Throughout the war, ethnic cleansing was the key objective of the Croatian Government. On September 12, 1993, at a meeting of the Council for Defense and National Security of the Republic of Croatia, President Tudjman told his cabinet that "Croatia must resolve the [Serbian] problem by war, contrary to international norms, meaning by ethnically cleansing the Serbs from Croatia. That is happening in practice because we cannot hide that they have the information that in Slavonia, western Slavonia, some thirty Serb villages disappeared from the face of the Earth." ¹⁰³

Of course the Croatian regime could not publicly say that it wanted to ethnically cleanse the Krajina-Serbs, so it needed to create a pretext so that it would have an excuse to attack them and thereby carry out ethnic cleansing.

On April 30, 1995 Tudjman approved a plan to stage a fake terrorist attack on the Zagreb-Lipovac highway. The Croats would blame the so-called "terrorist attack" the Krajina-Serbs, thus giving themselves the pretext they needed to launch Operation Flash and carry out the ethnic cleansing of the Serbian population in Western Slavonia.

This fact came to light on January 22, 2004 during the trial of Slobodan Milosevic. Franjo Tudjman's cabinet chief, Hrvoje Sarinic, had come to the Tribunal to testify against Milosevic, but Milosevic quickly turned the tables on him.

Unbeknownst to the prosecution or the witness Milosevic had obtained the transcripts of Tudjman's meetings from the Tribunal's archives. Milosevic read-out excerpts from the transcripts of Tudjman's April 30, 1995 meeting where his cabinet is planning to stage a phony incident in order to give themselves an excuse to launch Operation Flash. ¹⁰⁴

President Tudjman: "It has been agreed with the soldiers that the [operation] should start tomorrow at 5.00 a.m., that it should be finished within a few hours, not later than the end of the day. We have come to the conclusion ... it would be a good idea for some kind of incident to be provoked an hour prior to this. If the highway is open, then let two or three of our cars

pass through and let them be exposed to some sort of fire. So this would be an incident one hour prior to the beginning ... It is very important that this should be accompanied with appropriate propaganda."

Defense Minister Susak: "President, Mr. President, the worst option would be for us to go with two cars, two vans, to leave them there, to riddle them with bullets, to film this for television if there is no other option."

Interior Minister Jarnjak: "Mr. President, the provoking of this incident, let's agree upon this, I'm going to agree with the police leadership and they'll do what's necessary. And it will be so -- it will seem to be the real thing, that nobody will be able to doubt it."

President Tudjman: "So on the motorway. Now, if the motorway does not work, then at the entrance."

Interior Minister Jarnjak: "I should like to receive maps to show me where that incident is going -- is happening."

So what we have here is Croatia's president, its defense minister, and its interior minister planning to stage a fake terrorist attack so that Croatia can have an alibi to launch an operation against the Krajina-Serbs in Western Slavonia.

After the transcript was read-out in court, Sarinic was caught like a deer in the headlights. He told the tribunal, "Now, as that is in the transcript, I cannot deny the authenticity of it." He attempted to defend the staging of the incident by saying, "The incident is not the important point. We were the victims on our own territory, and I think that that was military tactics along those lines." ¹⁰⁵

Sure enough, on May 1, 1995 Croatia launched Operation Flash after what was said to be a Serbian attack on the highway. The Croatian defense ministry issued a statement saying, "On May 1 at 05:30 a police operation began with the aim of ensuring free movement of traffic on the Zagreb-Lipovac motorway and preventing terrorist strikes against passengers." ¹⁰⁶

The fact that Operation Flash was a pre-planned operation, not a spontaneous response to a "Serbian attack", was publicly admitted by Croatian President Stepjan Mesic in 2005. Mesic told the Croatian news agency HINA that the operation was "brilliantly and professionally executed" adding that "all military analysts must admit that that battle was organized as armies established long before would have organized battles." ¹⁰⁷

The result of Operation Flash was thousands of Serbs either killed or expelled from their homes. In spite of credible reports by Croatian, Serbian, and international organizations that the Croatian Army committed war crimes and engaged in ethnic cleansing during the operation, no indictments have been issued either by the Croatian authorities or by the Hague Tribunal for Operation Flash.

In 2003 the Croatian Helsinki Committee for Human Rights published a report on Operation Flash which stated that the "Serbs of western Slavonia were subjected to a systematic ethnic cleansing campaign". The report accused Croatian soldiers of "systematically looting Serb houses" and executing Serbian civilians who did not flee ahead of the advancing Croatian army. ¹⁰⁸

The report details the death of 83 Serbian civilians. It lists the names of 30 Serb civilians who were killed in Croatian military attacks on refugees fleeing towards Bosnia, and it lists the names of 53 Serb civilians who remained in their homes only to be executed by Croatian soldiers. ¹⁰⁹

In 2005 the Veritas Documentation and Information Centre, a Serbian NGO, published a similar report listing 283 persons who were either killed or went missing during the operation, of which 57 were women and children. ¹¹⁰

The U.S. State Department issued a report stating that 188 Serbs were killed during the action, including several refugees who lost their lives while attempting to flee Croatian troops. According to the report, the UN reported 30 civilian corpses near the village of Novi Varos where eyewitnesses had seen Croatian soldiers shooting at fleeing refugees. ¹¹¹

According to the Association of Croatian Serbs some 15,000 Serbs fled Western Slavonia during Operation Flash. ¹¹²

OPERATION STORM

The biggest single incident of ethnic cleansing to be carried out during any of the 1990s Yugoslav wars was Croatia's Operation Storm. The Croatian Army attacked the Krajina-Serbs over a 36-hour period on August 4-5, 1995. According to the UNHCR, some 250,000 Serbs fled Croatia during the operation. ¹¹³

Serbs who did not flee were executed by Croatian troops. Videos from some of these killings can be seen in Bozo Knezevic's documentary film *"Storm over Krajina"*.

Casualty figures for Operation Storm vary wildly. According to the Croatian authorities, 526 Serbs were killed, of which 160 were civilians. ¹¹⁴

Serbian sources claim that the number of people killed during Operation Storm was much higher. According to the Belgrade newspaper Vecernje Novosti, at least 1,960 Serbs were killed, out of which 1,205 were civilians. They also claim that at least 3,200 Serbian civilians were captured by Croatian troops and imprisoned in camps. ¹¹⁵

Regardless of whether it was hundreds or thousands of Serbs that were killed, the most despicable aspect of Operation Storm is the fact that Croatia attacked the Krajina-Serbs after they had surrendered.

It appears that Tudjman launched Operation Storm because he realized that it would be impossible to ethnically cleanse the Serbian population after a peace agreement was reached. It was his last chance to carry-out ethnic cleansing and he took it.

THE Z-4 PLAN, THE SURRENDER OF THE KRAJINA-SERBS, AND OPERATION STORM

Throughout 1995 the Contact Group conducted peace negotiations in Geneva between the Krajina-Serb authorities, and the Croatian Government. The Zagreb 4 or "Z-4" peace plan was drafted by the United States, Russia, the U.N., and the European Union.

On August 3, 1995 the Krajina-Serb Prime Minister, Milan Babic, announced that his government had accepted the terms of the Z-4 Plan, which envisioned the integration of Serb-held areas into the Croatian state. Babic had reached the agreement on August 2nd through negotiations with Peter Galbraith, the U.S. Ambassador to Croatia.

On August 3rd Galbraith went on Croatian TV and announced that "Mr. Babic agreed to negotiate the reintegration of the Serb-held areas in Croatia. Mr. Babic said that he was going to instruct his delegation in Geneva about these points. According to our reports, he has already done so." ¹¹⁶

The same day, American mediators in Geneva told the Glasgow Herald that the Krajina Serbs had offered significant concessions so that there was "no reason for Croatia to go to war". At the same time Ambassador Galbraith confirmed to reporters that Babic had agreed to "hold talks on the peaceful re-integration into Croatia of Serb-held areas." ¹¹⁷

According to an August 3, 1995 interview that Babic gave to Serbia's FoNet news agency,

Galbraith even promised that the United States would protect the Krajina Serbs from any Croatian military offensive. Babic told FoNet: "I spoke to US Ambassador Galbraith last night. Today I also made a statement which supported the stand of our delegation in Geneva. Mr. Galbraith promised me that his government would uphold our stand and that it would intervene to prevent Croatia from carrying out its military strike, provided we made public the stands we adopted earlier and which we made public today." 118

Unfortunately, the Krajina Serbs' acceptance of the Z-4 Plan was rejected by Croatia. The Croats walked out of the Geneva peace negotiations and began their military offensive the very next morning. 119

The Krajina-Serbs agreed to the Z-4 Plan. Babic publicly voiced his acceptance of the Z-4 Plan. He instructed the Krajina-Serb negotiators in Geneva to implement the agreement. The U.S. Ambassador Galbraith confirmed all of this. The peace agreement was in the wings, yet the Croats chose to break-off talks and launch a military offensive. Obviously Tudjman's objective was ethnic cleansing, not peace.

There can be no doubt that Croatia was successful in its campaign to ethnically cleanse most of its Serbian population. According to the 1991 census Serbs made-up 12% of Croatia's population, but in the 2001 census Serbs only comprised 4.5% of the population. 120

AMERICAN COMPLICITY IN OPERATION STORM

Croatia was not alone in its war effort. Tudjman's regime was supported by the U.S. Government. In his book entitled "To End a War", former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke publishes correspondence that he had with American diplomat Robert Frasure during a meeting with Croatian officials in Zagreb shortly after Operation Storm.

Holbrooke recounted that Frasure handed him a note reading: "Dick: We 'hired' these guys to be our junkyard dogs because we were desperate. We need to try to 'control' them. But it is no time to get squeamish about things." 121

Croatian sources confirm the involvement of the United States in the planning of Operation Storm. Lawyers for Operation Storm commander Ante Gotovina told the Croatian newspaper Globus that in July 1995, at the Sepurine military base in southern Croatia, Gotovina prepared Operation Storm together with former CIA chief, George Tenet. 122 According to the report, Tenet and at least 12 American military experts worked with Gotovina to plan the operation. 123

The Globus report said that the United States directly participated in Operation Storm by, among other things, jamming Serb communication systems and conducting reconnaissance flights for the Croatian military. 124

Reports of U.S. involvement were also published by U.S. Government sources. According to The Navy Times, a magazine published by the U.S. Navy, American warplanes bombed the Krajina-Serbs' missile defense systems during Operation Storm. 125

The American support for Operation Storm was discussed by Tudjman and his cabinet during a meeting on August 7, 1995. The Croatian newspaper 24 Sata published transcripts from the meeting in which Tudjman said, "[The Americans] must have been pleased how we finished [Operation Storm]". Croatia's Prime Minister, Ivo Sanader, replied saying "I talked to [Peter] Tarnoff -- More or less when it came to us it was decided with Tarnoff on one side, who was a secretary and worked in the name of Gore, but I think that all clearance came from Clinton. So that all of this was approved straight from him. I think that we can expect continuous support from them." 126

James Jatras, an analyst for the U.S. Senate's Republican Policy committee, summed it up best when he said that the Clinton Administration "actively abetted the Croatian Army's

'Operation Storm' with mercenary retired U.S. military consultants to provide training and operational planning under the guise of 'democracy training.' Indeed, there is evidence that U.S. assistance to the eradication of the Krajina-Serbs may have included air strikes and psy-ops, but to my knowledge no member of our intrepid Fourth Estate has yet seen fit to look into it." ¹²⁷

The mercenaries that Mr. Jatrass was referring to are retired U.S. military officers working for Military Professional Resources, Inc (MPRI), based in Alexandria, VA.

The American embassy in Zagreb admitted that MPRI trained the Croats, on license from the US government as part of the "US-Croatian Military Co-operation Agreement", but they denied that military tactics were taught. ¹²⁸

Croatian military sources told the London Observer that that MPRI gave a series of seminars to officers at Cenomerec, the Croatian officer training school in Zagreb. One Croatian officer said: "They lecture us on tactics and big war operations on the level of brigades, which is why we needed them for Operation Storm when we took the Krajina. At the beginning of the war, we had no real army. Every man was a hero and thought he could win the war by himself. The Americans taught us to change all that." ¹²⁹

UN Observers stationed in Croatia told the Observer that, whatever Washington might say, the results of the MPRI training are obvious on the ground. One Western observer who witnessed Croatian commandos crossing the River Una told journalists that it was "a textbook US field manual river crossing. The only difference was the troops were Croats." ¹³⁰

WESTERN MOTIVATION

When the Krajina-Serbs agreed to the Z-4 Plan, Ambassador Galbraith promised Babic that the United States would intervene to protect them in the event of a Croatian military attack. Then, as soon as Babic agreed to the Z-4 Plan, the United States not only failed to protect the Krajina-Serbs it actively participated in the attack against them.

What caused this stunning duplicity in U.S. policy? Although NATO was established to be a defensive alliance against the Soviet expansion, it has continued eastward expansion since the end of the cold war. On May 31, 1997 President Clinton stated, "The bottom line is clear: Expanding NATO will enhance our security. It is the right thing to do." ¹³¹

A resolution drafted by the U.S. Council of State Governments, and published by the U.S. State Department in 1998 stated point-blank that "NATO Enlargement is the stated goal of U.S. foreign policy, demonstrating responsible U.S. engagement in global affairs in pursuit of vital U.S. security and commercial interests." ¹³²

NATO has accomplished the objective of eastward expansion in the Balkans by breaking-up non-aligned Yugoslavia and ruling over the pieces. Today all of Yugoslavia's former republics are either members of NATO, are actively trying to obtain NATO membership, or have NATO troops stationed on their territory. It is no coincidence that the flames of war burned across Yugoslavia in a path from West to East beginning first in Slovenia and ending in Macedonia.

The Serbs, as the most numerous of the Yugoslav nationalities, were the main obstacle in Yugoslavia's destruction. Yugoslavia was in their best interest and they wanted to preserve it. But the preservation of a non-Aligned Yugoslavia would have been at odds with eastward NATO expansion, so the Serbs were treated by NATO as an obstacle that needed to be removed or destroyed.

The mechanism that NATO exploited to break-up Yugoslavia was ethnic hatred. Germany forced the EC to illegally recognize Croatian secession, while the United States provided military support to the Croatian government in spite of a UN arms embargo.

In an interview with the *New Yorker*, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke told interviewer Ted Koppel that he regarded the Serbs as nothing more than "murderous assholes".¹³³

Holbrooke was Washington's point-man on the Balkans; the Administration called him their "Balkan Bulldozer". The fact that such a senior U.S. official regarded the Serbian people as nothing more than "murderous assholes" might offer a clue as to why the U.S. gave Tudjman the green light to ethnically cleanse the Krajina-Serbs even after they had surrendered and agreed to the Z-4 peace plan.

And let there be no doubt that Washington gave Tudjman the green light for Operation Storm. In a meeting with Tudjman held in Zagreb on August 18, 1995, less than two weeks after Operation Storm, Holbrooke was discussing the operation with him and made reference to Washington's green light. He told Tudjman, "We said publicly, as you know, that we were concerned, but privately, you knew what we wanted."¹³⁴

CHAPTER 4

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA GOES TO WAR

Until its secession in 1992, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a Yugoslav republic made-up of three constituent peoples: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims – all of which are indigenous to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

However, since 1993, many of Bosnia's Muslims have taken to calling themselves "Bosniaks" to create the illusion that they are more indigenous to Bosnia than either their Serbian or Croatian countrymen.

Muslims, or "Bosniaks", did not exist as an ethnicity prior to the 1970s. Marshal Tito made Muslims an ethnicity by Communist decree in 1971.¹ Prior to 1971 Muslims were a religious group whose members had either Serbian or Croatian ethnic affiliation.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA'S UNLAWFUL SECESSION FROM YUGOSLAVIA

Like Slovenia and Croatia before it, Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia was illegal. Not only did Bosnia's secession violate Article 5 of the Yugoslav Constitution; it violated the laws and constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina itself.

On October 15, 1991 Bosnia took its first official step towards secession. The Bosnian parliament was in session well into the early hours of the morning debating the issue of secession from Yugoslavia. Bosnia's Serbs opposed secession, while Bosnia's Croats and Muslims supported it.

Alija Izetbegovic, Bosnia's Muslim leader, was greeted by loud cheers from Muslim parliamentarians as he told the parliament: "There is no place for us in Yugoslavia."²

At 3:30 AM the speaker adjourned the parliament, the Serb deputies went home for the night, but the Croatian and Muslim deputies stayed behind and took the debate to a vote in the absence of the Serbian deputies.³

Even though the vote was unlawful, because it was held while the parliament was not in session, it resulted in the adoption of the so-called "memorandum on the sovereignty of Bosnia-Herzegovina".

The adoption of the "Memorandum" was significant because it paved the way for a referendum on Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia.⁴

The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), led by Dr. Radovan Karadzic, branded the vote "an attempted coup" and demanded that the legal order be respected. The SDS issued a statement warning that if the law was not respected "the Serbian people will establish a legal order in keeping with federal regulations and establish their own lawmaking, administrative and judiciary authorities."⁵

Ultimately Bosnia's Serbs did establish their own institutions and on October 24, 1991, Republika Srpska (the Bosnian Serb republic) was founded and Dr. Karadzic was elected president.

Contrary to Western opinion, Republika Srpska was not created to facilitate the formation of a "greater Serbia". The establishment of Republika Srpska was a direct reaction to the unlawful and anti-constitutional behavior of Bosnia's Croat and Muslim leaders.

Pursuant to the memorandum, the referendum on Bosnia's secession was held on February 29 and March, 1 1992.

Bosnia's 1974 Constitution was in force when the referendum was held and its 62nd Amendment regulated changes to Bosnia's borders and territorial status. It stipulated that any change in Bosnia's status must be approved by voters in a referendum, and that such a referendum could only pass if two-thirds of all eligible voters voted in favor of it. ⁶

The results the referendum were as follows: Voter turn-out was 64.31%. Of the ballots cast 99.4% voted in favor of secession, 0.29% voted against, and 0.25% of ballots were invalid. ⁷

By law the referendum failed because it did not meet the two-thirds threshold mandated by the constitution. Two-thirds is 66.6% and the 64.31% voter turnout simply fell short.

Even though most Bosnian-Serbs boycotted the referendum because of its inherent illegality, it is still suspicious that 99.4% of the ballots were in favor of secession. Such a one-sided result is a strong indicator vote fraud.

Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia was illegal on every level. It was unconstitutional since it violated Article 5 of the Yugoslav Constitution and Article 1 of the Bosnian Constitution. The entire referendum process was the direct result of an unlawful vote in the Bosnian parliament, the voting was rigged during the referendum itself, and to top the whole thing off the referendum failed to get enough votes to pass anyway.

Recognizing Bosnian secession was a direct violation of Yugoslavia's sovereignty, a violation of the Helsinki Final Act, and a violation of the UN Charter.

In spite of the flagrant illegality of Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia, the European Community recognized Bosnian independence on April 6, 1992 -- the 51st anniversary of Hitler's attack on Belgrade. The United States followed suit recognizing Bosnian secession the very next day.

MUSLIM LEADER REJECTS PRE-WAR PEACE AGREEMENT (AFTER SIGNING IT)

Before full-scale war broke out there was a golden chance for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On March 18, 1992, Bosnia's Serb, Croat, and Muslim leaders adopted the Cutileiro peace plan. The agreement was signed by: Alija Izetbegovic on behalf of the Muslims, Radovan Karadzic on behalf of the Serbs, and Mate Boban on behalf of the Croats. ⁸

The Cutileiro Plan (also known as the Lisbon Agreement) was named for Jose Cutileiro the Portuguese diplomat appointed by the European Community to bring Bosnia's feuding ethnic groups to the negotiating table.

Under the Cutileiro Plan Bosnia would have been divided into three autonomous Swiss-style cantons. The Muslims would govern the canton in which they were the ethnic majority, and the Croats and Serbs would each govern in the cantons where they were the majority.

By agreeing to the Cutileiro Plan the Bosnian-Serbs proved beyond any doubt that "greater Serbia" was not their objective. Under the terms of the Cutileiro plan Bosnia would have been a completely separate country from Serbia, thereby negating any possibility of a "greater Serbia".

When the Cutileiro Plan was signed Radovan Karadzic said, "This is a big day for Bosnia. If we respect what has been agreed, we can say there are no reasons for civil war." ⁹

The agreement was signed and ready to go. On March 19th Jose Cutileiro held a press conference at the Sarajevo airport to announce that the agreement had been signed. He said that Bosnia-Herzegovina would be a state consisting of three constituent units in which each ethnic group had the majority population. At the start of the press conference Cutileiro stressed that there were no obstacles to the plan's implementation since the minor discrepancies which had existed were successfully resolved during the negotiations. ¹⁰

Unfortunately peace was not in the cards for Bosnia-Herzegovina, after signing the Cutileiro Plan, the leader of the Bosnian-Muslims changed his mind. Alija Izetbegovic withdrew his signature from the Cutileiro Plan and renounced the agreement.

In paragraph 14 of its judgment against Biljana Plavisc the Hague Tribunal conceded that "In March 1992 the Bosnian Serbs signed the Cutileiro Plan which provided for a sovereign BH, based upon principles of cantonisation and ethnic identity, but the Bosnian Muslims rejected the plan."¹¹

After the Bosnian war ended, Cutileiro wrote a letter to the Economist magazine stating that: "After several rounds of talks our 'principles for future constitutional arrangements for Bosnia and Hercegovina' were agreed by all three parties (Muslim, Serb and Croat) in Sarajevo on March 18th 1992 as the basis for future negotiations. These continued, maps and all until the summer, when the Muslims reneged on the agreement. Had they not done so, the Bosnian question might have been settled earlier, with less loss of (mainly Muslim) life and land. To be fair, President Izetbegovic and his aides were encouraged to scupper that deal and to fight for a unitary Bosnian state by well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew better".¹²

The "well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew better" were the Americans -- in particular Warren Zimmermann the U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia.

James Bisset, Canada's Ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1990 to 1992, testified at The Hague Tribunal that Izetbegovic had been encouraged by Zimmermann to renounce the Cutileiro plan.¹³

Bisset wrote that: "Within days of [signing the Cutileiro Plan], the U.S. Ambassador, Warren Zimmermann flew to Sarajevo and met with Izetbegovic. Upon finding that Izetbegovic was having second thoughts about the agreement he had signed the Ambassador suggested that if he withdrew his signature, the United States would grant recognition to Bosnia as an independent state. Izetbegovic then withdrew his signature and renounced the agreement."¹⁴

The New York Times also identified Zimmermann as the man who talked Izetbegovic out of the peace agreement. It wrote that: "Immediately after Mr. Izetbegovic returned from Lisbon, Mr. Zimmermann called on him in Sarajevo. The Bosnian leader complained bitterly that the European Community and Bosnian Serbs and Croats had pressured him to accept partition."

"He said he didn't like it", Mr. Zimmermann recalled. "I told him, if he didn't like it, why sign it?"

"In retrospect, Mr. Zimmermann said in a recent interview, 'the Lisbon agreement wasn't bad at all.'"

"But after talking to the Ambassador, Mr. Izetbegovic publicly renounced the Lisbon agreement."¹⁵

THE MUSLIMS PREPARE FOR BOSNIAN SECESSION THROUGH WAR

In order to be fair to Ambassador Zimmermann, it should be noted that Alija Izetbegovic didn't need much encouragement to renounce the Cutileiro Plan. There is ample evidence that he was planning to go to war all along.

On February 7, 1991 Alija Izetbegovic stood in front of the Bosnian parliament and said point-blank: "I would sacrifice peace for a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina... but for that peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina I would not sacrifice sovereignty."¹⁶

In addition to coming right out and saying that he would wage a war to achieve Bosnia's secession. Izetbegovic made no secret of the fact that he was forming Muslim paramilitary units to forcibly break Bosnia away from Yugoslavia.

The first Muslim paramilitary group to be established was the so-called "Patriotic League". In 1998 Halid Chengic -- a high level official in Izetbegovic's Party of Democratic Action (SDA) -- gave an interview to "Lijiljan" the official newspaper of the SDA. In that interview he said that the first Patriotic League unit was established in the Bosnian town of Foca in 1990.

Chengic said, "At the time of defending Focetrans, already on August 1, 1990, we had a platoon armed with automatic weapons, a machine-gun and a mortar. They all had camouflage uniforms and they pledged their allegiance in the Ustikolina mosque, with their hands on the Koran. The deceased Husein Cavrak, a BH Army major decorated with a Golden Lily award was the unit commander. He was killed on Preljuca near Gorazde."¹⁷

The initiative to establish the Patriotic League throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina came shortly after Izetbegovic's speech to the Bosnian parliament. Muslim activists meeting at a mosque in the town of Souk Bunar near Sarajevo resolved on the 31st of March 1991 that the Patriotic League should be established on a large scale.¹⁸

On June 10, 1991, nearly one year before the war broke out, the Bosnian-Muslims officially established the "Patriotic League". In its judgment in the Stakic case the Hague Tribunal found that "In anticipation of Bosnian Serb resistance, the Bosnian Muslim leadership founded the paramilitary organization, the Patriotic League. In June 1991 the SDA created the National Defense Council whose task was to guide the work of the Patriotic League."¹⁹

In addition to the Patriotic League, the "Green Berets" were another paramilitary organization created by Muslim leaders in 1991.²⁰

Just prior to the outbreak of war, in the spring of 1992, the Green Berets were reported to have had more than 80,000 Muslims under arms in Bosnia.²¹

The fact that the Muslims were setting-up paramilitary formations for years before the war goes to show that their intention all along was to start a war against Yugoslavia. Croatia and Slovenia hadn't even declared independence before the Muslims began setting-up their armed units.

Unlike the Bosnian-Muslims, who were setting-up their armed units since 1990; the Bosnian-Serbs didn't have their own military force until the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) withdrew from Bosnia in May of 1992. In light of these simple facts the Western thesis of blaming the Serbs for the outbreak of the Bosnian war strains credulity.

ALIJA IZETBEGOVIC, OSAMA BIN LADEN, AND IRANIAN REGIME

When the Americans and the Europeans recognized Bosnia as an independent country in April of 1992, they also recognized Alija Izetbegovic as its head of state. One of the major flaws in this policy was the fact that Izetbegovic was an Islamic fundamentalist who worked directly with Osama bin Laden and the Iranian government to bring Islamic terrorists from around the world to fight in Bosnia.

Because they recognized him as the "President of Bosnia-Herzegovina" the Western political establishment actively tries to deny the fact that he was an Islamic fundamentalist. In January 2006, the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) held a conference entitled "Explaining the Yugoslav Catastrophe; The Quest for a Common Narrative".

The result of the USIP's "quest" was a briefing paper in which they dutifully regurgitated the Western narrative blaming the outbreak of war on Slobodan Milosevic and asserted that "The

Bosnian Serb claim that Izetbegovic was a fundamentalist [is] unfounded".²²

The USIP would certainly like you to think the claim that Izetbegovic was a fundamentalist is unfounded, but it is a claim that quite easily finds its foundation in Izetbegovic's own words and deeds.

In 1970 Izetbegovic wrote a book entitled "The Islamic Declaration", which he published in Sarajevo in 1990. In the book he advocates Sharia law and the establishment of "a united Islamic community from Morocco to Indonesia". He wrote that the establishment of an Islamic order was his "incontrovertible and invincible aim". In Izetbegovic's view "the Islamic movement should and can, take over political power as soon as it is morally and numerically so strong that it can not only overturn the existing non-Islamic power, but also build up a new Islamic one". He branded Western feminists "a depraved element of the female sex" and said, "There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic faith and non-Islamic social and political institutions".²³

Further foundation for the claim that Izetbegovic was an Islamic fundamentalist can be found in the company he kept. In 1993 and 94 two Western reporters witnessed Osama bin Laden visiting Izetbegovic's offices in Sarajevo.

According to the German author Jürgen Elsaesser, Renate Flottau (Der Spiegel's correspondent for the Balkans) told him that she had personally seen Bin Laden on two different occasions at Izetbegovic's Sarajevo office in 1993/94.²⁴

Eve-Ann Prentice, a reporter for the London Times and The Guardian, testified under oath at the Hague Tribunal that she too had seen Osama bin Laden being escorted into Izetbegovic's Sarajevo office in November 1994.²⁵

According to the 9/11 report four of the September 11th hijackers fought in Bosnia on the side of the Muslims: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, and Khalid al Mihdhar.²⁶

The 9/11 Report asserts that "The groundwork for a true global terrorist network was being laid" thanks in part to Bin Laden's Bosnian connections. The report found that "Bin Laden's impressive array of offices covertly provided financial and other support for terrorist activities. The network included a major business enterprise in Cyprus; a 'services' branch in Zagreb; [and] an office of the Benevolence International Foundation in Sarajevo, which supported the Bosnian Muslims in their conflict with Serbia and Croatia."²⁷

In addition to Izetbegovic's connections to Osama bin Laden, he maintained a strong relationship with the Iranian government, which according to the U.S. State Department is the world's "most active state sponsor of terrorism".²⁸

In 1996, just after the Bosnian war ended, the U.S. Congress launched an investigation into America's role in Iranian arms transfers to Croatia and Bosnia. The investigation found that the Iranian government had provided a full two-thirds of the Bosnian-Muslims' military hardware.²⁹

According to the report issued by the U.S. House Committee on International Relations, "Iran ordered senior members of its Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps ("IRGC"), the elite force used to advance militant Islam, to travel to Bosnia to survey the military needs of the government. IRGC trainers taught the Muslims how to use anti-tank missiles and helped with troop logistics and weapons factories. The IRGC also incorporated religious indoctrination into military training. Iran used this leverage to urge Hizballah to send foreign fighters to the region as members of the Mujahideen. The effort was successful and a force of thousands drawn from several pro-Iranian groups and other Islamic Opposition movements assembled in Bosnia."³⁰

CROAT AND MUSLIM AGGRESSION PROVOKED ALL-OUT WAR IN BOSNIA

In the beginning of the Bosnian war the Croats and the Muslims allied to attack the Serbs and the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA).

The early Croatian attacks were stronger than the Muslim ones because it was in the interest of the Croatian government to provoke fighting in Bosnia in order to force the JNA to divert resources away from the war in Croatia.

Nikola Gardovic, a Serb, was the first civilian victim of the Bosnian war. He was the father of the groom in a Serbian wedding party that was attacked by Muslims in Sarajevo on March 1, 1992 during the referendum on Bosnia's secession from Yugoslavia.

Eyewitnesses identified Gardovic's killer as Ramiz Delalic "Cleo", the commander of a Green Berets paramilitary unit in Sarajevo.³¹

In spite of warrants issued for his arrest by the Bosnian Interior Ministry, Delalic was appointed to the command of the Stari Grad police department in Sarajevo. He was also appointed to the command of the 3rd Mountain Brigade and the 9th Motorized Brigade of the Bosnian-Muslim Army.³²

Delalic clearly had a mandate from the Muslim authorities to carry out the killing; otherwise they wouldn't have put him in charge of their police and appointed him to command positions in their military. The Muslim objective in murdering Gardovic was to provoke a violent Serbian reaction that they could use as an alibi to accuse the Serbs of precipitating the fighting in Sarajevo.

The Bosnian-Muslims behaved in a similar manner as the Croats did when Croatia declared its independence. When they made-up their mind to secede from Yugoslavia they proclaimed the JNA to be an "occupying" army on its own territory. Their common enemy was Yugoslavia and the Serbian population who wanted to hold the country together.

Croat and Muslim paramilitaries precipitated the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina by attacking the JNA and carrying out massacres in Bosnian-Serb villages. Their early actions forced the JNA and the Bosnian-Serbs to retaliate in self-defense.

Case in point: Bosnian-Croats directed machine-gun fire against the JNA barracks in Capljina from the direction of the town's railway station on the night of 8th-9th March, 1992.³³

On March 27, 1992, in the town of Sijekovac, 14 Serbian civilians were massacred.³⁴ The massacre in Sijekovac provoked a refugee crisis in northern Bosnia as terrified Serbs fled their homes en-masse. There were even reports of Serb civilians taking-up hiding places in the woods to save themselves from the slaughter.³⁵

The murder of Nikola Gardovic, the massacre of Serbian civilians in Sijekovac, and attacks on JNA barracks, all of which occurred in March 1992, are only some of the events that forced the Bosnian-Serbs to go to war. Suada Dilberovic, the first non-Serb civilian to die, wasn't killed until April 6, 1992.³⁶

Who attacked whom first? March obviously comes before April; therefore the war started when the Croats and Muslims attacked the Bosnian-Serbs. The war was the direct result of Croat and Muslim aggression against the Bosnian-Serbs and the JNA; not, as they would have you believe, the other way around.

THE YUGOSLAV PEOPLES ARMY (JNA) AND THE BOSNIAN SERB ARMY (VRS)

Starting in 1991 the Muslims and Croats deserted the JNA en-masse to join their secessionist paramilitary groups. The only ones remaining in the JNA were the Serbs and a hand-full of non-Serbs who had remained loyal to Yugoslavia.

On August 23, 1991, while Yugoslavia was still an internationally recognized state, Bosnia's Defense Ministry (under Izetbegovic's control) ordered JNA recruits to disregard draft notices sent out by the federal army.³⁷

The JNA officially withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina on May 19, 1992. However, JNA soldiers who already lived in Bosnia didn't have anywhere to go since they were in their own republic. They remained in Bosnia with the JNA's equipment, and since the soldiers were overwhelmingly Serbs (by virtue of mass desertion by non-Serbs) they established the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS).

Once the JNA left Bosnia, the Muslims and Croats quickly found themselves outgunned by the Bosnian-Serbs. The JNA was the one of the largest armies in Europe, so when it left its equipment behind the Bosnian-Serbs became the best armed faction in the war.

When the Muslims figured out what was going to happen they tried all means to snatch the JNA's equipment away from the Bosnian-Serbs. JNA conscripts found themselves under siege in barracks though out Bosnia-Herzegovina as the Muslims frantically attempted to hold them hostage in exchange for weapons.

On May 3, 1992 Muslim "Green Berets" massacred a column of JNA soldiers on Dobrovoljacka Street in Sarajevo while they were attempting to withdraw from Bosnia towards Lukovica in Serbia. The attack was all the more insidious because the Muslims launched the attack after they had promised to let the soldiers pass peacefully.³⁸

Unfortunately Dobrovoljacka Street wasn't the only instance in which Muslims massacred departing JNA soldiers. There were several such incidents, but the biggest incident happened on May 15, 1992 on Skojevaska Street in Tuzla when 80 JNA soldiers were killed by members of the Muslim "Patriotic League".³⁹

On May 28, 1992, as the JNA was attempting to pull its last troops out of Bosnia, Croatian and Muslim paramilitaries launched attacks against the Jusuf Dzonlic barracks and the Marshal Tito barracks in Sarajevo.⁴⁰

The Muslims had been blockading the soldiers in the Marshal Tito barracks since May 13, 1992 demanding that the JNA give-up its weapons.⁴¹

The infamous "Siege of Sarajevo" wasn't an aggression. It began as an operation to liberate JNA soldiers being held captive by the Muslim paramilitaries in the Marshal Tito barracks.⁴²

SELF-INFLICTED ATROCITIES TO WIN WESTERN SYMPATHY AND NATO INTERVENTION

Because they were outgunned by the Bosnian-Serb Army (VRS), there was no way for the Muslims to carry through and win on the battlefield. The Muslims knew they couldn't win alone so they devised a political strategy to obtain foreign intervention on their behalf.

In order obtain foreign intervention; the Muslims portrayed the war as a "genocidal aggression" by the Bosnian-Serbs. By doing so they successfully conned Western public opinion into supporting a NATO "humanitarian intervention" in Bosnia.

Of course NATO knew what was happening. It didn't intervene in Bosnia because of some high-minded concern about human rights. As I mentioned in the last chapter, NATO's objective was simply eastward expansion. To accomplish its objective NATO supported the destruction of non-Aligned Yugoslavia by supporting anyone who wanted to secede from it.

In order to create the illusion that the Bosnian-Serbs were waging a "genocidal aggression" the Muslims needed to create victims of "Serbian" atrocities. To achieve this objective the Muslims used two strategies. Their first strategy was to draw Serbian fire against civilian targets by shooting at Serbian positions from hospitals, schools, mosques, and the like. Their second strategy was to attack their own civilians and then accuse the Serbs.

The first self-inflicted Muslim atrocity was carried out on April 6, 1992. Muslim snipers fired on a peace rally in front of the Holiday Inn hotel in Sarajevo killing Suada Dilberovic. In spite of Serbian denials, it was widely reported that members of Radovan Karadzic's Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) had been behind the shooting.

However, on February 17, 2003, prosecutors at the Hague Tribunal called a former Yugoslav counter-intelligence officer named Aleksandar Vasiljevic to testify against Slobodan Milosevic. Vasiljevic testified that Yugoslav KOS agents had evidence including intercepted Muslim radio communications and videotape proving "beyond any doubt" that it was members of the Muslim Green Berets who had carried out the shooting, not members of Karadzic's SDS.⁴³

Another incident that the Serbs were wrongfully blamed for was the 1992 "Breadline Massacre" in Sarajevo. The London Independent reported that "United Nations officials and senior Western military officers believe some of the worst killings in Sarajevo, including the massacre of at least 16 people in a bread queue, were carried out by the city's mainly Muslim defenders -- not Serb besiegers -- as a propaganda ploy to win world sympathy and military intervention.... Classified reports to the UN force commander, General Satish Nambiar, concluded ... that Bosnian forces loyal to President Alija Izetbegovic may have detonated a bomb. 'We believe it was a command-detonated explosion, probably in a can,' a UN official said then. 'The large impact which is there now is not necessarily similar or anywhere near as large as we came to expect with a mortar round landing on a paved surface.'⁴⁴

Lewis MacKenzie, the Canadian general in-charge of UN Peacekeeping troops in Sarajevo wrote in his book that "Our people tell us there were a number of things that didn't fit. The street had been blocked off just before the incident. Once the crowd was let in and had lined up, the media appeared but kept their distance. The attack took place, and the media were immediately on the scene."⁴⁵

The February 1994 "Markale Market Massacre", which killed 68 people, is another self-inflicted Muslim atrocity wrongfully attributed to the Bosnian-Serbs. A UN investigation found that the fatal shell had been fired from inside Bosnian-Muslim lines.⁴⁶ In spite of the anti-Serb frenzy provoked by the massacre; the UN ballistics report exonerating the Serbs was suppressed by the former U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright.⁴⁷

The Bosnian-Serbs were also blamed for a number of sniping incidents in Sarajevo that they weren't responsible for. In 1995 a squadron of French UN troops was ordered to investigate "Serbian" sniping in Sarajevo and uncovered several instances of Muslim snipers shooting their own civilians.

The New York Times reported that "French peacekeeping troops in the United Nations unit trying to curtail Bosnian Serb sniping at civilians in Sarajevo have concluded that until mid-June some gunfire also came from [Bosnian-Muslim] Government soldiers deliberately shooting at their own civilians. After what it called a 'definitive' investigation, a French marine unit that patrols against snipers said it traced sniper fire to a building normally occupied by Bosnian [Muslim] soldiers and other security forces. A senior French officer said, 'We find it almost impossible to believe, but we are sure that it is true.'⁴⁸

In addition to coming right out and shooting their own civilians, the Muslim authorities took measures to draw Serbian fire against civilian targets. The Muslims fired at the Bosnian-Serb military from civilian areas hoping that the Serbs would fire back and kill Muslim civilians.

A prime example of this strategy was witnessed by UN military observers at the Kosevo Hospital – the largest medical center in Sarajevo. David Owen, the former British Foreign Secretary who served as the E.U.'s special negotiator for Bosnia wrote that "An UNMO (United Nations Military Observer) team near Kosevo hospital in Sarajevo had witnessed a Bosnian government mortar crew set up in the grounds of the hospital and fire over the hospital into a Serb area. They had quickly packed up and gone, only for the UNMOs to see a television crew arrive and then record the retaliatory Serb shelling of the hospital."⁴⁹

This was a favorite trick of the Muslims; according to Philippe Morillion, the French general commanding the UN force in Bosnia from 1992 to 1993, the Muslims "Very frequently used mortars at Kosevo for provocation purposes".⁵⁰

Morillion was so outraged by the practice that he wrote a letter of protest to Alija Izetbegovic after one particularly egregious incident in 1993. He wrote that on January 11, 1993 "[an] 82-millimeter mortar had been set up on the western side of the Kosevo Hospital within the hospital grounds. This mortar and its crew then proceeded to fire nine rounds using the hospital as a screen. The direct consequence of this disreputable and cowardly act was that shortly afterward the hospital came under fire from anti-aircraft gunfire, artillery fire, and mortar fire ... You will, I'm sure, be aware that the firing of weapons from the hospital is against the Geneva Convention."⁵¹

Sir Michael Rose, the British General who took Morillion's place as the UN Protection Force commander, wrote in his book that "The Serbs whom we could clearly see in their trenches on the slopes behind us covered with fir trees completely halted a Muslim attack. That is when they used their artillery and mortars to respond to Muslim fire whose mortars were distributed all over town and one of them within the Kosevo Hospital compound. The Muslims opened fire at the Serbs, hoping that they would respond with blows against built-up areas which would be another cause for the international community to condemn the Serbs and take their side. History will be the best judge of the Muslim leaders for resorting to such inhumane tactics."

During his testimony as a prosecution witness at the Milosevic trial, David Harland, the UN's Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping in Bosnia, confirmed that between March 28, 1993 and April 27, 1994 the Muslim side violated UN-brokered cease-fires in Sarajevo 514 times. He said that "The Muslims certainly understood that when they fired out of the city that [it] would provoke incoming Serb fire, which would make normal life in the city impossible."⁵²

The Serbs were pilloried by the Western media and demonized as the new Nazis because of the siege of Sarajevo, but the constant Muslim attacks emanating out from the city made it impossible for the Serbs to lift the siege. The Muslims were down in the city shooting at them, so the Serbs were forced to shoot back in self-defense.

The Bosnian-Muslims played Western public opinion like a cheap violin. They did everything to endanger their own civilian population. They massacred their own civilians, made-up phony stories about Serb atrocities, and paraded their dead and wounded in front of the television cameras.

Ultimately the Bosnian-Muslims were successful in their ploy to win world sympathy. Together with a compliant Western media, they conned the Western public into supporting a NATO attack against the Bosnian-Serbs.

The incident that provided the final pretext for NATO's attack on the Bosnian-Serbs was another stage-managed massacre at a Sarajevo marketplace.

On August 28, 1995 a mortar shell again hit Sarajevo's Markale market killing 37 people and wounding 85. The Serbs were blamed and two days later NATO launched a massive saturation bombing campaign against the Bosnian-Serbs in "retaliation" for the massacre. At the time of the attack it was the largest military operation in NATO's 46 year history.⁵³

However, upon closer investigation, it emerged that the Muslims had themselves fired the fatal shell that triggered the NATO bombing.

Two months after the fact, London's Sunday Times newspaper interviewed a group of British ammunition experts who had served on the U.N. crater analysis team that examined the scene in Sarajevo. They said that they "found no evidence that Bosnian Serbs had fired the lethal mortar round" and that they "suspected that the Bosnian government army might have been responsible". They told the Sunday Times that French analysts who had also examined the scene agreed with them. But that they had been overruled by a senior American officer in the UN.⁵⁴

The Nation magazine reported that "[a] crucial U.N. report [blaming the Serbs for] the market massacre is a classified secret, but four specialists -- a Russian, a Canadian and two Americans -- have raised serious doubts about its conclusion, suggesting instead that the mortar was fired not by the Serbs but by Bosnian government forces." A Canadian officer "added that he and fellow Canadian officers in Bosnia were 'convinced that the Muslim government dropped both the February 5, 1994, and the August 28, 1995, mortar shells on the Sarajevo market.'" An unidentified U.S. official "contends that the available evidence suggests either 'the shell was fired at a very low trajectory, which means a range of a few hundred yards -- therefore under [Muslim] government control,' or 'a mortar shell converted into a bomb was dropped from a nearby roof into the crowd.'" ⁵⁵

French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur came right out and admitted in the Le Nouvel Observateur newspaper that the Muslims had carried out the attack in order to win NATO intervention.

French magazine editor Jean Daniel asked the Prime Minister point-blank: "They have committed this carnage on their own people?" and Balladur replied in consternation saying, "Yes, but at least they have forced NATO to intervene."⁵⁶

NATO policymakers knew all along that the Serbs weren't really guilty. However, NATO and the Bosnian-Muslims shared a common objective -- they both wanted the destruction of Yugoslavia.

A conscious decision was made by the Western diplomatic corps to conceal the truth from the public. David Owen wrote that when a UN ballistics report established that the first Markale market massacre had been a Muslim attack, rather than a Serb one, "everything was done to clamp down on the number of people who saw it so as to reduce the chance of press leak".⁵⁷

PUTTING BOSNIA'S CARNAGE INTO PERSPECTIVE

Regardless of who committed the crimes, the foremost question when discussing war crimes is this: Who started the war? One can argue about who did what to whom all day long, but at the end of it all one simple fact remains -- without war there are no war crimes.

Robert H. Jackson the Chief Prosecutor at the Nuremburg trials stated: "To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."

On this basis one could argue that the entire issue of Serbian war crimes is a moot point since the Muslims and the Croats undoubtedly incited the Bosnian war.

When the war broke out, roughly one-third of Bosnia's population was Serbian, and the other two-thirds were made-up of Croats and Muslims. A report compiled in 2004 by Ewa Tabeau and Jacub Bijak for the ICTY prosecution found that 31% of the civilians and 21% of the soldiers to lose their lives in Bosnia were Serbs.⁵⁸ In other words the Serbs, at roughly one-third of the population, comprised about one-third of the war's victims.

In 2005 the Bosnia-Herzegovina Research and Documentation Center identified 94,000 people -- civilians and soldiers -- who lost their lives during the war.⁵⁹

The Tabeau/Bijak report put the death toll for the entire Bosnian war at 102,622 including soldiers, civilians, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims.⁶⁰

All told the Bosnian war killed 94,000 to 102,000 people total. Relatively speaking, Bosnia wasn't that bad when you compare it to other conflicts. For example, when the United States firebombed Tokyo on the night of March 9, 1945 it killed 100,000 people in one night alone.⁶¹ Contrast that to Bosnia where the whole entire war killed 100,000 people and you can start to get some rational perspective on the issue.

Writing about effective propaganda in *Mein Kampf* Hitler stated: "The people in their overwhelming majority are so feminine by nature and attitude that sober reasoning determines their thoughts and actions far less than emotion and feeling."⁶²

The Bosnian-Muslims understood this principle very well, which is why most of the information coming out of Bosnia was focused on emotionally charged stories of Muslim victimization. The whole idea was to elicit an emotional and irrational response from the Western public so that NATO would be free to intervene on behalf of the Muslims.

Bosnia was not a bed of roses during the war, but the people who compare it to World War II and tell you that it was genocide are malicious. They are trying to manipulate your emotions for their own purposes and should be viewed with deep suspicion.

THE SO-CALLED "GENOCIDE" IN SREBRENICA

Among those to who should be viewed with suspicion is The Hague Tribunal. The Tribunal found that the Bosnian war was "genocide" in their judgment against Bosnian-Serb general Radislav Krstic for crimes in Srebrenica.

I put the term "genocide" in quotation marks because the Tribunal changed the definition of the word so that they could use it in reference to Srebrenica.

Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defines genocide as "the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such."⁶³

Genocide is a crime of intent, yet the Hague Tribunal concluded that: "the existence of a plan or policy is not a legal ingredient of the crime of genocide."⁶⁴

The logical question that arises is this: How can you demonstrate that genocidal intent existed if you can't show that a genocidal plan or policy existed?

In Srebrenica there is no evidence of a genocidal plan. The tribunal found that "the record contains no statements by members of the VRS [Bosnian Serb Army] Main Staff indicating that the killing of the Bosnian Muslim men was motivated by genocidal intent to destroy the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica."⁶⁵

The Hague Tribunal concluded that the death of Muslim soldiers during the war was genocide in and of itself. Their judgment says "the Trial Chamber treated the killing of the men of military age as evidence from which to infer that Radislav Krstic and some members of the VRS Main Staff had the requisite intent to destroy all the Bosnian Muslims of Srebrenica."⁶⁶ It goes on to say "the perpetrator's genocidal intent will almost invariably encompass civilians, but that is not a legal requirement of the offence of genocide."⁶⁷

Any war can be called "genocide" if you use the definition applied in Srebrenica.

VENGEANCE: AN ALTERNATIVE MOTIVE

Although "genocide" certainly did not occur in Srebrenica, there is evidence that some Muslim POWs were executed.

Srebrenica was supposed to be a UN Safe Area, but the UN never demilitarized the enclave. The 28th Division of the Muslim army was stationed in there under the command of Nasir Oric, a convicted war criminal before the ICTY.⁶⁸

In 1995 Bill Schiller of the Toronto Star interviewed Oric and was shown videos filmed by his troops in and around Srebrenica.

Schiller wrote that he sat in Oric's living room watching a video of what might have been called Nasir Oric's Greatest Hits. There were burning houses, dead bodies, severed heads, and people fleeing. Schiller wrote, "Oric grinned throughout, admiring his handiwork".

"We ambushed them," Oric said when a number of dead Serbs appeared on the screen. The next sequence of dead bodies had been done in by explosives: "We launched those guys to the moon," he boasted.

According to Schiller's recollection, when footage of a bullet-marked ghost town appeared without any visible bodies, Oric hastened to announce: "We killed 114 Serbs there."⁶⁹

The former UN Protection Force commander in Bosnia, General Philippe Morillon, testified about Oric during Slobodan Milosevic's trial in The Hague.

Morillon described one meeting he had with Oric saying: "Naser Oric was a warlord who reigned by terror in his area and over the population itself. I think that he realized that those were the rules of this horrific war, that he could not allow himself to take prisoners. According to my recollection, he didn't even look for an excuse. It was simply a statement: One can't be bothered with prisoners."⁷⁰

Morillon described Srebrenica as a "hellish circle of revenge." He said that Oric "engaged in attacks during Orthodox holidays and destroyed villages, massacring all the inhabitants. This created a degree of hatred that was quite extraordinary in the region."⁷¹

The presiding trial Judge asked Morillon point blank: "Are you saying, then, General, that what happened in 1995 was a direct reaction to what Naser Oric did to the Serbs two years before?" and Morillon responded, "Yes. Yes, Your Honour. I am convinced of that."⁷²

Genocide is the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such. Revenge is an entirely different matter because the intent is to kill those who wronged you, not to exterminate an ethnic group.

Another indicator that revenge -- not genocide, motivated killings was videotape that surfaced at the Milosevic trial on June 1, 2005. The video was played in open court by the prosecution but was never entered into evidence because the prosecution did not authenticate it.

The video showed six men, identified by the prosecutor as Muslims from Srebrenica, being executed by men that the prosecutor claimed was a Serb unit called the Skorpions. One of the victims can be heard on the video asking his executioner to wait, but the response that he got was "when you were killing Serbs you didn't wait."

If the prosecutor is correct, and the victims were in fact Muslims from Srebrenica, then it is proof that the men executed on the tape were killed because they were at least thought to have killed Serbs, not because they were Muslims.

Another indicator that genocidal intent did not exist was the Bosnian-Serb Army's treatment of the Muslim women and children from Srebrenica. If the goal of the Bosnian-Serbs had been to exterminate the Muslim ethnicity then they surely would have killed the women and children, but the women and children were all allowed to go to Tuzla unharmed.

THE EXAGGERATED TOLL OF THE SREBRENICA MASSACRE

According to any number of Western press reports the Bosnian-Serb Army executed 8,000 Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica.

The number 8,000 comes from an International Red Cross (ICRC) report stating that 8,000 Srebrenica-Muslims were missing after the Bosnian-Serbs took the Srebrenica enclave in July 1995. The media jumps to the conclusion that the Serbs must have executed all 8,000 of these missing Muslims.

The ICRC's report states that "After the fall of the enclave, the ICRC received over 10,000 requests for family news from civilians who were transferred to Tuzla in central Bosnia. About 2,000 of these requests were from different family members seeking the same individuals. An in-depth analysis has shown that the remaining 8,000 requests fall into two categories: about 5,000 concern individuals who apparently fled the enclave before it fell, while the remaining 3,000 relate to persons reportedly arrested by the Bosnian Serb forces."⁷³

3,000 of the missing were arrested by the Bosnian-Serbs and 5,000 were gone before the Serbs got there. Furthermore, analysis of OSCE voter registration records showed that 3,016 of the "missing" Muslims turned out to vote in Bosnia's 1996 elections - 16 months after they were supposed to have been "executed" by the Serbs.⁷⁴

Evidence presented by the ICTY prosecution, nine years after the fall of Srebrenica (in 2004), showed that 2,541 bodies had been exhumed from mass graves around Srebrenica.⁷⁵

According to the testimony of Dean Manning, an Australian forensic expert commissioned by the ICTY prosecution to compile a report on Srebrenica, 1,175 of the exhumed corpses had died of gunshot wounds, 67 died from shrapnel wounds or blast injuries, 11 died from a combination of gunshot and shrapnel, and the cause of death was undetermined for the remainder of the bodies.⁷⁶

According to Manning's report, 390 ligatures and cloth blindfolds were dug up from the graves.⁷⁷

Going by the forensic evidence alone, one can assert that about 2,500 persons from Srebrenica lost their lives and out of that total at least 390 were executed. The claim that 8,000 people were executed lacks evidential foundation.

Writing in Canada's Globe and Mail newspaper, Gen. Lewis Mackenzie the former commander of the UN Protection Force in Bosnia stated that: "Evidence given at The Hague war crimes tribunal casts serious doubt on the figure of 'up to' 8,000 Bosnian Muslims massacred. That figure includes 'up to' 5,000 who have been classified as missing. More than 2,000 bodies have been recovered in and around Srebrenica, and they include victims of the three years of intense fighting in the area. The math just doesn't support the scale of 8,000 killed."⁷⁸

While it is undoubtedly true that some of the Muslims from Srebrenica were executed, there is no indication that the numbers even begin to approach the scale alleged.

A fact that goes almost completely unreported is that the fighting in Srebrenica was provoked by a Muslim attack on the Bosnian-Serb Army. A significant number of the Muslim men who lost their lives may have been killed in combat rather than executed.

In paragraph 77 of its August 2nd 2001 judgment in the Radislav Krstic trial, The Hague Tribunal acknowledged that "a percentage of the bodies in the gravesites examined may have been of men killed in combat."

MUSLIM ATTACK PRECIPITATED MASSACRE

As Manning's report noted, several of the corpses exhumed from around Srebrenica died from shrapnel wounds and blast injuries which would be consistent with death in combat, but not death by execution. Death by gunshot is also possible in combat, but does not preclude the possibility of an execution like death by shrapnel wounds or blast injuries.

On July 10-11, 1995 approximately 15,000 Muslim men and boys from Srebrenica, under orders from the Muslim Army, mobilized and set-out to break-through the Bosnian-Serb lines towards Tuzla. The group was a mixture of soldiers and male civilians; some had weapons and military training while others didn't.⁷⁹

When this group attempted to force its way through the confrontation line they encountered fierce resistance from the Bosnian-Serb Army. The Serbs defended their position and started shelling the column of men advancing against them from Srebrenica.

The men and boys in that column were sent like lambs to the slaughter by the Muslim authorities. Most made it all the way through to Tuzla, but others weren't as lucky. It is difficult to say how all of those people died. Some died fighting with a rifle in their hands, others were caught in the crossfire, some committed suicide to escape the horrible situation they were in, and some were captured and executed.

Without a doubt the Muslim authorities bear the greatest responsibility for what happened at Srebrenica. They abused Srebrenica's status as a UN Safe Area by using it as a military base to attack the Bosnian-Serbs.

The Muslim Authorities deliberately provoked the Bosnian-Serbs to go into Srebrenica. Two weeks before Srebrenica fell; the Muslims attacked a small-undefended Serbian village near Srebrenica. At 4:30 AM on June 26, 1995 Muslim forces from Srebrenica attacked the Serb village of Visnjica burning houses, killing livestock, and forcing Serbian civilians to flee for their lives.⁸⁰

Then, once the Muslims had the Serbs good and pissed-off, they sent a poorly trained and poorly equipped group of 15,000 men and boys from Srebrenica to attack the Bosnian-Serb front line.

The Muslims wanted their people to get slaughtered so that they could portray themselves as victims and give NATO a pretext to attack the Bosnian-Serbs. The existence of this plan is no secret either; the Muslims themselves freely admit that it existed.

In 1998 Hakija Meholic, the Muslim police chief in Srebrenica during the war, gave an interview to the Sarajevo newspaper Dani. He said that Izetbegovic told him during a meeting in September 1993: "You know, I was offered by Clinton in April that the Chetnik forces enter Srebrenica, carry out a slaughter of 5,000 Muslims, and then there will be a military intervention."⁸¹

Sefer Halilovic, the chief-of-staff of the Muslim armed forces during the war, admitted during his testimony at The Hague Tribunal that Izetbegovic's regime intentionally abandoned the Srebrenica-Muslims. He said, "the command of the 2nd Corps and the General Staff knew when the operation on Srebrenica started, but from a series of testimonies, the people who were in Srebrenica, both from military and political structures, we can clearly see that they asked for help, both of the command of the 2nd Corps and the command of the General Staff and President Izetbegovic, but that they did not receive that assistance. To answer your

question whether they had the power and materiel to help, to come to the help of Srebrenica, I think that they did."⁸²

Ibran Mustafic, a founding member of Izetbegovic's SDA party, a member of the Bosnian parliament, and a resident of Srebrenica, told the July 14, 1996 issue of the Slobodna Bosna newspaper that: "[The] scenario for the betrayal of Srebrenica was consciously prepared. Unfortunately, the Bosnian presidency and the Army command were involved in this business; if you want the names, figure it out yourself. I understood the situation in Srebrenica and, you can trust me on this, had I not been prevented by a group of criminals, many more inhabitants of Srebrenica would be alive today. Had I received an order to attack the Serb army from the demilitarized zone, I would have rejected to carry out that order without thinking and would have asked the person who had issued that order to bring his family to Srebrenica so that I can give him a gun and let him stage attacks from the demilitarized zone. I knew that such shameful, calculated moves were leading my people to a catastrophe. The orders came from Sarajevo and Kakanj."⁸³

In 2005 former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke told the Sarajevo broadcaster TV Hyatt that "As far as Srebrenica goes, Srebrenica is, uh... is a great tragedy which should not have been permitted to occur. But it did and I tell you that I was under initial instructions to sacrifice Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa and I felt that was wrong."⁸⁴ Holbrooke later admitted to the domovina.net website that his instructions to "sacrifice Srebrenica" had come from Clinton's national security advisor Anthony Lake.

So there we have it. Izetbegovic's regime collaborated with NATO to create conditions for a slaughter in Srebrenica to justify NATO's attack against the Bosnian-Serbs.

It may seem unconscionable that somebody could deliberately put his own people in a position to be slaughtered, but Alija Izetbegovic's philosophy was that "For all Muslims there is but one solution: to continue to fight, to strengthen and broaden it, from day to day, from year to year, no matter the victims and no matter the time."⁸⁵

NON-SERB UNIT EXECUTED SREBRENICA MUSLIMS

It is interesting to note that non-Serbs carried out a large share of the executions of Srebrenica Muslims.

Drazen Erdemovic, the only individual to be prosecuted by the Hague Tribunal for directly participating in the execution of Muslims from Srebrenica isn't even a Serb. He's a Bosnian-Croat.⁸⁶

According to Erdemovic, his unit was predominantly made-up of non-Serbs. Testifying at the Hague Tribunal he said, "I joined a unit that later came to be known as the 10th Sabotage unit or detachment, which consisted of eight to ten soldiers, most of whom were Croats. There was one Muslim and one Slovene. I joined that unit I think in April of 1994, and this unit belonged to the army of Republika Srpska."⁸⁷

SREBRENICA EXECUTIONERS ENJOYING THE PROTECTION FROM THE WEST

The Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic led the way in the criminal prosecution of those responsible for the executions of Srebrenica Muslims.

In March of 1996 Erdemovic was arrested by police in Novi Sad, Serbia 10 days after entering Serbian territory from Croatia. He was charged with the execution of Muslims from Srebrenica and sent to prison.⁸⁸

The Serbian authorities charged Erdemovic with war crimes against the civilian population under Article 142, paragraph 1 of the Penal Code of Yugoslavia. Had he stood trial in Serbia he

would have faced at least 20 years in prison and possibly the death penalty, but The Hague Tribunal came to his rescue and protected him from any real punishment.

Look at the following exchange between Milosevic and Erdemovic at the Hague Tribunal:⁸⁹

MILOSEVIC: Mr. Erdemovic, you were not tried by Yugoslav courts for this act [the killings], but your extradition was requested. You know that. Isn't that right?

ERDEMOVIC: Yes.

MILOSEVIC: And that is how you arrived here [at the Hague Tribunal] and you were put on trial here; is that right?

ERDEMOVIC: Yes.

MILOSEVIC: Precisely for the act as it is described in the criminal report and the request for the conduct of an investigation issued by the Yugoslav authorities; is that right?

ERDEMOVIC: Yes.

MILOSEVIC: As far as I have been able to see from these documents, you yourself confessed that you personally had killed about 100 men; is that right?

ERDEMOVIC: Yes.

MILOSEVIC: But the total was about 1,200, according to this report. You said 1,000 a moment ago.

ERDEMOVIC: Yes. I said between 1,000 and 1,200.

MILOSEVIC: And is it beyond dispute that for killing more than a thousand men and for personally killing about 100 men you were sentenced to a prison term of five years? Is that right?

ERDEMOVIC: Yes.

[...]

MILOSEVIC: Tell me, how much time did you spend in prison altogether for all these acts you were charged with and condemned for?

ERDEMOVIC: I can't remember.

MILOSEVIC: You didn't even spend a full five years, did you?

ERDEMOVIC: No. But that wasn't a decision taken by the Prosecution to release me. In fact, the Prosecution opposed my early release from prison, but the President of the Tribunal, Judge McDonald, decided that I should be released earlier.

THE FRENCH CONNECTION AND THE "PAUK" GROUP

There is reason to suspect that Erdemovic's unit may have been acting on orders of a foreign government when it carried out the executions. Slobodan Milosevic claimed to have evidence linking the Srebrenica slaughter to the French intelligence services, but he died before he had a chance to call witnesses proving that.

What is notable is the fact that Erdemovic's unit remained a cohesive unit after the war ended. The 10th Sabotage detachment changed its name to "Pauk" and fought as a mercenary unit in Zaire in 1997.⁹⁰

In 1999 several members of the "Pauk" group were arrested in Serbia when Yugoslav authorities uncovered a plot by French intelligence to assassinate Slobodan Milosevic. Seven members of the group were imprisoned and charged with plotting to kill Milosevic and participating in the Srebrenica massacre.⁹¹

Unfortunately things were never fully elucidated. The trial was supposed to start on October 11, 2000, but on October 5, 2000 Slobodan Milosevic was overthrown in a US-financed coup.

Agence France Presse reported that "The judge who was due to hear their case on October 11 'called in sick' during a rash of legal staff quitting their posts or fleeing the country amid fears of reprisals in the wake of Milosevic's fall."⁹²

Because the original judge was suddenly "too sick" to try the case, another judge was appointed and on November 13, 2000 the new judge acquitted the "Pauk" group and set them all free.⁹³

To date nothing has really happened to these guys. They apparently executed 1,200 men from Srebrenica, but the only one who ever showed any interest in prosecuting them was Slobodan Milosevic and his government. The Hague Tribunal let Erdemovic go with barely even a slap on the wrist, and when Milosevic was overthrown by a pro-Western regime they had the rest of these guys set free.

It is a real tragedy that Milosevic died before he could present all of his evidence, but the circumstantial evidence that's already on the record seems to corroborate his claims of Western involvement in the killings.

There is Clinton's remark to Izetbegovic that 5,000 Srebrenica-Muslims should be slaughtered in order to justify NATO intervention. There's Holbrooke's admission that he was ordered to "sacrifice Srebrenica" by Tony Lake. There are admissions from Muslim officials that they deliberately sacrificed Srebrenica. It is clear that NATO and the Muslims wanted a slaughter. It's not implausible to think that somebody may have hired a group of mercenaries to infiltrate the Bosnian-Serb Army to make sure there really would be a massacre.

The involvement of these self-same mercenaries in Zaire in 1997 proves that they were capable of acting as a cohesive unit outside the command of the Bosnian-Serb Army. The fact that they have been shielded from prosecution by The Hague Tribunal and by the "pro-Western" Serbian government that overthrew Milosevic in 2000 seems to suggest that they may have been working on behalf of a Western interest.

It is more than a little cynical for the Western political establishment to accuse Slobodan Milosevic of genocide in Srebrenica when his government was the only one seriously trying to prosecute the killers.

FIKRET ABDIC AND THE OTHER BOSNIAN MUSLIMS

In the West it is a virtually unknown fact that a second faction of Bosnian-Muslims existed. These Muslims did not accept Alija Izetbegovic as their leader. They rejected his Islamist policies and formed a military alliance with Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian-Serbs. Their leader was a half-Muslim half-Croat named Fikret Abdic.

The fact that such an alliance existed refutes the thesis that the Bosnian-Serbs had genocidal intentions towards the Bosnian-Muslim ethnicity. The Bosnian-Serbs were at war with a militant faction of Bosnian-Muslims led by Alija Izetbegovic. They were not at war with the Bosnian-Muslim ethnicity.

Abdic, although vilified on the rare occasions when he was mentioned in the Western press, was extremely popular with his people. He was the rightful winner Bosnia's 1990 presidential elections – not Izetbegovic. According to the official election results Abdic got about 163,000 more votes than Izetbegovic.⁹⁴

Unfortunately, Izetbegovic and Abdic belonged to the same political party and a decision was made at the party level that Izetbegovic should be installed as the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina instead.

If the will of the voters had been respected then Fikret Abdic would have been the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina and there wouldn't have been a war. Unlike Izetbegovic, Fikret Abdic was a man of peace. While Izetbegovic was busy making deals with Osama bin Laden and the Iranian regime, Abdic was in Belgrade negotiating peace with Radovan Karadzic and the Serbs.

The Muslims in Western Bosnia were overwhelmingly supportive of Abdic in rejecting Izetbegovic's extremist policies. Over 80,000 Muslims in the Bihac pocket signed the petition demanding autonomy from Izetbegovic's regime.⁹⁵

On September 27, 1993 the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia was proclaimed and Fikret Abdic was elected president.⁹⁶

On October 22, 1993 Fikret Abdic and Radovan Karadzic met in Belgrade, and under the mediation of Slobodan Milosevic, signed an agreement pledging peace and mutual cooperation.⁹⁷

Reacting to the proclamation of an autonomous Western Bosnia and its peaceful relations with the Serbs, Izetbegovic and his followers called for a Jihad against Abdic and the moderate Muslim population living in Western Bosnia.

Abdic denounced Izetbegovic's calls for Holy War saying, "I call on the citizens of Western Bosnia not to obey the orders to remain at home in self-imposed isolation because Izetbegovic wants to subject all citizens to his self-will and his illusion that he is a great statesman and the leader of all Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. His followers decided at the pan-Muslim Convention in Sarajevo today to continue the Holy War until, as they put it, the final victory. To realize that goal they count on 200,000 lives of people from Krajina, which we will never sacrifice for the crazed idea of creating Alija's state in the heart of Europe."⁹⁸

Izetbegovic's regime attempted to impose martial law on Western Bosnia, but was met with widespread non-violent resistance from its moderate Muslim population. Croatian radio reported that in the ancient town of Pecigrad some 15,000 citizens, including women with infants in their arms, took to the streets to resist the onslaught of Izetbegovic's forces while another 10,000 Muslim civilians assembled in the Cazin municipality demanding that the Sarajevo regime withdraw troops from Western Bosnia immediately.⁹⁹

By the first week of October '93 Izetbegovic's forces were openly attacking their fellow Muslims in Western Bosnia. On October 4, 1993 the Fifth Corps of Izetbegovic's army killed nine people after it began shelling the city of Velika Kladusa.¹⁰⁰

In response to Izetbegovic's open assault on the Muslims of Western Bosnia, Abdic asked the UN Protection Force to intervene and protect the lives of the citizens.¹⁰¹

The UN didn't lift a finger, but the Bosnian-Serbs and the Krajina-Serbs did come to his aid. They joined the fight on the side of Fikret Abdic and the moderate Bosnian-Muslims in the Bihac Pocket.

Izetbegovic's regime was furious. The following is an excerpt of the crude propaganda that was broadcast by regime-controlled Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina during those days: "The attacks by the united enemy against the Bihac region have continued today, and the situation is again

particularly bad on the Velika Kladusa and Bosanska Krupa parts of the front, where Martić's, Karadžić's and Abdić's Chetniks are using tanks and artillery. They have also attempted several infantry breakthroughs. ... The grouping and movements of Chetniks has continued along the border with the so-called Serb Autonomous Province of Krajina, particularly on the Velika Kladusa part of the front, from where they have been providing the forces attacking Velika Kladusa itself with intense artillery support."¹⁰²

Of course NATO and its lapdog media adopted the same line advanced by the Sarajevo regime. When the Serbs attempted to help Abdić the Western media portrayed their intervention as a Serbian "attack" on the Bihać pocket. For example, the headline on the April 3rd Washington Post blared "Serbs Launch Attack on Bihać".¹⁰³

OPERATION STORM AND THE DOWNFALL OF FIKRET ABDIĆ

Izetbegović's troops ruthlessly abused their fellow Muslims when they finally seized control over Western Bosnia. In 2006 a videotape surfaced showing the Fifth corps of Izetbegović's Army massacring Abdić's followers. The video showed the corpses of Abdić's men after being sadistically tortured and killed by Izetbegović's troops. The video also showed two of Abdić's men being driven around the streets of Bihać chained, naked, to the front of a jeep driven by Izetbegović's army.¹⁰⁴

When Croatia launched Operation Storm in August of 1995 it effectively ended the ability of the Serbs to aid Abdić in the defense of Western Bosnia. Izetbegović's forces took full advantage of the Croatian attack and swept into Western Bosnia.¹⁰⁵

Following Operation Storm, Fikret Abdić and his supporters were driven out of Bosnia and Abdić was placed under house arrest in Croatia.¹⁰⁶

Fikret Abdić was a man of peace who fostered interethnic cooperation during Bosnia's darkest hour. As I write this book Fikret Abdić, the rightful president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is wasting away in a Croatian prison.

Fikret Abdić has been demonized because his alliance with the Bosnian-Serbs provides incontrovertible proof that the Bosnian-Serbs weren't fighting for an ethnically cleansed Bosnia-Herzegovina devoid of Muslims. Fikret Abdić and Radovan Karadžić were fighting for a free Bosnia-Herzegovina where the people wouldn't be subjected to Sharia law or foreign domination.

NATO/EU INTERVENTION IN BOSNIA

In 1994-95 NATO bombed Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Izetbegović's regime thereby forcing the warring parties to sign the 1995 Dayton Accords.

NATO's involvement in Bosnia had the same basic purpose as the Soviet Union's domination over Eastern Europe during the cold war.

When the Soviet Union was expanding westward it was easy for the Western public to understand how the USSR, through the Warsaw Pact, was colonizing Eastern Europe to secure its political and economic ambitions. However, since the collapse of the USSR, it has been difficult for the Western public to realize that Germany and United States have been pursuing the same imperialistic ambitions in Eastern Europe as the Soviets before them. Bosnia was merely a step in NATO and the EU's larger ambition of eastward expansion.

Germany and the United States deliberately provoked interethnic conflict and sabotaged the peace process in Bosnia in order to give NATO and the EU a pretext to occupy the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a so-called "peacekeeping force".

The Dayton Accords have imposed a NATO/EU administered dictatorship on the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. There is no democracy in Bosnia. Under the terms of the Dayton Accords the entire political process is subject to the absolute authority of the Office of the High Representative (OHR); renamed the EUSR (European Union Special Representative) in 2007.

In 1997 the High Representative was given unfettered dictatorial powers, including the power to remove elected officials from office and the power to impose laws as he sees fit.¹⁰⁷

NATO and the EU pay lip service to democracy. But democracy is a joke when Brussels appoints an unelected foreign bureaucrat to overturn your election results and pass laws by decree. The only democratic freedom that the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina have today is the freedom to pass laws and elect officials that NATO and the EU approve of.


CHAPTER 5

ALBANIAN SEPRATISM AND THE WAR IN KOSOVO AND METOHIIJA

Kosovo and Metohija is an autonomous province of Serbia, one of Yugoslavia's former republics. Located in southern Serbia it borders Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro. Albanians and Serbs are the two largest ethnic groups in the province.

Kosovo's Serbs and Albanians each claim to be victims of genocide at the hands of the other population. Over the course of the last 150 years Kosovo's Serbian population has diminished, while the Albanian population has surged.

The following table tracks Kosovo's ethnic make-up from 1871 until 2007:



MEDIEVAL KOSOVO AND METOHIIJA

Albanians demand Kosovo's secession from Serbia, which Serbia rejects citing a historical claim to Kosovo dating back more than 14 centuries.

The Serbs first settled Kosovo in the 7th century. Kosovo was the heart of the Serbian kingdom until the Ottoman Empire invaded it in 1389.

The Serbs converted to Christianity in the 9th century and the seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church has been in Kosovo ever since the Church was founded in the 11th century. Hundreds of medieval Serbian churches and Orthodox monasteries stand as evidence of Kosovo's undeniable Serbian heritage.

Even the etymology for the name Kosovo and Metohija is Serbian. Kosovo originates from the Slavic word "kos" which means blackbird. The name "Kosovo" stems from "Kosovo Polje" meaning field of blackbirds and "Metohija" means land of the church. The Albanian name "Kosova" is nothing more than a variant on the province's Serbian name.

According to census and tax records from the Ottoman Empire, in the year 1455, 95.88% of Kosovo's population was Serbian and only 0.26% was Albanian.¹

Serbs were second-class citizens in Ottoman-occupied Kosovo because they clung to their Christian faith. They were given the status of *Raya*, which meant that they were denied rights because they were non-Islamic subjects of a Muslim Empire. The Empire gave Albanians, who largely abandoned Catholicism and converted to Islam, a more favorable status.

Kosovo's ethnic make-up began to change with "The Great Migration of 1690" following a failed Serb revolt against Ottoman rule in Kosovo. It was then, in the late 17th century that Albanians began immigrating to Kosovo in large numbers to settle the land that the Serbian population had been driven off of.

The Ottoman Empire allowed Albanian-Muslims to run rampant in Kosovo. The Turkish authorities permitted Albanians to murder Serbs, rape Serbian girls, and steal Serbian property. This repression continued unabated until Serbia regained control over Kosovo in the Balkan War of 1912.

ALBANIANS BECOME THE MAJORITY IN KOSOVO

In 1866 Evgeny Timayev, the Russian consul in Prizren, wrote that: "The Albanian folk are increasingly conquering the lands they are settling... The massive settling of the Prizren Sanjak [Kosovo] ... is not encountering any obstacles. It seems that the Turkish government would be very happy if no Christians were left in this province."²

Although they suffered widespread persecution under Ottoman occupation, Serbs were still the majority population in Kosovo as recently as 1871. According to statistics compiled by the Austrian government Serbs were 64% of Kosovo's population and Albanians were still a minority at 32%.³

Albanians became Kosovo's dominant ethnic group by waging a brutal campaign of repression against the Serbian population during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. By 1899 the Albanians had taken over, and Serbs were a minority on their ancient homeland. A survey commissioned by the Austrian Government in 1899 found that Albanians were 47.88% of the population and Serbs were now a minority at 43.7%.⁴

THE PRIZREN LEAGUE

In 1878 the Albanians established the Prizren League, which had the goal of establishing a greater Albanian state. The founding documents of the Prizren League outline which territories the Albanians sought to control. These territories include present-day Albania, Kosovo, Serbia's Presevo Valley, northern Greece, western Macedonia, and southeastern Montenegro.

To achieve their dream of a greater-Albanian state in Kosovo the Albanians killed or expelled over 150,000 Serbs in the years between 1878 and 1912. Several foreign observers who traveled to Kosovo during that time corroborate Serb accounts of a widespread and systematic campaign of Albanian terror against the Serbian population.

In 1880 Kirby Green, the British consul for Northern Albania, wrote about the situation in Kosovo saying, "The Albanian League is an organization of the most fanatical Muslims in the country. Those people are now taken up with extreme religious fanaticism and hatred of Christians. With the exception perhaps of Mecca, Prizren is the most dangerous spot for a Christian to be in all Mohammedan countries."⁵

On September 9, 1901 a British diplomatic cable sent to the Marquess of Lansdowne said: "Old Serbia [Kosovo] is still a restive region because of the Albanians' lawlessness, vengeance and racial hatred."⁶

British journalist Henry Noel Brailsford wrote in his 1906 book "*Macedonia*" that in Kosovo "There are few Serbian villages that have not been looted bare on one occasion or another... A

village suffers total deprivation for two or three years at a time and then, thanks to hard work, it manages to start a herd, only to have it stolen as well." He emphasized that the Albanians "manifested semi-feudal terrorism" against the Serbian population saying, "I tried to find out about what kind of a system of land rent this was. As a rule, my questions were met with a smile. The system of land rent in that land, where the Kur'an and the rifle were the only law, was what the Albanian area chieftain chose it to be. The Serbian peasants, the children of that soil, are tenants according to someone's whim, exposed to every caprice of their domestic conquerors. Albanian highlanders conquer more of the plains each year, while the Serbian peasants flee before them year after year. Hunger, want and disease are the natural companions of that daily abuse."

Serbia regained control over Kosovo in 1912, but years of Albanian repression had drastically changed Kosovo's ethnic make-up. According to the 1921 Yugoslav census Albanians made-up 65.8% of Kosovo's population and Serbs were a minority of 25.9%.

KOSOVO DURING WORLD WAR II

During World War II Kosovo was invaded by the Axis powers, and in 1941 Kosovo was annexed to Albania until Allied forces liberated the territory and returned the province to Yugoslav sovereignty.

Many Kosovo Albanians saw the Axis powers as guarantors of their ambition to create a greater-Albanian state in Kosovo. In order to realize this goal many Kosovo-Albanians volunteered for service in the Nazi SS.

Several Albanians joined the *13th Waffen-Gebirgs-Division der SS "Handschar" (Kroat Nr. 1)*. Although this division was primarily made-up of Muslims from the Independent State of Croatia (NDH), it did contain an entire battalion of Albanians commanded by Nazir Hodic from Kosovo.

In the spring of 1944 Heinrich Himmler established the *21st Waffen-Gebirgs Division der SS "Skanderbeg" (Albanische Nr. 1)*. This division numbered more than 9,000 men and was made-up primarily of Albanian volunteers from Kosovo.

The Skanderbeg division's first operation was a raid on May 14, 1944 against the Jewish community in Pristina. Kosovo-Albanian SS troops raided apartments and homes belonging to Jews, looting their possessions and rounding them up for deportation to Nazi death camps. The SS Skanderbeg Division apprehended 281 Kosovo-Jews, which included men, women, and children. From May to June 1944 they apprehended a total of 519 Jews and Serbs from Kosovo.⁷

The Kosovo-Albanian Nazis' hatred of Jews was exceeded only by their hatred of Serbs. They took full advantage of the Axis occupation to wage a second extermination campaign against the Serbs.

The Italian army reported that the Albanians were "hunting down Serbs," and that the "Serbian minority are living in conditions that are truly disgraceful, constantly harassed by the brutality of the Albanians, who are whipping up racial hatred."⁸

Carlo Umiltà, a civilian aide to the Commander of the Italian occupation forces in Albania, described some of the atrocities in his memoirs writing, "The Albanians are out to exterminate the Slavs."⁹

German diplomat Hermann Neubacher, the Third Reich's representative for southeastern Europe reported that the "Shiptars [Kosovo-Albanians] were in a hurry to expel as many Serbs as possible from the country."¹⁰

In June of 1942 the president of Albania, Mustafa Kroja, openly declared his intentions before his followers in Kosovo: "The Serbian population of Kosovo should be removed as soon as possible ... All indigenous Serbs should be qualified as colonists and as such, via the Albanian and Italian governments, be sent to concentration camps in Albania -- Serbian settlers should be killed."¹¹

Similarly, Kosovo Albanian leader Ferat-bey Draga, said that the "time has come to exterminate the Serbs ... there will be no Serbs under the Kosovo sun."¹²

Fortunately for the Serbs, the Axis powers lost the war. Kosovo was returned to Yugoslav rule and the Albanians were unable to carryout their "final solution" in Kosovo. But World War II left an indelible mark on Kosovo's ethnic make-up. The Albanian population increased yet again and the Serbian population was further diminished. In 1948, when Yugoslavia took its first census after the war, it was revealed that Albanians were outnumbering Serbs by a ratio of more than 3 to 1 in Kosovo. Albanians had grown to 68.46% of the population while the Serbian population had shrunk to 23.6%.

KOSOVO UNDER TITO

Tito's Communists controlled Yugoslavia following World War II. From the end of the war until his death in 1980 Josip Broz Tito was the undisputed ruler of Yugoslavia including Kosovo.

Next-door in Albania Enver Hoxha was that country's communist dictator until 1985. The brand of communism practiced by Tito's Yugoslavia was far more liberal than the Stalinist brand of communism practiced in Albania.

Kosovo-Albanian militias known as the Bali Kombetar (National Front) fought Tito throughout the late 40s and early 1950s. The Bali Kombetar were Albanian-nationalists dedicated to Kosovo's secession from Serbia and the establishment of a Greater-Albania.

Throughout his reign, Tito used force to keep the Kosovo-Albanians in line. During the 1950s and 60s Yugoslav UDBA (state security) employed harsh measures against Kosovo-Albanians suspected of anti-Yugoslav or "counter-revolutionary" activities.

During the late 1960s Tito eased-up, but the Kosovo-Albanians were still intent on separating Kosovo from Serbia and uniting it with Albania.

In November of 1968 the Kosovo-Albanians held mass-demonstrations under the slogans "Kosovo Republic" and "Unification". These demonstrations got out of hand and Tito had to send in the Army bring the situation under control.¹³

The demonstrations were violent, as one Albanian participant recalled, "the streets of Pristina were covered with blood" following clashes with the army.¹⁴

Following this unrest a series of constitutional changes were adopted in 1968, 1971, and 1974 which expanded the competences of Kosovo's provincial government.

Although Tito had tried everything from force to appeasement to deal with Kosovo's Albanians, nothing was ever done to protect the non-Albanian population. By the time of Tito's death in 1980 Kosovo's Serb population had shrunk to roughly 13.2% while the Albanian population had surged to 77.5%.¹⁵

MODERN KOSOVO-ALBANIAN SEPARATISM PREDATES MILOSEVIC

By 1981 it was clear that the constitutional changes weren't appeasing the Kosovo-Albanians. Emboldened by the death of Tito, Albanian nationalists stepped-up their efforts to chase non-Albanian minorities out of the province and establish a greater-Albania.

On April 2, 1981 rioting erupted in Kosovo. Nine people were killed and scores injured as police broke up a mob of 10,000 ethnic Albanian demonstrators who were rampaging through the streets of Pristina smashing shop windows and destroying factory machines. The demonstrators, some armed with guns and firing at the police, pushed children in front of them to make it more difficult for security forces to disrupt the march.¹⁶

The Yugoslav Government said the rioting was the "worst outbreak of separatist demands" since World War II and imposed martial law to bring the situation back under control. Eyewitnesses reported that cars and trucks were overturned and burning in the center Pristina while the Army guarded public buildings and ambulances toured the streets to pick up the injured.¹⁷

The separatist nature of the rioting was clear to one and all. When the New York Times reported on it their lead paragraph read: "Yugoslav tanks and troops took up positions today in a province in the south to put down anti-Government riots by Albanian separatists ... the separatists want to unite with Albania, the small and selfisolated Communist country on the Adriatic."¹⁸

According to the Washington Post, the demonstrators were said to be chanting "Long Live Enver Hoxha" along with slogans demanding Kosovo's unification with Albania.¹⁹

The situation in Kosovo attracted international attention. The New York Times reported that the 1981 Kosovo riots were "the worst riots in Yugoslavia since World War II".²⁰ The rioting marked the first time since the Second World War that a full state of emergency had been declared in any part of Yugoslavia.²¹

Things flared-up in Kosovo a month later when Pristina University was forced to close its doors amid student demonstrations demanding Kosovo's unification with Albania.²²

In 1982 Becir Hoti, an ethnic Albanian official in Kosovo's ruling Communist party, explained the situation quite well. He told the New York Times: "The nationalists have a two-point platform. First to establish what they call an ethnically clean Albanian republic and then the merger with Albania to form a greater Albania."²³

This is significant because today's Western narrative claims that the Kosovo-Albanian population wants to secede from Serbia because they allegedly suffered mistreatment under the rule of Slobodan Milosevic.

That thesis is exposed as fallacy because Slobodan Milosevic's political career didn't even begin until 1983 when he took a job as economic advisor to the mayor of Belgrade.

Milosevic didn't have any real power until he was elected chairman of the Serbian League of Communists in 1987.

Kosovo-Albanian separatism had already erupted violently in 1981 and 1982 -- long before the public even knew who Slobodan Milosevic was. Therefore, Kosovo-Albanian separatism can't be a reaction to his policies because it's a phenomenon that predates his political career by several years.

SERBIAN EXODUS FROM KOSOVO DURING THE 1980s

It was no secret that the Serbian population was leaving Kosovo throughout the 1980s. In 1981 the Washington Post reported that: "The Serbs are a minority whose proportion of the population is dwindling because of the exceptionally high birth rate of Kosovo Albanians, which stands at about 29 per 1,000, the highest in Europe. The demographic trend has been intensified by a slow but steady exodus of Serbs from Kosovo after they lost control of the province and it was granted full home rule. Since then Albanians have come to dominate the

political life of Kosovo. They have replaced Serbs in key positions, established an Albanian university in Pristina and made Albanian the dominant language in the province."²⁴

Nothing Serbian was safe in Kosovo. In 1981 Albanian extremists burnt-down the Patriarch of Pec, one of the holiest sites in the Serbian Orthodox Church.²⁵

Following the 1981 riots, and various assaults on their places of worship, fears among Kosovo's Serbian population escalated. Frightened of being the target of Albanian demonstrations, several Serbian villages erected blockades to protect themselves from possible attack.²⁶

The Serbs had been fleeing from Albanian persecution for years, but increased violence in the early 1980s greatly accelerated their exodus from the province.

In 1982 the New York Times reported that: "acts of violence, mostly attacks on Kosovo Serbs or their property continue ... such incidents have prompted many of Kosovo's Slavic inhabitants to flee the province, thereby helping to fulfill a nationalist demand for an ethnically 'pure' Albanian Kosovo. The latest Belgrade estimate is that 20,000 Serbs and Montenegrins have left Kosovo for good since the 1981 riots."²⁷

Yugoslav officials estimated that approximately 57,000 Serbs fled the province over the ten-year period between 1972 and 1982.²⁸

By the mid-80s things had gone from bad to worse in Kosovo. By 1986 it was no secret that the Serbs were living in fear of Kosovo's Albanians. One column in The New York Times reported that "The ethnic Albanian majority in the autonomous province of Kosovo is feared by the minority population of Serbs and Montenegrins, who believe the Albanians are seeking to drive them out of the province... Non-Albanian Yugoslav residents and visitors characterize the atmosphere of Kosovo as frighteningly restrictive and its Communist leadership as so dogmatic as to resemble the rigorously Stalinist regime that holds power in nearby Albania."²⁹

Throughout the 1980s Kosovo's non-Albanian minorities were subjected to every kind of violent attack. These attacks included murders, abductions, arson, and vandalism. One of the most insidious weapons in the Albanian nationalist arsenal was rape. By the late 1980s Kosovo-Albanian men were increasing sexual assaults against non-Albanian women in order to scare non-Albanian families out of the province.

The cavalier attitude of the Kosovo-Albanian authorities towards this sort of crime was demonstrated in 1987. Fadilj Hodza, a leading Kosovo-Albanian politician and former president of Kosovo, remarked on the rising number of rapes in the province by joking that Serbian women might not get raped as often if more of them worked as prostitutes in Kosovo's cafes.³⁰

A NEW CONSTITUTION IS ADOPTED

By the early-1980s it was clear to everyone in Yugoslavia that something had to be done about the situation in Kosovo. In 1982 and 1983 the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) adopted a set of conclusions aimed at centralizing Serbia's control over law enforcement and the judiciary in its Kosovo and Vojvodina provinces.³¹

In 1986 Serbia's president, Ivan Stambolic, established a commission made-up of representatives from Serbia, Kosovo, and Vojvodina, to amend the Constitution of Serbia so that it would conform to the conclusions adopted by the federal LCY.³²

The constitutional commission worked for three years to harmonize its positions and in 1989 submitted a draft of the new constitution to the Serbian Assembly for approval. The new constitution was fully supported by the federal Yugoslav authorities and the provincial authorities in Kosovo and Vojvodina.

In February 1989 Stipe Suvar, the Croatian president of the federal LCY, said that: "Our main problem is that throughout these years, from the explosion of Albanian nationalism, accompanied by all those counterrevolutionary demands from 1981 onwards, we still have not made or achieved this in-depth transformation. We did not improve the situation or achieve stabilization."

"Together with Albanians, who are an overwhelming majority in the province, there live there also Serbs and Montenegrins who feel the most threatened and are indeed the most threatened, followed by Muslims, who live there in considerable numbers, as well as Romas, Croats, and all the others."

"It is ludicrous to hear discussions about which nationalism is more dangerous. In Kosovo, the Albanian nationalism is 100 times more dangerous."

"In conclusion, I think what happened in the Assembly of Serbia concerning constitutional amendments is good, as well as the way it happened. First of all, I can't understand why the Albanian masses in Kosovo seem to think that something radically changed here, because the amendments relate to five or six issues, and it is quite normal that Serbia receives competence over them as a state."³³

Kosovo's provincial Communist party adopted the same line as their federal counterparts. At a Yugoslav leadership summit in Pristina, Kosovo's party presidency stated that the amendments to the Serbian Constitution "invoke the stances taken by the Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" adding that "The Presidency of the provincial committee of the League of Communists of Kosovo reiterates once again that it supports constitutional changes to the constitution of Serbia and demands that they be passed as soon as possible in order for the Republic of Serbia to be able to exercise its powers and functions on its whole territory, because these amendments do not jeopardize the autonomy of provinces or the equality among peoples and minorities."³⁴

In order for the Constitutional amendments to be passed by the Serbian Assembly, they first had to be approved by the Kosovo Assembly, and the Vojvodina assembly.

On March 10, 1989 the Vojvodina assembly approved the amendments. The Kosovo Assembly approved them on March 23rd, and the Serbian Assembly finally ratified the constitutional amendments on March 28th.³⁵

The ethnic composition of the Kosovo Assembly was over 70% Albanian with the remaining members being Serbs, Montenegrins, Turks and others.³⁶

The vote in the Kosovo Assembly wasn't even close. 187 of the 190 assembly members were present when the vote was taken: 10 voted against the constitutional amendments, 2 abstained, and the remaining 175 voted in favor of the amendments.³⁷

The result of the vote is hardly surprising given that Yugoslavia had been a communist country with a single party system since the end of World War II, and the federal Communist party had proposed and supported the amendments.

Although nothing had really changed, Kosovo-Albanian nationalists reacted violently to the amendments. The new Serbian constitution stood in the way of their plans to secede from Serbia and establish their dream of an ethnically pure greater Albanian state in Kosovo - so they rioted for six days.

The UPI wire service reported that the rioting killed 29 people and left 30 policemen and 97 civilians wounded. Their report said that "the unrest began when amendments were approved [by the Kosovo Assembly] returning to Serbia control over the province's police, courts, national defense and foreign affairs ... mass demonstrations turned into violent street rioting when demonstrators began using firearms against police."³⁸

KOSOVO'S AUTONOMY

The 1989 amendments to the Serbian Constitution have often been portrayed as "Milosevic Revoking Kosovo's Autonomy". The assertion that "Milosevic revoked Kosovo's Autonomy" is malicious because it is intended to justify the violent acts of Kosovo-Albanian extremists by providing them with a legitimate grievance.

The initiative to change the Serbian Constitution came from the federal Communist party in response to the 1981 rioting by Kosovo-Albanian secessionists. Official documents relating to the planned amendments date back to 1982 and 1983, long before Milosevic was even involved in politics.

The commission to amend the constitution was set-up in 1986 by Milosevic's predecessor Ivan Stambolic, more than a year before Milosevic held any real power in the hierarchy of the party or the government.

The Kosovo assembly, which had an Albanian majority, approved the amendments five days before the Serbian assembly.

One could even argue that Kosovo didn't have any meaningful autonomy that could be revoked anyway. The Communist party expanded Kosovo's provincial powers in 1974 and rolled them back somewhat in 1989. Kosovo was under the control of the LCY the entire time. It didn't matter where the *de jure* power was at because the *de facto* power was always with the Tito or the Central Committee of the federal LCY.

After the amendments were passed, Kosovo's degree of autonomy remained virtually unchanged. Kosovo maintained practically the same status it had before the amendments were enacted. All the amendments did was place Serbia on an equal footing with the rest of the republics in Yugoslavia. The new constitution gave Serbia authority over police and judicial functions on the whole of its territory, as well as control over national defense and foreign affairs – just like all of the other Yugoslav republics had.

Kosovo still had the status of a self-governing province within Serbia. It had its assembly and the authority to pass laws on its territory. Kosovo also kept its own judicial system; the only difference was that after the 1989 one could appeal a verdict of the Kosovo courts up to the Serbian Courts.

Kosovo's status within the Yugoslav Federation was not compromised by the amendments. Kosovo kept the same number of representatives in the Federal Assembly and it kept its representative in the Federal Presidency.

The government of Kosovo continued to function normally until the summer of 1990 at which time Croatia and Slovenia began announcing their intentions to secede from Yugoslavia – at that point a split emerged in the Kosovo Assembly.

One faction of about 40 renegade deputies wanted to secede from Serbia and attempted to read-out an illegal declaration on Kosovo's independence at the assembly hall. The situation in the Kosovo Assembly building was so dramatic that the President of the Assembly had to suspend the session because there was a danger that clashes would breakout between the deputies.³⁹

The Kosovo Assembly found itself unable to function. Stane Dolenc led the faction of deputies opposing Kosovo's secession from Serbia. When he condemned the unlawful conduct of the secessionist deputies, pandemonium broke-out in the assembly hall. The president of the Kosovo assembly closed the assembly hall and sent an official request to the Assembly of Serbia asking it to temporarily dissolve the Kosovo Assembly.⁴⁰

Because of the dramatic situation, the threat of violence, and the inability of the Kosovo Assembly to function, the Serbian Assembly accepted the request and the Kosovo Assembly was temporarily dissolved.

Yugoslavia's federal assembly fully supported the Serbian Assembly's decision and issued a statement saying that "the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly concluded that Serbia dissolved the Kosovo Assembly and its Executive Council in order to protect the constitutional order and territorial integrity of the republic and Yugoslavia."⁴¹

Slobodan Milosevic, although he had no say in the matter, was against the temporary dissolution of the Kosovo Assembly. When the president of the Kosovo Assembly first broached the question of dissolving the Assembly, Milosevic told him that he should let the secessionist deputies speak, but enforce the rules of parliamentary procedure.⁴²

Nonetheless, the Kosovo Assembly was dissolved pursuant to its own request. A new Kosovo assembly was elected in 1993, but Kosovo's Albanian population boycotted the elections.⁴³

KOSOVO'S ALBANIANS ESTABLISH PARALLEL INSTITUTIONS

After failing to unlawfully proclaim Kosovo's secession from Serbia at the real Kosovo Assembly, a group of renegade Albanian deputies established a parallel "Kosovo Assembly" and promulgated a parallel "Kosovo Constitution" in the town of Kacanik on September 7, 1990.

The so-called "Kacanik Constitution" declared Kosovo a sovereign republic, separate from Serbia. The Federal Executive Counsel (FEC) of Yugoslavia immediately declared the parallel "Kosovo Assembly" and its so-called "constitution" null and void.

The FEC issued a statement saying, "the secret meeting of citizens of Albanian nationality in Kacanik on 7th September, which has been presented to the public as a session of the Kosovo Assembly at which the so-called Constitution of Kosovo was adopted and the so-called Republic of Kosovo proclaimed, was yet another anti-constitutional act and a direct attack on the territorial integrity of both Serbia and Yugoslavia."⁴⁴

Although there was no legal basis for its existence, and in spite of the fact that its constitution was totally illegal, Kosovo's Albanian population generally viewed the work of the parallel "Kosovo Assembly" as legitimate.

In 1991 Kosovo's Albanian clan leaders instructed the Albanian population to cut off all relations with Serbs, not to work with them or even talk to them.⁴⁵

By and large Kosovo's ethnic Albanian population withdrew from political and economic life in the province. They established parallel Albanian institutions, which they financed through so-called "solidarity taxes" collected from ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo and abroad; generally these taxes amounted to an income tax of about 3%.⁴⁶

The situation in Kosovo remained tense but relatively calm until the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) appeared on the scene and violence began erupting in the mid-1990s.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE KLA

The KLA is a Kosovo-Albanian terrorist organization that first appeared in 1996 when it claimed responsibility for a series of bomb attacks against refugee camps that were housing Serbian refugees from the wars in Croatia and Bosnia.⁴⁷

The KLA's activity was sporadic at first, there was a three-month delay between their first wave of violence and their second round of attacks when they shot and killed an Albanian

student and five Serbs, and then detonated a bomb killing one child and wounding three others.⁴⁸

The KLA claimed Kosovo for Albanians and threatened further attacks unless its demands were met. In August 1996 the KLA issued a communiqué saying: "We would like to state clearly to the current Serbian political leadership that they must withdraw from our territories as soon as possible, or our attacks to liberate the country will be fierce and merciless."⁴⁹

The KLA's goal is to break Kosovo away from Serbia and unite it with Albania. During the Milosevic trial a video of the KLA's oath-taking ceremony was played. The tape showed KLA commander Hajdin Abazi reading out the text of the KLA's oath in which members pledged to "fight until their last drop of blood" to unite Kosovo with Albania.⁵⁰

The KLA is a classic terrorist organization. Under American law, terrorism is defined as "the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives."⁵¹

United States acknowledged the KLA as a terrorist organization in 1998 when Robert Gelbard, the U.S. Special Envoy for Kosovo, told Agence France Presse: "We condemn very strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo. The KLA is, without any questions, a terrorist group."⁵²

Throughout 1996 the KLA carried out a series of terrorist attacks, but it lacked the means to wage a full-scale war against Serbia -- until a massive political and economic meltdown gripped Albania in 1997.

THE COLLAPSE OF ALBANIA FLOODS KOSOVO WITH WEAPONS

During 1996-97, Albania was convulsed by the dramatic rise and collapse of several huge financial pyramid schemes. The pyramid scheme phenomenon in Albania is important because its scale relative to the size of the economy was unprecedented. At their peak, the nominal value of the pyramid schemes' liabilities amounted to almost half of the country's GDP. Many Albanians—about two-thirds of the population—invested in them. When the schemes collapsed, there was uncontained rioting, the government fell, and the country descended into anarchy and a near civil war in which some 2,000 people were killed. Several members of Albania's army and police deserted, and 1 million weapons were looted from the country's armories.⁵³

The weapons flooded into Kosovo and gave ethnic Albanian extremists, who already possessed the desire to wage a separatist war against Serbia, the means to do so.

A U.N. study found that at least 200,000 Kalashnikov automatic assault weapons stolen from Albanian military armories wound up in the KLA arsenal. So many that KLA operatives were themselves exporting guns to overseas black markets at the start of 1999.⁵⁴

In 1998 a senior NATO official was quoted by Radio Free Europe saying that "the wholesale transfer of weapons to Kosovo" from Albania significantly contributed to the growth of violence in the province.⁵⁵

According to Serb and Yugoslav authorities, Albanian terrorist attacks began to increase dramatically in late 1997 and early 1998 after the collapse of the Albanian government.

From January 1991 through December 1997, Serbian authorities recorded 131 Albanian terrorist attacks in Kosovo. These attacks resulted in the death of 13 police officers, 25 civilians, and in 9 cases the Albanian terrorists who carried out the attacks were killed.⁵⁶

Violence in Kosovo increased significantly once the stolen Albanian weapons began reaching the province. From January until August 1998, Serb authorities recorded 1,126 terrorist

attacks. Police were targeted in 616 cases and civilians in 510. The attacks resulted in the death of 74 policemen and 81 civilians and the wounding of an additional 282 policemen and 95 civilians.⁵⁷

To put this in perspective, during the first eight months of 1998 there was an average of 140.75 terrorist attacks per month, compared to the previous average of 1.56 attacks per month over the previous six years.

In addition to terrorist attacks, the KLA forcibly seized large swaths Kosovo's territory. By mid-1998 it was estimated that the KLA had seized control over roughly 40 per cent of Kosovo.⁵⁸

THE ALBANIAN MAFIA AND THE KLA

Albanian criminal syndicates infiltrated the KLA early on. The KLA operates on funds raised by the Albanian mafia.⁵⁹ In 1998 the Baltimore Sun, citing western intelligence sources, reported that "powerful Albanian mafia organizations that deal in narcotics, prostitution and arms smuggling across Europe" finance the KLA.⁶⁰

The London Times called the KLA "an outgrowth of the Kosovo Albanian mafia." Their report said, "These Kosovan criminals operate the most powerful drug-running network in Europe."⁶¹

According to police in the Czech Republic, Kosovo Albanian drug traffickers fund the KLA with proceeds from the heroin trade. "Kosovo Albanian drug smugglers have become a major phenomenon," said Jiri Komorous, head of the Czech Republic's national narcotics police, adding that his heroin division "spends about 80 percent of its time" on Kosovo drug gangs.⁶²

Interpol estimates that Kosovo-Albanians may control 40 percent of the European heroin trade. In Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and the Czech Republic, they may have as much as 70 percent of the market, according to estimates.⁶³

In addition to drug trafficking, the KLA finances itself by kidnapping women and young girls and forcing them into prostitution. During NATO's 1999 bombardment of Yugoslavia the KLA robbed refugee families and forced refugee girls into prostitution.

According to the London Times, "Reports from Macedonia and Albania confirm that KLA 'minders' ensure that all refugees peddle the same line when speaking to Western journalists. KLA gangsters rob them of any remaining cash. And KLA pimps driving Mercedes kidnap refugee girls for prostitution in Italy."⁶⁴

The Albanian mafia's involvement in prostitution is huge. In 2001 The Economist, citing an internal British Home Office briefing, reported that "Albanians or Kosovars now control 'around 70%' of massage parlors in Soho. That ties in with a report by the National Criminal Intelligence Service, which noted a long-term threat from organized Albanian gangs who run immigration and prostitution rackets across Western Europe to pursue their goals."

The article says there is "little the police can do. They say that immigrant sex workers refuse to testify because the gangs threaten reprisals against the women's loved ones. Since these groups operate internationally, the British police cannot protect the families of the workers. They are powerless against such intimidation."⁶⁵

The Albanian mafia has become a worldwide criminal force. Its effects are felt as far away as the United States where it is taking over organized crime.

The FBI says that thousands of Albanians who fled the Balkans for the United States have emerged as a serious organized crime problem, threatening to displace La Cosa Nostra (LCN) families as kingpins of U.S. crime.⁶⁶

In 2004 Chris Swecker, the head of the FBI's criminal division, told the USA Today newspaper

that Albanian gangsters have already seized control of some rackets from New York Mafia families.⁶⁷

THE KLA LINKED TO INTERNATIONAL ISLAMIC TERRORISM

With weapons looted from Albanian armories and cash from the Albanian mafia all the KLA needed was training, which it received from Islamic terror groups and the U.S. defense contractor MPRI (Military Professional Resources, Inc.).

Even before 9/11, the KLA had been credibly linked to the notorious terrorist Osama bin Laden. In 1999 the Washington Times obtained intelligence documents that showed what is described as a "link" between bin Laden and the KLA --including a common staging area in Tropoje, Albania, a center for Islamic terrorists. The reports say that bin Laden's al-Qaeda organization has both trained and financially supported the KLA.⁶⁸

In 1998 Fatos Klosi, the head of SHIK (Albania's intelligence service), told London's Sunday Times newspaper that bin Laden had visited Albania. According to Klosi, al-Qaeda was one of several fundamentalist groups that had sent units to fight in Kosovo.⁶⁹

In 2002 the U.S. State Department issued a report designating Iran "the most active state sponsor of terrorism." Their report said that Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps are involved in planning and support for terrorist acts and exhort a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals.⁷⁰

The Jerusalem Post reported that Iranian Revolutionary Guardsmen trained the KLA. The newspaper said that "Selected groups of Albanians were sent to Iran to study that country's version of militant Islam ... millions of dollars have been funneled through Bosnia and Albania to buy arms for the KLA. The money is raised from both Islamic governments and from Islamic communities in Western Europe, particularly Germany."⁷¹

Yossef Bodansky, the Director of the U.S. House Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, wrote a report for the magazine Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy saying that "In the Fall of 1997, the uppermost leadership in Tehran ordered the IRGC [Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps] High Command to launch a major program for shipping large quantities of weapons and other military supplies to the Albanian clandestine organizations in Kosovo. [Ayatollah] Khamene'i's instructions specifically stipulated that the comprehensive military assistance was aimed to enable the Muslims 'to achieve the independence' of the province of Kosovo."

Bodansky's article corroborates the Jerusalem Post's account. He wrote that in 1997 "the Iranians began sending promising Albanian [KLA] commanders for advanced military training in al-Quds [special] forces and IRGC camps in Iran."⁷²

Islamic Mujahedin were spotted in the ranks of the KLA by foreign observers during the war. During the trial of Slobodan Milosevic, a German journalist named Franz Josef Hutsch, who had accepted an offer to accompany a KLA brigade in Kosovo during the war, was called to testify.

When asked whether he had seen any non-Albanian fighters in the KLA he said: "In particular, there were officers of Arab origin. These officers were the forward air control officers, there was an American from MPRI who recruited these officers from the Mujahedin brigades of the Bosnian army as mercenaries, and they offered them a great deal of money. These officers were then trained in Turkey, and from spring 1998, from February in particular, they were sent to the KLA in Kosovo as forward air control officers. They had a very good training in English, and they were trained to organize air operations, air raids. Each brigade had one of these officers who were particularly well protected. During the war, these officers, were able to delegate further down the hierarchy of the battalion."⁷³

NATO/U.S. INTERFERENCE IN KOSOVO

For the most part the Yugoslav government allowed the Kosovo-Albanians to withdraw into their parallel institutions. Yugoslavia didn't react when the Kosovo-Albanians refused to pay taxes, nor did it stop them from establishing their own mono-Ethnic institutions. But there was a limit to Yugoslavia's patience, it wasn't going to stand idly by and let Albanian terrorists murder its security forces and take-over its territory.

Unfortunately, NATO and the Americans had different ideas. With the events in Waco and Ruby Ridge still topical when Kosovo was exploding, one might wonder how the American authorities would have dealt with terrorists who were seizing their territory and murdering their security forces. But the Clinton Administration adopted a "do as we say, not as we do" approach towards Kosovo.

Slobodan Milosevic was forced to negotiate with the American Government. The Clinton Administration had already helped Croatia carryout ethnic cleansing operations against the Krajina-Serbs, and the first Bush Administration had already lit the fuse on the Bosnian War by sending Ambassador Zimmerman to sabotage the Lisbon Agreement. Now the United States and NATO were threatening to bomb Serbia unless Milosevic agreed to negotiate with them.

Milosevic's "negotiating partner" was Clinton's Balkan envoy Richard Holbrooke -- a man who famously called the Serbian people "murderous assholes" in a 1995 interview with Ted Koppel.⁷⁴

On October 13, 1998 the so-called "Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement" was signed. Under the terms of the agreement, Yugoslav and Serbian security forces would be reduced and there was supposed to be a cease-fire between the KLA and government security forces.

The Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement brought anything but peace to Kosovo, as soon as Yugoslav and Serbian forces stood-down the KLA moved-in to take their place. On November 12, 1998 -- one month after the adoption of the agreement, the UN Secretary-General issued a report on its implementation.

The report found that the Serbian side was complying with the cease-fire. It noted that "The army and police presence in Kosovo has been significantly reduced since early October. The presence and disposition of the remaining Government forces indicate a strategy based on containing pockets of resistance and on control of high ground and the main arterial routes in areas dominated by Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units. Tripwires and anti-personnel mines have reportedly been laid at the approaches to some police positions as an early warning measure. Since 27 October, there has been a continued withdrawal of the Serbian security forces from Kosovo and numerous checkpoints and fortified positions have been dismantled. The Serbian police retain control over key roads. Mobile police checkpoints have been established on major roads in some areas."⁷⁵

The KLA, on the other hand, abused the cease-fire in order to expand its operations. The Secretary-General's report found that: "Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units are asserting their own authority to supplant that of the Serbian police in areas from which the police have withdrawn, and have established their own checkpoints on a number of secondary roads. ... Recent attacks by Kosovo Albanian paramilitary units have indicated their readiness, capability and intention to actively pursue the advantage gained by the partial withdrawal of the police and military formations. Reports of new weapons, ammunition and equipment indicate that the capacity of those units to re-supply themselves is still fairly good."⁷⁶

Shortly after the Kosovo war, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs issued a report stating that: "Serbia initially implemented the [Milosevic-Holbrooke] agreement and withdrew its forces accordingly. The KLA, by contrast, took advantage of the new situation and

renewed military action. In fact, KLA forces moved in to take up positions vacated by the redeployed Serbian forces."⁷⁷

Whatever NATO and the American Government's intentions were, the net result of their interference was a strengthening of the KLA and an escalation of violence on the ground.

THE KOSOVO VERIFICATION MISSION

Three days after Milosevic's agreement with Holbrooke, on October 16, 1998, Yugoslavia accepted the presence of an OSCE monitoring mission known as the Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM).

The KVM reached approximately 1,500 international staff by February 1999. On March 20, 1999, four days before the start of NATO bombing raids against Yugoslavia, OSCE CiO, Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek pulled the KVM out of the province.⁷⁸

There is strong evidence that NATO spies infiltrated the ranks of the KVM to liaison with the KLA and plan the 1999 attack on Yugoslavia.

Roland Keith, a 32-year veteran of the Canadian Armed Forces who served as a field commander in the verification mission, testified during the Milosevic trial that the senior leadership of the KVM had "no real interest in rebuilding stability in Kosovo but probably had other political agendas".⁷⁹

Alice Mahon, a member of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly who spent a great deal of time in the region with members the verification mission testified that she had heard rumors and read reports that "the CIA had infiltrated the verification monitors in Kosovo."⁸⁰

Her testimony was backed-up by London's Sunday Times newspaper which reported that "Central Intelligence Agency officers were ceasefire monitors in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999, developing ties with the KLA and giving American military training manuals and field advice on fighting the Yugoslav army and Serbian police". The newspaper quoted sources inside the CIA saying that the KVM was "a CIA front". One CIA agent turned KVM monitor said, "I'd tell [the KLA] which hill to avoid, which wood to go behind, that sort of thing."⁸¹

During the Milosevic trial, a Yugoslav colonel who eye witnessed the activities of the KVM testified that: "The NATO Air Force had very precise [targeting] data which had been amassed in 1998 and 1999 precisely by members of the verifying commission. I came across them many times taking the coordinates of facilities and features and drawing maps of the communication network."⁸²

The head of the KVM was a man named William Walker who, as the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador during the late 80s and early 90s, already had a shady past and was suspected by many to be a CIA agent.

In 1989 the Catholic Church implicated Walker in the murder of five Jesuit priests in El Salvador. It accused his embassy of "concealing evidence, obstructing the investigation, pressuring judges to impede the trial process, and terrorizing witnesses." Jesuit priest Fernando Guardia said that Walker was "a symbol of the destruction of life" while he was ambassador in El Salvador.⁸³

Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. government provided billions of dollars of support to the Salvadoran military during a war that cost 70,000 lives.⁸⁴ According to human rights organizations, most of that killing was done by the Salvadoran military and most of the victims were unarmed civilians.⁸⁵

Walker was also the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Central America from July 1985 until August 1988 during the Iran-Contra scandal.⁸⁶

Although Walker says he didn't know that the "humanitarian" operation he was running at the Ilopango air base in El Salvador was a front for arming the Contras, one wonders how Oliver North could have single-handedly slipped several hundred tons of weapons, not to mention over 20 tons of cocaine, past him and the people working under him without being noticed.

RACAK

Given Walker's past, it's little wonder that he was the one who ultimately lit the fuse on NATO's drive to bomb Yugoslavia when he accused Serbian police of massacring forty Albanians in the Kosovo village of Racak.

Far from being a massacre, Serbian authorities claim that Racak was a legitimate anti-terrorist operation aimed at arresting members of the KLA responsible for the murder of a Serb policeman. They claim that the KLA fired on them when they entered the village and that they returned fire killing several KLA terrorists in the process.

None of this stopped Walker from branding Racak "an unspeakable atrocity" and "a crime very much against humanity" and saying that he did not "hesitate to accuse the [Serbian] government security forces of responsibility".⁸⁷

U.S. President Bill Clinton also accused Serbian forces saying, "This was a deliberate and indiscriminate act of murder designed to sow fear among the people of Kosovo. It is a clear violation of the commitments the Serbian authorities have made to NATO."⁸⁸

Racak is significant because it is the only war crime that The Hague Tribunal accused Serbian security forces of prior to NATO's 1999 attack on Yugoslavia - and if you'll recall, "stopping Serb war crimes" was NATO's *raison d'être* for attacking Yugoslavia.

In a televised address to the nation Clinton cited Racak as a key motivating factor NATO's imminent attack. He said: "We should remember what happened in the village of Racak back in January -- innocent men, women and children taken from their homes to a gully, forced to kneel in the dirt, sprayed with gunfire -- not because of anything they had done, but because of who they were."⁸⁹

While Clinton and Walker were busy pointing the finger at Serbian security forces, KVM verifiers on the ground had other information. Three days before the so-called "massacre" the Kosovo Verification Mission issued an intelligence assessment saying that the KLA was expected to carry out murders of Albanians that they would falsely ascribe to Serbian forces.

On January 12, 1999 the KVM's intelligence assessment stated: "It is assessed that the KLA shall intensify their activities in the area of Mitrovica, Urosevac, as well as on the Urosevac-Suva Reka-Stimlje route", which is precisely where Racak is located. The intelligence estimate went on to say that "It is also expected that they will fabricate incidents, even murders of Albanians, to be ascribed to the MUP (Serbian Police) and the VJ (Yugoslav Army)."⁹⁰

When the bodies were found on the morning of January 16th Walker was not interested in preserving the scene of the crime for an investigation. On the contrary, he wanted a media circus. Instead of sealing-off the scene so that forensic scientists could carryout a proper investigation, he brought in a bunch of journalists and let them trample all over the crime scene.

One German journalist who was on the scene with Walker that morning was shocked by his behavior. He said that Walker "was marketing what happened" to the journalists. During his testimony at the Hague Tribunal the journalist said, "Something else which I noticed was that we could move freely between these bodies, and some of my colleagues actually rearranged these bodies so as to photograph them better, and Ambassador Walker did not try to prevent this from happening ... I thought that was a highly strange way of dealing with a crime scene,

changing the bodies. And also, Mr. Walker had directed us to an area where, from a forensic point of view, we were actually destroying evidence."⁹¹

Despite Clinton and Walker's propensity towards making wild accusations about massacres, forensic autopsies were carried out on the bodies by an international team of scientists from Finland, Serbia, and Belarus in the presence of KVM observers.

The forensic autopsies revealed that for all of the corpses, "gunshot injuries were established to be the cause of death and only one case was suspected a close-range discharge."⁹² In other words, while everybody died from gunshot wounds only one person was shot at close-range.

The scientists also found bullet-paths traveling through the bodies in various directions. There were injuries from top to the bottom, from the bottom to the top, and laterally.⁹³

If these people had been "forced to kneel in the dirt and sprayed with gunfire" like Clinton said they were, then they should have all been shot at close range and the bullets should have all been coming from roughly the same angle and direction -- but they weren't. These people were shot in a variety of different ways, from varying directions and ranges.

There are strong indications that the "victims" weren't as "innocent" as Clinton said they were either. Diphenylamine testing revealed that thirty-seven out of the forty bodies found in Racak had nitrate particles on their hands -- gunpowder. The location, concentration, and distribution of the particles showed that the alleged "massacre victims" had been firing weapons shortly before their death.⁹⁴

The bodies found in Racak were wearing civilian clothes, but they were dressed to spend prolonged periods of time outside. Some were wearing grey woolen military trousers. Most of them had military boots. They had identical leather belts, and some were wearing two or three layers of clothing.⁹⁵

In addition to the forensic evidence, witness statements presented to the Hague Tribunal during the Milosevic trial showed that thirty out of the forty people found dead in Racak were known members of the KLA.⁹⁶

A German journalist named Bo Adam went to Racak after the alleged massacre and the locals showed him the KLA cemetery in Malopoljce where several of the fighters who died in Racak were buried.⁹⁷

The villagers also showed him a variety of locations around the village where people had been hit by gunfire, including a 13 year-old boy and a woman who had been hit by cross-fire from a nearby hill, as well as a man who died in a foxhole with his rifle, but nobody had witnessed any organized executions or a massacre.⁹⁸

Further evidence against a massacre is the fact that the Serbs have multiple alibis. There were two teams of KVM verifiers and an Associated Press camera crew on site when Serbian police entered the village and none of them saw a massacre.

One of the KVM teams was even situated on a hill overlooking the gully where Walker found the bodies. They could see the gully with the naked eye. Nobody could have carried out a massacre in that gully without being seen.⁹⁹

On top of that, the Serbian police let an Associated Press camera crew to come to Racak with them to film the operation.¹⁰⁰

The video filmed in Racak has been exhibited at the Milosevic trial. On the videos you can see the Serbian police entering the village while the KVM's bright orange vans are seen standing watch on the hills overlooking the village. You can also see that the Serbian police were pinned down under KLA fire in the village. The videos show two-way combat between the KLA

and the Serbian police as well as an extensive network of trenches, bunkers, and arms caches that the KLA had built in and around Racak.¹⁰¹

If the objective of the Serbian security forces had been to massacre innocent people do you really think they would have been dumb enough to let an Associated Press camera crew tag along and film it? Do you think they would have been stupid enough to carryout a massacre in front of not one, but two teams of KVM monitors? And how could they round up victims and execute them while they were pinned down under KLA gunfire?

What happened is clear. When the Serbian police left the village on the evening of January 15th, the KLA rounded-up its war dead, took away their weapons, and piled their corpses in the gully to create the appearance of a "massacre" so that William Walker could come back the next morning with a bunch of journalists who would tell the world that there had been a massacre and the Serbs were to blame.

It is worth noting that Walker was spotted by a Serbian police patrol entering Racak in a white Jeep at about 9:00 PM the night before they entered the village.¹⁰²

Walker knew that the Albanians were planning to fabricate "Serbian crimes" in the area, and he knew that the Serbian police were about to carryout a raid against the KLA in Racak. One could certainly speculate that the purpose of his visit the night before was to plan things out with the KLA.

THE ULTIMATUM AT RAMBOUILLET

Racak was used to galvanize Western public opinion against the Serbs ahead of a summit meeting in Rambouillet, France.

The meetings in Rambouillet were portrayed as "peace negotiations" by the Western media. Serbia was portrayed as belligerent while NATO was portrayed as a virtuous peacemaker selflessly working to stop a war from erupting in Kosovo.

The reality was 180 degrees the opposite -- nothing was going to stop NATO from attacking Yugoslavia. NATO had been drawing-up its war plans since June 1998 -- more than six months before the fake massacre in Racak.

Take a look at the following testimony from NATO Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Wesley Clark to the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee:

Mr. Chairman, we began the planning process for Operation Allied Force (the NATO attack on Yugoslavia) in June of 1998. At this time we looked at a full series of air and ground options, including the phased air campaign which was ultimately implemented as well as a number of variants on ground campaigns, including forced entry campaigns into Kosovo and as well into Yugoslavia.

The consensus emerged in the late summer that there needed to be a limited air option.

In October when the NATO activation order was issued, we had the plan for the limited air option, we had the plan for the phased air operation. Both of these plans were put into motion, the resources were provided, and they were used to secure the agreement that was achieved in October by Mr. Holbrooke and subsequently the promises that President Milosevic made to NATO. Those plans remained in place, the activation order remained in place, and it was subsequently incorporated as a threat into the Rambouillet process.

So in broad terms, the planning was done many months before the failure of the Rambouillet process. ¹⁰³

Rambouillet was political theater, and although it was portrayed as "last-ditch peace negotiations" it was really a NATO ultimatum to Serbia.

There were no "negotiations" at Rambouillet. A document called the "Rambouillet Accords" [Rambouillet Agreement; Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo] was put to the Serbs and an ultimatum was issued – sign this or else we'll attack you.

Madeline Albright, the U.S. Secretary of State, made no secret of America's position. She said point-blank: "If the talks crater because the Serbs do not say yes, we will have bombing. If the talks crater because the Albanians have not said yes, we will not be able to support them."¹⁰⁴

There were several unreasonable provisions in the Rambouillet Accords that no country could have accepted. For example, they would have allowed NATO personnel to commit crimes in Yugoslavia with impunity. Take a look at the following excerpts from the so-called "peace plan":

Section 6a, Appendix B. "NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether civil, administrative, or criminal."

Section 6b, Appendix B. "NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times, shall be immune from the Parties, jurisdiction in respect of any civil, administrative, criminal or disciplinary offenses which may be committed by them in the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)."

Section 7, Appendix B. "NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest, investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY."

Under the terms of the Rambouillet Accords, NATO could have occupied the whole of Yugoslavia (not just Kosovo) and Yugoslavia would be obligated to offer its entire infrastructure to NATO free of charge:

Section 8, Appendix B. "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations."

Section 11, Appendix B. "NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and ports without payment of fees, duties, dues, tolls, or charges occasioned by mere use."

The Rambouillet Accords would also have given NATO the right to take over any radio or television station whenever it wanted.

Section 15, Appendix B. "The Parties shall, upon simple request, grant all telecommunications services, including broadcast services, needed for the Operation, as determined by NATO. This shall include the right to utilize such means and services as required to assure full ability to communicate and the right to use all of the electromagnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of cost."

Under the terms of the Rambouillet Accords, the Chief of the Implementation Mission (CIM), appointed by the European Union, and the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) commander would have dictatorial powers over civilian and military matters.

Chapter 5, Article V—"The CIM shall be the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of the civilian aspects of this Agreement, and the Parties agree to abide by his determinations as binding on all Parties and persons."

Chapter 7, Article XV—"The KFOR commander is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Chapter (referring to military matters) and his determinations are binding on all Parties and persons."

Of course Yugoslavia couldn't sign this document, so NATO made good on Albright's threat and started bombing on the evening of March 24, 1999.

New York Times journalist David Binder quoted Albright boasting that she had "deliberately set the bar too high for the Serbs" to comply at Rambouillet because "they need a few bombs."¹⁰⁵

Rambouillet was political theater designed to put the onus on Yugoslavia for failing to achieve a peaceful resolution to the Kosovo crisis. By setting the Serbs up to reject a bogus "peace agreement" NATO could carry out its planned assault on Yugoslavia while Javier Solana (NATO's Secretary General) claimed that "All efforts to achieve a negotiated political solution to the Kosovo crisis have failed, and no alternative is open but to take military action."¹⁰⁶

On March 24, 1999 -- within 15 minutes of the announcement from NATO headquarters that air strikes had begun, Bill Clinton went on television to justify the attack to the American public.

Speaking from the podium in the White House briefing room, Clinton said that NATO forces had intervened to prevent a catastrophe in Kosovo. "If we do not act," Clinton said, "clearly it will get even worse. Only firmness now can prevent greater catastrophe later."¹⁰⁷

Clinton couldn't have been more wrong or mislead the public more maliciously. NATO's involvement in Kosovo did not avert a catastrophe it took a relatively small local conflict and turned it into a full-blown international incident and a humanitarian nightmare.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs described the Kosovo conflict before NATO's involvement thusly: "In the first phase of the conflict from February 1998 to March 1999, casualties were relatively low: around 1,000 civilians were killed up to September although the evidence is uncertain; the number of victims between September and March is unknown but must be lower."¹⁰⁸

The day before NATO started bombing Kosovo, the conflict had displaced approximately 69,500 people. After 78-days of NATO "humanitarian" bombing there were 862,979 refugees.¹⁰⁹

ETHNIC CLEANSING CLAIMS DEBUNKED

The initial justification for NATO's attack on Yugoslavia was Milosevic's refusal to agree to the ultimatum at Rambouillet, but that story soon changed.

Proponents of NATO's war began citing the mass exodus of refugees from Kosovo as proof that the Serbs were carrying out an "ethnic cleansing" campaign against the province's ethnic Albanians.

By the last day of the NATO bombing, the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) had registered a total of 862,979 Kosovo refugees. But since Kosovo is a Serbian province, refugees who fled to other parts of Serbia were classified as internally displaced persons (IDPs), rather than refugees.

The UNHCR noted that in addition to the 862,979 official refugees, "more than 100,000 Serb IDPs are estimated to have left Kosovo and to have been registered in Serbia and Montenegro."¹¹⁰ The Washington Post reported a similar numbers during the bombing noting that "100,000 Serbian civilians have left Kosovo since the NATO air campaign began March 24th."¹¹¹

The ethnicity of the persons displaced from Kosovo does not point to an ethnic cleansing campaign against the province's ethnic Albanians; it goes to show a general exodus of the population.

If the refugee exodus had been the result of Serbian ethnic cleansing against the Albanians, then there would have been a disproportionately large number of Albanian refugees, but there wasn't.

Although the refugee camps in Macedonia did have to be segregated because the Albanian refugees attempted to lynch the ethnic Roma refugees.¹¹²

The ethnicity of persons displaced from Kosovo until the end of the NATO bombing on June 10, 1999 breaks down as follows: Serbs at 6.3% of Kosovo's population comprised at least 10.3% of the persons displaced from the province, and ethnic Albanians at 89.9% of population comprised at most 89.6% of the people displaced.¹¹³

The numbers in the paragraph above are skewed to maximize the percentage of displaced Albanians and minimize the percentage of displaced Serbs. It is assumed that every one of the 862,979 refugees registered by the UNHCR were ethnic Albanians which isn't the case, but even when you inflate the percentage of Albanian refugees as high as it can go it's still proportionately smaller than their share of Kosovo's population.

Why were people leaving Kosovo? There was ground combat between the KLA and Serbian security forces and NATO was dropping bombs all over the place. Kosovo wasn't a safe place so people took their families and left. It didn't matter what their ethnicity was - nobody wants to put their family at risk by staying in the middle of a war zone.

KOSOVO DEATH TOLL INFLATED TO JUSTIFY NATO ATTACK

In order to bolster their assertion that the Serbs were murderous villains waging a brutal campaign of ethnic cleansing against the defenseless Kosovo-Albanian population, Western officials began throwing around wildly inflated numbers of dead and missing.

Less than one week after NATO began its attack on Yugoslavia, U.S. State Department spokesman James Rubin said, "There are indicators that genocide is unfolding in Kosovo."¹¹⁴

Addressing military personnel and veterans at the National Defense University, President Clinton compared Kosovo to Germany's Holocaust against the Jews. He said the alleged persecution of Kosovo's Albanians, like "the ethnic extermination of the Holocaust" was a "vicious, premeditated, systematic oppression fueled by religious and ethnic hatred."¹¹⁵

On CBS' Face the Nation, U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen claimed, "We've now seen about 100,000 military-aged men missing...they may have been murdered."¹¹⁶

On April 19, 1999, at the height of the NATO bombing, the State Department said that up to 500,000 Kosovo-Albanians were missing and feared dead.¹¹⁷

With the president comparing Kosovo to the Holocaust and the State Department talking about "genocide" and possibly half a million dead, rational discussion was all but impossible. If anyone opposed the war it would appear that they were supporting genocide.

As it turned out NATO's case for war was completely false. When the war ended, the actual number of missing persons was nowhere even close to the 100,000 to 500,000 alleged by NATO officials.

According to the International Red Cross and the UN Mission in Kosovo a total of 5,206 people were reported missing from the 1998-99 conflict.¹¹⁸

Out of the total number of 5,206 persons who were reported missing in Kosovo; the remains of 1,911 have been found and pronounced dead by the UN Mission in Kosovo. The International Red Cross found 1,145 of the missing persons alive. As of December 6, 2006 the fate of 2,150 missing persons was still unknown.¹¹⁹

In addition to the fact that the number of missing persons was several times smaller than what had been alleged by NATO, there is the fact that a proportionately greater number of Serbs went missing. According to figures released by the International Red Cross anywhere from 7.6% to 9.6% of all missing persons were Serbs, and since Serbs accounted for about 6.3% of Kosovo's pre-war population one can see that a Serb was just as likely to go missing as anybody else.¹²⁰

After the war ended, NATO officials forgot about the claims they had made about 100,000 to 500,000 Kosovo-Albanians "missing and feared dead". Six months after the war ended, the State Department estimated that the final Kosovo death toll was "probably around 10,000".¹²¹

Yet, less than one month before issuing that estimate, State Department spokesman James Rubin said, "The State Department is not on the ground trying to answer that question ... Whether it will be 10,000 or 12,000 or 8,000 is anybody's guess."¹²²

Ten thousand, while 90 to 98% lower than their previous estimates, is still too high of a number because it exceeds the number of confirmed deaths added to the number of missing.

Based on "interviews with victims and witnesses" Human Rights Watch has claimed that Serbian forces killed 3,453 persons in Kosovo during the war. The quality of this information is doubtful. According to the HRW's data, its witnesses could only identify 27 percent of the victims by name, and in one-third of cases its witness couldn't even identify the gender of the alleged victim.¹²³

More than one year after the end of the conflict, the Hague Tribunal's spokesman Paul Risley said: "The final number of bodies uncovered [in Kosovo] will be less than 10,000 and probably more accurately determined as between 2,000 and 3,000."¹²⁴

As it turned out, war crimes investigators exhumed a total of 2,788 bodies from graves in Kosovo¹²⁵ and of that only about 850 were thought to be victims of war crimes.¹²⁶

If I had to hazard a guess as to the actual number of lives claimed by the Kosovo war I would guess that it's probably about 5,500 people.

Human Rights Watch has names for 916 victims¹²⁷, which means that these people were probably never reported missing because their fate was already known. We can assume that the remaining 2,537 victims whose identity was not known to HRW were reported missing by their friends or families.

We know that war crimes investigators exhumed 2,788 bodies, and we know that the remains of 1,911 missing persons have been found and identified, which leaves a balance of 877 exhumed bodies that were never reported missing.

When you add the 916 victims identified by HRW to the 877 exhumed bodies that weren't reported missing you get a total of 1,793 victims who were never reported missing. Add that to the 4,061 missing victims and you get a maximum total of 5,854 people who lost their lives in the war.

And since there is the possibility that the same victims reported to HRW were subsequently exhumed by war crimes investigators there is the possibility of double counting the same person twice, which is why I estimate that the actual number of lives claimed by the conflict must be somewhere around 5,500, which includes Serbs and other non-Albanian minorities.

While every death is a tragedy, determining the true number of lives claimed by this war is of particular importance because NATO justified its attack by portraying Kosovo as a premeditated genocide in which the Serbs were waging a widespread and systematic campaign of mass-murder against the Kosovo-Albanians.

The fact that the actual number of victims is much lower than what had been alleged calls the legitimacy of NATO's "humanitarian" war into serious doubt.

The Kosovo death toll points towards a garden-variety civil war over territory, not a replay of the Nazi Holocaust. If there had been a widespread and systematic campaign of mass-murder the number of people killed would have certainly been much greater.

Attacking a sovereign nation without authorization from the UN Security Council is a violation of international law, and from March 24th until June 10, 1999 that was exactly what NATO did. NATO exaggerated the Kosovo death toll because it needed a "new Holocaust" to justify its illegal attack on Yugoslavia.

Wesley Clark, the NATO general who oversaw the attack, openly admits that the Kosovo war was "technically illegal". He told the New Yorker magazine that, "The Russians and the Chinese said they would both veto it. There was never a chance that it would be authorized [by the Security Council]."¹²⁸

THE WESTERN MEDIA'S COMPLICITY IN NATO'S WAR

NATO had no propagandist more willing than the Western press corps. NATO press briefings and the claims of sobbing Albanian refugees were reported uncritically in order to incite hatred against Serbia ahead of the NATO attack.

Commenting on the coverage he had seen in the Western media Dietmar Hartwig, the chief of the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Kosovo, said "I didn't think it had anything to do with reality [the] reporting was always very one-sided. There was only one perpetrator and always one victim."¹²⁹

While the Western media painted Serbs as aggressors and Albanians as innocent victims the reality was 180 degrees opposite. Hartwig had several teams of EUMM observers stationed throughout Kosovo and reporting to him from 1998 until NATO attacked in March 1999. When asked whether he had any information about Serb forces provoking fighting in the province he said, "I know of no conflict that was initiated, and I did not receive any reports, and I myself had seen nothing or heard anything." adding that "Certainly there were no incidents that had been provoked by the [Serb] police."¹³⁰

According to all of the information at the EUMM's disposal, Serbian security forces never deliberately targeted civilians. On the contrary, Hartwig testified that Serb security forces tried to "ensure that every kind of attention" was paid to avoiding acts that would "lead to a worsening of the Serbian reputation."¹³¹

Hartwig was an active duty officer in the German military, which participated in the NATO attack on Yugoslavia. There is no conceivable reason why he or the European Union's Monitoring Mission would cover for the Serbs; on the contrary, most EU countries are members of NATO so the EU would have a greater motive to accuse the Serbs than defend them.

While the EUMM found that Serbian security forces behaved in a responsible manner and only using force in response to KLA attacks, the Western media painted these same Serbian security forces as genocidal demons intent on victimizing the hapless Albanian population of Kosovo.

The American news channel CNN was particularly unprofessional in its reporting. In 1998 CNN's chief international correspondent Christiane Amanpour married James Rubin, the U.S. State Department's spokesman during the Kosovo war.¹³²

Ms. Amanpour's conflict of interest couldn't be clearer, if she had information that contradicted the official statements her husband was making at the State Department could she be trusted to relay that information to the public?

If CNN's senior management had any ethics they would have reassigned her or at least told their viewers about the wedding.¹³³

In addition to its chief international correspondent being married to the State Department's spokesman, CNN had Army psychological operations specialists working in its newsroom.

Major Thomas Collins of the U.S. Army Information Service told the Dutch newspaper Trouw that personnel from the Fourth Psychological Operations Group based at Fort Bragg "worked as regular employees of CNN. Conceivably, they would have worked on stories during the Kosovo war. They helped in the production of news."¹³⁴

CNN's Kosovo reporting was deliberately misleading. Goran Stojcik, a Macedonian ambulance driver, who worked in the refugee camp near the Donje Blace border crossing during the Kosovo war, testified under oath at The Hague Tribunal that he had eye witnessed CNN camera crews stage-managing fake news footage.

He saw CNN crews provoking refugee children to cry by throwing them into the mud, and he saw CNN camera crews coaching the refugees how to act in front of the cameras. In one instance he said that his colleague's medical supplies were stolen so that a perfectly healthy man could be wrapped in bandages and placed on a stretcher to be portrayed as wounded in front of the TV cameras.¹³⁵

Stojcik identified Christiane Amanpour as the CNN reporter on the scene and said "CNN was the most prominent in stage managing things that were to be filmed".¹³⁶

While Rubin was at the State Department telling the world that "genocide" was unfolding in Kosovo¹³⁷, his dutiful wife was in the refugee camps where CNN was stage-managing fake news footage to jibe with his assertions.

CNN may also be complicit in the killing of 16 employees of Radio-Television Serbia and the attempted assassination of Serbian Information Minister Aleksandar Vucic when NATO warplanes bombed the Radio-Television Serbia's (RTS) Belgrade studios.

NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Gen. Wesley Clark, told reporters: "I personally called the CNN reporter and had it set up so that it would be leaked [that RTS would be bombed]."¹³⁸

If Clark leaked information, CNN never forwarded it to the doomed staff of RTS. Less than 24-hours before the attack, CNN producer Dheepa Pandian arranged for Serbian Information Minister Aleksandar Vucic to be interviewed on CNN's "Larry King Live" program. She asked him to be at the RTS studios in Belgrade at 2:30 AM on the morning of April 23rd for a 3:00 AM interview.¹³⁹

NATO bombed the Belgrade RTS studios from 2:06 AM until 2:20 AM on April 23rd. Vucic was on his way to the studio for the interview when it was hit. If he had been a few minutes early he could have very easily been killed right along with everybody else.

In addition to Gen. Clark's assertion that he leaked the information, there are other indications that CNN knew the attack was coming. Three days before the attack, CNN moved its crew out of the RTS building and began working from the Hyatt Hotel instead.¹⁴⁰

CNN got out of the building and left everybody else to die. Even worse, they invited people to come to the building knowing that it was about to be bombed. CNN wasn't the only media outlet to mislead the public, but its conduct was certainly the most malicious.

Most media outlets misled the public by uncritically reporting any outlandish claim the Kosovo-Albanians could come up with. The media was duped or misreported the facts on several occasions. There were reports of a concentration camp at the Pristina soccer stadium that were later debunked.

In another example, Canadian television reporter Nancy Durham did a critically acclaimed report about a Kosovo-Albanian girl named Rajmonda Rreci who said that Serbian troops had murdered her six-year-old sister, but when Durham returned several weeks later to do a follow-up story she found the "murdered" girl alive and well in the Rreci family's home.¹⁴¹

NPR reported that the bodies of up to 1,500 Kosovo-Albanian civilians had been burned in a wartime crematorium set up by the Serbs at the Trepca lead mining complex in an apparent effort to conceal evidence of mass-killings.¹⁴²

Stories of the Nazi-like body-disposal facility were debunked when war crimes investigators sent a French Gendarmerie team down the mine to search for bodies. They found none. Another team analyzed ashes in the furnace. They found no teeth or other signs of burnt bodies. After the fruitless search an official at The Hague Tribunal told the Wall Street Journal: "We don't see any need to do [a] further investigation at this point".¹⁴³

The media should have known better than to uncritically report every outlandish story it was fed, because it was a known fact that the Albanians were under immense pressure from the KLA to lie.

During the war the London Times was the rare exception reporting that: "Reports from Macedonia and Albania confirm that KLA 'minders' ensure that all refugees peddle the same line when speaking to Western journalists. KLA gangsters rob them of any remaining cash. And KLA pimps driving Mercedes kidnap refugee girls for prostitution in Italy."¹⁴⁴

Chief war crimes prosecutor Carla del Ponte told the Kosovo-Albanian press, "You cannot imagine what kind of problems we are having in the investigations into KLA leaders in Kosovo. There is huge intimidation of witnesses in Kosovo, and now they do not want to cooperate with us. We are not receiving any assistance, either from the international community in Kosovo or from local authorities."¹⁴⁵

Albanians considered "traitors" by the KLA have been murdered. One example is the case of Cerim Ismaili he was the secretary of the Democratic Initiative of Kosovo, an Albanian political party allied with Slobodan Milosevic's government. He was gunned down and killed in front of his family.¹⁴⁶

The family members of Albanians who refuse to lie against the Serbs are also targets of the KLA. The KLA kidnapped Saban Fazliu's 16 year-old daughter after they learned that he was going to testify in Milosevic's favor at the Hague Tribunal.¹⁴⁷

Fazliu was Milosevic's second Albanian witness and his last, after news of the kidnapping spread no more Albanian witnesses would testify for the defense.

The coercion and intimidation of witnesses is worse in Kosovo than anywhere else in the former Yugoslavia. A confidential brief submitted by Hague prosecutors in the trial of KLA commander Ramush Haradinaj said, "the security situation for witnesses in Kosovo is fundamentally different from situation faced by witnesses in other regions of the former Yugoslavia. UNMIK's efforts to re-establish a functional judicial system have been beset by persistent problem associated with the intimidation of witnesses. In some of the most serious

cases witnesses have been killed shortly after cooperating with local judicial authorities."¹⁴⁸

The Kosovo-Albanian population is unable to speak freely. An Albanian speaking favorably about the Serbs or negatively about the KLA is liable to be killed or have his family victimized.

THE KOSOVO-ALBANIAN NATIONALISTS' CAPACITY FOR DECEPTION

Like the Muslim regime in Bosnia, Albanian nationalists in Kosovo sought to portray themselves as victims of human rights abuses at the hands of the Serbs. Their goal was to justify the KLA's terrorism and obtain foreign intervention against the Serbs.

The first instance of Kosovo-Albanians faking a human rights abuse occurred on March 22-23, 1990. Thousands of ethnic Albanian school children were admitted to Kosovo hospitals complaining of a mysterious illness that only affected Albanians.

Ibrahim Rugova, the man who would go on to lead Kosovo's parallel Albanian institutions, accused Serbian authorities of using nerve gas to poison Albanian children. The Kosovo-Albanian public was outraged and Albanian mobs rampaged through Kosovo's streets beating-up several Serbs in the process.¹⁴⁹

A Yugoslav commission set-up to investigate the "mystery illness" said that 2,990 Kosovo-Albanians had been hospitalized, but there was no evidence that any of them had been poisoned.¹⁵⁰

Yugoslav medical specialists examined blood, urine, and stomach fluid samples and found "no trace whatsoever of any toxic or other chemical substances".¹⁵¹

The Helsinki Watch (now known as Human Rights Watch) appointed its own international panel of doctors to assess the situation, and they didn't find any evidence of poisoning either. They concluded that the Albanians were suffering from "mass hysteria".¹⁵²

Dr. Vukasin Andric, a healthcare professional, who worked in Kosovo's hospitals during those days, testified about this incident at the Hague Tribunal. He said, "Those were young people who were completely healthy, who were brought to hospital to be portrayed as sick. They would walk along the corridors of the hospital, and then when a TV crew or somebody would arrive, they would run to their beds and make believe that they were poisoned."¹⁵³

At the time of the "poisonings", the Yugoslav government issued a statement saying that the "false epidemic" was "planned by Albanian extreme nationalists" who tried to "deceive the public and further deepen inter-nation conflicts."¹⁵⁴

The fact that Kosovo-Albanian nationalists could organize nearly 3,000 school children to pretend like they were the victims of a Serbian nerve gas attack is truly remarkable. Their only mistake was perpetrating a hoax that could be exposed by performing toxicology tests on the "victims".

The fact that you're dealing with people who have demonstrated the ability to organize thousands of children to lie en-masse should give you pause when you assess the credibility of the allegations the Kosovo-Albanians have made against the Serbs since then.

NATO'S MOTIVES NOT HUMANITARIAN

78-days of NATO bombing Yugoslavia under "humanitarian" pretences forced Serbian security forces to withdraw from the province in June 1999.

NATO's subsequent occupation of Kosovo did not make the province any safer for the civilian population. In the five months after NATO-led KFOR troops first took control of the province

there were 379 murders, at roughly 15 to 20 murders a week there were as many killings in Kosovo after the withdrawal of Serbian forces as there were before the NATO air strikes began.¹⁵⁵

NATO claims that it went to war to "stop ethnic cleansing" but the consequence of its war were exactly the opposite. After the withdrawal of Serbian security forces, the vast majority of Kosovo's non-Albanian population was forced to leave the province.

Over 200,000 Serbs and nearly 50,000 Roma (Gypsies) fled Kosovo after KFOR troops occupied the province. The non-Albanian population that stayed behind lives in constant fear of being attacked by ethnic Albanian extremists.¹⁵⁶

In the first eight months after KFOR troops occupied Kosovo, Albanian extremists managed to destroy nearly 100 Serbian Orthodox Churches (many of which dated back to medieval times) and burn or loot thousands of Serb-owned homes.¹⁵⁷

NATO's war didn't stop ethnic cleansing -- it facilitated ethnic cleansing. Unlike the exodus of refugees during the NATO bombing when people left the province regardless of their ethnicity, the exodus of practically the entire non-Albanian population after NATO-led troops occupied the province is a clear case of ethnic cleansing.

After the province was occupied by KFOR troops, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) ceremoniously transformed the KLA into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) on January 21, 2000.¹⁵⁸

The man that UNMIK chose to command this civilian "protection corps" was none other than Agim Ceku - the same ethnic Albanian field commander that Canadian troops had eye witnessed carrying out war crimes against the Serbian population in Croatia's Medak Pocket in 1993.¹⁵⁹

Appointing Ceku and the KLA to "protect" the civilian population makes about as much sense as getting a fox to guard the henhouse. Given the nature of their "protection", it's no wonder the non-Albanian population was expelled from Kosovo.

GREATER ALBANIA IS STILL THE GOAL

To this day the establishment of a Greater-Albanian state remains the over-riding goal of the Kosovo-Albanians. In 2004 The Albanian National Union Front published data from a poll commissioned by the Albanian magazine *ILIRA* showing that 82.5% of the nearly 8,000 Albanians polled favored the "Unification of Albanian lands".¹⁶⁰

Campaigning in Kosovo's 2004 elections, Naser Bresa, chairman of the Democratic National Front [BKD], told the Kosovo-Albanian newspaper *Kosova Sot*: "We offer the fulfillment of the historic aspiration for national unification, or said even more plainly, the formation of an ethnic Albania - an aspiration that dates back to the time of Mithat Frasheri, Abdyl Frasheri in the 19th century."¹⁶¹

Bresa was not the only Kosovo-Albanian politician campaigning on the greater-Albania platform. Emrush Xhemajli, chairman of the People's Movement of Kosovo [LPK] said "We are determined to realize the declaration on the independent state of Kosova and the creation of the Kosova-Albania Union."¹⁶²

Muhamet Kelmendi, the chairman of the Party of Albanian National Unity [UNIKOMB], told his supporters: "Our party offers a state through which we believe we can move towards realization of the historic will of the Albanian nation to have a state and be one nation. We do not understand creation of a new nation in the Balkans, but we do understand unification of the Albanian nation, which is currently separated and divided in various parts of the Balkans."¹⁶³

THE ALBANIAN PUSH FOR KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE

Most Kosovo-Albanian leaders realize that the only way to achieve their ultimate goal of a greater-Albania is to first declare Kosovo an independent country and then link it up with Albania.

The problem the Kosovo-Albanians have is the fact that there is no legal avenue to separate Kosovo from Serbia without Belgrade's consent.

The 1998-99 war ended with UN Security Council Resolution 1244. The resolution gives Kosovo the right to "substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration" but denies it the right of secession by guaranteeing Serbia's territorial integrity and sovereignty over it.¹⁶⁴

Kosovo's final status, which the resolution leaves open, is a question of what Kosovo's "substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration" will look like, not a question of whether it can be independent from Serbia.

The Kosovo-Albanians forfeited any claim to secession when they signed the Rambouillet Accords, which also provide guarantees for Serbia's territorial integrity and sovereignty over Kosovo.¹⁶⁵

In addition to the explicit guarantees in Resolution 1244 and the Rambouillet Accords, the Helsinki Final Act and the UN Charter provide general guarantees Serbia's territorial integrity.

From the standpoint of international law, Kosovo has no right to secede from Serbia. The Kosovo-Albanians, after starting the war and ethnically cleansing practically the entire non-Albanian population, have no moral right to secession either.

Because they don't have a legal or a moral leg to stand on, the Albanian secessionists have resorted to threats. Ylber Hasa, the lead Albanian negotiator at the 2006-07 negotiations on Kosovo's final status threatened the world with "a new Balkan war" unless Kosovo was given independence from Serbia.¹⁶⁶

Hasa's threat did not fall on deaf ears in Washington. The State Department official in charge of Kosovo, Nicholas Burns, argued in favor of Kosovo independence before the House Foreign Affairs Committee saying: "We became convinced in looking at it, all of us, that the prospects of violence would be greater if we waited ... because 92 percent to 94 percent of the people who now live in Kosovo are Albanian Moslems. And they've been waiting [for independence] a long, long time."¹⁶⁷

Many critics of Kosovo's independence claim that granting independence to its Albanian population would be an unprecedented act in international relations. Unfortunately, there is one precedent - the 1938 Munich Agreement.¹⁶⁸

In 1938 France and England signed an agreement with Hitler ceding a region of Czechoslovakia known as Sudetenland (which had a majority German population) to the Nazis in spite of the objections of the Czechoslovakian government.

The Germans living in Sudetenland had provoked clashes with the Czechoslovakian authorities and were accusing them of human rights abuses.

Hitler was threatening to go to war, for (as Nazi propaganda would have it) humanitarian purposes to rescue the German population, unless the Czechoslovakian government was ousted from Sudetenland.

In an attempt to appease Hitler, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, and French Prime Minister Edouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement giving control of Sudetenland to the

Germans. Unfortunately appeasement didn't work and the Munich Agreement only brought more German demands and even greater German belligerence.

Similarly, appeasing the Albanians with Kosovo won't bring peace. There are large Albanian populations in Montenegro, Macedonia, and Greece that share the same aspiration of establishing a greater-Albania. Albanian nationalists in Macedonia already pushed that country to the brink of civil war in 2001-02. Granting the Kosovo-Albanians independence will only embolden Albanian separatists in other parts of the Balkans.

Unfortunately, the lessons of Munich appear to have been lost on the U.S. and its European allies. It would have been far better to take a stand against the Germans in 1938, but the threat of German violence led to a policy of appeasement that enabled Germany to build-up its war machine and take countless lives. Today's threats of Albanian violence are leading to a similar policy of appeasement in Kosovo.

The precedent of an independent Kosovo would be dangerous for global and regional stability because it would give ethnic minorities the right to secede from their host countries. If Albanians in Serbia's Kosovo province can declare independence and establish their own country then why can't the Kurds do the same thing in Turkey or Iraq? For that matter why couldn't the Mexican population exercise their "right to self-determination" and do the same thing in the southwestern United States?

Kosovo independence is a Pandora's Box that the world would be well advised not to open.

CHAPTER 6

MILOSEVIC ON TRIAL

Milosevic's popularity in Serbia was declining after NATO troops occupied Kosovo. Due to the political atmosphere in Yugoslavia, Milosevic called for early presidential elections even though his term was not due to expire until July 2001.

A COUP IN YUGOSLAVIA

On September 24, 2000 presidential elections were held in Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milosevic was running for re-election and four candidates were running against him.

Milosevic's main opposition was Vojislav Kostunica, running as the joint candidate of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), a ragtag alliance of eighteen pro-Western political parties.

Kostunica was Washington's man in Belgrade. The U.S. Government spent some 77 million dollars funding DOS's efforts to unseat Milosevic.¹

The funds came in suitcases of cash smuggled across the border between Yugoslavia and Hungary, and in more subtle forms like computers and broadcasting equipment.²

In most Western nations, including the United States, financing a political campaign with foreign money will land you in prison. During the "1996 Campaign Finance Scandal" the United States arrested several persons suspected of funneling Chinese money into the coffers of the Democratic Party.³

In spite of massive interference from the United States, Yugoslav voters went to the polls and voted. On September 28, 2000 Yugoslavia's Federal Election Commission announced the election results:

1. Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, 2,474,392 votes, 48.96%
 2. Slobodan Milosevic, 1,951,761 votes, 38.62%
 3. Tomislav Nikolic, 292,759 votes, 5.79%
 4. Vojislav Mihailovic, 146,585 votes, 2.90%
 5. Miodrag Vidojkovic, 46,421 votes, 0.92%
- Invalid ballots: 2.68%

According to the results, Kostunica got the most votes. However, Yugoslav law required that if no candidate received an outright majority in the first round of voting the two top polling candidates must face off in a run-off election.

Because Kostunica got less than 50% of the vote the Federal Election Commission scheduled a run-off election between him and second place candidate Slobodan Milosevic for October 8, 2000.

Unfortunately, the run-off election was never to happen. Kostunica's supporters, with their suitcases stuffed with foreign cash, accused Milosevic of electoral fraud.

The absurdity of their accusation is obvious because people don't cheat to lose – they cheat to win. If Milosevic had cheated then he certainly wouldn't have rigged the election so that he would poll more than 10 points behind Kostunica.

Nonetheless, on October 5, 2000, three days before the run off election was to be held, Kostunica's supporters took to the streets of Belgrade to protest Milosevic's so-called "electoral fraud". They rioted, ransacked the headquarters of Milosevic's political party, and set the federal assembly building on fire. They had such strong inclinations towards democracy that

they raided the offices of the Federal Election Commission where the ballots from the first round of polling were stored. They took the ballots, threw them out the window, and set them on fire.⁴

Two days after the rioting and subsequent destruction of the ballots the Federal Election Commission issued a new set of election results:

1. Dr. Vojislav Kostunica, 2,470,304 votes, 50.24%
 2. Slobodan Milosevic, 1,826,799 votes, 37.15%
 3. Tomislav Nikolic, 289,013 votes, 5.88%
 4. Vojislav Mihailovic, 145,019 votes, 2.95%
 5. Miodrag Vidojkovic, 45,964 votes, 0.93%
- Invalid Ballots 2.85%

The logical question that arises is this: How could the Federal Election Commission recount the ballots after they were destroyed? Obviously, Milosevic's opponents were the ones engaged in electoral fraud.

In spite of the fact that Kostunica and DOS had seized power through violence, their actions were hailed by Bill Clinton who said: "It is not just the end of dictatorship in Belgrade. In a real sense, it is the end of the war Mr. Milosevic started in the former Yugoslavia 10 years ago. Democracy has reclaimed every piece of ground he took."⁵

While Clinton's idea of "democracy" included seizing power through violence and falsifying election results. Milosevic, the so-called "dictator", had a different set of moral principles. He could have ordered the army to putdown the rioting, and he could have remained in office until the end of his term, but he chose to step down. Unlike the dictator portrayed in the West, he didn't want to see his people killed or injured in clashes with the army.

In an interview published by the Russian press Milosevic said:

"After the October 5th coup I resigned the presidency. I didn't have to do that. We could have mounted a counter attack. But our government discussed the situation. It was our opinion that the foreign powers wanted to provoke a bloodbath. Their idea was, we would strongly resist; their Fifth Column would stage violent provocations; we would act to preserve order; and then their agents would stage murderous incidents for the camera, blaming us to create the impression of ruthless repression."

"It was our opinion that NATO wanted to provoke civil war, have a blood bath and let the Serbs kill each other to create a pretext for intervention."

"We have direct experience with war. The losses cannot be replaced. So if possible, it is better to make a struggle in the political sphere. So I resigned."⁶

Milosevic's guiding principle was that "Everything needs to be sacrificed for the people except for the people themselves."⁷

Unlike the vainglorious dictator portrayed in the West, Milosevic sacrificed the presidency and his own personal power to protect the physical wellbeing of his people.

MILOSEVIC ARRESTED

After they overthrew his presidency in a coup, the pro-Western regime in Belgrade had him arrested on bogus charges of corruption and abuse of power.

Milosevic surrendered to police after a forty-hour standoff between the army and police that ended at 4:00 AM on April 1, 2001. The Yugoslav Army was guarding him because he was the former President of Yugoslavia. When the police first tried to arrest him they didn't have a

warrant for his arrest so the army wouldn't let them take him. Reports that the standoff ensued because Milosevic was threatening to kill himself and/or his family were false. Milosevic surrendered to the police as soon as they presented a proper warrant for his arrest.⁸

Ironically, the police officer that led the operation to arrest Milosevic was none other than Milorad Lukovic "Legija", the same man that the Quisling regime in Belgrade would three years later, without even batting an eyelash, accuse of assassinating of Serbia's pro-Western Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic, in an alleged plot to "return allies of Slobodan Milosevic to power".¹⁰

Following his arrest, Milosevic was held in Belgrade's central prison where he was held for nearly three months without being arraigned. Under Yugoslav law, a court must either arraign the defendant or set them free within three months of their arrest.

In an interview with the New York Times, Djindjic said that they couldn't try Milosevic in Serbia because the investigation into him at home on charges of corruption had faltered for lack of hard evidence.¹¹

Rather than releasing Milosevic because there wasn't any evidence against him, Djindjic chose to break the law and ship him off to The Hague Tribunal instead.

Milosevic's transfer to the Hague Tribunal was illegal on every level. The constitutions of Serbia and Yugoslavia explicitly forbade the extradition of any citizen to a foreign court.

The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia had explicitly ruled that Milosevic was not to be extradited to the ICTY.¹²

The pro-Western puppet regime in Belgrade made no secret of its contempt for the rule of law. Djindjic's party called the court's ruling "irresponsible and scandalous" and Zarko Korac (Djindjic's deputy prime minister), boasted to the British press that "Milosevic could be extradited no matter how the courts ruled."¹³

Deliberately violating the constitution and ignoring the ruling of the highest court in the country, Djindjic decided that he and his "democratic" henchmen knew better. Six hours after the court had ruled that Milosevic couldn't be extradited -- he was shipped off to The Hague Tribunal anyway.¹⁴

The Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia has since reviewed Milosevic's transfer to the ICTY and definitively ruled that it was unconstitutional.¹⁵

To call Milosevic's transfer an "extradition" would be an abuse of the term. Extradition is a legal procedure, but Milosevic's transfer had no legal basis whatsoever. His transfer to The Hague Tribunal was a deliberate violation of the law. Milosevic wasn't extradited - he was kidnapped. To add insult to injury, the national humiliation of the NATO puppet regime kidnapping the former president happened on June 28th, Vidovdan, one of the holiest days in Serbian culture.

MILOSEVIC ARRIVES AT THE HAGUE

The first words out of Milosevic's mouth when he appeared in court at the Hague Tribunal were: "I consider this Tribunal a false Tribunal and the indictment a false indictment. It is illegal being not appointed by the UN General Assembly."¹⁶

Although his microphone was cut-off by the presiding judge, Milosevic did manage to make an important point.

The tribunal was established by UN Security Council resolutions 808/93 and 827/93. However, the UN Security Council does not have the authority to establish a criminal tribunal because

the UN Charter doesn't give it the power to adjudicate law. The Security Council cannot bestow powers that it does not possess on an entity that it creates; therefore the ICTY lacks legal foundation and has no jurisdiction.

The fact that the Tribunal was unlawfully established was not lost on its first defendant, a low-level Bosnian-Serb commander named Dusko Tadic. Tadic, citing the ICTY's lack of legal foundation challenged the court's jurisdiction to put him on trial.

The ruling that the ICTY's Appeals Chamber handed down looks like something that Franz Kafka would have written. Their disposition literally says, "The International Tribunal is empowered to pronounce upon the plea challenging the legality of the establishment of the International Tribunal" which of course led to the conclusion that "that the International Tribunal has subject-matter jurisdiction over the current case".¹⁷

That's the ICTY in a nutshell. The Tribunal's entire legal foundation is derived from the circular reasoning that it's legal because it says it's legal.

Although he did not acknowledge its legitimacy, the Tribunal quickly learned that Milosevic wasn't going to roll over and let them accuse him without a fight. After the Prosecutor read out the text of the indictment against him, Milosevic denounced the trial as a farce and said that the indictment was "written at the intellectual level of a seven-year-old child -- or rather - let me correct myself - a retarded seven-year-old."¹⁸

THE PROSECUTION'S CASE

The prosecution issued three indictments against Milosevic for 66 counts of war crimes in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo where the Prosecution alleged that he had participated in a joint criminal enterprise.

Under the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (JCE), an accused is individually liable for crimes committed in the pursuit of the JCE, whether he knows anything about them or not. The thinking is that an accused is guilty of the crime if the JCE was the motivating factor behind it.

In Croatia the Prosecution alleged that the purpose of the joint criminal enterprise was "the forcible removal of the majority of the Croat and other non-Serb population from the approximately one-third of the territory of the Republic of Croatia that [Milosevic] planned to become part of a new Serb-dominated state through the commission of crimes."¹⁹

In Bosnia the Prosecution claimed, "The purpose of [the] joint criminal enterprise was the forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, from large areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the commission of crimes."²⁰

In Kosovo the Prosecution alleged that the joint criminal enterprise was aimed at "the expulsion of a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian population from the territory of the province of Kosovo in an effort to ensure continued Serbian control over the province."²¹

The prosecution successfully petitioned the tribunal to join the three indictments into one mega trial by arguing that the "common scheme, strategy or plan which connects the three Indictments is Milosevic's plan to create a 'Greater Serbia', encompassing Kosovo and the areas of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina with a substantial Serb population: this was to be achieved through the forcible removal of non-Serbs from large areas of the territory of the former Yugoslavia by means of acts which constitute crimes under the Statute."²²

In the Prosecution's submission, the "purpose of the joint criminal enterprise described in these indictments and the methods applied to achieve the goal are effectively identical."²³

The core foundation of the Prosecution's case was the allegation that Milosevic sought to create a "Greater Serbia" and that the motive behind the litany of crimes listed in the indictments was his ambition to create a "Greater Serbia".

Although the trial transcript ran almost 50,000 pages and the trial lasted for four years, the question at the heart of it all is very simple. Did Milosevic want a "Greater Serbia" or not?

As we already established in Chapter 1, Milosevic didn't have any intention to create a "Greater Serbia."

Because Milosevic did not seek the establishment of a "Greater Serbia" none of the crimes listed in the indictments can be attributed to "his plans to create a 'Greater Serbia'". There was no joint criminal enterprise and therefore no link between him and the crimes set out in the indictments.

The other plank in the prosecution's case was that Milosevic was individually responsible for crimes allegedly committed by Yugoslav and Serbian Security forces in Kosovo by virtue of the command authority he possessed as the President of Yugoslavia.²⁴

In addition to Milosevic's direct authority in Kosovo, the prosecution alleged that he possessed de facto authority over Serbian combatants during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, but they didn't have any evidence to prove this.

THE PROSECUTION'S CASE SELF-DESTRUCTS

The Prosecution made the fatal mistake of calling its own employee to testify. Reynaud Theunens, a Belgian intelligence officer employed by the Office of the Prosecutor, was asked whether the prosecution had any evidence that Milosevic issued orders to Serbian forces fighting in either Croatia or Bosnia. The answer that Theunens gave was a disaster for the prosecution. He said, "The fact that we don't have orders doesn't mean that they don't exist."²⁵

Milosevic responded saying, "There are none, that's why you haven't got one."²⁶ It was five days before the end of the prosecution's case and their own employee had done them in.

There was only one prosecution witness who testified that he had actually witnessed Milosevic advocating a "Greater Serbia" or encouraging his subordinates to commit war crimes. That witness was a protected witness identified only as "Witness C-048".

C-048's testimony was the best evidence that the prosecution had. When C-048 gave his testimony, nearly fifteen months into the prosecution case, the Western media triumphantly reported that ICTY prosecutors "have finally found the elusive 'smoking gun' evidence to tie Milosevic to Balkan atrocities."²⁷

Judith Armatta, of the pro-ICTY Coalition for International Justice, hailed C-048's testimony as "some of the closest evidence of a 'smoking gun' yet to appear in the trial."²⁸

The Institute for War & Peace Reporting said that C-048's testimony was the first testimony "directly linking Milosevic to war crimes". Their report said that "After 15 months of trying, war crimes prosecutors have finally produced what they hope will be the 'smoking gun' evidence against Slobodan Milosevic. A witness has produced the first testimony that the former Serbian strongman instructed his men to persecute thousands of civilians."²⁹

After reporting that C-048's testimony had finally ended "15 months of frustration in [the] battle to link Milosevic to the atrocities of the Balkan wars," the Scotsman newspaper noted that "It is one of the paradoxes of Milosevic's trial that while more than 120 witnesses have recalled grisly details of massacres across the Balkans, not a scrap of testimony had been produced proving Milosevic actually ordered any of these crimes."³⁰

C-048 testified that he was the managing director of the Royal Casino in Novi Sad, Serbia, when sometime in March of 1993 (he didn't know exactly when) he overheard Milosevic in the casino advocating the establishment of a Greater Serbia and encouraging his subordinates to carryout ethnic cleansing operations against the Croatian population in the Serbian Krajina.³¹

C-048 claimed that Milosevic had visited the casino during a working visit to the Novi Sad headquarters of the Socialist Party of Serbia.³²

On July 7, 2003 this author personally went to the Socialist Party headquarters in Novi Sad to find out whether Milosevic had been there in March of 1993, and was unequivocally told that he had never even set foot in Novi Sad during that entire month.

The Royal Casino (now called the Hotel "Putnik"), where C-048 worked, is directly across the street from the Socialist Party headquarters in Novi Sad. I asked around and found that C-048's identity wasn't much of a secret. People knew his real name and they knew the motive behind his testimony at the Hague Tribunal.

According to the information that I received in Novi Sad, C-048 was a waiter who sometimes dealt cards for the various table games in the casino. He was also the guy that people went to see if they wanted drugs or a prostitute.

It came out during C-048's testimony that the Royal Casino's tax records never listed him as the director of the casino³³ and from what I learned in Novi Sad that would make sense; I was told that he never was the director of the casino in the first place.

It also came out during C-048's testimony that he had a criminal past, which apparently involved armed robbery, racketeering, and time in the Zrenjanin prison. Unfortunately, the details have been hidden from the public because the Hague Tribunal redacted most of this information from the trial transcript.³⁴

From what I was told in Novi Sad, C-048 was in trouble with the law because of drug offences so he decided to testify at the ICTY in order to use their witness protection program as a means to escape criminal prosecution in Serbia.

The explanation that C-048 gave in court was radically different from what I heard. He said, "I made contact [with the prosecution] at my own initiative ... because I'm convinced that it is the duty of any honest man to testify at court against crime."³⁵

C-048's recollection of the events he was testifying about came from an alleged diary that he says he wrote, but when the Prosecution asked him to produce it for the trial he told them that it was no longer available.³⁶

When the prosecution sent an investigator to Novi Sad to try and find it they came back empty handed.³⁷ The Tribunal was told that C-048's mother had destroyed the diary.³⁸

Tore Soldal, the prosecution investigator who interviewed C-048 before his testimony, said that he barely even saw the book that was purported to be the diary. He said that he was only able to glance at it briefly when the witness left the room, and even then he only saw two pages and couldn't remember what they said.³⁹

Soldal also went to Novi Sad to try and find corroboration for C-048's testimony, and he didn't find any either. When asked whether he found information corroborating C-048's assertion that Milosevic had been at a meeting in Novi Sad sometime in March of 1993 he admitted that he couldn't find any information "that matched the period or the incident the witness was talking about."⁴⁰

It must have been frustrating for the prosecution to have the one and only witness linking Milosevic to war crimes come to naught on the very last day of their case. I'm sure it wasn't the note they wanted to go out on.

A SERIES OF DISASTERS

The prosecution case was a series of disasters. Prosecution witnesses were caught lying, the prosecution got caught putting bogus information into the written statements of its witnesses, and several prosecution witnesses turned against them and gave evidence favorable to Milosevic.

The trial brought the tribunal into disrepute and transformed Milosevic from a defeated political candidate into a national hero.

Several prosecution witnesses got caught lying while telling dramatic tales of alleged Serbian atrocities. Prosecution witness Bilal Avdiu claimed that he had witnessed Serbian police executing civilians in Racak. He described one of the killings saying: "I saw that myself. He had no bullet injuries. I saw the knife and saw how they ripped his heart out. I know it was the police who did it themselves. I know that. It was just the wound from the knife when they ripped out his heart. That was the only injury on his body."⁴¹

Five days later, after forensic evidence submitted to the court had established that none of the bodies in Racak had had their hearts cut out, lead prosecutor Geoffrey Nice was trying to explain why his witness had testified that someone's heart had been cut out with a knife. Mr. Nice said, "Several witnesses now have spoken of mutilation of bodies at Racak, hearts being cut out and so on. It may be, and this will be an argument in due course, and may be that that is explicable by damage done to bodies by gunshot and similar weaponry."⁴² Even though the witness had been very explicit that there were "no bullet injuries" and that he "saw the knife and saw how they ripped his heart out".

Prosecution witness Milazim Thaci, a cousin of the KLA leader Hasim Thaci⁴³, testified how he had miraculously survived execution by Serbian police. He says they fired at him with heavy machine guns from a distance of seven meters and missed. To prove his claim he brought his shirt, which was riddled with bullet holes, to court with him. When asked to explain how the shirt he was wearing got hit while he wasn't touched he explained that "God saved us."⁴⁴ - God just didn't bother saving his shirt.

Ratomir Tanic, a so-called "insider witness" for the prosecution, testified that he was privy to sensitive state secrets because he was a special advisor to Novo Demokracija president Dusan Mihajlovic during a time when that party formed a coalition government with Milosevic's party.⁴⁵

Back in Belgrade, Novo Demokracija (which by then was allied with the Democratic Opposition of Serbia -- i.e. against Milosevic's party) issued a press release denying that Tanic had ever even been a member of the party, let alone an advisor to its president.

Dusan Mihajlovic told Serbian television that Tanic could not be described as "an insider" because he had not taken part in the events he was testifying about. He said, "The Hague tribunal is a serious institution and we should not have witnessed this. We should not have ended up in this laughable and ridiculous situation where the prosecution announces as a key witness a person who cannot possibly be that".⁴⁶

The Serbian newspaper NIN reported that Tanic, rather than the high-powered political insider he presented himself as, was a swindler known for massive gambling debts and a penchant for inventing personal exploits.⁴⁷

On another occasion a protected prosecution witness testifying under the pseudonym "Witness B-083" denounced the prosecution for getting large swaths of his written witness statement

wrong. He said: "I say quite plainly that there are errors of such a nature that I couldn't under any circumstances sign such a statement ... If I had written such a statement in my own hand, I would stand by it, but believe me, many of these things would not have been said if that had been the procedure, especially as there are some things that are absolutely untrue ... These are technical errors and things that absolutely are out of the question, because that is not what I think and what I believe."⁴⁸

This "mistake" was able to happen because the witnesses at the ICTY don't write their own witness statements. The Prosecutor writes their statements for them.

The day before the fiasco with B-083's witness statement broke; the Trial Chamber had ruled that written statements from witnesses known only as B-1516 and B-1010 could be admitted as evidence against Milosevic without cross-examination⁴⁹ and God only knows how accurate those were.

B-083 wasn't the only prosecution witness to find himself on the witness stand trying to explain how things he never said got into his witness statement.

Prosecution witness Dragan Vasiljkovic's witness statement said: "In my opinion, the Serbian government financed the war effort [in Croatia]. However, I have no evidence." When asked about that in court he said, "I don't remember saying this at all ... I don't know how this found its way into my statement ... I would not use the term 'war effort' for sure. This is not my word. I don't know how that went past. I reject it."⁵⁰

After Vasiljkovic's testimony failed to turn out the way the prosecution had hoped, he says they refused to pay his travel expenses and left him stranded in The Hague.⁵¹

On another occasion prosecution witness Radomir Markovic testified that the "democratic" regime that overthrew Milosevic in Serbia had tried to bribe him so that he would give false testimony.

Excerpt from Milosevic trial transcript; Friday, 26 July 2002; pg. 8764-8765

MILOSEVIC: Is it true that they offered on that occasion to you certain protective measures? They told you you would be in prison for six months and would be tried if you don't agree to charge me falsely, to level false allegations against me? Is that true or not?

MARKOVIC: They spoke to me about the difficult position I was in. They warned me against the possible consequences and offered me an option in the form of accusing Milosevic, as the person who issued orders for those criminal offences, which would relieve me of liability before a criminal court.

MILOSEVIC: Is it true that they offered you a new identity, money, and sustenance for you and your family only so that you would falsely accuse me? Is that correct?

MARKOVIC: Yes, that's correct.

The Milosevic trial was an unmitigated public relations disaster for the tribunal. Tim Judah, an anti-Milosevic journalist who blames him for the wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo⁵², was dismayed when the trial started. He wrote that "the trial of former Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic at The Hague is going horribly wrong, turning him in the eyes of the public from a villain charged with war crimes into a Serbian hero."⁵³

Midway through the Prosecution case the London Times was lamenting the fact that "One of the ironies of Slobodan's trial is that it has bolstered his popularity. Hours of airtime, courtesy of the televised trial, have made many Serbs fall in love with him again."⁵⁴

By August of 2004 the Milosevic trial had been going on for about three years and the Tribunal's credibility was in tatters. The Serbian public had been watching the coverage on TV and when the Serbian Human Rights Ministry conducted a public opinion poll they found that "three quarters of Serbian citizens believe that the Hague Tribunal is a political rather than a legal institution."⁵⁵

Milosevic's popularity, on the other hand, was skyrocketing because of the case he was making at Tribunal.⁵⁶ Milosevic had better poll numbers than the people who overthrew him in the October 5th coup. Public opinion polls showed Kostunica polling behind Milosevic.⁵⁷

By September 2005, Milosevic's critics were complaining that the live broadcasts of the trial were not having the desired political effect. His detractors urged Belgrade broadcaster B92 to take the U.S.-sponsored broadcasts of his trial off the air. Political analyst Daniel Cveticanin wrote, "It seems that the coverage benefits more those it was supposed to expose than the Serbian public. [The] freedom-loving and democratic intentions of the live coverage have not produced [the] planned effects."⁵⁸

While many of Milosevic's detractors wanted the live broadcasts pulled, his supporters were even more passionate that the daily trial broadcasts should continue.⁵⁹

The simple fact that Milosevic's opponents wanted the trial hidden, while his supporters wanted the whole thing broadcast wall to wall on live TV should give you a clue about who had the better case.

IMPOSITION OF COUNSEL DESTROYS TRIBUNAL'S CREDIBILITY

Milosevic's defense case began on August 31, 2004 with a two-day opening defense statement.

On September 2, 2004, before Milosevic even had a chance to call his first witness, the trial chamber took the unprecedented step of imposing a defense lawyer on him against his will.

The presiding judge explained that "The Chamber is satisfied on the basis of the Tribunal's Statute and the jurisprudence, as well as the law of many domestic jurisdictions that the right of an accused person to represent himself is not unfettered, and in the circumstances of this case, it is both competent to assign counsel to the accused and in the interests of justice to do so. We shall, therefore, do so."⁶⁰

Milosevic denounced the decision saying, "I want the Appeals Chamber to consider this decision of yours, which is illegal, which violates international law, which violates every conceivable covenant on human rights. At the moment when I am supposed to exercise my right to defense, you decided to deprive me of that right. I believe that that's a scandal."⁶¹

Indeed, article 21.4(D) of the Tribunal's own statute as well as article 14.3(D) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights guarantees all accused persons the minimum right "to defend themselves in person or through legal assistance of their own choosing".

The Trial Chamber's decision to impose counsel on Milosevic against his will was clear violation of that minimum guarantee. The Trial Chamber's assertion that the decision to impose counsel was grounded in "statute and jurisprudence" is pure fallacy. The Statute explicitly forbids imposing counsel on an unwilling defendant and the jurisprudence is nonexistent, never in the history of the Tribunal had a lawyer been imposed on an unwilling defendant.

The Tribunal chose two British lawyers to represent Milosevic: Mr. Steven Kay and Ms. Gillian Higgins. The two had previously worked for the tribunal as *amicus curiae* in the Milosevic trial.⁶²

The decision to impose Kay and Higgins as counsel on Milosevic was all the more scandalous because they had already said that they weren't competent to defend him. In their role as *amicus curiae* they had filed submissions opposing the imposition of a lawyer on Milosevic. Their submission said that "an imposed lawyer would not be in a position to positively advance a defense or contest evidence during the trial."⁶³

The Trial Chamber said that it was imposing counsel on Milosevic to protect his health and the reputation of the Tribunal.⁶⁴ Unfortunately they didn't have the same concern for his health when he needed heart surgery, but you'll read more about that later.

The decision to impose counsel on Milosevic against his will was roundly condemned and brought the tribunal further into disrepute. The imposed lawyers found themselves unable to function because the witnesses they were supposed to call denounced the trial a farce and refused to testify.

James Bissett, the former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia, had previously agreed to testify at the trial, but after the Tribunal decided to impose counsel on Milosevic he informed them that he was no longer willing to testify. He sent the Tribunal a letter saying, "The proceedings have taken on all of the characteristics of a Stalinist show trial. I do not want to be part of this travesty of justice. The frightening part is that it now seems evident justice was never a consideration of the Tribunal."⁶⁵

The Canadian ambassador wasn't the only one denouncing the tribunal. George Kinney, the man in charge of the Yugoslavia desk at the U.S. State Department during the early 1990s transmitted his refusal to testify saying; "the proceedings have become inherently unfair, amounting to no more than a political show trial with no authentic legal legitimacy."⁶⁶

The tribunal received numerous such letters in response to its decision to impose counsel on Milosevic. Eventually the political pressure got so unbearable that on November 1, 2004 the ICTY Appeals Chamber restored Milosevic's right to conduct his own defense. Their ruling said that the Trial Chamber's original ruling had been "grounded on a fundamental error of law" and that "it was an abuse of discretion to curtail [Milosevic's] participation in the trial so dramatically."⁶⁷

MILOSEVIC'S DEFENSE

Milosevic's defense was broadly aimed at debunking the prosecution's thesis that he had been involved in a Joint Criminal Enterprise to create a "Greater Serbia".

Milosevic's case was that the wars were the result of the unlawful acts of others - namely attempts by the Slovenes, Croats, Muslims and Kosovo-Albanians to secede from Yugoslavia through the use of violence.

The Prosecution claimed that Serbian security forces had conducted a widespread and systematic campaign of repression and ethnic cleansing against Kosovo's ethnic Albanian population. The indictment said: "While holding positions of superior authority, Slobodan Milosevic [is] individually criminally responsible for the acts or omissions of [his] subordinates ... A superior is responsible for the acts of his subordinates if he knew or had reason to know that his subordinates were about to commit such acts or had done so, and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish their perpetrators."⁶⁸

Milosevic defended himself from this charge by showing that there was no widespread and systematic campaign of persecution, and by demonstrating that measures were taken to prevent and punish crimes against the civilian population in Kosovo.

The orders that Milosevic gave to the security forces in Kosovo were crystal clear:

Any individual, whether military personnel or civilian, who violates or orders, incites, assists or participates in the violation of the principles, rules and regulations of international laws of war shall be held personally responsible for that violation. Ignorance of the provisions of the rules and regulations of international laws of war shall not exclude the liability of those who violate these provisions.

Any military officer who knows that there have been violations of the principles, rules and regulations of international laws of war and does not initiate disciplinary or criminal proceedings shall be held personally responsible.⁶⁹

In addition to the orders from the Supreme Command, each soldier was issued a pamphlet drawn-up by the International Red Cross that outlined international humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions.⁷⁰

Unfortunately, as in any army, there were soldiers that didn't follow orders. Milosevic's Government undertook measures to prosecute these soldiers. Yugoslav military courts prosecuted 254 of their own soldiers for a variety of crimes against civilians in Kosovo ranging from crimes against property to assault and murder.⁷¹ In the most extreme cases, soldiers prosecuted for murder were given the death sentence.⁷²

It should be noted that the actual number of criminal prosecutions was even greater. 254 soldiers were prosecuted for offenses against civilians by military courts during the first 45 days of the war. When the war ended the military courts were abolished, but the prosecutions were continued in Serbia's civilian courts.

In addition to prosecutions against military personnel, some 200 Serbian police officers were prosecuted by Serbian courts for criminal offenses against the civilian population in Kosovo during the war.⁷³

Given that the indictment against Milosevic lists 607 Kosovo-Albanians as the victims of war crimes, the criminal prosecution of roughly 450 Serbian security personnel sounds about right.

Although Serbian security forces undoubtedly committed some crimes in Kosovo, the scale of their crimes has been wildly exaggerated. The policy of Milosevic and Serbia's state authorities was to prosecute crimes against the civilian population, not to condone or encourage them.

I would put the professionalism and ethics of Serbia's security forces up against any modern Western military force. In 2007 the Pentagon commissioned a survey of U.S. troops in Iraq and found that fewer than half of marines and a little more than half of soldiers said they would report a member of their unit for killing or wounding an innocent civilian. More than 40 percent supported the idea of torture, and one in ten soldiers said that they had personally mistreated Iraqi civilians by physically assaulting them or by destroying their property when it wasn't necessary.⁷⁴

RESPONSIBILITY FOR WAR CRIMES

War, especially ground combat, is inherently evil. No matter how well you train your men, no matter how strict the discipline, when you put young men into a situation where they have to dehumanize and kill other people in order to survive, bad things will happen. In the annals of warfare nobody has ever fought a "clean war". War crimes are the nature and the consequence of war itself.

That being said, there are two types of war: defensive war and aggressive war. Defensive war is a necessary evil – if you're attacked you have to defend yourself in order to survive. Aggressive war, on the other hand, is fought by choice usually for some political or economic objective.

Milosevic was fighting a defensive war in Kosovo. The KLA and NATO attacked Yugoslavia and, as the president of Yugoslavia, fighting a defensive war was his only option.

The fact that some of Milosevic's subordinates may have committed crimes in Kosovo does not make him a war criminal. Milosevic didn't order them to commit crimes; in fact he warned them not to and then did his best to prosecute them when they did.

NATO and the KLA waged an aggressive war against Yugoslavia. They attacked Yugoslavia and went to war of their own choosing. Every war crime that was committed in Kosovo is the direct consequence of their decision to start the war.

Justice Robert Jackson of the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal said, "War is essentially an evil thing. Its consequences are not confined to the belligerent states alone, but affect the whole world. To initiate a war of aggression therefore, is not only an international crime, it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."

Ironically, or more likely by design, aggression and crimes against peace are not criminal offenses under the ICTY statute. An accused can be prosecuted for crimes inadvertently committed in the course of a defensive war, while the people who started the war in the first place have nothing to worry about.

Although it is frequently compared to Nuremberg, the ICTY operates on an entirely different set of principles. If the ICTY operated on the same set of principles as the Nuremberg Tribunal, then Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, et al. would have been the first heads of state to be indicted for war crimes, not Slobodan Milosevic.

Walter J. Rockler, who served as a prosecutor at the Nuremberg Tribunal wrote about the NATO attack on Yugoslavia saying:

We have engaged in flagrant military aggression, ceaselessly attacking a small country primarily to demonstrate that we run the world. The rationale that we are simply enforcing international morality, even if it were true, would not excuse the military aggression and wide spread killing that it entails. It also does not lessen the culpability of the authors of this aggression.

As a primary source of international law, the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the 1945-1946 case of the major Nazi war criminals is plain and clear.

At Nuremberg, the United States and Britain pressed the prosecution of Nazi leaders for planning and initiating aggressive war. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the head of American prosecution staff, asserted, "that launching a war aggression is a crime and that no political or economic situation can justify it."⁷⁵

The trial of Slobodan Milosevic was a political show trial. Its purpose was to absolve NATO leaders of responsibility for a war that they started by putting the blame on Milosevic instead.

When a reporter asked NATO spokesman Jamie Shea whether he was worried that the Tribunal might indict NATO leaders for the crimes they had committed in Yugoslavia he explained that the Tribunal wasn't going to bite the hand that feeds it. He said:

I believe that when Justice Arbour starts her investigation, she will because we will allow her to. It's not Milosevic that has allowed Justice Arbour her visa to go to Kosovo to carry out her investigations. If her court, as we want, is to be allowed access, it will be because of NATO so NATO is the friend of the Tribunal, NATO are the people who have been detaining indicted war criminals for the Tribunal in Bosnia. We have done it, 14 arrests so far by SFOR, and we will continue to do it.

NATO countries are those that have provided the finance to set up the Tribunal, we are amongst the majority financiers, and of course to build a second chamber so that prosecutions can be speeded up so let me assure that we and the Tribunal are all one on this, we want to see war criminals brought to justice and I am certain that when Justice Arbour goes to Kosovo and looks at the facts she will be indicting people of Yugoslav nationality and I don't anticipate any others at this stage.⁷⁶

Milosevic was the president of Yugoslavia when NATO unlawfully attacked it, then a Tribunal that's been bought and paid for by NATO captures him and puts him on trial. Only an idiot wouldn't be able to see that the fix was in.

MILOSEVIC'S DEATH

Throughout Milosevic's detention in The Hague, it was a known fact that he had a heart condition. By the latter half of 2005 his condition was getting worse, and it was clear that he needed medical attention.

In November 2005 a team of doctors from the Bakulev Medical Center in Moscow traveled to The Hague to examine him. They determined that he needed heart surgery, which they were willing to perform at their facility in Moscow.⁷⁷

On December 12, 2005 Milosevic asked the Tribunal to let him receive medical treatment at the Bakulev Medical Center in Moscow.⁷⁸

The tribunal denied his request. They told him that the request was not made properly, and that it would not even be considered unless they received guarantees that he would return to complete the trial.

On January 18, 2006 the Russian Government provided the Tribunal with written guarantees that Milosevic would be returned to The Hague to complete the trial once his surgery was over.

In spite of the Russian Government's guarantees, on February 23, 2006, the trial chamber handed down a ruling denying his request for medical treatment in Moscow.⁷⁹

The next day Milosevic filed an appeal against the Trial Chamber's decision.⁸⁰ Unfortunately he would not live long enough to see the appeals process through, early on the morning of March 11, 2006 Slobodan Milosevic had a heart attack and died.⁸¹

Academician of the Russian Academy of Medical Sciences, Dr. Leo Bokeria, the coronary specialist who would have overseen Milosevic's treatment at the Bakulev Medical Center said: "If Milosevic was taken to any specialized Russian hospital, the more so to such a stationary medical institution as ours, he would have been subjected to coronographic examination, two stents would be made, and he would have lived for many long years to come. A person has died in our contemporary epoch, when all the methods to treat him were available and the proposals of our country and the reputation of our medicine were ignored. As a result, they did what they wanted to do."⁸²

The tribunal gave Milosevic a death sentence. They didn't condemn him on the basis of evidence presented in the trial; they denied him proper medical care so that eventually he just died.

WAS IT MURDER?

At best the Tribunal was negligent – at best they killed their star defendant by denying him the medical care he urgently needed.

At worst, the staff in the Tribunal's detention unit poisoned Milosevic by slipping him drugs that would dull the effect of the high blood pressure medicine he was taking.

On March 8, 2006 Milosevic sent a letter to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to express his fear that the Tribunal was poisoning him. His letter said:

I think that the persistence, with which the medical treatment in Russia was denied, in the first place is motivated by the fear that through careful examination it would be discovered, that there were active, willful steps taken, to destroy my health, throughout the proceedings of the trial, which could not be hidden from Russian specialists.

In order to verify my allegations, I'm presenting you a simple example which you can find in the attachment. This document, which I received on March 7, shows that on January 12th (i.e. two months ago), an extremely strong drug was found in my blood, which is used, as they themselves say, for the treatment of tuberculosis and leprosy, although I never used any kind of antibiotic during this 5 years that I'm in their prison.

Throughout this whole period, neither have I had any kind of infectious illness (apart from flu).

Also the fact that doctors needed 2 months (to report to me), can't have any other explanation than we are facing manipulation. In any case, those who foist on me a drug against leprosy surely can't treat my illness; likewise those from which I defended my country in times of war and who have an interest to silence me.

Less than 72-hours after writing this letter Slobodan Milosevic was dead. The drug that had been found in his blood was Rifampicin, an antibiotic used to treat leprosy and tuberculosis.

The Tribunal's official report on the inquiry into his death confirmed that, "Rifampicin had been found in a blood sample taken from Mr. Milosevic on 12 January 2006." And that, "Mr. Milosevic was not told of the results until 3 March 2006 because of the difficult legal position in which Dr Falke (the Tribunal's chief medical officer) found himself by virtue of the Dutch legal provisions concerning medical confidentiality."⁸³

The Tribunal is obviously lying. I have checked this out thoroughly. I have spoken with Dutch attorneys, and there is no provision in Dutch law that prevents a doctor from telling a patient the results of his own blood test. The explanation that the Tribunal's doctor couldn't tell Milosevic the results of his own blood test because Dutch medical confidentiality laws prevented him from doing so is absurd.

The possibility that Milosevic was deliberately poisoned cannot be ruled out. Milosevic had been the target of several assassination attempts in the past. In 1992 the British intelligence agency MI6 drafted a plan to assassinate him.⁸⁴ During the 1999 NATO attack on Yugoslavia, the Chinese Embassy was bombed because NATO thought he was in the embassy and wanted to kill him⁸⁵ and on another occasion NATO fired a cruise missile into his bedroom at 3 in the morning.⁸⁶

It is entirely possible that the Tribunal murdered Milosevic because they knew that no verdict convicting him could stand-up to scrutiny. The fact that the Dutch authorities have denied the Milosevic family access to the blood samples taken during his autopsy, and the fact that they refused to let the medical specialists chosen by his family even attend the autopsy is more than a little suspicious.⁸⁷

EPILOGUE

In April 2006, only weeks after Milosevic's death, the Tribunal terminated the employment of Geoffrey Nice, the lead prosecutor in the Milosevic trial. According to reports published in the

Serbian press, Nice was sacked amid allegations of sexual harassment. He was alleged to have fondled female witnesses and staffers on the premises of the Tribunal.⁸⁸

If there is a silver lining to all of this it is that Milosevic was able to use his trial to set the record straight on ten years of Balkan history. The most frequently cited source in this book are the transcripts from his trial in The Hague.

Slobodan Milosevic died with his honor intact. The last person that he spoke to before he died was Milorad Vucelic, an official in the Socialist Party of Serbia. His last words were, "Don't you worry: They will not destroy me or break me; I shall defeat them all."⁸⁹

Even though he was dead, Milosevic returned to Serbia a hero. According to police estimates, more than 500,000 people jammed the streets and the plaza in front of the Federal Assembly building in Belgrade to pay their final respects at his funeral.⁹⁰

Slobodan Milosevic died a hero's death. He died defending his country and his people. During his opening defense statement at The Hague he told his accusers, "Gentlemen, you cannot imagine what a privilege it is, even in these conditions that you have imposed on me, to have truth and justice as my allies. I am sure you cannot even conceive this."⁹¹

FOOTNOTES

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Onderwerp: New Book
Hello,

I have written a book entitled "Joint Criminal Enterprise; How NATO Destroyed Yugoslavia and Tried to Blame Slobodan Milosevic"

I have attached a copy of the manuscript so that anybody who has the time or the inclination to read the book can do so. I have immense respect for all of you. You are all experts on the subject matter contained in the book and I would appreciate any feedback you can offer, especially critical feedback.

I also don't have the first clue about how to go about getting a book published. If anybody has any suggestions I would be glad to hear them.

Best regards,
Andy

P.S. Please don't re-distribute copies of the manuscript. It is intended for your eyes only. If any errors are discovered in this text I would like to correct them. I would not want a flawed copy of the manuscript to be out there floating around.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX I

Full text of Milosevic's April 24, 1987 speech as translated by The Hague Tribunal's interpreters from the original videotape of the speech.

Source: Milosevic Trial Transcript Pg. 35670 - 35680, Tuesday, 25 January 2005

Comrades, before I say a few words about the substance of our today's discussions, I would like to say that there is no need for us to trade places as the lady said just a moment ago in order to ask for accountability. It is our duty.

And as for the unfortunate incident that happened here today and the police intervention that ensued, the responsibility for this intervention for which there was no reason will be established. This is completely clear.

Comrade Mitar, our chairman today, informed us about what was happening in front of the building, and you know quite well that within one minute we agreed that it is not -- that it should not be the police maintaining order but that you should undertake that yourselves in the interests of the safety of citizens and children who were there. The proof that it was the right decision was the fact that order was maintained quite well and that people behaved with dignity.

Now, finally, I would like to say something about the substance of our talks. I would like to say something about how such gatherings are evaluated, qualified. To put it briefly, these gatherings are not the gatherings of nationalists. They are not the gatherings of enemies either. And precisely because of that, Comrades, and I know that the vast majority of those who are present here and those outside of it will side with me on this, that we must not allow such gatherings of citizens to be abused by nationalists. All honest people have to stand up against this, because we must guard our brotherhood and unity like the apple of our eye. This is the only way. Especially nowadays when the brotherhood and unity are threatened. We must and we can win.

We neither wish nor we can classify people into Serbs and Albanians, but we should distinguish among the honest and progressive people fighting for brotherhood and unity and national equality on the one hand and nationalists and counter-revolutionaries on the other hand. If we do not create and strengthen that front, Comrades, then there will be no Kosovo, no Serbia, and no Yugoslavia either.

Another issue that I would like to bring up is this: I want to assure you that all the problems that you have discussed here, literally every word will be conveyed to the members of the Central Committee of the Communist League of Serbia. They will be told about it not just for the purpose of informing them but in order to solve the problems within the institutional framework of our system. I had to say this in the beginning since it is physically impossible to discuss all of the questions that have been brought up here.

Comrades, everybody in entire Yugoslavia is aware of the fact that Kosovo is a great problem of our society, which is being resolved very slowly. However, I have to say that if Kosovo had been the only problem, or at least the only major problem of the Yugoslavia society, the issues would have been solved faster and better. However, the problem in Kosovo occurred at the same time as the great economic crisis when the standard of living drastically deteriorated, when prices went up and the rate of unemployment grew. There are also political problems. You are aware of the fact that our country has been shaken by separatism and nationalism in many parts although not to such an extent as here in Kosovo.

And finally, there have been increasingly present aggressive anti-Yugoslav and anti-communist forces. Thus at the same time when there were many serious problems, our

society and the League of Communists have a lot of problems they are dealing with, and this is why the solution is difficult to find.

The League of Communists has not always been united in solving all of these problems. Therefore, they could not be sufficiently efficient. I do not bring this up as a justification since I'm not entitled to but as a statement. The request for unity is the most important task facing the party today. This request that there be unity was mentioned in every speech at the session of the Serbian Central Committee recently held. I'm convinced that we have made a large step forward, moving into the direction of the unity of both the Serbian Central Committee and the Yugoslav League of Communists. Only united can we solve many problems, and if we're not united we can solve none of them.

Despite many of the measures some of which you have mentioned as having been taken particularly in the past year, the situation in Kosovo, both the economic and political situation, continues to be dissatisfactory. Kosovo continues to be underdeveloped. There is a lot of unemployment. We have a lot of foreign debts. Exports are not satisfactory. We have a lot of buildings that have -- where construction hasn't been finished and there is great abuse of work and the function of administration in various services, and this includes the realm of politics as well.

We discussed this problems today both at the Presidency meeting, and I can tell you that that was yesterday at the Presidency meeting of the Provincial Committee, these problems were raised. It was held yesterday at noon. We discussed these issues, and we also discussed the question of education and upbringing, cadres policy, and that that -- there was still a spirit of separatism and very often counter-revolutionary spirit prevailing there too. The fact that the Serbs and Montenegrins are leaving the area under economic, political and physical pressure, this, too, represents the last tragic exodus of the population in Europe, and the last time such processions of desperate people were seen was in the Middle Ages.

I know full well that you need not listen to stories of what happened in the past or just to have an analysis of the present situation. Nobody is interested in that any more. And that is quite logical, because you and all of us are interested and should be interested only in those agreements who -- which will be able to change things for the better, which can resolve the situation we are all in, all of us together, you and then all of us together. But I do, nonetheless, wish to assure you that many measures have been taken in the field of financial/political relations, personnel policies, and that they are changing daily and that those changes will be even faster in the months to come.

The material development of Kosovo is something that is constantly being invested in. Separatism and nationalism have been treated as a counter-revolution, and there are substantial changes in personnel, policies, legal, administrative, ideological, and political measures are being put forward, but nobody is satisfied at the rate at which this is going, this process, neither in the Provincial Committee or in the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia or Yugoslavia. And we observed that yesterday at the meeting of the Presidency that was held. However, the process is gaining acceleration, and I am convinced that it will be even faster in the times to come, and that is something that I wish to assure you of.

However, we must understand from this, and I don't want to imply or suggest a solution and say that we have any reason to be satisfied. Quite the contrary. Kosovo is still today the poorest part of our country and the Albanian separatists and nationalists seem to have calmed down somewhat. They think time is on their side. And of course circumstances are in their favour, too, but let them know this: They should know that on this territory, there will be no tyranny. The progressive people of Kosovo will not allow it. Neither will Serbia or Yugoslavia allow it.

As for politics, in the political view, we still have the idea that the request for an ethnically pure Kosovo is justified and possible, and that's where the crux of the matter lies, because it is from this kind of attitude whereby the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo is considered to be a socio-political community of the Albanian nationality in Kosovo launched by

the counter-revolution, we come to the logical continuation that in that sense the province should de facto and legally be transformed into a republic. So this is the first but not insignificant steps towards breaking up the territorial integrity of Serbia and Yugoslavia. And, Comrades, we have begun to tackle that. We have come to grips with that both in Kosovo and in Serbia and in Yugoslavia. Among all progressive people.

Bearing in mind all the achievements so far, everything that remains to be done, and much more remains to be done than has been achieved already, we are facing not tasks and obligations but a great party offensive, the goal of which should be the material and cultural development of Kosovo and a free life of dignity for each of its inhabitants. However, we must first of all clarify some misunderstandings. The inhabitants -- when we say 'inhabitants,' we mean all the people living in the province of Kosovo and who are not singled out daily on the basis of their nationality or ethnic affiliation, just as we don't call them out as -- on the basis of their sex or marital status. So we cannot speak either of a minority nation or a majority nation in Kosovo. It is the Serbs and Montenegrins. The Serbs and Montenegrins are not national minorities in relation to the Albanians in Kosovo, just as Albanians are not a national minority in Yugoslavia, but they live together on a footing of equality with all our other nations and nationalities within our three socialist republics. The stand for an ethnically pure Kosovo and economically and politically autonomous one is not possible ideologically, politically or ethnically either, and in the long-run, it is not in the interests of the Albanian people themselves.

Nationalism of this kind would exclude it from its environment and would not only slow it down but would put a stop to its development altogether, both in the economic sense and in a general sense, in a spiritual sense.

Enver Hoxha, through his policy, excluded the Albanian people as an underdeveloped society from Europe and thereby deprived them of taking part in the dynamic life of the present-day world, and this portion of the Albanian people, here and now, are aspiring towards Europe and a modern society and they should not be stopped along that path. Nationalism always means isolation from others, closing in upon oneself within one's own framework. It means lagging behind in development, because without progress and cooperation on an all Yugoslav level and broader afield, there can be no progress. Every nation and nationality which isolates itself is behaving irresponsibly towards its own development. That is why it is we communists in the first place who must do everything to eliminate the consequences of a nationalist and separatist behaviour on the part of the counter-revolutionary forces in Kosovo and also elsewhere in the country.

It is our goal here to emerge from this state of hatred, intolerance, and distrust. It is our goal that all the people of Kosovo should live well, should have a good life, and it is with respect to that goal that I wish to tell you first and foremost, Comrades, that it is your duty to remain here, to stay here. This is your country. These are our homes. These are your cultivated fields and gardens, and your memories lie here.

You're not going to leave your country, are you, just because you live hard there or because you have been weighed down by the injustices and humiliation? It has never been typical of the Serbian Montenegrin people to yield before obstacles and to become demoralised when facing a problem.

As I was saying, to become demoralised when facing a problem, when coming upon hard times. You must stay here because of your ancestors and because of your descendants. Otherwise, your ancestors would be disgraced and your descendants disappointed. I do not suggest to you, Comrades, that in staying you put up with the suffering and the situation that you're not satisfied with. Quite the contrary. You must change the situation together with all other progressive people here in Serbia and Yugoslavia. Do not say to yourselves that you cannot stand alone. Of course you cannot stand alone, and we shall do it together. We in Serbia and everybody else in Yugoslavia will strive to change the situation. We cannot return the national structure of the Kosovo population, but we can stop further -- the further exodus and provide conditions conducive to a good life to all people in Kosovo, living

together and sharing their destiny and the economic opportunities that Kosovo has to offer and every other opportunity.

For some citizens in Europe, this demand seems to be absurd. It seems to be ridiculous to have to voice that demand in the present day world, and they rightly ask themselves about the life and work of the citizens, their security and equality, their rights and duties, because are they not regulated by the constitution and the law? Yes, they are if those laws are applied. When those laws are not applied, then they are not well regulated and that is when all these state authorities and administrative bodies must warn the political platform to do their duty. Their duty to consistently enforce the constitutional laws in Kosovo is a duty that is up to us all; Serbs, Montenegrins, and Albanians as well, Comrades, because if we legalised this state of lawlessness, then all those who are exposed to lawlessness are endangered. "Today it is the Serbs and Montenegrins that suffer most from that, but tomorrow this could be the Albanians, too, and that is why, unless law and order is introduced and respected in the broader social and historical sense, this will be the interest of all of the inhabitants of Kosovo. It is a very urgent matter which we must see to together in Kosovo.

And the second thing is this: We must talk about the return of people to Kosovo, especially experts, professionals. I firmly believe that you cannot stop the process of exodus until people are allowed and able to return to Kosovo. The return of the Serbs and Montenegrins to Kosovo is a process. It cannot be done by decree. People cannot be forced to go where they do not wish to live but we can launch a political campaign in order to provide material, economic, work and cultural conditions conducive to their return to Kosovo so that people who left Kosovo because of injustice and discontent can return. We must provide apartments for them and jobs for them and generally conditions for this to come about.

By creating all these -- in order to create all these conditions, we must harness the strengths of all progressive people, communists, young people, and all honest and progressive people in Serbia. No price is too high to achieve this.

And in -- we usually say in our political language that we're not in favour of campaigns but in favour of permanent lasting processes. In this case, the situation is urgent. It is alarming. We must launch a campaign, a real campaign to ensure that 50, 100, 200 professors, doctors, experts, professionals, skilled workers come back and then others will follow. This campaign must then become a process. Only then can we have any hopes of stopping the exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from Kosovo. And the spirit of law and justice and progress must be embodied in the working class of Kosovo, because it has identical interests and least interest in becoming divided on a national basis. It is the working class that have always fought successfully against greater injustices. We cannot place our trust in any other people, ladies and gentlemen, Comrades, but in us ourselves.

That is what I wanted to tell you on this occasion, Comrades, with respect to this discussion of ours here today, and I would also like to convince you that every member of the leadership of the Socialist Republic of Serbia and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will always be ready for discussions of this kind and for a permanent presence in our joint activities, the joint endeavours discussed here by us today. Rest assured those are the sentiments which prevail throughout Yugoslavia. The whole of Yugoslavia is with you. We are not -- we are conscious of the fact that this is not a problem of Yugoslavia alone. Yugoslavia cannot exist without Kosovo. Yugoslavia will become disintegrated without Kosovo. Yugoslavia and Serbia will not give up Kosovo.

Full text of Milosevic's June 28, 1989 speech as translated by the Hague Tribunal's interpreters from the original videotape of the speech.

Source: Milosevic Trial Transcript Pg. 35787 - 35795, Wednesday, 26 January 2005

Comrades, comrades, men and women. At this place, at this place in the heart of Serbia at the Field of Kosovo, six centuries ago, a full 600 years ago, one of the greatest battles of the time

took place. Like all major events, there are many questions and secrets attached to this one and are the subject of public curiosity and scientific research. By the force of social circumstances, this great 600th anniversary of the battle of Kosovo is taking place in a year in which Serbia, after many years and many decades has regained its state, national, and spiritual integrity. It is not, therefore, difficult for us to answer today that age-old question: How are we going to face Milos, Milos Obilic? To replay of history and life, it seems as if Serbia has precisely in this year 1989 regained its states and its dignity and thus is celebrating an event of the distant past which had a great historical and symbolic significance for its future. Today it is difficult to say what is the historical truth about the battle of Kosovo and what is the legend, and today that is no longer important. Oppressed by pain and filled with hope, the people used to remember and to forget as, after all, all people in the world do, and it was ashamed of treachery and glorified heroism. That is why it is difficult to say today whether the battle of Kosovo is a defeat or victory for the Serb people. Whether thanks to it we fell into slavery or thanks to it we survived in that slavery. The answers to those questions will constantly be sought by science and the people. What has been certain through all the centuries is that today in that -- there was disharmony that struck in Kosovo 600 years ago. If we lost the battle, then it was not only the result of social superiority and the armed advantage of the Ottoman Empire but also of the tragic disunity and discord in the leadership of the Serbian state at the time.

In the distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire was not only stronger than that of the Serbs but it was also more fortunate than the Serbian kingdom. The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to attend the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history. Even in the last war this discord and betrayal led the Serbian people in Serbia into an agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral sense exceeded the fascist aggression. Even later when a socialist Yugoslavia was established, in this the new state the Serbian leadership remained divided, prone to compromise to the detriment of its own people. The concessions that many Serbian leaders made at the expense of their people could not be accepted either historically or ethnically by any nation in the world, especially because the Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others. Their national and historical being has been one of liberation throughout the whole of its history and through two world wars, as indeed it is today. They liberated themselves. And when they could, they also helped others to liberate themselves. The fact that in this region they are a major nation is not a Serbian sin or shame of any kind. It is an advantage which they have not used against others. But I must say here and now in this big legendry Field of Kosovo Polje that the Serbs have not used the advantage of being great for their own benefit either.

It is thanks to their leaders and politicians and their vassal mentality that they felt guilty before themselves and before others too. Discord among Serbian officials made Serbia lag behind and their inferiority humiliated Serbia.

This situation lasted for decades. It lasted for years, and here we are now standing on the Field of Kosovo Polje to say that this is no longer the case. Therefore, no place in Serbia is better suited for saying this than the Field of Kosovo. And there is no better place in Serbia which is better suited than Kosovo Polje to say that unity in Serbia will bring prosperity both to the Serbian people in Serbia and each one of its citizens irrespective of their national or religious affiliation.

Serbia is today united and equal with the other republics and prepared to do everything in its power to improve its financial and social position and that of all its citizens. If there is unity, cooperation, and seriousness, it will succeed in that. That is why the optimism that is present in Serbia today to a considerable extent regarding the future days is realistic, because it is based on freedom which makes it possible for all people to express their positive, creative, and humane capabilities in order to further social -- social life and their own private lives.

Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today more than ever before in the past, we have members of other peoples and nationalities living in it. This is not a disadvantage or handicap to Serbia in any way. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. And the national composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly the developed ones, has

been changing in its direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together more and more frequently and successfully. Socialism, as a progressive and just democratic society should not allow people to be divided in the national and religious sense. The only reasons one can and should allow in socialism are between hard-working people and idlers, between honest people and dishonest people. Therefore, all people living in Serbia who live on the basis of their own work, honestly and respecting all other people and other nations and nationalities in their own republic. After all, our entire country should be founded upon those principles.

Yugoslavia is a multinational community, and it can survive only under conditions of full equality for all the nations living within it. The crisis that has hit Yugoslavia has brought about national but also social divisions, cultural, religious, and many other less important divisions too. Among all these divisions the nationalist ones have shown themselves to be most dramatic. Resolving them will make it easier to remove other divisions and mitigate the consequences that these other divisions have created.

Ever since multinational communities have existed their weak point has always been the relations between the different nations. The threat is that a Damocles sword stands over their heads and that one nation might be endangered by another one day, and this can then start a wave of suspicion, accusations and intolerance, a wave that invariably grows and is difficult to stop. This threat has been hanging over all our heads and external enemies of multinational communities are aware of this and therefore they organise their activity against multinational societies mostly by fomenting national conflict. At this time we in Yugoslavia are behaving as if we have never had such an experience and that in our recent and more distant past we have not experienced all the tragedy that national conflicts have brought with them in a society and yet survive.

Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the perseverance and existence of Yugoslavia and a way out of its crisis, and especially a prerequisite for its economic and social prosperity and in this way Yugoslavia does not stand out from the social milieu of the present day, especially the developed world which is more and more marred by national tolerance, national cooperation and even national equality.

Modern economic and technological as well as political and cultural development has guided various peoples towards each other and this has made them interdependent and increasingly has made them equal. In the civilisation of the present day towards which mankind is striving, it can only be equal peoples, and if we cannot lead the way into such a civilisation certainly we must not be at its tail either.

At the time when this famous historical battle was fought in Kosovo, the people looked to the stars, expecting them to provide the answers and give them assistance. Today, six centuries later, they are looking to the stars again, waiting to conquer them. On the first occasion they could allow themselves to be disunited, to have hatred and treason because they lived in small, weakly interconnected worlds. Today as citizens of the planet, they cannot even conquer their own planet, let alone others, unless they live in mutual harmony and solidarity.

Therefore words devoted to unity, solidarity and cooperation among people have no greater significance anywhere else on the soil of our motherland than they do here in the Field of Kosovo, which is a symbol of discord and treason. In the memory of the Serbian people, this discord in unity was decisive for them losing the battle and the terrible fate that Serbia was to suffer for a full six centuries. Even if it were not so from a historical viewpoint it remains certain that the people regarded their disunity as its greatest disaster. Therefore, it is the obligation of the people to remove disunity and discord in order to protect themselves in future from defeat, failure, and stagnation.

The people in Serbia this year have become aware of the necessity for mutual harmony as indispensable for their present life and further development. I am convinced that this awareness about harmony and unity will enable Serbia not only to function as a state but also to function as a successful state. Therefore, I think that it makes sense to say this here and

now in Kosovo Polje where disunity once upon a time tragically pushed Serbia back for centuries and endangered it and where renewed unity may advance it, give it back its dignity. And it is this kind of awareness about mutual relations that constitutes an elementary necessity for Yugoslavia, too, because its fate is in the joined hands of all its people.

The Kosovo battle and heroism also contains another great symbol, and it is the symbol of heroism. We have poems and literature devoted to it and history is devoted to it, too. The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our creative endeavours for six centuries. It has been feeding our pride and does not allow us to forget that once upon a time we were a great army, a brave army, and a proud army. One of the few who remained undefeated in defeat.

Six centuries later, in the present day today we are again engaged in battles and are having to face battles, but they are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded either. However, regardless of what kind of battles we're talking about, they cannot be won without the resolve, bravery and sacrifice of the people, without the noble qualities that were once present here in the Field of Kosovo Polje. Our main battle today concerns the implementation of economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity to find a quicker and more successful approach to a civilisation in which people will be able to live in the 21st century. It is for this battle that we need heroism in particular. Of course of a somewhat different kind, but the kind of courage and bravery without which nothing serious and great can be achieved in the world. And this remains an eternal truth and an eternal necessity.

Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself here in the Field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia at the time was the bastion that defended European culture, religion and society in general. Therefore, today it appears not only unjust but even unhistorical and completely absurd to talk of the Serbs belonging to Europe. Serbia has been a part of Europe incessantly. It is now as it was before. Of course always in its own way but in the way that in the historical sense never deprived it of its dignity.

And it is in this spirit that we now endeavour to build a society which is rich and democratic and thus to contribute to the prosperity of this beautiful country of ours and at this point unjustly suffering country but also to contribute to the efforts of all the progressive people of our age in the efforts they're making for a better and happier world.

Let the memory of Kosovo -- of the Kosovo heroism live on forever. Long live Serbia. Long live Yugoslavia. Long live peace and brotherhood among peoples. For the strengthening of Serbia, so that Serbia could leave the times of crisis and start heading towards true progress.

Alternate translation of Speech by Slobodan Milosevic, delivered to 1 million people at the central celebration marking the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, held on 28 June, 1989. Transcript compiled by the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce of the U.S.:

By the force of social circumstances this great 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo is taking place in a year in which Serbia, after many years, after many decades, has regained its state, national, and spiritual integrity. Therefore, it is not difficult for us to answer today the old question: how are we going to face Milos [Milos Obilic, legendary hero of the Battle of Kosovo]. Through the play of history and life, it seems as if Serbia has, precisely in this year, in 1989, regained its state and its dignity and thus has celebrated an event of the distant past which has a great historical and symbolic significance for its future.

Serbian Character -- Liberational

Today, it is difficult to say what is the historical truth about the Battle of Kosovo and what is legend. Today this is no longer important. Oppressed by pain and filled with hope, the people used to remember and to forget, as, after all, all people in the world do, and it was ashamed of treachery and glorified heroism. Therefore it is difficult to say today whether the Battle of Kosovo was a defeat or a victory for the Serbian people, whether thanks to it we fell into

slavery or we survived in this slavery. The answers to those questions will be constantly sought by science and the people. What has been certain through all the centuries until our time today is that disharmony struck Kosovo 600 years ago. If we lost the battle, then this was not only the result of social superiority and the armed advantage of the Ottoman Empire but also of the tragic disunity in the leadership of the Serbian state at that time. In that distant 1389, the Ottoman Empire was not only stronger than that of the Serbs but it was also more fortunate than the Serbian kingdom.

The lack of unity and betrayal in Kosovo will continue to follow the Serbian people like an evil fate through the whole of its history. Even in the last war, this lack of unity and betrayal led the Serbian people and Serbia into agony, the consequences of which in the historical and moral sense exceeded fascist aggression.

Even later, when a socialist Yugoslavia was set up, in this new state the Serbian leadership remained divided, prone to compromise to the detriment of its own people. The concessions that many Serbian leaders made at the expense of their people could not be accepted historically and ethically by any nation in the world, especially because the Serbs have never in the whole of their history conquered and exploited others.

Their national and historical being has been liberational throughout the whole of history and through two world wars, as it is today. They liberated themselves and when they could they also helped others to liberate themselves. The fact that in this region they are a major nation is not a Serbian sin or shame; this is an advantage which they have not used against others, but I must say that here, in this big, legendary field of Kosovo, the Serbs have not used the advantage of being great for their own benefit either.

Thanks to their leaders and politicians and their vassal mentality they felt guilty before themselves and others. This situation lasted for decades, it lasted for years and here we are now at the field of Kosovo to say that this is no longer the case.

Unity Will Make Prosperity Possible

Disunity among Serb officials made Serbia lag behind and their inferiority humiliated Serbia. Therefore, no place in Serbia is better suited for saying this than the field of Kosovo and no place in Serbia is better suited than the field of Kosovo for saying that unity in Serbia will bring prosperity to the Serbian people in Serbia and each one of its citizens, irrespective of his national or religious affiliation.

Serbia of today is united and equal to other republics and prepared to do everything to improve its financial and social position and that of all its citizens. If there is unity, cooperation, and seriousness, it will succeed in doing so. This is why the optimism that is now present in Serbia to a considerable extent regarding the future days is realistic, also because it is based on freedom, which makes it possible for all people to express their positive, creative and humane abilities aimed at furthering social and personal life.

Serbia has never had only Serbs living in it. Today, more than in the past, members of other peoples and nationalities also live in it. This is not a disadvantage for Serbia. I am truly convinced that it is its advantage. National composition of almost all countries in the world today, particularly developed ones, has also been changing in this direction. Citizens of different nationalities, religions, and races have been living together more and more frequently and more and more successfully.

Socialism in particular, being a progressive and just democratic society, should not allow people to be divided in the national and religious respect. The only differences one can and should allow in socialism are between hard working people and idlers and between honest people and dishonest people. Therefore, all people in Serbia who live from their own work, honestly, respecting other people and other nations, are in their own republic.

Dramatic National Divisions

After all, our entire country should be set up on the basis of such principles. Yugoslavia is a multinational community and it can survive only under the conditions of full equality for all nations that live in it.

The crisis that hit Yugoslavia has brought about national divisions, but also social, cultural, religious and many other less important ones. Among all these divisions, nationalist ones have shown themselves to be the most dramatic. Resolving them will make it easier to remove other divisions and mitigate the consequences they have created.

For as long as multinational communities have existed, their weak point has always been the relations between different nations. The threat is that the question of one nation being endangered by the others can be posed one day -- and this can then start a wave of suspicions, accusations, and intolerance, a wave that invariably grows and is difficult to stop. This threat has been hanging like a sword over our heads all the time. Internal and external enemies of multi-national communities are aware of this and therefore they organize their activity against multinational societies mostly by fomenting national conflicts.

At this moment, we in Yugoslavia are behaving as if we have never had such an experience and as if in our recent and distant past we have never experienced the worst tragedy of national conflicts that a society can experience and still survive.

Equal and harmonious relations among Yugoslav peoples are a necessary condition for the existence of Yugoslavia and for it to find its way out of the crisis and, in particular, they are a necessary condition for its economic and social prosperity. In this respect Yugoslavia does not stand out from the social milieu of the contemporary, particularly the developed, world. This world is more and more marked by national tolerance, national cooperation, and even national equality. The modern economic and technological, as well as political and cultural development, has guided various peoples toward each other, has made them interdependent and increasingly has made them equal as well [medjusobno ravnopravni]. Equal and united people can above all become a part of the civilization toward which mankind is moving. If we cannot be at the head of the column leading to such a civilization, there is certainly no need for us to be at its tail.

At the time when this famous historical battle was fought in Kosovo, the people were looking at the stars, expecting aid from them. Now, 6 centuries later, they are looking at the stars again, waiting to conquer them. On the first occasion, they could allow themselves to be disunited and to have hatred and treason because they lived in smaller, weakly interlinked worlds. Now, as people on this planet, they cannot conquer even their own planet if they are not united, let alone other planets, unless they live in mutual harmony and solidarity.

Therefore, words devoted to unity, solidarity, and cooperation among people have no greater significance anywhere on the soil of our motherland than they have here in the field of Kosovo, which is a symbol of disunity and treason.

In the memory of the Serbian people, this disunity was decisive in causing the loss of the battle and in bringing about the fate which Serbia suffered for a full 6 centuries.

Even if it were not so, from a historical point of view, it remains certain that the people regarded disunity as its greatest disaster. Therefore it is the obligation of the people to remove disunity, so that they may protect themselves from defeats, failures, and stagnation in the future.

Unity brings Back Dignity

This year, the Serbian people became aware of the necessity of their mutual harmony as the indispensable condition for their present life and further development.

I am convinced that this awareness of harmony and unity will make it possible for Serbia not only to function as a state but to function as a successful state. Therefore I think that it makes sense to say this here in Kosovo, where that disunity once upon a time tragically pushed back Serbia for centuries and endangered it, and where renewed unity may advance it and may return dignity to it. Such an awareness about mutual relations constitutes an elementary necessity for Yugoslavia, too, for its fate is in the joined hands of all its peoples. The Kosovo heroism has been inspiring our creativity for 6 centuries, and has been feeding our pride and does not allow us to forget that at one time we were an army great, brave, and proud, one of the few that remained undefeated when losing.

Six centuries later, now, we are being again engaged in battles and are facing battles. They are not armed battles, although such things cannot be excluded yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they cannot be won without resolve, bravery, and sacrifice, without the noble qualities that were present here in the field of Kosovo in the days past. Our chief battle now concerns implementing the economic, political, cultural, and general social prosperity, finding a quicker and more successful approach to a civilization in which people will live in the 21st century. For this battle, we certainly need heroism, of course of a somewhat different kind, but that courage without which nothing serious and great can be achieved remains unchanged and remains urgently necessary.

Six centuries ago, Serbia heroically defended itself in the field of Kosovo, but it also defended Europe. Serbia was at that time the bastion that defended the European culture, religion, and European society in general. Therefore today it appears not only unjust but even unhistorical and completely absurd to talk about Serbia's belonging to Europe. Serbia has been a part of Europe incessantly, now just as much as it was in the past, of course, in its own way, but in a way that in the historical sense never deprived it of dignity. In this spirit we now endeavor to build a society, rich and democratic, and thus to contribute to the prosperity of this beautiful country, this unjustly suffering country, but also to contribute to the efforts of all the progressive people of our age that they make for a better and happier world.

Let the memory of Kosovo heroism live forever!
Long live Serbia!
Long live Yugoslavia!
Long live peace and brotherhood among peoples!

APPENDIX II

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Reprinted for Fair Use only)
June 27, 1991, Thursday

SECTION: Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS; YUGOSLAVIA; EE/1109/B/ 1;
LENGTH: 441 words

HEADLINE: FEC SAYS FEDERAL ARMY AND POLICE TO TAKE OVER SLOVENIA'S BORDERS

SOURCE: Tanjug in SerboCroat 0129 gmt 26 Jun 91

Text of report on FEC decision

BODY:

At its session tonight [25th June], chaired by Ante Markovic, the FEC made a decision on how directly to ensure the implementation on the territory of the Republic of Slovenia of federal legislation regulating border crossings, the FEC Secretariat for Information announces. The decision is as follows:

1. In order to ensure the implementation of federal legislation regulating border crossings and movements in border zones in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, and also to ensure the carrying out of the SFRY'S international duties and an undisrupted flow of international traffic and free movement of people across the state border, the Federal Secretariat for Internal

Affairs will directly take over, that is, ensure the carrying out of the control services over crossings of the state border.

2. In its direct protection of the implementation of federal legislation regulating border crossings the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs will directly co-operate with the Federal Secretariat for National Defence so as also to engage Yugoslav Peoples' Army [JNA] border units in protecting state borders at border crossings and in built-up areas in the border zone.

The methods of carrying out this co-operation, as stated in paragraph 1 of this item, will be endorsed by an agreement between the Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs and the Federal Secretary for National Defence.

3. If a federal administrative organ or a federal organisation encounters physical or other resistance to the carrying out of its control of passengers and goods, or if such resistance is likely, workers of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs are duty-bound to help that administrative organ, or federal organisation, at its request.

4. More detailed conditions and methods of carrying out this decisions will be specified by the Federal Secretary for Internal Affairs.

5. The Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs will inform the competent organs of the neighbouring states about the temporary regulation of crossing the state border in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia in line with this decisions.

In the second part of its session, the FEC issued an order banning the erection of so-called border crossings within the SFRY's territory which reads as follows

1. The installation of so-called border crossings within the SFRY's territory is forbidden. The border crossings that have already been set up must be removed on the day this order comes in effect.

2. The Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs and the Federal Secretariat for National Defence will carry out this order.

APPENDIX III

[NO DOCUMENTS]

APPENDIX IV

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Reprinted for Fair Use only)
March 10, 1992, Tuesday

SECTION: Part 2 Eastern Europe; C. SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT; YUGOSLAVIA; EE/1325/C1/ 1;
LENGTH: 91 words

HEADLINE: BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA IN BRIEF; Final results of referendum on independence

SOURCE: Yugoslav News Agency in Serbo-Croat 1151 gmt 9 Mar 92

BODY:

(EE/1320 i - Text) Sarajevo, 9th March According to information from municipal election commissions, out of 3,253,847 registered voters, 2,073,568 citizens - that is 64.31% - voted in the referendum in the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 29th February and 1st March. Out of all valid votes, 2,061,932 - that is 99.4% of the valid votes - voted "for" [an independent and sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina] ; 6,037 - that is 0.29% - voted "against", and 5,227 votes - i.e. 0.25% - were invalid. (Tanjug in Serbo-Croat 1151 gmt 9 Mar 92)

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Reprinted for Fair Use only)

November 29, 1990, Thursday

SECTION: Part 2 Eastern Europe; B. INTERNAL AFFAIRS; YUGOSLAVIA; EE/0934/B/ 1;

LENGTH: 1209 words

HEADLINE: ELECTION RESULTS IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA

SOURCE: Yugoslav News Agency in Serbo-Croat 1800 gmt 18 Nov 90

Yugoslav News Agency in Serbo-Croat 1927 gmt 19 Nov 90

Yugoslav News Agency in Serbo-Croat 1703 gmt 19 Nov 90

Yugoslav News Agency in Serbo-Croat 1437 gmt 19 Nov 90

Zagreb 1400 gmt 22 Nov 90

Yugoslav News Agency in Serbo-Croat 1523 gmt 22 Nov 90

Yugoslav News Agency in Serbo-Croat 1333 gmt 23 Nov 90

Belgrade home service 2100 gmt 25 Nov 90

Yugoslav News Agency in Serbo-Croat 1304 gmt 27 Nov 90

BODY:

Abstract of reports

The Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina issued a statement in the evening of polling day stating that it was now certain that between 90,000 and 100,000 members of the party had been unable to cast their vote because they were not included on the electoral registers. The statement also complained of the very small number of polling stations in Serbian constituencies, which led to gross overcrowding, with many people leaving without voting because they could not wait any longer. At two polling stations in Pala, for example, over 7,000 people should have cast their vote, and at 8 pm over 5,000 people were still waiting. The party estimated that over 130,000 members of the Serbian Democratic Party, or 12% of the Serbian electorate, would not be able to vote (Tanjug in Serbo-Croat 1800 gmt 18 Nov 90).

In the evening of the 19th, the leaders of all the major parties which took part in the elections held a press conference in Sarajevo at the insistence of foreign correspondents and stated that, despite all the shortcomings, the elections were legitimate, and they would respect their results (Tanjug in Serbo-Croat 1927 gmt 19 Nov 90). The leaderships of the Democratic Socialist Alliance of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Party of Yugoslavs, the Bosnia-Herzegovina LC - Socialist Democratic Party and the Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia for Bosnia-Herzegovina stated nevertheless that they would call for an annulment of the election in those constituencies where malpractices are alleged to have occurred (Tanjug in Serbo-Croat 1703 gmt 19 Nov 90).

The municipal electoral commission in Mostar was the first to announce the final outcome of the elections for the municipal assembly. According to its figures, national parties have together polled over 60% of votes from about 645,000 voters. Most votes, 30%, were polled by the Croatian Democratic Community. The Party of Democratic Action gained almost 19%, the Serbian Democratic Party, 15%, and the Bosnia-Herzegovina LC-Socialist Democratic Party, 15.9%, far fewer than expected or forecast (Tanjug in Serbo-Croat 1437 gmt 19 Nov 90).

The counting of ballot papers and the summing up of the results of were completed on 22nd November. However, it will take few more days before the final results can be announced, although it is already clear that no major upsets in the present position should be expected. The three national parties convincingly lead in the elections for the presidency, for the two chambers of the republic's new parliament and for the local authorities. The Democratic Action Party has won the largest number of seats in the chamber of citizens - 42. It is followed by the Serbian Democratic Party - 36 and the Croatian Democratic Community - 20. In the first round of voting, 55 deputies, all representatives of the three national parties, have already secured seats in the chamber of municipalities. Deputies from the other 55 municipalities will be known after the second ballot, to be held on 2nd December. Out of the 55 deputies in the chamber of municipalities who succeeded in gaining over half the votes, 13 came from the HDZ (Zagreb 1400 gmt 22 Nov 90).

The republican electoral commission has decided to cancel the elections in Mostar and hold them again. Here the national representation of the population amongst elected deputies envisaged by the constitutional law was not achieved. According to reports, two representatives too many from the Croatian group and one from Serbian group were elected, although Yugoslavs in this town are also protesting that they are not represented in accordance with their numbers. The repeat elections in Mostar will be carried out on 16th December. Here all electoral procedures will be repeated, from the nominations procedure to the actual voting. The republican commission has also received complaints from Ilidza, where the national structure has also been upset (four Muslims too many have been elected), so that elections will probably be repeated here too, although information from this municipality is still being examined. It is expected that the elections in the republic will be completely carried out by 25th December, by which time the republican assembly and municipal assemblies should be constituted. (Tanjug in Serbo-Croat 1523 gmt 22 Nov 90).

The final results of Bosnia-Herzegovina's multi-party elections will be known after 25th November when the voting will be repeated at the 103 polling-stations where irregularities were spotted. Today's preliminary official results do not change in the least the picture outlined by the first count of ballots. At a press conference on 23rd November, the republican electoral commission announced that out of 2,997,661 voters, 2,279,712 or 76.05% voted and 123,816 votes were registered as invalid.

The national parties have won a resounding victory over the parties of the so-called "left-wing bloc" on all the lists. The future presidency of the SR of Bosnia-Herzegovina will comprise of Fikret Abdic with 1,010,618 votes and Alija Izetbegovic with 847,386 - both Muslim candidates of the Party of Democratic Action. This party will also have another member in the presidency, Ejup Ganic (680,783 votes), who was nominated in the elections as a Yugoslav, and will therefore represent the other nations and nationalities in this republic. Biljana Plavsic (557,218 votes) and Nikola Koljevic (541,212 votes) will join the presidency as candidates of the Serbian Democratic Party. Stjepan Kljuic (464,174 votes) and Franjo Boras (408,750 votes) will join the new presidency as candidates of the Croatian Democratic Community (Tanjug in Serbo-Croat 1333 gmt 23 Nov 90).

On 25th November, voting was repeated in 22 constituencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina where there were irregularities in the electoral procedure. The republican electoral commission decided that voting be repeated in 113 polling stations in 29 constituencies. However, since voters' lists have not yet been drawn up in seven constituencies, the voting will be repeated in these places next week. About 80,000 voters were involved in the repeat ballot but the results of the voting will have no influence on last week's results. Polling stations closed at 1900 and the votes will be counted tomorrow (Belgrade home service 2100 gmt 25 Nov 90).

The repeated voting in 22 municipalities and 53 polling stations which took place on Sunday has not made a great deal of difference to the existing ratio. The republican electoral commission said that a re-run was yet to be held in 60 polling stations in seven municipalities and that the voting for deputies in the chamber of municipalities of the would have to go into second round in 54 municipalities. The turnout for both ballots (on 18th and 25th November)

was 77%. Out of 56 seats secured so far in the chamber of municipalites, the Serbian Democratic Party has 27; the Democratic Action Party - 16 and the Croat Democratic Community - 13. The left-wing bloc is putting forward 19 candidates in the second round of voting on 2nd December, but if the first round is anything to go by their chances for a victory are slim (Tanjug in Serbo-Croat 1304 gmt 27 Nov 90).

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (Reprinted for Fair Use only)
October 25, 1993, Monday

SECTION: Part 2 Central Europe and the Balkans; FORMER YUGOSLAVIA; BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA; EE/1828/C;

LENGTH: 902 words

HEADLINE: [25];

Western Bosnian leader and Karadzic sign peace accord in Belgrade

SOURCE: Yugoslav Telegraph Service news agency, Belgrade, in Serbo-Croat 1345 gmt 22 Oct 93

BODY:

Text of report (EE/1827 C/1 [3])

Summary: Karadzic-Abdic declaration includes mutual recognition; proclamation of peace and commitment to cooperation; assurance of complete freedom of movement; announcement of the setting up of a commission to define the borders between the Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Western Bosnia; offer of immediate talks with Bosnian President Izetbegovic

Belgrade, 22nd October: Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serbian Republic [in Bosnia-Herzegovina], and Fikret Abdic, president of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, signed a joint declaration in Belgrade today, motivated by the objective of reaching a lasting peace between the Serbs and Muslims in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The declaration was adopted jointly, with the participation of the President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic.

The declaration reads:

At the invitation of the president of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, and motivated by the objective of reaching a lasting peace between the Serbs and Muslims in the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina the president of the Serbian Republic, Radovan Karadzic, and the president of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, Fikret Abdic, have met in Belgrade and decided, jointly and with participation of the president of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, to adopt the following declaration:

- The Serbian Republic acknowledges the existence, the will and the legal authorities of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, as envisaged by the Owen-Stoltenberg plan.

- The Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia acknowledges the Serbian Republic's existence, the will of its people and its legal authorities. It recognizes the Serbian Republic as one of the three constituent republics of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as envisaged by the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan;

- On behalf of their citizens and governments, Presidents Radovan Karadzic and Fikret Abdic solemnly conclude peace and proclaim the beginning of the development of good-neighbourly relations and multi-faceted cooperation in the areas of politics, the economy, traffic, culture and sports.

- Complete freedom of movement throughout the entire territory of the Serbian Republic is guaranteed to all citizens of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia and complete freedom of movement throughout the entire territory of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia is guaranteed to all citizens of the Serbian Republic, providing they are in possession of valid travel documents or an official identity card issued by the relevant authorities of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia, or by those of the Serbian Republic.
- Border crossing points between the Serbian Republic and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia will be established at points designated by representatives of the Serbian Republic and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia 48 hours after the proclamation of this declaration. All border crossings will be opened and equipped with adequate facilities on the basis of mutual consent and within a period of seven days upon the proclamation of this declaration.
- All basic freedoms and human rights, stipulated by relevant international legal instruments and political documents, in accordance with the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan, are mutually guaranteed.
- All persons who are found to have violated regulations of the international law on warfare will be tried before the regular courts of the Serbian Republic, or the courts of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia.
- All persons who have left their homes because of the civil war are granted the right to return to them, if they so wish.
- Presidents Radovan Karadzic and Fikret Abdic will within seven days appoint a commission for border issues, with the mandate of defining borders between the Serbian Republic and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, with the most important task of defining the borders in the area of the town of Krupa, on the right bank of the River Una.
- Presidents Radovan Karadzic and Fikret Abdic again confirm that all convoys carrying international humanitarian aid will be granted free passage on the entire territory of the Serbian Republic and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, in order to provide aid to all those who need it.
- Presidents Radovan Karadzic and Fikret Abdic express the hope that the leadership of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo will join their declaration and stress their readiness to launch negotiations on this issue with them as soon as possible.
- Presidents Radovan Karadzic and Fikret Abdic express gratitude to the president of the Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, for his great contribution in the reaching of a just and lasting peace between the Serbian Republic and the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia.

The declaration is signed by the president of the Serbian Republic, Radovan Karadzic, and the president of the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia of the Republic of Bosnia, Fikret Abdic.

The president of the Republic of Serbia [Slobodan Milosevic] attests to the reaching of the agreement and assumes the obligation of mediating if difficulties arise during its implementation.

LOAD-DATE: October 24, 1993

APPENDIX V

04 09 10:20 FAX +44 171 637 6868 CNI

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ABLE NEWS INTERNATIONAL, INC.
New House, 16-22 Rainbow Place, London W11 1DF, United Kingdom

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April 22, 1999

Aleksandar Vucic
Information Ministry

Via Fax: 36-16-578

Dear Mr. Vucic,

I am writing to confirm that Minister Aleksandar Vucic, will join CNN's Larry King Live program on Friday 23, 1999 at 3:00am (BELGRADE) for a live interview.

The interview will take place at RTS Belgrade Television and Minister Vucic should arrive at 2:30am (BELGRADE). The interview will last approximately 15 minutes and Minister Vucic will appear on his own. Mr. King would like to discuss with Minister Vucic the on-going situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

You can reach me in London at 44-171-637-6807 (office) 44-7803-294-819 (mobile), 44-1459-1500-36 (pager) and I look forward to speaking with you in the near future.

Kind regards,

J. Pandian
Dheepa Pandian
Larry King Live, CNN

APPENDIX VI

WAR CRIMES LAW APPLIES TO U.S. TOO (Reprinted for Fair Use only)
Chicago Tribune - Sunday, May 23, 1999, pg. 1, 5

By Walter J. Rockler

As justification for our murderously destructive bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, it is of course necessary for the U.S. to charge that the Serbs have engaged in inhuman conduct, and that President Slobodan Milosevic, the head Serb demon, is a war criminal almost without peer.

President Clinton assures us of this in frequent briefings, during which he engages in rhetorical combat with Milosevic. But shouting "war criminal" only emphasizes that those who live in glass houses should be careful about throwing stones.

We have engaged in flagrant military aggression, ceaselessly attacking a small country primarily to demonstrate that we run the world. The rationale that we are simply enforcing international morality, even if it were true, would not excuse the military aggression and wide spread killing that it entails. It also does not lessen the culpability of the authors of this aggression.

As a primary source of international law, the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the 1945-1946 case of the major Nazi war criminals is plain and clear. Our leaders often invoke and praise the judgment, but obviously have not read it. The International Court declared:

"To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime, it is the supreme international crime differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole."

At Nuremberg, the United States and Britain pressed the prosecution of Nazi leaders for planning and initiating aggressive war. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson, the head of American prosecution staff, asserted, "that launching a war aggression is a crime and that no political or economic situation can justify it." He also declared that "if certain acts in violation of treaties are crimes, they are crimes whether the United States does them or whether Germany does them, and we are not prepared to lay down a rule of criminal conduct against others which we would not be willing to have invoked against us."

The United Nations Charter views aggression similarly. Articles 2(4) and (7) prohibit interventions in the domestic jurisdiction of any country and threats of force or the use of force by one state against another. The General Assembly of the UN in Resolution 2131, "declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention," reinforced the view that a forceful military intervention in any country is aggression and crime without justification.

Putting a "NATO" label on aggressive policy and conduct does not give that conduct any sanctity. This is simply a perversion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, formed as a defensive alliance under the UN Charter. The North Atlantic Treaty pledged its signatories to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations, and it explicitly recognized "the primary responsibility of the Security Council (of United Nations) for the maintenance of international peace and security." Obviously, in bypassing UN approval for the current bombing, the U.S. and NATO have violated the basic obligation.

From another standpoint of international law, the current conduct of the bombing by United States and NATO constitutes a continued war crime. Contrary to the beliefs of our war planners, unrestricted air bombing is barred under international law. Bombing the "infrastructure" of a country - waterworks, electricity, plants, bridges, factories, television and radio locations - is not an attack limited to legitimate military objectives. Our bombing has also caused an excessive loss of life and injury to civilians, which violates another standard. We

have now killed hundreds, if not thousands, of Serbs, Montenegrins and Albanians, even some Chinese, in our pursuit of humanitarian ideals.

In addition to shredding the UN Charter and perverting the purpose of NATO, Clinton also has violated at least two provisions of the United States Constitution. Under Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution, Congress, not the president, holds the power to declare war and to punish offenses against the law of nations. Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist* No. 69 pointed out one difference between a monarchy and the presidency under the new form of government: A king could use his army as he pleased; the president would have no such unlimited power. Under Article VI of the Constitution, treaties, far from being mere scraps of paper as we now deem them to be, are part of the supreme law of the United States. Of course, these days a supine Congress, fascinated only by details of sexual misconduct, can hardly be expected to enforce constitutional requirements.

Nor can a great deal be expected from the media. Reports rely on controlled handouts of the State Department, Pentagon and NATO, seeing their duty as one adding colorful details to official intimations of Serb atrocities. Thus, the observation of a NATO press relations officer that a freshly plowed field, seen from 30,000 feet up, might be the site of a massacre has been disseminated as news.

The notion that humanitarian violations can be redressed with random destruction and killing by advanced technological means is inherently suspect; this is mere pretext for our arrogant assertion of dominance and power in defiance of international law. We make the nonnegotiable demands and rules, and implement them by military force. It is all remindful of Henrik Ibsen's "Don't use that foreign word 'ideals.' We have that excellent word 'lies.'"

Walter J. Rockler, a Washington lawyer, was a prosecutor at the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal.

TEXT OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC'S LETTER TO THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

The text of a handwritten letter dated March 8, 2006, written by Slobodan Milosevic to Russia asking for its help. Milosevic was found dead in his cell on March 11, 2006, less than 72 hours after writing this letter. His lawyer Zdenko Tomanovic provided the text of the letter in an English translation:

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation:

Dear ladies and gentlemen,

With my acknowledgment for the solidarity and understanding which you expressed by accepting to receive me to come for medical treatment and by giving guarantees, I would like to inform you about the following:

I think that the persistence, with which the medical treatment in Russia was denied, in the first place is motivated by the fear that through careful examination it would be discovered, that there were active, willful steps taken, to destroy my health, throughout the proceedings of the trial, which could not be hidden from Russian specialists.

In order to verify my allegations, I'm presenting you a simple example which you can find in the attachment. This document, which I received on March 7, shows that on January 12th (i.e. two months ago), an extremely strong drug was found in my blood, which is used, as they themselves say, for the treatment of tuberculosis and leprosy, although I never used any kind of antibiotic during this 5 years that I'm in their prison.

Throughout this whole period, neither have I had any kind of infectious illness (apart from flu).

Also the fact that doctors needed 2 months (to report to me), can't have any other explanation than we are facing manipulation. In any case, those who foist on me a drug against leprosy surely can't treat my illness; likewise those from which I defended my country in times of war and who have an interest to silence me.

Dear Sirs, it is known to you that Russian physicians, who rank among the most respected physicians in the world, came to the conclusion that the examination and treatment of the vascular problems in my head are inevitable and urgent. I know very well that this is true, as I feel very bad.

I'm addressing you in expectation that you help me defend my health from the criminal activities in this institution, working under the sign of the U.N., and that I be enabled as soon as possible to get adequate treatment in your hospital, in whose physicians, as well as in Russia, I have absolute confidence.

Yours sincerely,
Slobodan Milosevic

MARKO MILOSEVIC'S LETTER TO THE ORGANS OF THE ICTY AND THE UNITED NATIONS
REGARDING JUDGE PARKER'S INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEATH OF SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC
July 17, 2006

This is an open letter and is to be distributed to
The President of the ICTY
The Chairman of the Security Council of the OUN
The Secretary General of the OUN

It represents an official reaction of the family of Slobodan Milosevic to the report of ICTY concerning the causes of his death.

Mr. Parker,

I received your report concerning the causes of my father's sudden and untimely death. Unfortunately, it is exactly as I expected it would be, and as I warned your deputy, the French judge with whom I spoke in The Hague, that it should not be.

First of all, I must note that your investigation was not initiated because of "media speculation that Slobodan Milosevic had been poisoned" as you put it. Your report's continuous justifications before media are both inadequate and insulting.

Although illegal, the ICTY owes explanations to the family of the deceased, the Security Council as the organ which founded ICTY, the General Assembly, the Secretary General, and to the public.

Secondly, neither we the family, nor the expert team of pathologists, which was familiar with my father's health and was given the findings of the Dutch team, ever alleged the possibility of poisoning. To the contrary, I accepted the diagnosis of a heart attack (infarction) from the moment I heard it in The Hague. I warned both your deputy and the Dutch prosecutor not to vulgarize the investigation by setting-up a "straw man" accusation such as a violent murder or poisoning. The lines you have chosen to describe the "scene of crime" are naïve, vulgar and insulting. The report itself, if made by an independent institution, would have been at the very least disappointing. But, since it's being issued by the Tribunal, the very institution which had a monopoly over my father's health during his time in UN custody, it is shocking. It contains an unexpected number of contradictions. Its contents and conclusions are absolutely unacceptable to the sane mind.

Even if we had suspicions of poisoning, it would be pointless to try and prove them in conditions where the only possible culprit is the investigator. It is as if an accused committed a crime, leads the investigation, and comes to the expected conclusion that he is innocent. An accused may defend himself, but it is quite unusual that the accused himself leads the investigation, as was the case with your investigation and your report.

Should I mention the fact that the autopsy was conducted without the presence of the independent expert team sent by our family, even though we insisted on it? Or that the Russian doctors were denied the access to the body and the tissue samples? Or that we have been denied his blood samples? Now it happens that the Dutch medical institutions and doctors, which have already been gravely compromised in the eyes of the public through their involvement with the ICTY Prosecution in numerous manipulations with my father's health, medical treatment, and respective diagnosis, were the only ones to manage the toxicology tests and announce their results?! Here I must remind you of my father's letter addressed to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he wrote just hours before his death that he suspected he was being poisoned in the UNDU. So here we have a situation where we are witnessing numerous speculations regarding his blood samples, he expresses his worry about it, then he suddenly dies. Now comes this mysterious autopsy conducted by the very same people that he accused in his last hours, and they conclude that there was no poisoning. How credible does this sound even to you Mr. Parker? It is a pity that I am not in a position to ask Ms. Del Ponte an even simpler question – if he was ill, then why he wasn't he given medical treatment when he asked for it? And if he wasn't ill, then why did he die?

I understand that you have set-up this straw-man accusation of poisoning, and now by finding that there was no poisoning you assert that the ICTY has been relieved of all responsibility for my father's death. Nevertheless, an unquestionable truth remains before the public, the image of my father addressing your so-called "trial chamber" and asking to be allowed medical treatment, and the "presiding judge" responding that he will not listen to him.

The question isn't whether or not my father was murdered or poisoned. The point is that a former head of state, being held in UN custody, was gravely ill and constantly complaining of his medical condition. His health condition was assessed many times by medical experts as dire. He was denied adequate (if any) medical treatment, and then he died. At the same time those who denied him treatment were undeniably aware of what the consequences would be. He asked for provisional release to receive medical treatment. Dr. Shumilina warned on November 6th that his condition was so critical that he could die at any moment. Although you claim in your report (among many other contradictions, which I will not quote by number in this letter) that there was no suggestion by my father's doctors that cardiac surgery was needed, even in your own report, in paragraph 65., you write: («On 20 December 2005 a formal motion was filed seeking Mr. Milošević's provisional release to enable medical treatment at the Bakoulev Scientific Centre for Cardiovascular Surgery in Moscow. In addition to the reports of the three visiting doctors from November, a further email of Dr Shumilina dated 19 December 2005 to an assigned counsel for Mr. Milošević was relied on. In this email Dr Shumilina recommended the following additional tests: a complex ultrasonic of the vascular pathology, especially brachiocephal arteries and veins; echocardiography and stress echocardiography; Holter monitoring and daily monitoring of the blood pressure; "estimation" of the homeostasis: investigation of the brachiocephal and coronary vessels with contrast media; and PEI (position-emission imaging) of the brain and of the heart. Her email also indicated that endovascular or surgical decompression of the right vertebral artery, the stenting of brachiocephal or cardiac arteries, carotid endarterectomy, or even bypass surgery may be necessary to perform.»)

The guaranties had been granted, and the ICTY ignored all of it. Obviously deliberately for they were aware of all the facts, both general and subtle. So he died.

The Tribunal, and everyone in charge, has committed a deliberate murder. They condemned him to death on February 24th when they rejected his request for provisional release, ignoring everything: his health condition, his rights, and the warnings of his doctors, which unlike the jail physician hired by the ICTY, had both – unquestionable competence and expertise, as well

as his confidence. Ignoring even the guarantees of The Russian Federation (by the explanation that those guarantees lacked credibility, it seems that the Tribunal has given itself the mandate to evaluate the credibility of even the Security Council's permanent member states). The ruling handed down on February 24th came into effect on March 11th. That is the fact and the truth. Any other speculation is just evasive political maneuvering.

The statements and opinions of the ICTY Prosecution and the Dutch doctors have been completely disqualified. The Dutch doctors are going to be criminally prosecuted before the courts of their country. Ms Del Ponte was so keen to qualify my father as guilty even though the trial had not been completed as to insist on his "suicide" before the autopsy had even taken place. In such circumstances, both the Dutch doctors and the entire Office of the Prosecutor lack any credibility for matters concerning my father, from responsibility for the crimes he was accused of to the circumstances of his death.

It is obvious that even without poisoning, murder, or anything similar, but with heart failure which you consider to be a "natural" death that the ICTY and the UN who created it bears the sole responsibility for my father's death.

That "court" had already committed a series of violations against my father. It violated every rule and regulation known to modern civilization, both East and West. It failed to even comply with its own statute and rules. It ignored the guarantees given by permanent members of the UN Security Council, the very organ which created the ICTY. And finally, it deliberately led my father to his "natural" death.

As if that wasn't enough, you produced this grotesque "investigation" which found that "he was not murdered"! With all this, it is clear that the Organization of United Nations will have to take the responsibility for the death of the former President of Federative Republic of Yugoslavia and that the ICTY will have to be disbanded, as I told your deputy four months ago. I do not accept the explanations offered in your report. I find it visibly tuned to suit the ICTY Prosecutor's Office, and most importantly it is obvious that it was produced to relieve the ICTY of responsibility, not to show the truth or bring justice.

I expect the superior organs of the Organization of the United Nations to reject your report and reconsider the legitimacy of ICTY, as well as the behavior and performance of its staff. I also expect that, for the sake of the integrity and credibility of OUN, that the ICTY will be brought to end.

Marko Milosevic
July 17, 2006

Geneva 1201
Switzerland

John Wadham
Liberty
21 Tabard Street
London SE1
11 September 1998

Dear John,

As requested, I enclose a statement detailing MI6's plot to assassinate President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia in 1992.

When you have read it, lets discuss the best way to proceed.

Yours sincerely,
Richard Tomlinson

To whom it may concern: MI6 1992 proposal to assassinate President Slobodan Milosevic of Serbia

Dear Sir,

I would like to bring to your attention a proposal by MI6 to assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia. My motive in doing this is to draw to your attention the casual and cavalier attitude that many MI6 officers have to British and international law. The officer who wrote this proposal clearly could (and in my view, should) be charged with conspiracy to murder. He will no doubt escape unpunished, like many other MI6 officers who routinely break the law. This lack of legal accountability of MI6 officers needs to be addressed urgently.

From March 1992 until September 1993 I worked in the East European controllerate of MI6 under the staff designation of UKA/7. My role was to carry out natural cover operations (undercover as a businessman or journalist etc) in eastern Europe. The Balkan war was in its early stages at this time, and so my responsibilities were increasingly directed to this arena.

My work thus involved frequent contact with the officer responsible for developing and targeting operations in the Balkans. At the time, this was Nicholas Fishwick, who worked under the staff designation of P4/OPS. We would frequently meet in his office on the 11th floor of Century House to discuss proposed and ongoing operations that I was involved in and, indeed, many other operations which I was not myself involved in.

During one such meeting in the summer of 1992 Nick Fishwick casually mentioned that he was working on a proposal to assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia. I laughed, and dismissed his claim as an idle boast as I (naively) thought that MI6 would never contemplate such an operation. Fishwick insisted that it was true, and appeared somewhat offended that I did not believe him. However, I still presumed that he was just pulling my leg, and thought nothing more of the incident.

A few days later, I called in again to Fishwick's office. After a few moments of conversation, he triumphantly pulled out a document from a file on his desk, tossed it over to me, and suggested I read it. To my astonishment, it was indeed a proposal to assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia.

The minute was approximately 2 pages long, and had a yellow minute card attached to it which signified that it was an accountable document rather than a draft proposal. It was entitled "The need to assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia". In the distribution list in the margin were P4 (Head of Balkan operations, then Maurice Kendrick-Piercey), SBO1/T (Security officer responsible for eastern European operations, then John Ridd), C/CEE (Controller of east European operations, then Richard Fletcher or possibly Andrew Fulton), MODA/SO (The SAS liaison officer attached to MI6, then Major Glynne Evans), and H/SECT (the private secretary to Sir Colin McColl, then Alan Petty).

The first page of the document was a political "justification" to assassinate President Milosevic. Fishwick's justification was basically that there was evidence that Milosevic was providing arms and support to President Radovan Karadzic in the breakaway republic of Bosnian Serbia.

The remainder of the document proposed three methods to assassinate Milosevic. The first method was to train and equip a Serbian paramilitary opposition group to assassinate Milosevic in Serbia. Fishwick argued that this method would have the advantage of deniability, but the disadvantage that control of the operation would be low and the chances of success unpredictable. The second method was to use the Increment (a small cell of the SAS and SBS which is especially selected and trained to carry out operations exclusively for MI5/MI6) to infiltrate Serbia and attack Milosevic either with a bomb or sniper ambush. Fishwick argued that this would plan would be the most reliable, but would be undeniable if it went wrong. Fishwick's third proposal was to kill Milosevic in a staged car crash, possibly during one of his

visits to the ICFY (International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia) in Geneva, Switzerland. Fishwick even provided a suggestion about how this could be done, such as by disorientating Milosevic's chauffeur using a blinding strobe light as the cavalcade passed through one of Geneva's motorway tunnels.

There was no doubt in my mind when I read Fishwick's proposal that he was entirely serious about pursuing his plan. Fishwick was an ambitious and serious officer, who would not frivolise his career by making such a proposal in jest or merely to impress me. However, I heard no more about the progress of this proposal, and did not expect to, as I was not on its distribution list.

I ask you to investigate this matter fully. I believe that legal action should be taken against Fishwick, to show other MI6 officers that they should not assume that they can murder and carry out other illegal acts with impunity.

Yours sincerely
Richard Tomlinson

Joint Criminal Enterprise; How NATO Destroyed Yugoslavia and tried to Blame Slobodan Milosevic
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