

ANVULLING
STUKKEN CONTACTEN/
BEZOEK MILOSEVIC
EN ICDSH-CORRES-
PONDENTIE

အိတ်ဖတ်ကလေးကလေး

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Edited by Alexander Hoenes and
Volker

MiLOSEVIC

ATTANTA



'Ik heb alleen maar gewerkt. Altijd. Nu denk ik: was ik maar eerder opgehouden'

"Ik heb een dodelijke drive naar de jacht op het recht. Natuurlijk zag ik om mij heen advocaten zoals volledig afbrandende met meer kunnen. De empathie, het aantrekken van anderen's leed kan je ten val brengen. Je ziet enorme ellende, aanhoudend. Dus je moet er wel gescheiden voor zijn om de toetsen weg, de chirurg te blijven. Je moet altijd onafhankelijk problemen te blijven."

[illegible]

Waar heb ik het niet over. Daar doe ik ab-

U schrijft nu als geheimhouder toch ook

Impliciet over de Rindkerk Taghiz?
„Ik ben in die banden boeiend vanwege de verdelingen over de banden met hem. Dus beschrijf ik wel wat zich in die periode rond zijn komst uit Dubai naar Nederland heeft afgespeeld. De geheimenbander moet het in het oog van de stroom naar oplossingen. Je wordt als advocaat maar je moet overtuigen. Ik ga uiteindelijk met in op in houdelijke dingen over hem en zijn zaak. Over mijn contacten met hem kan ik niet zeggen.“

Vernuch is dat er **definitief** een straf-proces komt tegen u?

Uw voormalige collega Youssouf Toghiani is een celebrant uit van 5,5 jaar. Bent u niet bang ook jarenlang achter de tralies te verblijven?

Maakt u zichzelf ook verwijten in deze zaak?

Had u niet beter eerder met pensioen kunnen gaan?
 „Ik was al jaren bezig met afbouw-wen. Je kan niet eeuwig doorgaan. Ik heb alleen maar gewerkt. Altijd. Absurd. Het is niet normaal, maar ik dacht: dat moet. Dat is de billen van de bezetting. Nu denk ik: was ik maar eerder opgehoorden. *Quint while you eat* afhand. Ik wens dit wat ik mee-mak in elk geval niemand toe.“

» Versofo van Dordina 11

vertrouwd, geheim te houden. „Clienten en anderen uit de advocaat in verhouding metten, mogen erop rekenen dat een advocaat dat recht respectieel en zich op zijn verordeningrecht als geheimhoudende kan betrekken.”

Weski zegt daarom ook nooit te zullen praten over zaken als de verdachte op-
piles. Ze kan immers de geheimhoudings-
plicht niet verhoeden, zelfs als dat
mijzelf zou kunnen reddent'.

Wes-decantat dat de justitie diensten haar doel 'aankerk en afwe' wilden - 'nuwe' maken, zodat ze zou ingaan op het 'geestelijke ambod' en het OM haar geschiktheidspolitiek te doordringen. 'Mij werden harenkies door verschillende diensden afleitet onthultingen vooropleiden over gewa, over drijgingen en dat ik hun beestemming moet aanvaardden'. Een heel hebben twee agenten geprobeerd de verdachte advocaat tijdens haar vooracten te verhooren. Ze wilden de harenvooracten, vertelde ze.

Het eigenaardigste dat de vertaalky-
dens haast per gangenschap naar eigen ge-
nos behoeft, speelde zich af in de pen-
tentie Inrichting Nieuwstraat, waar ze
werd geplaatst na haar tien dagen dueren
de verblijf in de banken. Ze vertelt dat ze
in die gangenschap bezoekt krijgt van twee
officieren van justitie, een man en een
vrouw. Een is van de afdeling die over
kroongetuigen gaat en de ander is belast
met het bevestigingsprogramma. „Mijn

worden allerlei wollige opties en vertu-
de toevoegingen voorgeschoteld, kenne-
nls in de sfeer van het worden van
kroongetuige of hoe dan ook het geven
van informatie. Men kan wat voor mij b
believen, ik zou naar het buitenland kun-

Westal zegt dat de mannelijke officier van justitie daar vraagt of zij zijn naam kent. Die komt ze... Ik zeg dat ik nog niet goed in de herinnering heb, om te zien hoe daar op wordt gereageerd. Daar schijnt vol- gens hen een vrouw aan gepast te kunnen worden." De officieren, blijven aandachtig. "Weki zegt dat ze het gesprek na 'een kwartier' heeft beëindigd."

„Ik mag er vanuit gaan dat dit niet een privé-bobby zou van de officieren van justitie, ze kunnen niet ontdekken dat ze me voorstellen om een soort te kongstruiege of bijvoorbeeld informatie met gunsten te worden, want ik weet wie het waren en medeoverker van de inlichting was gestuurd.“

Ze is nog steeds verwont van de tijd over dit in haar ogen gruwelijke schrijnende voorstel, „ik hoorde het aan, ik dacht: hoe durf men... Als advocaat heeft ze zich in het Marneiro-proces nog nadruk-

keijls geleerd tegen het gebruik van kroongetuigen. Een 'terminale gifting' als bewijsmiddel. Het middel kroongetuigen heeft volgens Westdijkiers niet meer waarde om te gebruiken. Verklaringen zijn niet goed te controleren.

Tijlens met Maerango-pruizen zijn drie advocaten gedwongen hun werk te stoppen. Deek Westrum, advocaat van de kroongetuigen, werd vernood op 18 september 2019. Youssef Taghi, advocaat en

neef van Bidouan Taghli, is vorig jaar tot 5,5 jaar cel veroordeeld omdat hij onrechtmatig hoedschapen deelde met Bidouan. En nu wacht ook Wehli, die zich op 24 juli 2023 heeft laten uitschrijven als advocaat, een strafproces.

Hoe blijf je als strafadvocaat overeind onder de druk die verdachten en hun omgeving in dit soort grote strafzaken kunnen mitofensen?

Wederhoor

Mit heeft het Openbaar Ministerie vorigen gesteld over de desbetreffende advocaat. Weidert heeft voorts aan haar koninklijke vertegenwoordiger de reactie gezonden dat de reactie van Weidert is met Weidert verboden in een nog openstaand strafrechtelijk onderzoek. Het OM zal haar zaak en persoonlijk het voortgangsgesprek met de media bespreken. Deze komen aan de orde wanneer de strafzaak aan worden behandeld door de rechtbank. Op dit moment is nog niet bekend waar het dat kan zijn. Het OM wilde het strafproces vorig jaar aan de rechtbank voorleggen. Door de vertelding worden de rechtbank Rotterdam meerdere jaren procedures gevraagd.

3-5-24 NAC

RECHTSSTAAT Straftrechtadvocaat Inez Wesli was altijd getereveerd over haar persoonlijke leven. Als verdachte schrijft ze nu uitgebreid over haar diepe ambities.

Door onze redacteur Folkert Jansma

Afdraken In een Weeshuis op weg naar de zetting voor het Marlowe-proces.

teur nadrukkelijk op zoek naar zichzelf. Hoewel een publiek figuur, bekend van vele media-optredens, was ze altijd gescreend over haar persoonlijke leven. Nu lijkt ze voor het

Advocaat **mez Westl** op weg naar de zitting voor het Marenco-proces

[illegible]

De gruntnie passages over het gebiedshouderschap van advocaten en de structurele scheiding ervan door het OM, zijn daar niet los van zeen. Welke doet daar best los boosheid te camoufleren, maar vermoedelijk mee aanbandt.

Waarom zou de politie de zaak niet onderzoeken? Het antwoord is simpel: de zaak is te klein. Het is niet de moeite waard om er een zaak van te maken. Het is niet de moeite waard om er een zaak van te maken. Het is niet de moeite waard om er een zaak van te maken.

BESLUIT VERENIGDE NATIES

Genocide in Srebrenica wordt jaarlijks herdacht op 11 juli

Door een onzer redacteurs

AMSTERDAM. De Verenigde Naties hebben 11 juli uitgeroepen tot herdenkingsdag voor de genocide in Srebrenica. Op de Algemene Vergadering stemden donderdag 84 landen, waaronder Nederland, voor uitroeping van een jaarlijkse herdenkingsdag. Negentien landen stemden tegen en 68 landen onthielden zich. De resolutie was geïnitieerd door Duitsland en Rwanda.

Op 11 juli 1995 begonnen Servische soldaten met de moord op werden in

Srebrenica achtduizend moslimmannen en -jongens. Het dorp was door de VN aangemerkt als veilig gebied, en Nederlandse blauwhelmen waren verantwoordelijk voor de veiligheid van de groep, maar werden onder de voet gelopen door Servische troepen. De massamoord vond plaats tijdens de Balkanoorlogen na het uiteenvallen van Joegoslavië.

„Ons initiatief gaat over het eren van de nagedachtenis van de slachtoffers en het ondersteunen van de overlevenden die blijven leven met de littekens van die tijd”, zei de Duitse

VN-vertegenwoordiger Antje Leerdertse in de plenaire vergadering.

In Servië gingen voorafgaand aan de stemming duizenden mensen de straat op, omdat de resolutie het Servische volk als genocidaal zou bestempelen. De resolutie vermeldt overigens Servië niet als de schuldige en bevat überhaupt geen verwijzing naar Serviërs.

Het Internationaal Gerechtshof heeft in 2007 geoordeeld dat in Srebrenica genocide heeft plaatsgevonden, maar dat Servië hieraan niet schuldig is.

WARHOOFDERY

24-5-24
NR

Strafzaak



Foto: Arie Kruyt / de Volkskrant

Weski verdedt tot zichzelf in een boek

Het Openbaar Ministerie heeft Inez Weski na haar arrestatie in april 2023 voorgesteld om kroongertuige te worden. Dat schrijft de strafrechtadvocaat in een vrijdag verschenen boek. Ze doet daarin onder meer verslag van haar zes weken in de cel.

Mens van Dingen
Inez de Zwaan
Amsterdam

Nadat Inez Weski wekenlang alleen maar tegen betrouwbare mensen is maar eerste confrontatie met de buitenwereld, een verspreidde ervaring.

De eerste confrontatie met de buitenwereld, een verspreidde ervaring. Het boek is een verspreidde ervaring.

De eerste confrontatie met de buitenwereld, een verspreidde ervaring. Het boek is een verspreidde ervaring.

De eerste confrontatie met de buitenwereld, een verspreidde ervaring. Het boek is een verspreidde ervaring.

Traumatisch
Inez Weski, schrijft Weski de grote woorden niet. Tot in detail omschrijft ze haar decennie – een traumatische ervaring – en wat dit met haar heeft gedaan. De vervolging, hoe het is gegaan, hoe het is gegaan.

Al snel raakte ik overtuigd van het risico en misschien zelfs van de hoop dat ik de arrestatie, detentie en behandeling niet zou overleven

Inez Weski
Strafrechtadvocaat



Ze laat horen hoezeer haar ervaringen de wereld van de rechtspraak en de rechtspraak hebben veranderd. Ze doet daarin onder meer verslag van haar zes weken in de cel.

Ze doet daarin onder meer verslag van haar zes weken in de cel. Ze doet daarin onder meer verslag van haar zes weken in de cel.

Redacteur geopolitiek **Michel**

PILOSEVIC

in op als geopolitieke infrastructuurprogramma. Zo bouwt China tussen Boedapest en Belgrado spoor voor een snelle trein. Xi is overigens net in Belgrado op de 25ste verjaardag van het westerse vergisbombardeмент op de Chinese ambassade - altijd handig om je tegenspelers eventjes aan hun blunders ter herinneren.

Serbien schätzt Schaden durch NATO-Bombardierung auf 500 Milliarden Euro

28 Mär. 2024 10:10 Uhr

Die NATO sollte Serbien für die durch die Bombardierung Jugoslawiens verursachten Schäden in Höhe von 500 Milliarden Euro entschädigen, erklärte die Gesundheitsministerin des Landes, Danica Grujičić. Die Zahl der Krebsfälle in dem Land sei aufgrund der NATO-Bombardements gestiegen.

Quelle: Sputnik © Grigori Syssojew



Die Ministerin sagte:

"Sie haben uns damals so viel zerstört, lassen Sie uns ihnen diesen Betrag geben und vielleicht werden wir darüber nachdenken, ob wir Freunde werden."

Zuvor hatte der ehemalige jugoslawische Außenminister Živadin Jovanović in einem Interview mit *RIA Nowosti* den direkten Schaden durch die NATO-Bombardements auf 100 Milliarden US-Dollar (etwa 92 Milliarden Euro) geschätzt.

**"Wir sind Mahner in der Wüste"
– AfD-Abgeordnete erinnern an
NATO-Luftangriffe auf
Jugoslawien**

Am 24. März 1999 startete die NATO die Militäroperation "Operation Allied Force" gegen Jugoslawien ohne die Zustimmung des UN-Sicherheitsrates. Als Grund wurde die Weigerung der jugoslawischen Regierung genannt, den Konflikt friedlich beizulegen, was nicht erlaubte, Kriegsverbrechen und ethnische Säuberungen zu beenden. Die Bombardierung der serbischen Städte dauerte 78 Tage, bis zum 10. Juni 1999. NATO-

Generalsekretär Jens Stoltenberg benannte im Jahr 2018 als Ziele der Operation den Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung und den Sturz des damaligen jugoslawischen Präsidenten Slobodan Milošević.

Nach Angaben der serbischen Behörden fielen dem Bombardement etwa 2.000 Menschen zum Opfer, die genaue Zahl der Todesopfer ist jedoch nicht bekannt. Die russische Seite hat den NATO-Einsatz in Jugoslawien wiederholt verurteilt.

Wie een klacht heeft over de media, kan terecht bij de Raad voor de Journalistiek. Veel journalisten zijn ontvreden, de Raad zou te juridisch zijn en behandelt elk 'wisselwasje'.
Door onze redacteur **Wilfred Takken** Foto's **Oliver Middelendorp**


Juridische
taal wordt
vermeden.
Zo heet een
oordeel of een
uitspraak een
'conclusie'.

[illegible]

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Slobodan Milošević postuum vrijgesproken van oorlogsmisdaden Bosnische oorlog

11 augustus 2016

Auteur: Redactie KN (redactie/redactie-kn)



De voormalige Servische president Slobodan Milošević. (Foto: AP)

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Wat is de 'lijn Rome'?
[/commentaar/wat-is-de-lijn-rome](http://commentaar/wat-is-de-lijn-rome)

door Jan Peeters

Er was een tijd waarin wat van Rome kwam degelijk, scherpzinnig, consistent en bij de tijd was.

De voormalige Servische president Slobodan Milošević is door het Joegoslaviëtribunaal in Den Haag postuum vrijgesproken van oorlogsmisdaden die werden gepleegd tijdens de Bosnische oorlog van 1992 tot 1995.

Het International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), zoals het Joegoslaviëtribunaal officieel heet, stelt dat Milošević tijdens de Bosnische oorlog niet betrokken was bij een zogeheten 'gezamenlijke misdadige onderneming' tegen moslims en Kroaten.

Het International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), zoals het Joegoslaviëtribunaal officieel heet, stelt dat Milošević tijdens de Bosnische oorlog niet betrokken was bij een zogeheten 'gezamenlijke misdadige onderneming' tegen moslims en Kroaten.

Onvoldoende bewijs

Dat staat in de veroordeling door het Joegoslaviëtribunaal van de voormalige Bosnisch-Servische president Radovan Karadžić wegens oorlogsmisdaden. Karadžić is tot veertig jaar gevangenisstraf veroordeeld wegens volkerenmoord tijdens de Bosnische oorlog.

In het in maart gepubliceerde 2615 pagina's tellende oordeel

(http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf)

meldt het Joegoslaviëtribunaal in punt 3460 dat er onvoldoende bewijs is voor de betrokkenheid van Milošević bij het plan om het gebied dat in handen was van de Bosnische Serviërs te zuiveren van moslims en Kroaten.

Bescherming alle etniciteiten

Volgens het Joegoslaviëtribunaal beschuldigde Milošević in maart 1992 Karadžić en de Bosnisch-Servische leiding openlijk van mensenrechtenschendingen en etnische zuivering.

Ook sprak de voormalige Servische president zich uit voor de bescherming van alle etniciteiten in het voormalige Joegoslavië, stelt het Joegoslaviëtribunaal.

Hartaanval

Milošević werd in 1999 door het Joegoslaviëtribunaal aangeklaagd wegens oorlogsmisdaden en misdaden tegen de menselijkheid. In 2001 werd hij in Belgrado gearresteerd. Vanaf 12 mei 2002 stond hij terecht voor het Joegoslaviëtribunaal in Den Haag wegens verdenking van oorlogsmisdaden.

(/commentaar/wat-is-de-lijn-rome)



(<http://www.katholieknieuwsblad.nl/weeken-15>)

kn poll (/poll)

Donald Trump eert de heilige Moeder Teresa in een filmpje:

- ☐ Goedkope verkiezingsretoriek van Trump.
- ☐ Mooi! Waarom zou een multimiljonair Moeder Teresa niet kunnen bewonderen?
- ☐ Hypocrisie is de eer die de zonde aan de deugd bewijst, zo ook hier.

Bekijk Resultaat

Stem



(<http://www.arnulfus.nl>)

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ANALYSE

Joegoslavië-tribunaal spreekt Milosevic vrij van oorlogsmisdaden

ROOS REDACTIE BUITENLAND 08-09-2016 10:07:00

Het International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in de omgang wel Joegoslavië-tribunaal genoemd, heeft vastgesteld dat de voormalige Servische president Slobodan Milosevic niet verantwoordelijk was voor oorlogsmisdaden die werden gepleegd tijdens de Bosnische oorlog van 1992 tot '95.

De kamer die de Bosnisch-Servische president Radovan Karadzic wegens oorlogsmisdaden tot 40 jaar gevangenisstraf veroordeelde, concludeerde unaniem dat Slobodan Milosevic geen onderdeel was van een 'gezamenlijke misdadige onderneming' die het tijdens de Bosnische oorlog op Moslims en Kroaten gemunt had.

Enorme Winst Na Dood

McD's Kok wint duizenden vlak na de tragische dood van zijn vriendin

De uitspraak in de zaak van Karadzic van 24 maart jongstleden stelde dat er geen toereikend bewijs was dat Milosevic betrokken was in het plan om het territorium dat in handen was van Bosnische Serviërs te zuiveren van Moslims en Kroaten.

Hoewel aanvankelijk zowel Karadzic als Milosevic tegen het ontstaan van een onafhankelijk Bosnië waren en de voortzetting van Joegoslavië ten doel hadden, liepen vanaf eind 1991 hun ideeën uiteen. Tegen 1994 konden ze het niet meer eens worden. De kamer stelde echter ook vast dat Milosevic al in maart 1992 Karadzic en de Bosnisch-Servische leiding openlijk beschuldigde van mensenrechtenschendingen en etnische zuivering.

Toen in oktober 1991 het parlement van Bosnië, in afwezigheid van de Bosnisch-Servische afgevaardigden, de onafhankelijkheid uitriep, trok Karadzic de conclusie dat er een Servische Republiek in Bosnië gevormd moest worden, maar Milosevic had daar ernstige bedenkingen bij. Hij wilde niet op een illegale stap reageren met een andere illegale stap. Ook wilde hij de Bosnische Moslims die voor het voortbestaan van Joegoslavië waren niet uitsluiten. De kamer merkt op dat Milosevic zich uitsprak voor de bescherming van alle etniciteiten. Ook was Milosevic boos op de Bosnisch-Servische leiding, dat zij het Vance-Owen-plan verwierpen. Hij begreep hun bedenkingen, maar benadrukte het belang van het beëindigen van de oorlog.

Blijf op de hoogte van nieuws, opinie en achtergronden: Volg Novini!

Vind ik leuk Delen 1.3K personen vinden dit leuk. Registreer om te zien wat je vrienden leuk vinden

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Het is opmerkelijk dat de media nog geen melding hebben gemaakt van de zuivering van Milosevic' naam door het Joegoslavië-tribunaal. Maar het tribunaal heeft het zelf ook niet actief naar buiten gebracht. Het staat ergens halverwege het 2,5 duizend pagina's dikke oordeel in de zaak Karadzic. Zonder persbericht dat er op wijst kan het wel even duren voor zorets opgemerkt wordt.

Milosevic werd ten tijde van het uiteenvallen van Joegoslavië en de oorlogen waarmee dat gepaard ging, door westerse media voorgesteld als een dictatoriale leider en genocide aangewreven. Dat diende als rechtvaardiging voor economische sancties tegen Servië. Die beeldvorming speelde uiteindelijk ook een rol in de rechtvaardiging van de NAVO-bombardementen op Servië in 1999 en de opstelling van het Westen ten aanzien van Kosovo.

Milosevic bracht de laatste vijf jaar van zijn leven in een Haagse cel door, waar hij uiteindelijk stierf aan een hartaanval onder nog altijd niet helemaal opgehelderde omstandigheden. Milosevic vermoedde dat hij vergiftigd werd. Een arts vond inderdaad een stof in zijn bloed, die het effect van zijn hartmedicijnen op kon heffen, maar Milosevic kreeg dit pas maanden later te horen. Intussen werd Milosevic' gezondheidssituatie wel zonder zijn toestemming met de Amerikaanse ambassade besproken, zo blijkt uit WikiLeaks documenten. En nu, tien jaar na zijn dood, is hij stilletjes vrijgesproken van de voornaamste zaken waarvoor hij aangeklaagd was.

Bron: slobodan-milosevic.org


Dit delen:



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McD's Kok wint duizenden vlak na de tragische dood van zijn vriendin

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Jemen: Verenigd Koninkrijk verkocht verboden clusterbommen aan Saoedi-Arabië



Wees de eerste van je vrienden die dit leuk vindt



Sagitar

Van: "Gijsbert Beijen" <gijsbeijen.01@gmail.com>
Datum: zondag 31 maart 2024 22:22
Aan: <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>
Onderwerp: Moskou aan de Eems, 31 03 2024 - 1

Ha oerwoudbewoners,

Bij mijn FB-vrienden (zo heet dat) is een Duitser, Wolfgang Müller. Die is actief bij onderstaande website:

<http://www.nato-tribunal.de>

Heb het verder niet helemaal bekeken. Wellicht heb je er wat aan.

Groet'n,

P. Brandligt

(Ik knip en plak met groot gemak)!

Sagitar

Van: "Nedaista RD" <despot.nedaista@gmail.com>
Datum: woensdag 31 januari 2024 14:35
Aan: "Sagittarius" <sagitar@hetnet.nl>
Onderwerp: Groeten uit Servië

Beste Nico,

Jij wil het niet geloven hoe vaak ik aan jou denk, naar door omstandigheden aldoor niet aan toe gekomen om op te zoeken.

Ik heb zeer turbulente jaren achter de rug....

Momenteel ben ik in Servië en heb nu meer tijd om het e.e.a. te doen en zo denk ik ook aan tijden die wij samen hebben doorgebracht om te strijden voor de waarheid....

Nico, om lang verhaal kort te maken, blijf ik hier bij en hoop dat wij in de toekomst meer informaties kunnen uitwisselen over heel veel mensen en gebeurtenissen....

Groetjes,

Roza Despotović
despot.nedaista@gmail.com

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COUNTERPUNCH ≡

AUGUST 1, 2016

The Exoneration of Milosevic: the ICTY's Surprise Ruling

BY ANDY WILCOXSON

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague has determined that the late Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic was not responsible for war crimes committed during the 1992-95 Bosnian war.

In a stunning ruling, the trial chamber that convicted former Bosnian-Serb president Radovan Karadzic of war crimes and sentenced him to 40 years in prison, unanimously concluded that Slobodan Milosevic was not part of a "joint criminal enterprise" to victimize Muslims and Croats during the Bosnian war.

The March 24th Karadzic judgment states that "the Chamber is not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence presented in this case to find that Slobodan Milosevic agreed with the common plan" to permanently remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from Bosnian Serb claimed territory.[1]

The Karadzic trial chamber found that "the relationship between Milosevic and the Accused had deteriorated beginning in 1992; by 1994, they no longer agreed on a course of action to be taken. Furthermore, beginning as early as March 1992, there was apparent discord between the Accused and Milosevic in meetings with representatives, during which Milosevic and other Bosnian Serb leaders of committing 'crimes against the war for their own purposes.'"[2]

The judges noted that Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic had diverged over time. The judgment states that "from the common objective of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership to prevent the separation or independence of BiH,

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Bosnian Serbs from Serbia; the Chamber notes that Slobodan Milosevic endorsed this objective and spoke against the independence of BiH.”[3]

The Chamber found that “the declaration of sovereignty by the SRBiH Assembly in the absence of the Bosnian Serb delegates on 15 October 1991, escalated the situation,”[4] but that Milosevic was not on board with the establishment of Republika Srpska in response. The judgment says that “Slobodan Milosevic was attempting to take a more cautious approach”[5]

The judgment states that in intercepted communications with Radovan Karadzic, “Milosevic questioned whether it was wise to use ‘an illegitimate act in response to another illegitimate act’ and questioned the legality of forming a Bosnian Serb Assembly.”[6] The judges also found that “Slobodan Milosevic expressed his reservations about how a Bosnian Serb Assembly could exclude the Muslims who were ‘for Yugoslavia.’”[7]

The judgment notes that in meetings with Serb and Bosnian Serb officials “Slobodan Milosevic stated that ‘[a]ll members of other nations and ethnicities must be protected’ and that ‘[t]he national interest of the Serbs is not discrimination.’”[8] Also that “Milosevic further declared that crime needed to be fought decisively.”[9]

The trial chamber notes that “In private meetings, Milosevic was extremely angry at the Bosnian Serb leadership for rejecting the Vance-Owen Plan and he cursed the Accused.”[10] They also found that “Milosevic tried to reason with the Bosnian Serbs saying that he understood their concerns, but that it was most important to end the war.”[11]

The judgment states that “Milosevic also questioned whether the world would accept that the Bosnian Serbs who represented only one third of the population of BiH would get more than 50% of the territory and he encouraged a political agreement.”[12]

At a meeting of the Supreme Defense Council the judgment says that “Milosevic told the Bosnian Serb leadership that they were not entitled to have more than half the territory in BiH, stating that: ‘there is no way that more than that could belong to us! Because, we represent one third of the population. [...] We are not entitled to in excess of half of the territory – you must not snatch away something that can you imagine two thirds of the population being while 50% is too little for you?! Is it humane, is it fa

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In other meetings with Serb and Bosnian Serb officials “declared that the war must end and that the Bosnian complete defeat of the Bosnian Muslims.”[14] Because the Bosnian-Serbs, the judges note that “the FRY encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to accept peace prop

the Tribunal's determination that Slobodan Milosevic was not part of a joint criminal enterprise, and that on the contrary he "condemned ethnic cleansing"[16] is of tremendous significance because he got blamed for all of the bloodshed in Bosnia, and harsh economic sanctions were imposed on Serbia as a result. Wrongfully accusing Milosevic ranks right up there with invading Iraq only to find that there weren't any weapons of mass destruction after all.

Slobodan Milosevic was vilified by the entire western press corps and virtually every politician in every NATO country. They called him "the Butcher of the Balkans." They compared him to Hitler and accused him of genocide. They demonized him and made him out to be a bloodthirsty monster, and they used that false image to justify not only economic sanctions against Serbia, but also the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia and the Kosovo war.

Slobodan Milosevic had to spend the last five years of his life in prison defending himself and Serbia from bogus war crimes allegations over a war that they now admit he was trying to stop. The most serious charges that Milosevic faced, including the charge of genocide, were all in relation to Bosnia. Now, ten years after his death, they admit that he wasn't guilty after all – oops.

The ICTY did nothing to publicize the fact that they had cleared Milosevic of involvement in the joint criminal enterprise. They quietly buried that finding 1,303 pages into the 2,590 page Karadzic verdict knowing full well that most people would probably never bother to read it.

The presiding judge in the Radovan Karadzic trial, O-Gon Kwon of South Korea, was also one of the judges in the Slobodan Milosevic trial. Milosevic's exoneration by the Karadzic trial chamber may be an indication of how the Milosevic chamber would have eventually ruled, at least on the Bosnia charges, if Milosevic had lived to see the conclusion of his own trial.

It's worth recalling that Slobodan Milosevic died under a very suspicious set of circumstances. He died of a heart attack just two weeks after the Tribunal denied his request to undergo heart surgery in Russia.[17] He was found dead in his cell less than 72 hours after his attorney delivered a letter to the Ru: which he said that he feared he was being poisoned

The Tribunal's official report on the inquiry into his death has been found in a blood sample taken from Mr. Milosevic. Milosevic was not told of the results until 3 March 2001 in a position in which Dr. Falke (the Tribunal's chief medical examiner) the Dutch legal provisions concerning medical con

The presence of Rifamicin (a non-prescribed drug) counteracted the high blood pressure medication he

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the heart attack that ultimately did kill him. The Tribunal's admission that they knew about the Rifampicin for months, but didn't tell Milosevic the results of his own blood test until just days before his death because of "Dutch legal provisions concerning medical confidentiality" is an incredibly lame and disingenuous excuse. There is no provision of Dutch law that prohibits a doctor from telling the patient the results of his own blood test — that would be idiotic. On the contrary, concealing such information from the patient could be seen as malpractice.

This all gives rise to well-founded suspicion that powerful geopolitical interests would rather Milosevic die before the end of his trial than see him acquitted and have their vicious lies exposed. U.S. State Department cables leaked to Wikileaks confirm that The Tribunal did discuss Milosevic's medical condition and his medical records with U.S. Embassy personnel in The Hague without his consent.^[20] They clearly didn't care about medical confidentiality laws when they were blabbing about his medical records to the American embassy.

It's an unsatisfying outcome that Milosevic has been quietly vindicated for the most serious crimes that he was accused of some ten years after his death. At a minimum financial compensation should now be paid to his widow and his children, and reparations should be paid to Serbia by the western governments who sought to punish Serbia in order to hold Milosevic "accountable" for crimes that their own Tribunal now admits he wasn't responsible for, and was in fact trying to stop.

Notes.

[1] ICTY, Karadzic Judgment, 24 March 2016, Para. 3460
< http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement.pdf >

[2] Ibid., Footnote 11027

[3] Ibid., Para. 3276

[4] Ibid., Para. 2709

[5] Ibid., Para. 2710

[6] Ibid., Para. 2685

[7] Ibid., Para. 2687

[8] Ibid., Para. 3288

[9] Ibid., Para. 3284

[10] Ibid., Para. 3289

[11] Ibid., Para. 3295

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Sagitar

Van: "Arnold Koper" <arnoldkoper@gmail.com>
Datum: donderdag 22 november 2018 11:30
Aan: "Nico Steijnen" <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>
Onderwerp: Re: Milosevic

Dag Nico,

Ik heb je berichten uiteraard gelezen. Reageer nu pas omdat ik er even over wilde nadenken. Maar helaas zie geen kans om deze zaak in de Volkskrant of NRC-Handelsblad aan te kaarten. Niet alleen ben ik al zo'n 10 jaar uit de running, maar belangrijker is dat het me te veel werk en mentale (in)spanning gaat opleveren. (Reden waarom ik ooit in de WIA ben beland.)

Als je zoiets aankaart, moet je er ook echt voor gaan en dat heeft nogal wat consequenties, zoals het doornemen van berichtgeving over het proces en eventueel het schrijven van een ingezonden stuk e.d. En dat zit er wat mij betreft niet meer in.

Mocht jezelf nog een poging willen wagen, dan raad ik je aan je niet tot de betrokken verslaggevers zelf te richten, maar tot de ombudsman van de krant Jean Pierre Geelen (Volkskrant) of Sjoerd de Jong (NRC).

Je zou ze dan kunnen vragen hoe het komt dat aan die vrijspraak geen aandacht is besteed, en of dat niet in strijd is met de journalistieke ethiek, gezien het feit dat Milosevic van meet af als 'schuldig' is neergezet of iets dergelijks.

Verwacht overigens niet dat er met zo'n brief direct iets gebeurt, gun de heren een beetje tijd, want als ze je bezwaar oppikken, zullen ze zich toch moeten inlezen en eventueel een geschikt moment uit moeten zoeken om deze kwestie, die al weer in het vergeetboek zit, opnieuw aan te snijden.

Zelf zal ik als ik weer eens een relevante ex-collega tegenkom ook eens informeren of ze überhaupt van die vrijspraak op de hoogte zijn, en ze eventueel attent maken op de stukken die je me stuurde.

Met vriendelijke groet

Arnold Koper

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Met vriendelijke groet

Arnold Koper

Sagitar

Van: "Sagitar" <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>
Datum: dinsdag 20 november 2018 18:45
Aan: "Arnold Koper" <arnoldkoper@gmail.com>
Onderwerp: Milosevic-uitspraak ICTY

P.S. : Nog even voor de duidelijkheid. Voor zover ik weet heeft tot nu toe niet alleen ik niets hierover een de media gestuurd, maar ook niemand anders. Zoals Wilcoxson al aangeeft, heeft ook het Tribunaal zelf daarover in zijn perspresentatie met geen woord gerept. Alleen een handvol figuren als de stugge Tribunaal-watcher Wilcoxson zullen de vele honderden tot duizenden pagina's omvattende tribunaal-vonnissen werkelijk gelezen hebben.

Op di 20 nov. 2018 18:56 schreef Sagitar <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>:
PP. SS. : Dat de media toch al eerder gemeld zouden hebben dat het bewijs zwak was, betrof enkel en uitsluitend de eerste van de driedelige klacht, nl. die met betrekking tot Kosovo. Ik gaf al aan dat deze uitlating bovendien een duidelijke anomalie was en trouwens ook direct weer werd gevolgd door een permanente voorstelling van zaken, dat de schuld van Milosevic geen twijfel kende en dat hij zeker zou hangen, met name ook in de Bosnië-zaak. Ik heb van dag tot dag uitgeknipt wat de media over het Milosevic-proces verkondigden en dat is precies wat ik hier dus in de voorafgaande zinnen kenbaar maak.

Nico

Sagitar

Van: "Sagitar" <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>
 Datum: dinsdag 20 november 2018 18:35
 Aan: "Arnold Koper" <arnoldkoper@gmail.com>
 Onderwerp: Re: test

Nee, nee, ik heb nog niks naar welke media dan ook gestuurd. Dus jij bent de eerste (oud-) journalist die ik van de Tribunaal-uitspraak omtrent Milosevic in het Karadzic-vonnis op de hoogte heb gesteld. Even voor de duidelijkheid, ik heb je weliswaar ook geconfronteerd met materiaal omtrent het overlijden van Milosevic, maar dat laatste onderwerp is vooral ook een bekommernis van mezelf, een soort persoonlijk onderzoeksterrein dus. Dat kan dan ook verder tussen ons buiten beschouwing blijven. We hadden het hier ook nooit eerder over samen. Waar we wel eerder over hadden was wat het Joegoslavië Tribunaal in het Karadzic-vonnis jegens Milosevic vaststelt. Ik ben blij dat jij vindt dat Milosevic recht moet worden gedaan. Dat vindt ik ook. Maar het allerbelangrijkste is dat de westerse mainstream-media hun eigen zelfconceptie – onafhankelijk, vrij, objectief en waarheidszoekend – hier waar gaan maken. En over deze afloop van de Bosnië-klacht jegens Milosevic in dit vonnis van het Tribunaal alsnog komen te berichten. Zie jij er kansen toe om, in het spoor van de pretenties van informatieve, vrije en waarheidslievende pers te zijn, dat te bereiken?

Nico

From: Arnold Koper
Sent: Tuesday, November 20, 2018 3:35 PM
To: Nico Steijnen
Subject: Re: test

Jazeker Nico, dat vind ik ook. Maar ik neem aan dat jij, en anderen, al het nodige materiaal aan de kranten hebt gestuurd en dat je daar geen reactie op hebt gekregen. Ik probeerde in mijn eerdere mailtje uit te leggen, welke excuses ('we hebben toch al gemeld dat het bewijs zwak was') zullen worden gebruikt om, de stilte over het Milosovic-gedeelte in het Karadzic-vonnis te verklaren. Een ander argument zal ongetwijfeld zijn dat Milosevic geen lieverdje was, en dat er nog andere aanklachten tegen hem liepen.

Geen enkele reden dus om de man van blaam te zuiveren.

Daar ben ik het niet mee eens, want als iemand met zulke grote aanklachten wordt geconfronteerd, en daar blijft zo weinig van over dat de rechters van een overwinnaarstribunaal hem (deels) vrij pleiten, dan heeft hij er, ook na zijn overlijden recht op dat hem recht wordt gedaan.

Ik betwijfel alleen of jouw dagtotdagdocumentatie daaraan, althans in de richting van de media, veel zal bijdragen. Er staan namelijk nogal wat verdenkingen/beschuldigingen in die jij ook niet hard kunt maken.

Even in mijn eigen woorden. Het mogelijk dat de Navo betrokken was, maar echte harde aanwijzingen heb je daarvoor niet. Het is ook mogelijk dat rechters en/of ander tribunaalpersoneel betrokken was bij het ondermijnen (en erger) van 's mans gezondheid, maar ook daarvoor ontbreken de bewijzen.

Niettemin suggereer jij al in de eerste zin dat Milosevic mogelijk 'rechtsstreeks' om het leven is gebracht en zelfs als dat niet zo is, draagt jouw inziens het tribunaal 'rechtstreekse verantwoordelijkheid voor zijn dood'. Van zulke zwaarwegende beschuldigingen, die vervolgens slechts ten dele worden onderbouwd, gaan de stekels van veel journalisten (ondergetekende inclus) overeind staan.

22-11-2018

Concluderend, ja ik vind, op grond van de drie artikelen die jij me stuurde, ook dat 's mans naam op onderdelen moet worden gezuiverd. Ja, het is verkeerd dat de kranten en andere media dat niet al in 2016 hebben gedaan. En ja, het is mogelijk dat er krachten aan het werk zijn geweest die hem naar de uitgang wilden duwen, en ook dat die daar uiteindelijk in zijn geslaagd. En ja, dan hebben we het over moord. Maar helaas valt dat (nog) niet te bewijzen. De enige opening die ik zie is dat artsen of de mensen die hem zijn medicatie toedienden hun verhaal gaan doen. Want, even aangenomen dat de artsen zelf de man niet hebben vergiftigd, moeten die toch iets meer kunnen zeggen over de gang van zaken nadat die foute, giftige, medicatie in zijn bloed werd ontdekt.
met vriendelijke groet
Arnold

Op ma 19 nov. 2018 om 11:24 schreef Sagitar <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>:
Hoi Arnold,

Dat het ooit de teneur van de berichtgeving van de westerse mainstream-media is geweest dat er weinig bewijs tegen Milosevic was, is diametraal tegenovergesteld aan de waarheid. De teneur was juist dat in het proces, dag in dag uit, zijn schuldigheid genadeloos steeds verder voor het voetlicht werd gebracht. De door mij gesignaleerde koppen uit de NRC en de Volkskrant over het falen van de ICTY-aanklager in de Kosovo-deelzaak vormde dan ook in dit verband een volstrekte anomalie en kwamen als een donderslag bij heldere hemel. Daarna werd de verslaggeving omtrent Milosevic onmiddellijk weer 'genormaliseerd' en was het meteen weer allemaal de bekende voorstelling van zaken dat er in het proces niet aflatend zodanig overweldigend bewijs tegen Milosevic op tafel kwam dat een veroordeling van hem al op voorhand een zekerheid vormde. Mijn documentatie van het nieuws van het procesverloop van dag tot dag is daar om dit zo nodig nog eens keihard te bewijzen. Goed dat je (ex-)collega's, die indertijd tegen Milosevic de Verschrikkelijke, de Slager van de Balkan hebben gestreden zo betrokken zijn. Vindt je niet dat ook zij moeten worden geïnformeerd oer deze Nieuwe Werkelijkheid?

groeten van Nico

From: Arnold Koper
Sent: Friday, November 16, 2018 5:41 PM
To: Nico Steijnen
Subject: Re: test

Dag Nico,

Ik heb de stukken die je me gaf gelezen. Ik was van de belangrijkste feiten ('vrijspraak' Milosevic) niet op de hoogte. De grote kranten, in Nederland althans, maar elders zal het niet veel anders zijn, hebben aan dat impliciete vonnis geen aandacht besteed. Daar kunnen verschillende verklaringen voor zijn. Een ervan is ongetwijfeld dat het voor de betrokken journalisten (niet zelden hoogst betrokken types, weet ik uit ervaring) moeilijk is om toe te geven dat ze zich in een aantal opzichten hebben vergist; als ze al de moeite hebben genomen het hele vonnis te lezen. Maar daarnaast speelt ongetwijfeld het 'mosterd na de maaltijd-effect': de man is dood en de belangrijkste Nederlandse kranten hadden, zoals jij ook schrijft, wel al eerder

22-11-2018

VONNIS MLADIC

M.B.T.

Milosevic

BETREFFEN DE

①

3575.

Ch 1821

Elmshe moving the original JCE of Bosnia
but was o.w. Pelosari

gorilla, including
in areas inhabited
by war refugees
of Bosnia
Muslims

13482 Indulment para 10

Prosecution: at the time of 12 Mei 1992
12 members of the alleged JCE had already
established a policy of forcible ethnic
separation and were determined to establish
a ethnically separate and homogeneous Bosnian
Serb entity within the territory of Bosnia -



12919982 003977 1/1

AC = Accept
GM = Gelda
PO = Period

Mijn ING Zakelijk
Overal snel en makkelijk online uw bankzaken
regelen. Kijk voor meer informatie op ING.nl/zakelijk

266204 1016

3530

According to Babić, Karadžić ... were the main
leaders of the SDS and the governmental structures
of the Bosnian-Serb republic, 35354

Slobodan Milošević & Karadžić were very
close collaborators

1990: chaussées or de lockheed in Jugoslavia
Babić says that in Jan. 1991, Milošević began to
tell that, both publicly, that "in case of full
disintegration of Yugoslavia, Serbs had a right to
live and remain in ~~one~~ state. According to
Milošević, Serbs could not live in
a confederation of ~~four~~ four independent states

The Bosnian-Serb leadership considered
that "the Serbian people" had a historical
right to territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina
with Serbs constituted a majority of
before World War II. (3)

35-95 During a July 1991 meeting with Babic
and Milosevic, Karadzic said that he would chase
the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina into the river valleys
in order to link up all Serb territories there to into one (...)
During the meeting, Milosevic asked Karadzic where the JNA
should be deployed. Karadzic replied that that the JNA
should be deployed on the border with Croatia and the west-
ern sector in Krajina to protect Krajina, to link Milosevic
with 'Jene'.

256-3598
After this meeting, Milosevic agreed that Karadzic (9)
and Belic should go to Chicago, where Karadzic
had called a meeting of activists from the SDS
from the autonomous area of Bosanska Krajina
to tell them that activists would be less vigorous
should not be taken at that time. Karadzic also stated
that he did not know whether he should take Zanic
from the Muslims. Milosevic then told the witness that
he saw I should not bother or get in
Karadzic's way. In an later meeting ~~at~~ he handed
Karadzic what he had said at the earlier meeting with
Milosevic, that by expelling Muslims, he would create
a unified ~~and~~ Serb territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Voor Communie: Brood genoeg

Waar tot het eind gebroken wordt, waar
daar komt geen sterveling tekort, daar is

Tijdens Communie: Het water zal stenen

t: Michele Najlis m: Tom Löwenthal

Wanneer alles diep van binnen p
en je alleen, tegenover je eigen t
ziet dat het vervormd is door on

Wanneer de dingen voor je scha
wanneer je woord dat van een a
je hartslag uit je lichaam vlucht.

Wanneer je handen ver van je z
en je de afdruk van je voeten ni
wanneer je niets meer waarne
buitenkanten.

Ga dan als een zalm tegen de stroom ir
Wanhoop niet, het water zal stenen

(5)

lied: Waar vriendschap is

to wish the Krugier would be joined.

Niks geen wel meer van Marboeren omgegeven in de ket
gegeven dat de Bosnische Servische en Kroatische om armen
te gaan naar om 65 procent en dat laatste konden om te
geen prikkels, terwijl ze man 35% van de bevolking
verminderen

Let's see Milosevic, would it win - 6
Kurdish light, undoubtedly of hand in lead
General

3640. A few days after a February 1992 meeting
at which Slobodan Milosevic & ~~briefed~~ ^{briefed} ~~briefed~~ ^{briefed}
Radovan Karadzic c.s. on the stance of each of
the Presidents of the Yugoslav republics with respect
to maintaining a federal Yugoslav, Karadzic
gave an interview in which he stated that
should ~~the~~ Croatia and Slovenia secede, the core
Yugoslavia that remained would have to adjust its

Sanctus: Heilig, heilig, hoog verheven
koor:

Heilig, heilig, hoog verheven, heilig
Heilig, heilig, nooit volprezen, Hee

Onze Vader: Onze Vader verborgen
t: Huub Oosterhuis m: Tom Löwenthal

Onze Vader verborgen, uw naam worde
kome op aarde, uw wil geschiede een w
hemel, waar water schoonheid en brood

Waar vrede niet hoeft bevochten waar
mensen spreken als mensen waar kinde
niet worden gepijnigd nooit één mens n
meer geknecht.

Doof de hel in ons hoofd leg uw woord
breek het ijzer met handen breek de n

Van U is de toekomst kome ~~wat komt~~ (7)

Vredewens: Dat je de weg mag gaa

Andries Govaart m: Rien den A...

borders by applying the ethnic principle: to the extent
possible, Serb villages would remain in Yugoslavia, and
Croatian villages would become part of the new
Croatian state.

3668 as indicated under item de Trial Chamber 8
has indicated: "From as early as January
1991, Slobodan Milosevic began to ~~publicly~~
publicly advocate for the right of all
Serbs to live in one state."

3672: With respect to population transfers, in July
1991, during a meeting with Babic and Milosevic,
Kuznetsov said that he would chase the Muslims
in B6/ into the river valleys in order to link up
all Serb settlements there into one.

3675: overleed van de Trial Chamber Zonder verdere
 andere bewijsvoering van de hand van de staatsan- (9)
 van de Prosecution.

Hoofdstuk
 "THE TRIAL"
 CHARGES
 FINDINGS
 BEGINNING

Between at least July 1991 and February 1992,
 Karadzic met with and spoke to Srebrenica Milose-
 vic on numerous occasions. During these meetings,
 the unification of Serb territories and the division
 of territory along ethnic lines were discussed.

By
 3666

→ naar gelogen en versmoord,
 Zonder enige verwijzing naar de staatsan-
 en als zulke "besprekingen" bij "numerous occasions" af-
 hadden plaatsgevonden. Het "beveling" van gelogen, dat
 langs de lijnen is het punt, nog zeer de weg of het
 nietland ook gegeven is over "beveling" langs etnische lijnen.

Alleluia

Voorbeden

koor + allen:

t: Mari

Spread uw dragende vleugels onder
spread uw warmende lichtglans over

Offerande: Verder dan mijn ogen reiker

koor:

Verder dan mijn ogen reiken, verder dan
ligt het raadsel van mijn dromen en de z
Verder dan de vogels vliegen, verder dan
ligt het antwoord op mijn vragen, zonde
Verder dan de hemelsferen, verder dan
ligt het hoog geheim besloten, dat mij z

of zoek ik te ver is het dichterbij en ligt
mij?

10

Dichterbij dan ik vermoedde, dichterbij
wordt de stilte in mij wakker die mij
Dichterbij dan eigen adem, dichterbij
wordt een woord:

en dacht men ^{ook} dat de mens of ze het dichtbij en eenvoudig
mijheid zonder heile gelogen, die herpochten, want in
elk geval een barmhertige suggestie zou zij

3746 Verklarende not op 15 mei 1992 ⁽¹¹⁾
alle "interference" from outside B4 by
units of the JNA cease immediately
and that those units of which such work
begepshakker: heten om geroyen B4 worden
hore te ston, of onthoudt of in onthoudt worden
verder. The formal withdrawal of the
JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina took place
on 19 May 1992 and the FRG estab-
lished the VJ as the successor to the JNA.

12
Slobodan Milosevic was the supreme
Commander of the VJ and President of the
Supreme Defence Council. As such, Milosevic
Commanded the VJ, in compliance with decisions
of the Supreme Defence Council - a body that
he also chaired. (---)

3747. The Trial Chamber further recalls its findings
in Chapter 3.1.1. and 3.2 that the formation
of the VRS in BH in May 1992 was a product of
the dissolution of the JNA. In this respect
the Trial Chamber also recalls its findings

in chapter 3.2 on the preparations in April and (13)
May 1992 by the FRy Presidency enabling
the formation of the VRS. Specifically, Specifi-
cally, on 6 May 1992, two days after it
announced the JNA's withdrawal from BH,
The FRy Presidency ordered that all JNA
members who were ~~active~~ citizens of BH were
to be kept in their current posts in units and
institutions of BH. These JNA members - a
group of approximately 80,000 soldiers of
mostly Serb ethnicity - were informed that
they would remain till their

rights associated with their military status as JNA members while serving in (17) BiH. When the VRS was established, many of the commands and units of the JNA simply renamed themselves as units of the VRS and remained organized as they had been under the JNA. Finally, the Trial Chamber recalls its findings in chapter 3.1.1 and 3.2 that ~~withdrawing~~ ^{withdrawing} from BiH on 19 May 1992, the JNA left the VRS with substantial amounts of material, including tanks, APC's, heavy artillery and large quantities of ammunition.

de adem van God. Zijn stem in

ert die mij voedt.

n vlees en bloed

ei 'aag de klank van ken.

cigen stem

Dit allemaal is relevant ten aanzien van
het feit dat op die manier mede bevestigd
wordt om, als uitsluitend deel, het is de
ethnische cleavage en BH wilt te weten
→ me 3748

(15)

3761 Slot: Shobden Milosere noted that "they"
suggested! did not ask for money, but only for
ammunition, means, food, and
clothing"

#3777. "Up until at least October 1993, all
Bosnian-Serb JNA soldiers born in BH
were ordered by the VJ to go there; and those
who were already stationed there, were orde-
red to stay in BH. The Trud Chomler re-
calls its findings in chapter 3.2 that upon the
JNA's declared withdrawal in May 1993,
approximately 90,000 former JNA soldiers
who were Bosnian-Serb were ordered to
rejoin in BH so that the Bosnian-Serb leader-
ship could take command of them.

in, diep koningsblauw daar in de
ten en door water, zo zoek ik

16

ontsnapt
kerf ontkend, als was het

2e Dijkman - a la carte

00000824

Nazi-Justitie?

...Bush en Blair pleegden zodoende het meest ernstige misdrijf naar internationaal recht dat bestaat. Een misdaad waarvan het Tribunaal van Neurenberg heeft gezegd dat daarin al het kwaad van de oorlog ligt besloten...

Lees verder

Press Release: President Milosevic's Attorney Threatens Legal Action Against the ICTY's Dr. van Dijkman

Slobodan Milosevic Freedom Center The Hague

July 26, 2005

Nico Steijnen, board member of the Slobodan Milosevic Freedom Center and Slobodan Milosevic's attorney before the Dutch Courts, is threatening legal action against the ICTY's Dr. Van Dijkman.

If Dr. Van Dijkman, in response to the tribunal's recent requests, gives the go ahead to increase the weekly court session load on President Milosevic, then Nico Steijnen will initiate litigation against Dr. Van Dijkman on President Milosevic's behalf.

The following is the text of the letter served on Dr. Van Dijkman by attorney Steijnen yesterday.

Lees verder

Welkom bij NatoSued

re Milosevic
re Djindjic-Milosevic

pagina 1 van 2

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050725

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Pseudo-medical treatment with respect to Mr. S. Milosevic, former President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Law firm Steijnen, Olof & Stelling

Couwenhoven 52-05
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tel. 030-6956867
fax 030-6957830
e-mail: sagitar@hetnet.nl
Dr. P.R.M. Van Dijkman
Ten Hovestraat 66a
2582 RN Den Haag

25 July 2005

re: pseudo-medical treatment with respect to Mr. S. Milosevic, former President of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Dear Mr. Van Dijkman,

The so-called 'Yugoslavia tribunal' is again about to step up its efforts to silence my client Mr. Milosevic either by seeking to push him to the background in his own defence case which is currently going on. Or to silence him by seriously affecting his health condition as a result of further deliberately deteriorating the conditions of his defence imposed on him.

Again the 'tribunal' administration invoked your aid in order to achieve that well-considered aim. Again you are requested to allow yourself to be abused by the so-called 'tribunal' in order for the latter to obtain an alibi for infringing the fundamental right of Mr. Milosevic to defend himself.

As already pointed out in my initial complaint on behalf of Mr. Milosevic, filed against you with the Regional Disciplinary Board for Healthcare, by making statements regarding the ability of Mr. Milosevic regarding the ability of Mr. Milosevic to defend himself in various modalities of court session load, you make yourself guilty on the pronouncement of a pseudo-medical judgement, and thereby to a medically reprehensible act.

This because, as pointed out by me earlier, any answer to the question of what Mr. Milosevic physically is or is not able to do regarding the trial in progress, depends to a large extent on various other factors. Like, for instance, the time Mr. Milosevic daily needs for the preparation of his case.

So the question is not, like put to you by the so-called 'tribunal', whether or not Mr. Milosevic could physically stand various modalities of more court hours a week, but whether or not it would be acceptable to further severely deteriorate the amount of time left to Mr. Milosevic to prepare his defence case.

Doubtless and prima facie these two elements are directly linked: the more time Mr. Milosevic will be supposed to spend a week in court sessions, the more the time will be further decreased needed by him for the daily preparation of his defence case.

And, as a consequence, there is also another direct relationship: the more time Mr. Milosevic, despite all restraints already put upon him, will stick on appropriate defence preparations in a situation of further increase of the weekly court session loadt session load for Mr. Milosevic will be increased, the more he will be forced to choose between his health care and caring about his defence.

It is this evil dilemma the administration of the so-called 'tribunal' is about to force on Mr. Milosevic.

And the so-called 'tribunal', by failing to do so I will take further juridical action against you.

Sincerely yours,

N.M.P. Steijnen

00000827

00000829

Nazi-Justitie?

...Bush en Blair pleegden zodoende het meest ernstige misdrijf naar internationaal recht dat bestaat. Een misdaad waarvan het Tribunaal van Neurenberg heeft gezegd dat daarin al het kwaad van de oorlog ligt besloten...

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Lees verder

DE TOTALE ONTMASKERING VAN HET JOEGOSLAVIE-TRIBUNAAL KOMT DICHTERBIJ

Door Mr. M.N.P. Steijnen, advocaat

Iedereen die de geschiedenis van het zogenaamde 'proces' tegen Milosevic heeft gevolgd, weet welke dreunen Milosevic de afgelopen jaren heeft uitgedeeld aan het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal'.

Historie

Voor een goed begrip van de recente ontwikkelingen inzake het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal' nog even terug naar de dagen dat de NAVO bommen deed regenen op Joegoslavië.

De verwoestingen waren groot en het aantal slachtoffers was hoog. De protesten tegen deze naakte agressie door de NAVO-landen zwollen aan toen de bombardementen maar doorgingen, maand na maand. De NAVO wilde het karwei afmaken, en de bombardementen nog meedogenlozer maken. Maar intussen dreigde de publieke opinie in het westen te kantelen.

Het 'tribunaal' als bliksemafleider

Op dat moment snelde het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal' de NAVO te hulp.

Na overleg op het hoogste niveau met de Amerikanen kwam de aanklager van het 'tribunaal' met haar klacht tegen president Milosevic en zijn mederegeringsleden. Op beschuldiging van oorlogsmisdaden in Kosovo.

Daarmee was de aandacht voldoende afgeleid en kon de NAVO de bommenterror tot ongekende hoogte opvoeren. De Joegoslavische regering zag zich vervolgens gedwongen om een per saldo nadelige uitkomst te aanvaarden. Het alternatief was dat het land één grote puinhoop zou veranderen.

De NAVO had een Pyrrusoverwinning behaald, duizenden waren gedood en er was voor meer dan 100 miljard schade aangericht.

De agressieoorlog van de NAVO tegen Joegoslavië was evenzeer op leugens gebaseerd als de recente oorlog tegen Irak. Maar werd door de publieke opinie toen niet als zodanig ontmaskerd. De aanklacht van het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal' tegen de 'moordzucht' van Milosevic speelde daarin een belangrijke rol. Die fungeerde als bliksemafleider voor de pure agressie, waarvan hier sprake was.

Manipulatie met de schuldvraag voor het balkan-drama

Maar de rol van het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal' strekte nog veel verder.

Door Milosevic de schuld in de schoenen te schuiven van het bloedige uiteenvallen van de voormalige Joegoslavische federatie, was op slag ook de aandacht afgeleid van de overheersende westerse rol bij de afbraak van deze staat.

Het vervolg is bekend. Milosevic werd naar Den Haag ontvoerd om zogenaamd 'terecht te staan'.

En klachten tegen de NAVO-agressie jegens Joegoslavië en tegen de door de NAVO gepleegde oorlogsmisdrijven werden door datzelfde 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal' eenvoudig afgewimpeld. Ook dit laatste maakt volstrekt duidelijk dat het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal' niets meer en niets minder is dan een instrument van Amerika en de NAVO.

De mythe van de onafhankelijkheid van het 'tribunaal'

Desondanks wordt, met name hier in het westen, nog steeds de objectiviteit en onafhankelijkheid van dit 'tribunaal' gepredikt.

Verwezen wordt dan onder meer naar het feit dat er ook een aantal Kroaten en Bosnische Moslims zijn aangeklaagd. Verder hoort men dan bezweren dat heus ook Tudjman en Izetbegovic wel zouden zijn aangeklaagd, als deze maar tijd van leven hadden gehad. Een verhaal waarmee thans alleen nog maar de ware gelovigen kunnen worden bediend.

Inmiddels zijn door dit zogenaamde 'tribunaal' wel alle voormalige Servische leiders, politieke zowel als militaire, aangeklaagd. Stuk voor stuk en zonder ook maar één uitzondering. De leiders van de opstandige Servische entiteiten inclusief.

En dat is de derde boodschap die de Amerikanen via dit 'tribunaal' willen doen uitgaan: iedereen die zich militair verzet tegen de Amerikaanse opperheerschappij en niet op tijd inbindt, wordt gestraft.

Overigens is het 'tribunaal' altijd brutaal genoeg geweest om van zijn banden met de NAVO zelf geen enkel geheim te maken. Kennelijk rekenend op onuitputtelijkheid van het krediet dat het in de westerse politiek en media zou hebben.



Zo vertelde de voormalige plaatsvervangende hoofdaanklager Hewitt nog in juni jl. in een interview aan de NRC ongenueerd hoe de talrijke Amerikaanse medewerkers van het 'tribunaal' evenzeer kind aan huis waren bij de Amerikaanse ambassade als op de burelen van het 'tribunaal'.

De lakmoesproef voor het 'tribunaal'

Maar ook zonder te bekijken wat het 'tribunaal' nu wel of niet in feite doet, is er een overtuigende lakmoesproef om helder en overtuigend in beeld te krijgen wat werkelijk de mate van onafhankelijkheid en onpartijdigheid hiervan is.

Die lakmoesproef bestaat eruit de opstelling van de Amerikanen tegenover dit instituut te observeren en te verdisconteren. In vergelijking met hun opstelling jegens andere internationale rechtsinstellingen.

Als de Verenigde Staten iets als volstrekt verderfelijk beschouwen dan is dat wel, zoals bekend, alleen al de mogelijkheid dat enig onafhankelijk internationaal tribunaal over hun onderdanen een strafrechtelijk oordeel zou kunnen vellen. Daarom haat de VS-administratie het Internationale Strafhof als de pest, doet er alles aan om dit in de internationale arena onderuit te schoffelen, en bedreigt zelfs openlijk Nederland met een invasie als ons land, als gastheer van dit Internationale Strafhof, het ooit zou wagen een Amerikaans onderdaan ten dienste van dit Strafhof op te sluiten.

Vormt het Internationale Strafhof voor de Amerikanen een soort baarljke duivel, tegelijkertijd bejegenen zij het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal' als een knuffelbeer.

Dat kan maar één ding betekenen: voor de VS is het een uitgemaakte zaak dat het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal' nooit en te nimmer zelfs maar een poging zal ondernemen om een Amerikaans onderdaan te vervolgen. Hoewel het 'tribunaal' daartoe formeel wel de bevoegdheid bezit.

november 2004

De Anti Fascist

5

Kennelijk zijn de garanties, dat zo iets nimmer zal plaatsvinden absoluut en waterdicht. Anders zou het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal' immers allang dezelfde bejegening te beurt zijn gevallen als nu het Internationale Strafhof. Beter gezegd, anders was het er nooit gekomen.

Geen wonder dat de Amerikanen zich geen moment zorgen hebben gemaakt over het pseudo-onderzoek dat het 'tribunaal' na de NAVO-bombardementen van Joegoslavië zogenaamd instelde. Hoezeer mensenrechtenorganisaties als Amnesty International en Human Right Watch ook betoogden dat daarbij van NAVO-zijde oorlogsmisdaden waren gepleegd, de uitkomst van dit 'onderzoek' van het 'tribunaal' stond al van tevoren vast. De Amerikaanse controle over het tribunaal is volledig en sluitend.



Het 'Proces van de Eeuw' als de flop van de eeuw

Milosevic heeft zich, de afgelopen twee jaar, op magistrale wijze verdedigd. Wat voor de NAVO-trionfantalist het 'Proces van de Eeuw' had moeten worden, heeft hij onmiddellijk, vanaf de eerste procesdag, 180 graden omgekeerd en omgesmeed tot een directe aanval op de werkelijke schuldigen: de NAVO-landen onder leiding van de VS. Vervolgens is hij begonnen aan een niet aflatende reeks, waarin hij van de ene getuige na de andere gehakt maakte. Vele getuigen werden daarbij als pure leugenaars ontmaskerd, zonder dat de rechters van het 'tribunaal' tegen dergelijke meinedigheden optraden.

Intussen verstomde al gauw de media-aandacht. Dit was niet wat de westerse media graag in beeld gebracht zagen: een voortdurende ontmasking van het spinsel van westerse leugens en NAVO-misdaden.

Schrik en verbijstering bij het 'tribunaal'

Het 'tribunaal' heeft een en ander met schrik en verbijstering moeten aanzien. Men had gehoopt, door honderden getuigen tegen Milosevic in stelling te brengen en tonnen documenten over hem uit te storten, hem fysiek tot instorten te brengen.

Dat is niet gelukt, hoewel het 'tribunaal' er zodoende wel in geslaagd is zijn gezondheid ernstig te ondermijnen. En nu, na twee jaar onderhevig te zijn geweest aan het spervuur van getuigen en de vloed van documenten van de aanklager, was Milosevic zelf aan de beurt.

Het moment was gekomen dat hij, van zijn kant, zijn zaak naar voren zou mogen brengen en zijn getuigen zou mogen oproepen en ondervragen. Maandenlang, Milosevic had al aangekondigd dat hij, evenals de aanklager, honderden getuigen zou doen oproepen. Waaronder de complete westerse politieke top van destijds.



Nico Steijnen aan het woord. Foto's Jan Beentjes.

Milosevic op de spreekstoel als schrikbeeld

Met angst en beven heeft het 'tribunaal' dit moment naderbij zien komen. Milosevic, die de situatie in feite al beheerste in de afgelopen jaren toen de aanklager bezig was haar zaak te brengen, zou nu, maandenlang, een platform krijgen om zijn boodschap onbelemmerd uit te dragen. Zijn boodschap dat dit proces één grote cover-up is voor de misdaden die de NAVO jegens Joegoslavië heeft begaan en de voor de schuld die het Westen heeft aan het uiteenvallen van Joegoslavië. En zijn boodschap dat het tegen hem gerichte 'proces' er alleen maar op uit is om, misbruik makend van de schijn van de 'objectiviteit' van het recht, de CNN-'waarheid' over de schuld aan Balkan-catastrofe definitief in de geschiedenis te verankeren. De CNN-'waarheid' dat deze tragedie de schuld zou zijn geweest van Servische grootheidswaan, onder opperleiding van het monster Milosevic.

november 2004

De Anti Fascist

6

Noodgreep van het 'tribunaal'

Koste wat het kost heeft het 'tribunaal' willen voorkomen dat Milosevic maandenlang aldus op het spreekgestoelte zou komen te staan. Daarom heeft het zich gedwongen gezien tot een noodmaatregel. De noodmaatregel om, met een haast onvoorstelbare schending van diens fundamentele rechten, Milosevic het woord te ontnemen. En wel door hem voortaan het recht te ontzeggen om zijn eigen verdediging te voeren. Een recht

Monopoly van Michel Collon wekt wrevel bij regering-Bush

Door Vanessa Stojilkovic

De firma Hasbro eist van EPO 265.000 euro, omdat die het boek Monopoly (Blufpoker) uitgegeven heeft. De multinational had een tijd geleden de Amerikaanse vice-minister van Defensie

Uitgeverij EPO dreigt 265.000 euro te moeten betalen

dat, als een fundamenteel mensenrecht, is opgenomen in alle majeure mensenrechtenverdragen. Een recht dat ook klip en klaar is opgenomen in de reglementen van het zgn. 'tribunaal' zelf. Een recht waarvan ook het 'tribunaal' eerder talloze malen de onaantastbaarheid had bezworen in datzelfde Milosevic-'proces'.

Ondubbelzinnige schending van mensenrechten

Deze ondubbelzinnige schending van de mensenrechten van Milosevic getuigt ervan hoezeer het 'tribunaal' door het optreden van Milosevic in paniek is gebracht. En bewijst ook even ondubbelzinnig opnieuw waar dit zgn. 'tribunaal' voor staat. Het 'tribunaal' ontmaskert zichzelf steeds verder als het instrument dat het in feite is.

Tegenactie van Milosevic' zijde

De strijd tegen de gevolgen van dit optreden gaat onverdroten voort. In opdracht van Milosevic heb ik inmiddels bij het advocatentuchtcollege een klacht ingediend tegen de advocaat Kay die zich voor deze kar van het 'tribunaal' heeft laten spannen. En de verdediging van Milosevic heeft geïsurpeerd.

Bij het medisch tuchtcollege heb ik tevens een klacht ingediend tegen de arts Van Dijkman, die zich door het 'tribunaal' voor dit spel heeft laten misbruiken door een medische verklaring te ondertekenen dat Milosevic fysiek niet meer in staat zou zijn zijn verdediging te voeren. Daarmee heeft hij zich schuldig gemaakt aan een politiek oordeel, onder het mom van een medische verklaring.

Maar beslissend is dat het hele circus knarsend en krakend tot stilstand komt, nu de door Milosevic aangezochte getuigen massaal wegblijven. En zo wordt de schade die het 'tribunaal', onder druk van het magistrale optreden van Milosevic, zichzelf toebrengt al groter en groter.

Wilt u de verdediging van Milosevic steunen, dan kan dit op gironummer 972992 van de Stichting Steunfonds Juridische Hulp te Zeist o.v.v. 'Proces Milosevic'.

Milosevic zelf is zowel in eigen land als in het buitenland vrijwel volledig kaalgeplukt.

Wolfowitz in zijn raad van bestuur en beweert nu dat dit boek een namaak is van zijn spel Monopoly. Hasbro zegt dat het slachtoffer is van namaak. Maar wie kan in alle ernst beweren dat het boek van Michel Collon de verkoop van het spel Monopoly doet dalen? Het doel is duidelijk anders.


De multinational US Hasbro heeft op 16 mei 2003 de uitgeverij EPO gedagvaard voor de rechtbank van Parijs. Hij eist 150.000 euro voor schade aan zijn merk, 100.000 euro voor 'parasitisme' en 15.000 euro voor 'kosten'. Waarom in Parijs, hoewel EPO een Belgische uitgeverij is? Omdat van Franse rechtbanken bekend is dat ze zaken van vrije meningsuiting en van namaak strenger plegen te interpreteren.

Op 9 juli 2004 heeft Hasbro-Monopoly in eerste termijn gelijk gekregen van een rechtbank in Parijs en werd de uitgever veroordeeld tot het betalen van 20.000 euro. Die heeft beslist in beroep te gaan. Is het een gewoon handelsconflict? Helemaal niet.

Het 'juridisch' voorwendsel is grof

Hasbro zegt dat het slachtoffer is van plagiaat. Het verbod om bestaande handelsmerken te gebruiken dient om oneerlijke concurrentie tegen te gaan. Een boek met een politieke analyse is uiteraard geen concurrentie voor de verkoop van een gezelschapsspel. Het boek van Michel Collon heeft misschien de elite van de Verenigde Staten in verlegenheid gebracht door hun strategie van globale oorlog te ontmaskeren. Maar wie kan in alle ernst beweren dat het de verkoop van het spel Monopoly zou doen dalen?

Een van de bestuurders van Hasbro was Paul Wolfowitz. Hij is nu vice minister van Defensie en één van de strategen van de totale oorlog. Hij pleitte al sinds 1991 voor een nieuwe aanval op Irak. Bij zijn aanstelling tot minister heeft hij die lucratieve activiteit stopgezet (Hasbro is een van de wereldleiders in de speelgoedindustrie). Maar business en politiek zijn communicerende vaten.



Het doel is de uitgever kapot maken

EPO (www.epo.be) is actief in Frankrijk en België en kreeg de laatste jaren bekendheid door een aantal opmerkelijke boeken over het VS imperialisme.

Zoals 11 september van Peter Franssen, Palestina van Lucas Catherine of de boeken van Calvo Ospina over de banden tussen de CIA, Bacardi en de Cubaanse maffia. Of het boek van Mohamed Hassan en David Pestieau over de bezetting van Irak. De uitgever vecht om zijn onafhankelijkheid te behouden tegenover de grote uitgeverijen die in handen zijn van de industrie en de financiële machten. Door dergelijke hoge sommen te eisen wil Hasbro het EPO duidelijk onmogelijk maken dit werk voort te zetten.

(1) Het boek is samen met Poker Menteur naar het Nederlands vertaald en verschenen als Blufpoker. De grootmachten, Joegoslavië en de komende oorlogen (EPO, Berchem-Antwerpen).

Uitgeverij EPO moet worden gered! Wat kunt u daarvoor doen?

Een protestmail sturen naar Hasbro op zijn site: <http://www.hasbro.com> of <http://www.hasbro.fr> (of Hasbro, 1027 Newport Avenue Pawtucket, Rhode Island, 02862. USA. Kopie aan michei.collon@skynet.be).

Als teken van solidariteit, (om de proceskosten te dekken) een of meerdere exemplaren kopen van het boek Blufpoker, voor uzelf, als eindejaarsgeschenk...

Ook te bestellen bij de AFVN (zie [literatuurlijst](#)).



WITTE HELMEN

Discussie over artikel de
Volkskrant komt voor de Raad

De Groene Amsterdammer stelde een artikel in de *Volkstribune* onder kritiek. De Raad slapt vervolgens naar de Raad voor de Journalistiek

Door onze redacteur Karel Smouter

AMSTERDAM. Ruim een jaar na publicatie is in journalistiek kring discussie ontstaan over een artikel in de Volkskrant waarin ja met Le Mesurier, mede-oprichter van de Nederlandse Wille Heijnen, in verband werd gebracht met fraude. De strekking van dit artikel werd door verscheidende Nederlandse media, waaronder ook NRC overgenomen.

De discussie laaide eerder deze maand

op naar aanleiding van een publicatie in

Weekblad De Groene Amsterdammer, De

volksrant werd er in dit artikel van beticht

een "randetrans" te hebben gehanteerd.

terwijl een forensisch onderzoek te me-

krant heeft de volgende tekst: "Het is niet een

En bron die in een arbeidsconflict met 1

Mesurier verbeurde.

tussen heeft de Volkskrant de zaak bij

de Raad voor de Journalistiek neerweert.

De krant vervult De Groene Amsterdam-

mer geen weddenschap hebben gesmeed.

Hoofdredacteur Pieter Klok reageert teje-

tonisch: „Mit bezaubernd Syttische klingen“

knippen we nu te horen dat we een 'disgrace'

to journalism' zouden zijn. Daar had ik

the author's personal experience.

Or e-mails en handen van JRC, blijkt hoe
hoor de kwestie omlaag. Met zijn vroeke

terd over hoe de naam van de Volkskrant

hier door het stijk woord onthald = erbrilft

Klik aan De Groene-hoofdreducteur 'Xan-

dra Schutte. „Dat is niet alleen een journa-

listieke doodzonde, maar ook nog eens (...)

beschadigend voor de journalistiek als ge-

heel."

Klokschermerde vervolgens niet „publici-

taire" en „eventueel zelfs juridische stap-

pen" als Schutte dit niet zou rechtzetten.

1

Sagitar

Van: "Arnold Koper" <arnoldkoper@gmail.com>
Datum: vrijdag 16 november 2018 17:41
Aan: "Nico Steijnen" <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>
Onderwerp: Re: test

Dag Nico,

Ik heb de stukken die je me gaf gelezen. Ik was van de belangrijkste feiten ('vrijspraak' Milosevic) niet op de hoogte. De grote kranten, in Nederland althans, maar elders zal het niet veel anders zijn, hebben aan dat impliciete vonnis geen aandacht besteed. Daar kunnen verschillende verklaringen voor zijn. Een ervan is ongetwijfeld dat het voor de betrokken journalisten (niet zelden hoogst betrokken types, weet ik uit ervaring) moeilijk is om toe te geven dat ze zich in een aantal opzichten hebben vergist; als ze al de moeite hebben genomen het hele vonnis te lezen. Maar daarnaast speelt ongetwijfeld het 'mosterd na de maaltijd-effect': de man is dood en de belangrijkste Nederlandse kranten hadden, zoals jij ook schrijft, wel al eerder gemeld dat er weinig bewijs tegen hem was. Dat is een verklaring, geen excuus, want het is evident dat die 'vrijspraak' serieuze aandacht van de media had verdiend.

Zorgwekkend vind ik ook dat 'medicatie'-verhaal. Hoe kon dat verkeerde medicijn überhaupt in zijn bloed komen? En waarom werd hij zelf niet onmiddellijk op de hoogte gesteld? Vreemd is natuurlijk ook dat er naderhand lulkoek over privacy wordt verkocht om een en ander af te dekken.

Ik ben het met je eens dat dat nogal stinkt. Maar ik heb problemen met de vergaande conclusies die jij daaraan verbindt. Zeker, het is mogelijk/denkbaar dat de gezondheid van M. sluipenderwijs werd ondermijnd door een geheime dienst van een Navo-bondgenoot. Maar als het zo is gegaan (en ik ben niet zo naief dat uit te sluiten), dan is erg onwaarschijnlijk dat daarvan meer dan een persoon met 'toegang tot M' (arts, verpleger, cipier, kok) bij betrokken was. Anders zou het ontdekkingsrisico veel te groot zijn.

De fouten die door het tribunaal in de behandeling van M zijn gemaakt (klachten onvoldoende serieus nemen, extreem relevante medische informatie onthouden) komen dan niet per se voort uit betrokkenheid bij een smerige operatie, maar mogelijk uit bureaucratische traagheid, achteloosheid (of manipulatie van betrokkenen). En ja, dat is misschien verwijtbare nalatigheid, maar met wezenlijk andere oorzaken.

Eigenlijk zou je de betrokken Tribunaal-artsen onder ede moeten horen, maar die hebben waarschijnlijk een spreekverbod - als ze zelf al niet iets laakbaars te verbergen hebben. Behalve als een paar journalisten of onderzoekers met connecties bij de geheime diensten nog eens in deze zaak gaan spitten, lijkt de kans mij overigens klein dat het hele verhaal over die foutieve medicatie (dan wel doelbewuste vergiftigingspoging) boven tafel gaat komen.

Hoe is het trouwens gegaan met die juridische stappen (anti-folterverdrag) die jij aan het slot van je betoog noemt?

Mocht er in de toekomst nog nieuwe relevant bewijsmateriaal opduiken, dan hoor ik dat graag.

Nu in elk geval bedankt voor al deze nieuwe informatie.

Met vriendelijke groet,

Arnold

Op di 13 nov. 2018 om 16:22 schreef Arnold Koper <arnoldkoper@gmail.com>:
Ha Nico,

Dank voor de aanvulling. Je hoort/leest binnenkort van me.
Groet
Arnold

Op ma 12 nov. 2018 18:29 schreef Sagitar <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>:
Hoi Arnold,

In het verhaal dat ik indertijd schreef over de meer dan verdachte omstandigheden waarin Milosevic uiteindelijk tegen een hartstilstand aanliep, ontbreekt, zoals ik nu bij herlezing opmerk, hetgeen wél door Andy Wilcoxson op papier wordt aangegeven, maar dus niet door mij, namelijk een expliciete vaststelling van de onzinnigheid waarmee het ICTY-rapport inzake de dood van Milosevic tracht te verklaren dat de uitslag van de op 12 januari 2006 afgenomen bloedtest, waarbij het voor hem fatale middel rifampicine in zijn bloed werd aangetroffen, hem pas begin maart 2006 werd medegedeeld, luidende in dat rapport: "Mr. Milosevic was not told of the results until 3 March 2006 because of the difficult legal position in which Dr. Falke found himself by virtue of the legal provisions concerning medical confidentiality (an issue which is further considered later on in this report)." Voor de vindplaats van dit rapport, zie het artikel van Wilcoxson. Zodra dit ICTY-report uitkwam belde Wilcoxson mij en uitte zijn verbazing over deze laatste passage, de bewering dus dat Nederlandse regelgeving het extra moeilijk zou maken dat een arts gewoon normaal rechtstreeks zijn patiënt van een onderzoeksuitslag in kennis zou stellen, zoals het ICTY-onderzoeksrapport hier brutaalweg durft te stellen. Ik heb hem toen verzekerd dat zulks natuurlijk baarlijke onzin is. Natuurlijk staat de Nederlandse regelgeving er in geen enkel opzicht bij in de weg dat een patiënt door een dokter van de uitslag van een onderzoek direct zodra dit beschikbaar komt op de hoogte wordt gebracht! Blijft dus staan het feit dat Milosevic niet aanstonds van de uitslag van de bevinding van het voor hem verderfelijke medicijn in zijn bloed op de hoogte is gesteld en dat hiermee langer dan een maand werd gewacht, waarvoor het ICTY-rapport zich geroepen voelt een volstrekt nergens op slaande smoes te verzinnen, waaruit in elk geval valt af te leiden dat het zich kennelijk voor deze ernstige vertraging aansprakelijk voelt. Ze hadden anders natuurlijk ook het medische circuit van deze opvallende vertraging de schuld kunnen geven, onder het motto 'de medische molens hebben ditmaal nu eenmaal wat langzaam gemaald', maar dat hebben ze hier, als blijkbaar strijdig met de feiten, kennelijk niet aangedurfd, omdat ze zich realiseerden dat de betrokken medici dit wel eens zouden kunnen gaan tegenspreken. Nu hebben ze er dus uiteindelijk van gemaakt: het is die verdomde rare Nederlandse wetgeving geweest die hier heeft veroorzaakt dat noch wij als ICTY, noch Milosevic zelf eerder deze uitslag konden krijgen, dan pas weken later. Vast staat dat eerder zulke vertragingen van medische onderzoeken van Milosevic nooit opreden.

Ik neem er zelf ook maar even nota van dat deze openlijke smoes hier door het ICTY wordt verkondigd om een verklaring te bieden voor het feit dat gif in het bloed van Milosevic medisch werd vastgesteld, maar meer dan een maand werd verzwegen.

Ik constateer hier in dit verband in het voorbijgaan trouwens ook nog even een tweede onverklaarbaarheid in dit ICTY-onderzoeksrapport naar de dood van Milosevic, namelijk de volgende vaststellingen daarin: 1. "Mr. Milosevic was not aware that the sample he gave would be tested for rifampicin", in combinatie met 2. "This was the first time that a bloodtest of Mr. Milosevic had undergone the specific testing for rifampicin", en 3. "Normal testing would not have disclosed the presence of rifampicin." De vraag die nu hier, voor het eerst bij me opduikt is: waarom werd hier nu zo plotseling, voor het eerst, op een volslagen onbekend middel getest dat met de kwalen van Milosevic niks te maken had, en dit dan kennelijk zonder dat daarom door Milosevic was gevraagd, want die wist, zo stelt het rapport immers zelf, van niks. Stel nou dat hiermee een poging wordt ondernomen om de suggestie te wekken dat Milosevic op een geraffineerde manier bezig was zichzelf om zeep te helpen. De bijkomende suggestie is dan dat ie bezig was dit te doen met behulp van rifampicine en dat het ICTY daar lucht van zou hebben gekregen. En dat het ICTY juist ook daarom de opdracht zou hebben gegeven om hem ook maar even op die stof te testen. Dan hebben ze dus bij het ICTY eerst zogenaamd vastgesteld dat Milosevic bezig zou zijn geweest om zichzelf uit de weg te ruimen middels rifampicine, zouden dan vervolgens medisch bevestigd hebben gekregen dat Milosevic inderdaad bezig zijn geweest zichzelf aldus te vergiftigen, maar zouden dan vervolgens meer dan een maand lang geen enkele actie hebben ondernomen om hem tegen zichzelf en zijn zelfmoordneigingen te beschermen! Ook dit indiceert dan zonder meer dat ze hem met alle liefde en plezier de pijp zagen gaan.

Een laatste punt waarop mijn eigen verhaal aanvulling behoeft is dan tot slot de informatie uit Wikileaks die 'in mijn tijd' uiteraard nog onbekend was, namelijk dat nu wel definitief vaststaat dat de Amerikaanse ambassade en geheime diensten erg geïnteresseerd waren in de gezondheidstoestand van Milosevic. Als de ze daarop geen invloed ambieerden dan was daarover niet zo intensief met het ICTY gecommuniceerd, hetgeen het geval was, zoals Wikileaks aantoont. Wat de Amerikaanse ambassade wilde weten over de gezondheidstoestand werd hen door het ICTY, ondanks alle medische geheimhouding, zonder meer meegedeeld. Er is geen reden om aan te nemen dat het daarbij bleef. En dat de Amerikaanse administratie en geheime diensten niet alleen maar wilden weten hoe het met de gezondheid van Milosevic ging, maar dat ze diens gezondheidstoestand ook nog eens gaarne nader wilden bepalen.

groeten van Nico

From: Sagitar
Sent: Sunday, November 11, 2018 9:08 PM
To: Arnold Koper
Subject: Re: test

klopt.

From: Arnold Koper
Sent: Sunday, November 11, 2018 4:58 PM
To: sagitar2@kpnmail.nl
Subject: test

Test

--

Arnold Koper
0617664329
Havekerweg 9
7211DA Eefde

Sagitar

Van: "Sagitar" <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>
Datum: maandag 12 november 2018 18:29
Aan: "Sagitar" <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>; <arnoldkoper@gmail.com>
Onderwerp: Re: test

Hoi Arnold,

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groeten van Nico

VrijneLyn

From: [Sagitar](#)
Sent: Sunday, November 11, 2018 9:08 PM
To: [Arnold Koper](#)
Subject: Re: test

klopt.

From: [Arnold Koper](#)
Sent: Sunday, November 11, 2018 4:58 PM
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Test



counterpunch

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AUGUST 1, 2016

The Exoneration of Milosevic: the ICTY's Surprise Ruling

by ANDY WILCOXSON

The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague has determined that the late Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic was not responsible for war crimes committed during the 1992-95 Bosnian war.


In a stunning ruling, the trial chamber that convicted for the first time Bosnian-Serb president Radovan Karadzic of war crimes and sentenced him to 40 years in prison, unanimously concluded that Slobodan Milosevic was not part of a "joint criminal enterprise" to victimize Muslims and Croats during the Bosnian war.

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[1] ICTY, Karadzic Judgment, 24 March 2016, Para. 3460

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[2] Ibid., Footnote 11027

[3] Ibid., Para. 3274

[4] Ibid., Para. 2709

[5] Ibid., Para. 2710

[6] Ibid., Para. 2685

[7] Ibid., Para. 2687

[8] Ibid., Para. 3288

[9] Ibid., Para. 3284

[10] Ibid., Para. 3289

[11] Ibid., Para. 3295

[12] Ibid., Para. 3290

[13] Ibid., Para. 3297

[14] Ibid., Para. 3293

[15] Ibid., Para. 3292

[16] Ibid., Para. 3280

[17] ICTY Case No. IT-02-54 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, *Decision on Assigned Counsel Request for Provisional Release*, February 23, 2006

[18] Text of Slobodan Milosevic's Letter to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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[19] Judge Kevin Parker (Vice-President of the ICTY), *Report to the President of the ICTY: Death of Slobodan Milosevic*, May 2006; ¶ 31, 76

<

http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/custom2/en/parkerreport.pdf >

[20] U.S. State Dept. Cable #03THEHAGUE2835_a, "ICTY: An Inside Look Into Milosevic's Health and Support Network"

< https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03THEHAGUE2835_a.html >

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
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found that "Milosevic tried to reason with the Bosnian Serbs saying that he understood their concerns, but that it was most important to end the war."^[11]

The judgment states that "Milosevic also questioned whether the world would accept that the Bosnian Serbs who represented only one third of the population of BiH would get more than 50% of the territory and he encouraged a political agreement."^[12]

At a meeting of the Supreme Defense Council the judgment says that "Milosevic told the Bosnian Serb leadership that they were not entitled to have more than half the territory in BiH, stating that: 'there is no way that more than that could belong to us! Because, we represent one third of the population. [...] We are not entitled to in excess of half of the territory – you must not snatch away something that belongs to someone else! [...] How can you imagine two thirds of the population being crammed into 30% of the territory, while 50% is too little for you?! Is it humane, is it fair?!'"^[13]

In other meetings with Serb and Bosnian Serb officials, the judgment notes that Milosevic "declared that the war must end and that the Bosnian Serbs' biggest mistake was to want a complete defeat of the Bosnian Muslims."^[14] Because of the rift between Milosevic and the Bosnian-Serbs, the judges note that "the FRY reduced its support for the RS and encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to accept peace proposals."^[15]

The Tribunal's determination that Slobodan Milosevic was not part of a joint criminal enterprise, and that on the contrary he "condemned ethnic cleansing"^[16] is of tremendous significance because he got blamed for all of the bloodshed in Bosnia, and harsh economic sanctions were imposed on Serbia as a result. Wrongfully accusing Milosevic ranks right up there with invading Iraq only to find that there weren't any weapons of mass destruction after all.

Slobodan Milosevic was vilified by the entire western press corps and virtually every politician in every NATO country.

Protest and
Disrespect: America
in Black and White

September 06,
2016

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NORBERT ROSS
What's Class Got to
Do With It?

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The US Election: an
Exercise in Mendacity

JOSHUA FRANK
Frack, Rattle and
Roll: Drilling into
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PEPE ESCOBAR
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PETER BRADFORD
Subsidizing Nuclear
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ANDREW STEWART
Why Lincoln Chafee
Won the Election

DAVID ANDERSON
Disaster in Detroit:
Fear of a Black City

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Servergate, and the
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MANUELA YEPE
The Other War Crime

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They called him "the Butcher of the Balkans." They compared him to Hitler and accused him of genocide. They demonized him and made him out to be a bloodthirsty monster, and they used that false image to justify not only economic sanctions against Serbia, but also the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia and the Kosovo war.

Slobodan Milosevic had to spend the last five years of his life in prison defending himself and Serbia from bogus war crimes allegations over a war that they now admit he was trying to stop. The most serious charges that Milosevic faced, including the charge of genocide, were all in relation to Bosnia. Now, ten years after his death, they admit that he wasn't guilty after all – oops.

The ICTY did nothing to publicize the fact that they had cleared Milosevic of involvement in the joint criminal enterprise. They quietly buried that finding 1,303 pages into the 2,590 page Karadzic verdict knowing full well that most people would probably never bother to read it.

The presiding judge in the Radovan Karadzic trial, O-Gon Kwon of South Korea, was also one of the judges in the Slobodan Milosevic trial. Milosevic's exoneration by the Karadzic trial chamber may be an indication of how the Milosevic chamber would have eventually ruled, at least on the Bosnia charges, if Milosevic had lived to see the conclusion of his own trial.

It's worth recalling that Slobodan Milosevic died under a very suspicious set of circumstances. He died of a heart attack just two weeks after the Tribunal denied his request to undergo heart surgery in Russia.^[17] He was found dead in his cell less than 72 hours after his attorney delivered a letter to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which he said that he feared he was being poisoned.^[18]

The Tribunal's official report on the inquiry into his death confirmed that, "Rifampicin had been found in a blood sample taken from Mr. Milosevic on 12 January 2006." And that "Mr. Milosevic was not told of the results until 3 March 2006

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September 05,
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because of the difficult legal position in which Dr. Falke (the Tribunal's chief medical officer) found himself by virtue of the Dutch legal provisions concerning medical confidentiality." [19]

The presence of Rifamicin (a non-prescribed drug) in Milosevic's blood would have counteracted the high blood pressure medication he was taking and increased his risk of the heart attack that ultimately did kill him. The Tribunal's admission that they knew about the Rifampicin for months, but didn't tell Milosevic the results of his own blood test until just days before his death because of "Dutch legal provisions concerning medical confidentiality" is an incredibly lame and disingenuous excuse. There is no provision of Dutch law that prohibits a doctor from telling the patient the results of his own blood test — that would be idiotic. On the contrary, concealing such information from the patient could be seen as malpractice.

This all gives rise to well-founded suspicion that powerful geopolitical interests would rather Milosevic die before the end of his trial than see him acquitted and have their vicious lies exposed. U.S. State Department cables leaked to Wikileaks confirm that The Tribunal did discuss Milosevic's medical condition and his medical records with U.S. Embassy personnel in The Hague without his consent. [20] They clearly didn't care about medical confidentiality laws when they were blabbing about his medical records to the American embassy.

It's an unsatisfying outcome that Milosevic has been quietly vindicated for the most serious crimes that he was accused of some ten years after his death. At a minimum financial compensation should now be paid to his widow and his children, and reparations should be paid to Serbia by the western governments who sought to punish Serbia in order to hold Milosevic "accountable" for crimes that their own Tribunal now admits he wasn't responsible for, and was in fact trying to stop.

Notes.

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the Rough Road to
Understanding

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[1] ICTY, Karadzic Judgment, 24 March 2016, Para. 3460

<

<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324-judgement.pdf> >

Handwritten: J. N. DE SMEDT

[2] Ibid., Footnote 11027

[3] Ibid., Para. 3274

[4] Ibid., Para. 2709

[5] Ibid., Para. 2710

[6] Ibid., Para. 2685

[7] Ibid., Para. 2687

[8] Ibid., Para. 3288

[9] Ibid., Para. 3284

[10] Ibid., Para. 3289

[11] Ibid., Para. 3295

[12] Ibid., Para. 3290

[13] Ibid., Para. 3297

[14] Ibid., Para. 3293

[15] Ibid., Para. 3292

[16] Ibid., Para. 3280

[17] ICTY Case No. IT-02-54 Prosecutor v. Slobodan Milosevic, *Decision on Assigned Counsel Request for Provisional Release*, February 23, 2006

[18] Text of Slobodan Milosevic's Letter to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

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[19] Judge Kevin Parker (Vice-President of the ICTY), *Report to the President of the ICTY: Death of Slobodan Milosevic*, May 2006; ¶ 31, 76

<

http://www.icty.org/x/cases/slobodan_milosevic/custom2/en/parkerreport.pdf >

[20] U.S. State Dept. Cable #03THEHAGUE2835_a, "ICTY: An Inside Look Into Milosevic's Health and Support Network"

< https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/03THEHAGUE2835_a.html >

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Sagitar

Van: "Sagitar" <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>
Datum: dinsdag 2 april 2024 23:20
Aan: "Gijsbert Beijen" <gijsbeijen.01@gmail.com>
Onderwerp: Fw: Moskou aan de Eems, 31 03 2024 - 1

Nou, ik zou zeggen dat je meteen kunt verwijzen naar wat er op onze site staat over Milosevic. En op de site Natosued.org. Plus hem vertellen over alle processen die tegen de NAVO-agressieoorlog hier in ons land zijn gevoerd. Zie Natosued.org.

Ook kan je hem vragen of hij, op zijn site, in het belang van de geschiedenis, twee boekwerken zou willen opnemen met door de regering van door de Joegoslavische regering vastgelegd gedocumenteerd bewijsmateriaal van de oorlogsmisdrijven van de NAVO-oorlog tegen Joegoslavië van 24 maart tot en met 10 juni 1999, indertijd uitgebracht in mei 1999 in Belgrado en juli 1999, tesamen zo'n 800 blz. documenten en vaak ook met de meest afschuwelijke foto's van oorlogsmisdrijven, een en ander onder de titel "NATO CRIMES IN YUGOSLAVIA – Documentary Evidence. Ik heb deze boeken indertijd van Milosevic ontvangen, toen hij hier in Nederland gevangen zat. En ik hem, in Nederlands-rechtelijke zaken, verdedigde. Zijn opdracht was: maak dit bekend!

Vertel hem vooral ook dat inmiddels Milosevic, naar mijn mening, vermoord is in zijn cel in Den Haag, omdat hij zijn proces dreigde te winnen. Zie daarover mijn verhaal in onze site. Onder de titel HET TRIBUNAAL HAD EEN MOTIEF VOOR DE DOOD VAN SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC. En vertel hem tenslotte dat Milosevic inmiddels, in de zaak voor het Joegoslavië-Tribunaal tegen Karadzic, posthuum is vrijgesproken (<http://www.counterpunch.org/2016/08/01/the-exoneration-of-milosevic-the-ictys-surprise>)

Het zou geweldig zijn als deze FB-vriend met ons zou willen samenwerken om de posthume vrijspraak van Milosevic verder wereldkundig te maken !

groetjes en welterusten van ouwe Niek

From: [Gijsbert Beijen](#)
Sent: Sunday, March 31, 2024 10:22 PM
To: sagitar2@kpnmail.nl
Subject: Moskou aan de Eems, 31 03 2024 - 1

Ha oerwoudbewoners,
Bij mijn FB-vrienden (zo heet dat) is een Duitser, Wolfgang Müller. Die is actief bij onderstaande website:
<http://www.nato-tribunal.de>
Heb het verder niet helemaal bekeken. Wellicht heb je er wat aan.

Groet'n,
P. Brandligt
(Ik knip en plak met groot gemak)!

Sagitar

Van: "Sagitar" <sagitar2@kpnmail.nl>
Datum: maandag 12 november 2018 21:17
Aan: "N. van Holst" <n.van.holst@hetnet.nl>
Onderwerp: Fw: test

From: Sagitar
Sent: Monday, November 12, 2018 9:15 PM
To: sagitar2@kpnmail.nl
Subject: Fw: test

From: Sagitar
Sent: Monday, November 12, 2018 6:29 PM
To: Sagitar ; arnoldkoper@gmail.com
Subject: Re: test

Hoi Arnold,

In het verhaal dat ik indertijd schreef over de meer dan verdachte omstandigheden waarin Milosevic uiteindelijk tegen een hartstilstand aanliep, ontbreekt, zoals ik nu bij herlezing opmerk, hetgeen wél door Andy Wilcoxson op papier wordt aangegeven, maar dus niet door mij, namelijk een expliciete vaststelling van de onzinnigheid waarmee het ICTY-rapport inzake de dood van Milosevic tracht te verklaren dat de uitslag van de op 12 januari 2006 afgenomen bloedtest, waarbij het voor hem fatale middel rifampicine in zijn bloed werd aangetroffen, hem pas begin maart 2006 werd medegedeeld, luidende in dat rapport: "Mr. Milosevic was not told of the results until 3 March 2006 because of the difficult legal position in which Dr. Falke found himself by virtue of the legal provisions concerning medical confidentiality (an issue which is further considered later on in this report)." Voor de vindplaats van dit rapport, zie het artikel van Wilcoxson. Zodra dit ICTY-report uitkwam belde Wilcoxson mij en uitte zijn verbazing over deze laatste passage, de bewering dus dat Nederlandse regelgeving het extra moeilijk zou maken dat een arts gewoon normaal rechtstreeks zijn patiënt van een onderzoeksuitslag in kennis zou stellen, zoals het ICTY-onderzoeksrapport hier brutaalweg durft te stellen. Ik heb hem toen verzekerd dat zulks natuurlijk baarlijke onzin is. Natuurlijk staat de Nederlandse regelgeving er in geen enkel opzicht bij in de weg dat een patiënt door een dokter van de uitslag van een onderzoek direct zodra dit beschikbaar komt op de hoogte wordt gebracht! Blijft dus staan het feit dat Milosevic niet aanstonds van de uitslag van de bevinding van het voor hem verderfelijke medicijn in zijn bloed op de hoogte is gesteld en dat hiermee langer dan een maand werd gewacht, waarvoor het ICTY-rapport zich geroepen voelt een volstrekt nergens op slaande smoes te verzinnen, waaruit in elk geval valt af te leiden dat het zich kennelijk voor deze ernstige vertraging aansprakelijk voelt. Ze hadden anders natuurlijk ook het medische circuit van deze opvallende vertraging de schuld kunnen geven, onder het motto 'de medische molens hebben ditmaal nu eenmaal wat langzaam gemaald', maar dat hebben ze hier, als blijkbaar strijdig met de feiten, kennelijk niet aangedurfd, omdat ze zich realiseerden dat de betrokken medici dit wel eens zouden kunnen gaan tegenspreken. Nu hebben ze er dus uiteindelijk van gemaakt: het is die verdomde rare Nederlandse wetgeving geweest die hier heeft veroorzaakt dat noch wij als ICTY, noch Milosevic zelf eerder deze uitslag konden krijgen, dan pas weken later. Vast staat dat zulke vertragingen van uitslagen van medische onderzoeken van Milosevic eerder nooit optraden.

Ik neem er zelf ook maar even nota van dat deze openlijke smoes hier door het ICTY wordt verkondigd om een verklaring te bieden voor het feit dat gif in het bloed van Milosevic medisch werd vastgesteld, maar meer dan een maand werd verzweigen.

Ik constateer hier in dit verband in het voorbijgaan trouwens ook nog even een tweede onverklaarbaarheid in dit ICTY-onderzoeksrapport naar de dood van Milosevic, namelijk de volgende vaststellingen daarin: 1. "Mr. Milosevic was not aware that the sample he gave would be tested for rifampicin", in combinatie met 2. "This was the first time that a bloodtest of Mr. Milosevic had undergone the specific testing for rifampicin", en 3. "Normal testing would not have disclosed the presence of rifampicin." De vraag die nu hier, voor het eerst bij me opduikt is: waarom werd hier nu zo plotseling, voor het eerst, op een volslagen onbekend middel getest dat met de kwalen van Milosevic niks te maken had, en dit dan kennelijk zonder dat daarom door Milosevic was gevraagd, want die wist, zo stelt het rapport immers zelf, van niks. Stel nou dat hiermee een poging wordt ondernomen om de suggestie te wekken dat Milosevic op een geraffineerde manier bezig was zichzelf om zeep te helpen. De bijkomende suggestie is dan dat ie bezig was dit te doen met behulp van rifampicine en dat het ICTY daar lucht van zou hebben gekregen. En dat het ICTY juist ook daarom de opdracht zou hebben gegeven om hem ook maar even op die stof te testen. Dan hebben ze dus bij het ICTY eerst zogenaamd vastgesteld dat Milosevic bezig zou zijn geweest om zichzelf uit de weg te ruimen middels rifampicine, zouden dan vervolgens medisch bevestigd hebben gekregen dat Milosevic inderdaad bezig zijn geweest zichzelf aldus te vergiftigen, maar zouden dan vervolgens meer dan een maand lang geen enkele actie hebben ondernomen om hem tegen zichzelf en zijn zelfmoordneigingen te beschermen! Ook dit indiceert dan zonder meer dat ze hem met alle liefde en plezier de pijp uit zagen gaan.

Een laatste punt waarop mijn eigen verhaal aanvulling behoeft is dan tot slot de informatie uit Wikileaks die 'in mijn tijd' uiteraard nog onbekend was, namelijk dat nu wel definitief vaststaat dat de Amerikaanse ambassade en geheime diensten erg geïnteresseerd waren in de gezondheidstoestand van Milosevic. Als de ze daarop geen invloed ambieerden dan was daarover niet zo intensief met het ICTY gecommuniceerd, hetgeen het geval was, zoals Wikileaks aantoon. Wat de Amerikaanse ambassade wilde weten over de gezondheidstoestand werd hen door het ICTY, ondanks alle medische geheimhouding, zonder meer meegedeeld. Er is geen reden om aan te nemen dat het daarbij bleef. En dat de Amerikaanse administratie en geheime diensten niet alleen maar wilden weten hoe het met de gezondheid van Milosevic ging, maar dat ze diens gezondheidstoestand ook nog eens gaarne nader wilden bepalen.

groeten van Nico

From: [Sagitar](#)
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Subject: Re: test

klopt.

From: [Arnold Koper](#)
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 Instellingen

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Joost Niemöller 
@JoostNiemoller

Geen nieuws in NL media: Joegoslavië-tribunaal spreekt Milosevic vrij van oorlogsmisdaden novini.nl/joegoslavië-tr... via @NoviniNL

12:38 p.m. · 8 aug. 2016

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ANALYSE

Joegoslavië-tribunaal spreekt Milosevic vrij van oorlogsmisdaden

door REDACTIE BUITENLAND op 4 AUGUSTUS 2016 1 COMMENT

Het International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in de omgang wel Joegoslavië-tribunaal genoemd, heeft vastgesteld dat de voormalige Servische president Slobodan Milosevic niet verantwoordelijk was voor oorlogsmisdaden die werden gepleegd tijdens de Bosnische oorlog van 1992 tot '95.

De kamer die de Bosnisch-Servische president Radovan Karadzic wegens oorlogsmisdaden tot 40 jaar gevangenisstraf veroordeelde, concludeerde unaniem dat Slobodan Milosevic geen onderdeel was van een 'gezamenlijke misdadige onderneming' die het tijdens de Bosnische oorlog op Moslims en Kroaten gemunt had.

Enorme Winst Na Dood

McD's Kok wint duizenden vlak na de tragische dood van zijn vriendin

De uitspraak in de zaak van Karadzic van 24 maart jongstleden stelde dat er geen toereikend bewijs was dat Milosevic betrokken was in het plan om het territorium dat in handen was van Bosnische Serviërs te zuiveren van Moslims en Kroaten.

Hoewel aanvankelijk zowel Karadzic als Milosevic tegen het ontstaan van een onafhankelijk Bosnië waren en de voortzetting van Joegoslavië ten doel hadden, liepen vanaf eind 1991 hun ideeën uiteen. Tegen 1994 konden ze het niet meer eens worden. De kamer stelde echter ook vast dat Milosevic al in maart 1992 Karadzic en de Bosnisch-Servische leiding openlijk beschuldigde van mensenrechtenschendingen en etnische zuivering.

Toen in oktober 1991 het parlement van Bosnië, in afwezigheid van de Bosnisch-Servische afgevaardigden, de onafhankelijkheid uitriep, trok Karadzic de conclusie dat er een Servische Republiek in Bosnië gevormd moest worden, maar Milosevic had daar ernstige bedenkingen bij. Hij wilde niet op een illegale stap reageren met een andere illegale stap. Ook wilde hij de Bosnische Moslims die voor het voortbestaan van Joegoslavië waren niet uitsluiten. De kamer merkt op dat Milosevic zich uitsprak voor de bescherming van alle etniciteiten. Ook was Milosevic boos op de Bosnisch-Servische leiding, dat zij het Vance-Owen-plan verwierpen. Hij begreep hun bedenkingen, maar benadrukte het belang van het beëindigen van de oorlog.

Blijf op de hoogte van nieuws, opinie en achtergronden: Volg Novini!

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1 SEPTEMBER 2016

OORLOG & TERREUR

Hoog tijd om de NAVO op te doeken

31 AUGUSTUS 2016

MEEST GELEZEN

5 SEPTEMBER 2016
De anti-racistische demonstraties in Parijs

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
Het is opmerkelijk dat de media nog geen melding hebben gemaakt van de zuivering van Milosevic' naam door het Joegoslavië-tribunaal. Maar het tribunaal heeft het zelf ook niet actief naar buiten gebracht. Het staat ergens halverwege het 2,5 duizend pagina's dikke oordeel in de zaak Karadzic. Zonder persbericht dat er op wijst kan het wel even duren voor zoiets opgemerkt wordt.

Milosevic werd ten tijde van het uiteenvallen van Joegoslavië en de oorlogen waarmee dat gepaard ging, door westerse media voorgesteld als een dictatoriale leider en genocide aangevreven. Dat diende als rechtvaardiging voor economische sancties tegen Servië. Die beeldvorming speelde uiteindelijk ook een rol in de rechtvaardiging van de NAVO-bombardementen op Servië in 1999 en de opstelling van het Westen ten aanzien van Kosovo.

Milosevic bracht de laatste vijf jaar van zijn leven in een Haagse cel door, waar hij uiteindelijk stierf aan een hartaanval onder nog altijd niet helemaal opgehelderde omstandigheden. Milosevic vermoedde dat hij vergiftigd werd. Een arts vond inderdaad een stof in zijn bloed, die het effect van zijn hartmedicijnen op kon heffen, maar Milosevic kreeg dit pas maanden later te horen. Intussen werd Milosevic' gezondheidssituatie wel zonder zijn toestemming met de Amerikaanse ambassade besproken, zo blijkt uit WikiLeaks-documenten. En nu, tien jaar na zijn dood, is hij stiltejes vrijgesproken van de voornaamste zaken waarvoor hij aangeklaagd was

Bron: slobodan-milosevic.org

Dit delen:



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31 AUGUSTUS 2016 0

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2706. At first the Accused expressed that he wanted to be loyal to Yugoslavia and for the Bosnian Serbs to stay in this joint state.⁹⁰²² When the situation deteriorated and it became clear that BiH would not remain in Yugoslavia, the Accused adapted this goal.⁹⁰²³ In October 1992, Plavšić stated that the “establishment of a Muslim state without observing the interests of the Serbian people verges on insanity” and that Izetbegović had walked into that situation and “the consequences are now obvious”.⁹⁰²⁴

(2) Conclusion

2707. The Chamber finds that the Accused’s speech to the SRBiH Assembly in October 1991 in which he spoke about a “highway of hell” clearly shows the Accused’s consistent opposition to the proposed independence of BiH. While the Accused in the speech stated that he was not threatening the Bosnian Muslims, the Chamber finds that on the contrary, the speech contained very specific threats about what would happen if the Bosnian Muslims continued to pursue the path of independence and ignored the will of the Bosnian Serbs. The Chamber finds that the Accused was clearly threatening war if the Bosnian Serb interests were ignored, and he also envisaged that such a war would be “hell” and that the Bosnian Muslims would be unable to defend themselves in such a scenario.

2708. The Chamber also finds that these warnings by the Accused were not just an isolated aberration. The Chamber finds, by reference to multiple intercepted conversations in September and October 1991, that the Accused discussed how he would warn the Bosnian Muslims that if they persisted with their policies relating to the independence of BiH, this course of action would lead to extreme bloodshed, annihilation and the disappearance or extinction of the Bosnian Muslims. These conversations, in addition to speeches made by the Accused in 1991, underscore that the Accused intended to threaten the Bosnian Muslims against pursuing independence for BiH and that he was fully aware that a potential conflict would be extremely violent and result in thousands of deaths, the destruction of property, and the displacement of people and that it would be particularly devastating for the Bosnian Muslim population.

⁹⁰²² Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34268–34269 (26 February 2013). *See also* Milorad Dodik, T. 36845 (9 April 2013); D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), paras. 8, 15. The Chamber does not rely on Bulatović’s general opinion that everything that the Bosnian Serbs did was in response to acts and threats by Bosnian Muslims.

⁹⁰²³ Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34269 (26 February 2013); D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 16. *See also* P1349 (Transcript of 6th session of SerBiH Assembly, 26 January 1992), p. 8.

⁹⁰²⁴ P1360 (Transcript from Joint session (21st session) of RS Assembly and Assembly of Serbian Krajina, 31 October 1992), pp. 9–10.

2709. The Chamber finds that the declaration of sovereignty by the SRBiH Assembly in the absence of the Bosnian Serb delegates on 15 October 1991, escalated the situation. The Bosnian Serb leadership made it clear once again that they would not accept a sovereign BiH and issued an ultimatum for the revocation of this declaration. However, it is clear from the conversation on 24 October 1991 between the Accused and Slobodan Milošević that the Accused did not expect the Bosnian Muslims to abolish the decisions they had taken with respect to the sovereignty of BiH.

2710. The conversation with Milošević in October 1991 is also instructive as it shows that the Accused envisaged responding in such a way that the Bosnian Serbs would establish full authority in Bosnian Serb territories, create a *de facto* situation to ensure that the Bosnian Serbs would never live in the same state as the Bosnian Muslims, and create their own parallel and separate institutions and structures. It is also clear from this conversation that Slobodan Milošević was attempting to take a more cautious approach while the Accused was adamant that their goal was to ensure that they would establish full authority in their territories, which would mean that Izetbegović would not have control of 65% of BiH, and that they would announce their own Bosnian Serb Assembly.

2711. The Chamber also finds that while Milošević expressed reservations about excluding Bosnian Muslims, the Accused was adamant that there were not even 10% of Bosnian Muslims who supported Yugoslavia and that they could not take such a risk. The Accused also spoke clearly about steps Bosnian Serbs would take to establish authority and control over territories which they claimed and that the Bosnian Serbs would be moving towards mobilisation. The Chamber finds that this demonstrates that the Accused from October 1991 vehemently opposed the independence of BiH and planned on taking over Bosnian Serb claimed territory. This conversation also demonstrates that the Accused envisaged a separation of the Bosnian Serbs from non-Serbs in BiH and that war in BiH would result in "population homogenisation". The Chamber also finds that the Accused supported the creation of ethnically based entities in BiH. The Accused also encouraged the identification of Serb areas which would be to the exclusion of Bosnian Muslims.

2712. The Accused's conversation with Krajišnik in January 1992 also demonstrates the Accused's continuing anger with respect to the proposed independence of BiH. In this regard the Accused said that he would not be calming the Bosnian Serb people any further and that he would "release [their] tigers and let them do their job". The Accused also spoke about the non-negotiable character of the Bosnian Serb objectives and his position that they would not allow anything to stop them. The Chamber finds that the Accused's position was that the Bosnian Serbs would not allow BiH to secede from Yugoslavia, and if BiH insisted on independence so would the Bosnian Serbs.

2713. The Accused also described the Bosnian Muslims as a "religious sect" who had only recently been given the status of "people" and that they had no basis for their independence. The Chamber finds that this rhetoric when combined with the Accused's references to the Bosnian Muslims as their historic enemies, created an environment which sought to quash any claim to independence by BiH and to re-assert the Bosnian Serb interests in BiH.

2714. In meetings with international representatives, the Accused repeated his warning about how the independence of BiH would result in a "cruel war" and his prediction that he would not be able to calm down the Bosnian Serbs in this scenario.

2715. The Chamber also finds that there was a disjuncture between what the Accused said in private conversations or before a Bosnian Serb audience and the tone he took in international negotiations where he was more conciliatory, spoke against conflict, and claimed that the Serbs were the victims of propaganda. The Accused took a leading role in portraying the Bosnian Serbs as the victims of the conflict and used this as justification for pursuing their territorial and political objectives of a separate Serb state in BiH.

(D) Advocating separation of population and creation of a Bosnian Serb state

(1) Analysis of evidence

(a) Separation of population—inability to co-exist

2716. On 27 August 1991, in an intercepted conversation with Koljević, the Accused expressed his opposition to BiH independence and indicated his willingness to divide BiH along ethnic lines by stating "[l]et us see what it is, what the solution for each ethnic group would be, and for everyone to agree to it [...]. Because if there is no solution acceptable to us in [BiH], we will find our own solution".⁹⁰²⁵

2717. In November 1991, the Accused spoke about the "principle of reciprocity" and that the Serbs alone would not move out of certain areas and then allow the Bosnian Muslims to "stay in our areas to settle and build their colonies".⁹⁰²⁶ The Accused called on the Bosnian Serbs to "get ready and establish your authority in your territories; in municipalities, regions, local communities, and to prepare yourselves for restructuring and regionalizing the municipalities" and for them to

⁹⁰²⁵ P5878 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Nikola Koljević, 27 August 1991), p. 4.

⁹⁰²⁶ P958 (Radovan Karadžić's speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 7. See also P988 (Transcript of 53rd session of RS Assembly, 28 August 1995), p. 29.

control the process until the very last moment.⁹⁰²⁷ The Accused concluded that after and during the plebiscite it was important to "seize power wherever you can".⁹⁰²⁸

2718. With respect to the "three national communities" in BiH, the Accused suggested that "the more separate things there are the better it will be".⁹⁰²⁹

2719. The Accused in a speech in January 1992 stated that the Bosnian Serbs would "not impose anything on each other" and that they would work towards a form of state organisation to which Croats, Serbs and Muslims would agree.⁹⁰³⁰ The Accused also said that they had "no influence over the war or peace" and that if an inter-ethnic or religious war started in BiH, Serbs, Muslims, and Croats would run away and go to their own "fully homogeneous" areas and that there would be severe bloodshed and destruction of towns.⁹⁰³¹ Similarly the Accused told Vance that BiH independence could lead to war and that there "will be great mass movements, homogenisation of territories, migrations from one area into another and, of course, accompanied by instances of shooting out of hand".⁹⁰³²

2720. In January 1992, in a conversation in which there was discussion about having Bosnian Muslims within their borders, the Accused said "they will have their region, we will have our own region".⁹⁰³³ The Accused also spoke about the importance of creating their country first and then establishing "krajinas" and the danger that they would never create their state if they started establishing "krajinas" first.⁹⁰³⁴

2721. In February 1992, Krajišnik stated that if they were successful in creating a confederal BiH it would consist of three states and he was "not interested in Muslims in [BiH]".⁹⁰³⁵ He also stressed that everything which the Bosnian Serb Assembly did, and everything he did, was "for pure areas" of BiH, that he was in favour of a "monolithic Serbian state" where all Serbs live

⁹⁰²⁷ P958 (Radovan Karadžić's speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 10.

⁹⁰²⁸ P958 (Radovan Karadžić's speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 12.

⁹⁰²⁹ D84 (Shorthand Record of 3rd session of SRBiH Assembly, 11 December 1991), pp. 13–14; P958 (Radovan Karadžić's speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 7. *See also* D424 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Vojo Kuprešanin, 10 February 1992), p. 11.

⁹⁰³⁰ D87 (Transcript of 9th session of SRBiH Assembly, 24–25 January 1992), pp. 103–104.

⁹⁰³¹ D87 (Transcript of 9th session of SRBiH Assembly, 24–25 January 1992), p. 103; P5762 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Dobrica Ćosić, 22 January 1992), p. 6. *See also* Herbert Okun, T. 1715–1717 (27 April 2010); P5621 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Dobrica Ćosić, 25 January 1992), p. 3; P5615 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Nikola Koljević, 11 December 1991), p. 4; D4523 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and an unidentified male, 3 March 1992).

⁹⁰³² P5774 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Vladislav Jovanović, 5 January 1992), pp. 6–7. *See also* D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), pp. 18, 28.

⁹⁰³³ P2596 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and "Miroslav", 7 January 1992), p. 5.

⁹⁰³⁴ P2596 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and "Miroslav", 7 January 1992), p. 6.

together.⁹⁰³⁶ Koljević also emphasised that they would not allow the Bosnian Muslims to have a sovereign state which extended over both the Serb and Croat parts of BiH and that they had therefore constituted a Serb Assembly.⁹⁰³⁷ Koljević acknowledged that the process of re-organising municipalities was with the aim of creating “homogeneity of certain areas” and argued that contrary to the political assertions, it was not impossible to divide BiH.⁹⁰³⁸ Koljević stated that at a municipal level they had tried separate municipal assemblies and formed new municipalities.⁹⁰³⁹ Further, he repeatedly called for the expulsion of Bosnian Muslims and the homogeneity of territories, claiming it was impossible for Serbs to live with anyone else.⁹⁰⁴⁰

2722. Krajišnik also stated that “[o]ur aim is to divide with the Muslims, if the Muslims were to capitulate we would remain with them, if they remained with us they would soon be the majority?” and outlined the Strategic Goals, including dividing from Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.⁹⁰⁴¹

2723. In February 1992, the Accused spoke about having less than 10% of Bosnian Muslims in their “canton” of BiH according to the proposed maps.⁹⁰⁴² The Accused continued to deliver speeches in which he (i) spoke about avoiding the subjugation of the Serb people; (ii) advocated the creation of a “Serbian state”; and (iii) blamed the Muslims and Croats for destroying the unity of BiH and Yugoslavia.⁹⁰⁴³ The Accused in May 1992 spoke with Krajišnik, Mladić, and other military leaders and said that BiH as a state did not exist because it did not have any territory and that the Serbs were “on the threshold of achieving our centuries-old dream of creating our own state without many internal enemies”.⁹⁰⁴⁴ In this regard, the Accused also stated that they were “controlling the Serbian settlements” in Sarajevo and were expanding them.⁹⁰⁴⁵

⁹⁰³⁵ D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), pp. 62–63.

⁹⁰³⁶ P5623 (Speech of Momčilo Krajišnik at the Assembly of Serbian People of BiH, 28 February 1992), pp. 3–4.

⁹⁰³⁷ P986 (Transcript of a meeting between Nikola Koljević, Franjo Tudman, and Franjo Boras, 8 January 1992), pp. 11, 24.

⁹⁰³⁸ P986 (Transcript of a meeting between Nikola Koljević, Franjo Tudman, and Franjo Boras, 8 January 1992), p. 13.

⁹⁰³⁹ P986 (Transcript of a meeting between Nikola Koljević, Franjo Tudman, and Franjo Boras, 8 January 1992), pp. 22–23.

⁹⁰⁴⁰ Vitimir Žepinić, T. 33594–33595 (13 February 2013); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4220. During a meeting with Serb and Muslim representatives in May 1992, Koljević precluded any possibility of Muslims and Serbs cohabitating in Pale; the former had to leave. P733 (Witness statement of Sulejman Crnčalo dated 1 November 2009), para. 38; Sulejman Crnčalo, T. 1164–1165 (14 April 2010).

⁹⁰⁴¹ P1479 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 140, 143–144.

⁹⁰⁴² P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 2, 15.

⁹⁰⁴³ P1347 (Shorthand record of 5th session of SerBiH Assembly, 9 January 1992), pp. 45, 47–49; P956 (Transcript of 16th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 May 1992), e-court pp.3–4.

⁹⁰⁴⁴ P1477 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), pp. 256–258. See also D4025 (Excerpt of SDS Main Board meeting, 14 February 1992), pp. 13, 15 (where Kuprešanin spoke about BiH ceasing to exist as their “holy mission”).

⁹⁰⁴⁵ P1477 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), p. 257.

2724. In February 1992, the Accused went on to state “now our main goal is the only goal that can be achieved: to solve the issue of the majority of the Serbian people”, namely the creation of their republic of BiH.⁹⁰⁴⁶ He also stated that “it is clear to every Serb that Croats and Serbs cannot live in a single state. Consequently, they cannot be in the same army, and also that BiH cannot have its army. There would remain national guards in each of the republics, and the police which would be under the control of the respective republics”.⁹⁰⁴⁷ The Accused emphasised that there was tension and conflict in undefined territories where “two national communities touch each other” and that they should be defined as soon as possible.⁹⁰⁴⁸

2725. In meetings with international representatives, Bosnian Serb leaders including the Accused, Krajišnik, and Plavšić openly stated that it was impossible for Bosnian Serbs to co-exist with the other communities, particularly the Bosnian Muslims, and that it was better to separate the communities.⁹⁰⁴⁹ For example in discussions with Owen and Morillon, the Accused repeated that separation from the Bosnian Muslims and Croats was essential.⁹⁰⁵⁰

2726. In meetings with Harland, the Accused as well as Plavšić openly said that the basic Serb war aim was to redistribute the population of BiH so that the Serbs would be left in control of a single continuous block of territory embracing the whole border with Montenegro and Serbia and also including all of the traditionally Serb-inhabited areas.⁹⁰⁵¹ The Bosnian Serb leadership said that due to “an historical accident”, Bosnian Muslims were a majority in certain areas and to achieve their goal, large numbers of Bosnian Muslims had to be removed because the majority of the population along the Drina River in northeast BiH, was Muslim.⁹⁰⁵² They openly stated that the purpose of war was for the Bosnian government to accept this redistribution of the population and the Accused acknowledged that some “old people will probably want to remain” but he envisaged that to a large extent the overwhelming majority of the population that would remain in Serb areas

⁹⁰⁴⁶ P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies' Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 35.

⁹⁰⁴⁷ P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies' Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 6.

⁹⁰⁴⁸ P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 March 1992), pp. 2, 7; D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), pp. 4–5, 10.

⁹⁰⁴⁹ KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6751–6752, 6843 (under seal); KDZ240, T. 16064–16065, 16068 (5 July 2011) (closed session); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4205; Herbert Okun, T. 1496–1497 (23 April 2010); P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 25; P1029 (Witness statement of John Wilson dated 4 November 2008), para. 120; KDZ088, T. 6253–6255, 6314 (7 September 2010) (closed session) [REDACTED]; Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek, T. 5512–5514, 5522–5523 (20 July 2010). See also KDZ088, T. 6314 (7 September 2010); P5748 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Lukić, 13 February 1992), p. 1; P5063 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadžić on “Ask the President”, undated, with transcript), pp. 8–9. [REDACTED].

⁹⁰⁵⁰ P1481 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp. 349, 357–358.

⁹⁰⁵¹ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 269.

⁹⁰⁵² P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 270.

would be Serb and Muslim in Muslim areas.⁹⁰⁵³ At these meetings, some members of the Bosnian Serb leadership openly stated that it was good if all non-Serbs left and that they wanted them to go because they were not living well together.⁹⁰⁵⁴

2727. Biljana Plavšić spoke about the importance of the partition of territory and executing this partition “properly as this business awaits us”.⁹⁰⁵⁵ She also expressed the idea that Bosnian Serbs could no longer live with Bosnian Muslims; on one occasion at a funeral for a Bosnian Serb soldier she said that the Bosnian Muslims should be slaughtered or exterminated.⁹⁰⁵⁶ In May 1992, Plavšić spoke of the entitlement of the Serbs to 70% of the territory and that Bosnian Serbs “were used to living in wide spaces” while Muslims typically lived in cities.⁹⁰⁵⁷ Plavšić further stated that “if it takes the lives of 3 million people to solve this crisis, let’s get it done and move on”.⁹⁰⁵⁸ Plavšić also spoke about creating the conditions for “forced emigration” and that the “last thing that can be allowed [...] is a compromise at the expense of conquered territories” and that foreign countries should be reminded that the Bosnian Serbs would not give up what they had conquered.⁹⁰⁵⁹

2728. Koljević was particularly extreme in his views and continued to repeat at important meetings that it was impossible for the communities to live together.⁹⁰⁶⁰ A deputy at the Bosnian Serb Assembly echoed this sentiment and spoke about their common wish for an “ethnically pure Serbian state” and the need, in the context of negotiations, to “emphasise that we can not live with them”.⁹⁰⁶¹ Lukić, who was the second Prime Minister of the RS, also advocated “ethnic cleansing” and told leaders in Serbia that Bosnian Muslims could not be trusted.⁹⁰⁶² International observers reported that the JNA acquiesced in, or in some cases supported, the creation of ethnically homogeneous regions in BiH which involved “the seizure of territory by military force and intimidation of the non-Serb population”.⁹⁰⁶³

⁹⁰⁵³ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 270, 272.

⁹⁰⁵⁴ P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), para. 274.

⁹⁰⁵⁵ P1353 (Shorthand record of 10th session of SerBiH Assembly, 11 March 1992), p. 36.

⁹⁰⁵⁶ Colm Doyle, T. 2667–2668, 2670–2672 (21 May 2010); [REDACTED]; Vitomir Žepinić, T. 33594–33595 (13 February 2013).

⁹⁰⁵⁷ Colm Doyle, T. 2671–2672 (21 May 2010).

⁹⁰⁵⁸ Colm Doyle, T. 2672 (21 May 2010).

⁹⁰⁵⁹ D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 38–39, 52.

⁹⁰⁶⁰ Vitomir Žepinić, T. 33595 (13 February 2013). See also Herbert Okun, T. 1497–1498 (23 April 2010); P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 44.

⁹⁰⁶¹ P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 34.

⁹⁰⁶² Momir Bulatović, T. 34543–34544 (1 March 2013); P6161 (Excerpt from notes of FRY’s SDC 8th session, 12 March 1993), pp. 1–2.

⁹⁰⁶³ P937 (UNSG Report re peacekeeping operation in BiH, 12 May 1992), paras. 3–5; Colm Doyle, T. 2663–2666 (21 May 2010).

2729. Krajišnik often recalled that the main Bosnian Serb objective was to separate from the Bosnian Muslims and to create their own state which was ethnically “pure”.⁹⁰⁶⁴

2730. In July 1992, Mandić spoke about the Bosnian Serb territories which were “supposed to be taken”, had already been taken, and identified areas which were still disputable, including in Sarajevo.⁹⁰⁶⁵ Mandić also questioned “what to do with the Turks” and suggested that there “should be an airlift established with Turkey and let them go, we should split Bosnia in two parts”.⁹⁰⁶⁶ In this same conversation, Mandić said “[w]e don’t want to have a single-nation state, man. We want to have democratic state where the Serbian people would be in the majority.”⁹⁰⁶⁷ Mandić acknowledged that Croats and “the rest of Muslims” would also have rights after “we clean them out”.⁹⁰⁶⁸

2731. The Chamber recalls that Kuruzović, the Commander of Trnopolje, confirmed that the plan of the Serb authorities was to reduce the number of Bosnian Muslims in Prijedor to 10% or less, and then later to reduce this to 2% or less.⁹⁰⁶⁹ The Chamber also heard from KDZ051 that around September 1992, he was told by the President of the Rogatica SDS, Sveto Veselinović, that “all the Muslims were going to disappear from the territory” and that in conversations with the Accused in Pale, “[i]t has been decided that one third of Muslims would be killed, one third would be converted to the Orthodox religion and a third will leave on their own”.⁹⁰⁷⁰ Sveto Veselinović testified that he did not meet KDZ051 in person, that he did not make such a statement, and that he did not have such a conversation with the Accused, as he did not speak to him between

⁹⁰⁶⁴ P1479 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 140, 143–144; P5623 (Speech of Momčilo Krajišnik at the Assembly of Serbian People of BiH, 28 February 1992), pp. 3–4; P1481 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp. 146–147; P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 48; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4293, 4295. See Adjudicated Fact 2411. Živanović acknowledged that separation from the Bosnian Muslims was discussed. Milenko Živanović, T. 42585–42590 (30 October 2013).

⁹⁰⁶⁵ P1104 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Momčilo Mandić and Ivo Rezo; (ii) Momčilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić, 10 July 1992), pp. 7–8; Momčilo Mandić, T. 4619–4620 (5 July 2010). In an earlier conversation in May 1992, Mandić said that they “should settle the Sarajevo problem through war and then sit down and talk”. P1149 (Intercept of conversation between Momčilo Mandić and Milanko Mučibabić, 26 May 1992), p. 8.

⁹⁰⁶⁶ P1104 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Momčilo Mandić and Ivo Rezo; (ii) Momčilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić, 10 July 1992), p. 8.

⁹⁰⁶⁷ P1104 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Momčilo Mandić and Ivo Rezo; (ii) Momčilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić, 10 July 1992), p. 10.

⁹⁰⁶⁸ P1104 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Momčilo Mandić and Ivo Rezo; (ii) Momčilo Mandić and Branko Kvesić, 10 July 1992), p. 11.

⁹⁰⁶⁹ See para. 1910 (referring to Adjudicated Fact 1093). But see D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), paras. 28, 42; Milomir Stakić, T. 45266–45267 (17 December 2013). Stakić testified that he never had any knowledge or heard of such a plan and the municipal authorities in Prijedor never planned for the municipality to be mono-ethnic and that the rights of all citizens were maintained. In light of the weight of contrary evidence received by the Chamber and Stakić’s interest in distancing himself and the authorities from events in Prijedor, the Chamber does not find his evidence in this regard to be reliable.

⁹⁰⁷⁰ P3405 (Witness statement of KDZ051 dated 17 September 2011), para. 95.

January 1992 and autumn of 1993.⁹⁰⁷¹ The Chamber finds that Veselinović's evidence casts reasonable doubt on this issue and thus dismisses KDZ051's evidence on this point.

2732. The Accused made a number of speeches which spoke about the inability of the "three peoples" in BiH to live together, and for example compared them to "plants which cannot grow side by side. They have to be separated to flourish".⁹⁰⁷² He also stated that "they lived together only when occupied or under a dictatorship. [...] We can only be together like oil and water. When you mix us, we are together. When you leave us alone, we separate" and that if they were put in the same pot the soup would not mix.⁹⁰⁷³ The Accused stated that "[w]e are really something different [...] we should not hide that. We are not brothers. We must know that" and that when the world asked why they could not live together, he would answer that "we are three cultures, three peoples and three religions" and that they had never lived together in democracy.⁹⁰⁷⁴

2733. This sentiment was also reflected in speeches delivered by Bosnian Serb leaders at a municipal level. For example, the Chamber recalls that in early April 1992, there were radio announcements in Foča in which SDS President Miroslav Stanić said it was no longer possible for Bosnian Serbs to live with their Bosnian Muslim neighbours, that they could not be woken every morning by the hodža from the mosque, and that there was a danger that the Bosnian Serb population would be circumcised.⁹⁰⁷⁵ In May 1992, the Accused attended a meeting where he said

⁹⁰⁷¹ D4192 (D4192 (Supplemental witness statement of Sveto Veselinović dated 17 November 2013). Similarly Karabeg, the President of the SDA Executive Board in Sanski Most, testified that the "goal of the Serbian side was not to have more than 10 per cent of the population in Sanski Most". Mirzet Karabeg, T. 18700-187002 (13 September 2011). However, the Chamber does not consider that Karabeg's testimony provided any basis for him to reach this conclusion, or that he was privy to that kind of information. The Chamber therefore does not rely on his evidence in this regard.

⁹⁰⁷² D304 (Shorthand Record of 14th session of RS Assembly, 27 March 1992), p. 8. See also Vitomir Žepinić, T. 33586-33587 (13 February 2013) (also testifying that in his own talks with the Accused, he "was not convinced that [the Accused] really thought about physical elimination of non-Serbs from [BiH]", but that it was impossible to live together due to the extremism of the nationalist parties). While the Chamber accepts that this was Žepinić's own assessment, it does not rely on his opinion in this regard.

⁹⁰⁷³ P5596 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadžić on CNN, with transcript), p. 1; P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), p. 19; P6688 (Interview with Radovan Karadžić in Duga Magazine, 23 May 1992), p. 3.

⁹⁰⁷⁴ P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 19-20. KDZ310 testified that the Accused as the head of the SDS pursued a policy which was designed to prove to "both peoples that they can no longer live together" even though they had lived together for years. KDZ310, T. 9178, 9182-9183 (29 November 2010). During cross-examination, KDZ310 acknowledged that he was in no way involved in politics and he formed these views based on conversations with people and what was reported in the media. The Chamber therefore places no weight on his assessment. Similarly the Chamber places no weight on Mujadžić's opinion that in Prijedor, the Accused placed his confidence in Stakić as a municipal leader, as he came from a typical "Chetnik" background, to create a rift between Bosnian Muslims and Serbs and to impair the belief that it was possible for the two ethnic groups to co-exist. Mirsad Mujadžić, P3703 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Stakić*), T. 3737-3739, 3903-3904.

⁹⁰⁷⁵ KDZ239, P3336 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krnojelac*), T. 1185. See para. 852.

that if there was a response to the mobilisation of the 1st Krajina Corps, "then we clear the Posavina of Croats".⁹⁰⁷⁶

2734. These speeches are in stark contrast with an interview on 20 July 1990, where the Accused stated that

an illusion was created about a discord between the Serbs and the Muslims. [...] Basically, there is nowhere a conflict of interest between the Serbs and the Muslims. Regardless of what may happen, the Serbs and the Muslims will always live in a common state, and they know how and they will know in future how to live together. There is no need for a third party to fix the things between them.⁹⁰⁷⁷

2735. The Accused also stated:

Here, the Muslims are Slavs, people with our blood and language who, for the most part, opt for the European quality of life and preservation of the Islamic faith. There is no room for panic neither among the Serbs nor among the Muslims. According to my estimation, the Serbs do not have to defend the boundaries of the Christian Europe and fight the Islam. We are much closer to our Muslims than with that Europe.⁹⁰⁷⁸

2736. The Chamber notes, however, that these statements were made by the Accused in a very different environment and were delivered in a period where the political objective of the Bosnian Serb leadership was to emphasise the unity of Yugoslavia and the existence of a common state.

2737. Similarly the Chamber recalls that in the summer of 1991, the Accused attended an SDS rally in Zvornik;⁹⁰⁷⁹ thereafter, the SDS and SDA issued a joint declaration expressing the need to maintain peace in the municipality and calling for greater tolerance between ethnic groups there.⁹⁰⁸⁰ In August 1991, the Accused spoke about peace and reaching an agreement with the Bosnian Muslims.⁹⁰⁸¹

⁹⁰⁷⁶ P1478 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 38, 41.

⁹⁰⁷⁷ D269 (Radovan Karadžić's interview with NIN, 20 July 1990), p. 8.

⁹⁰⁷⁸ D269 (Radovan Karadžić's interview with NIN, 20 July 1990), p. 9. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 4748 (6 July 2010); D363 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, 13 July 1991), p. 5.

⁹⁰⁷⁹ D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), paras. 17–18; D3723 (Witness statement of Čedomir Zelenović dated 22 June 2013), paras. 15, 18. *See para.* 1230. Vasilčić stated that the Accused at SDS rallies in 1991 spoke in favour of a peaceful solution and respect for everyone in BiH. D3693 (Witness statement of Marinko Vasilčić dated 9 June 2013), para. 17. The Chamber notes that Vasilčić's testimony was marked by inconsistencies, evasiveness and other indicators that he was not forthright in his evidence. The Chamber therefore does not consider his evidence on what the Accused said at SDS rallies to be reliable.

⁹⁰⁸⁰ D3724 (Witness statement of Branko Grujić dated 22 June 2013), para. 15; D3725 (Joint declaration of Zvornik SDS and SDA, undated). *See also* D4533 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and unidentified male, 9 July 1991) (in which the Accused instructs an unidentified man to ensure that nothing happens to the Muslims in Bosnian Krajina); D4550 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Dragan Đokanović, 13 December 1991), p. 2.

⁹⁰⁸¹ D276 (Intercept of telephone conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, 7 August 1991), p. 2; D277 (Intercept of conversation between Nenad Stevandić and Radovan Karadžić, 17/18 August 1991), pp. 1–2. *See also* D272 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Vitomir Žepinić and

2738. On 12 May 1992, there was a large public rally in Banja Luka. The Accused, Mićo Stanišić, and Stojan Župljanin, amongst others, were present.⁹⁰⁸² The Accused addressed the rally and said that it demonstrated the organisation and power of the SerBiH and that he regretted that the war in BiH had been imposed on them by the two other national communities and that the “mutual extermination, killings and tortures have been imposed to us”.⁹⁰⁸³ The Accused stated that while they had no conflict with the Croats and Muslims they would not allow their “militant leadership” to make them second class citizens and this was the reason why they created their state unit in BiH.⁹⁰⁸⁴ The Accused also said that they were proud to say that Muslims and Croats were not in danger in SerBiH and that they had to defend the borders of SerBiH for all citizens of BiH regardless of their “confession or nationality”.⁹⁰⁸⁵ Similarly in June 1992, the RS Presidency issued a press statement condemning the BiH declaration of war and noting that this placed pressure on Serbs to fight “against their brothers” and that they wanted a peaceful resolution of the conflict and that all those who sought protection in SerBiH would be provided the bare necessities “irrespective of their nationality”.⁹⁰⁸⁶

2739. In contrast to these public statements, when the Accused spoke to Žepinić about his view that the different nationalities could not live together in BiH, Žepinić expressed his concern about what was going to happen to the large number of mixed families in BiH and the difficulty of dividing people who lived in the same high-rise buildings.⁹⁰⁸⁷ Žepinić was threatened by Mićo Stanišić and later arrested for his opposition to ethnically based parties and also faced pressure from both Koljević and the Accused.⁹⁰⁸⁸

Momčilo Mandić, 24 June 1991), p. 2; Robert Donia, T. 3470–3472 (8 June 2010); D4195 (Witness statement of Milomir Stakić dated 16 November 2013), para. 32; Milomir Stakić, T. 45193–45194 (16 December 2013) (stating that he met the Accused for the first time in 1991 when they were having issues with the political party in Prijedor and the Accused told him that “everything should be resolved democratically and through elections”). See D4546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Levko Žar, 21 September 1991), p. 3 (wherein the Accused stated that [a]ll disputed issues should be resolved peacefully.”); D4545 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 13 September 1991), p. 2 (referring to a Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Serb agreement).

⁹⁰⁸² D494 (Video footage of rally in Banja Luka, 12 May 1992, with transcript); Momčilo Mandić, T. 5331–5336 (16 July 2010).

⁹⁰⁸³ D494 (Video footage of rally in Banja Luka, 12 May 1992, with transcript), pp. 4–5.

⁹⁰⁸⁴ D494 (Video footage of rally in Banja Luka, 12 May 1992, with transcript), p. 5.

⁹⁰⁸⁵ D494 (Video footage of rally in Banja Luka, 12 May 1992, with transcript), pp. 5–7; Momčilo Mandić, T. 5334–5335 (16 July 2010). See also D1587 (Radovan Karadžić’s platform for the solution of crisis in BiH, 22 April 1992).

⁹⁰⁸⁶ D2244 (Statement by SRBiH Presidency, 23 June 1992), p. 1.

⁹⁰⁸⁷ Vitomir Žepinić, T. 33588–33589 (13 February 2013). Žepinić also testified that he could not accept this policy of division and he did not believe that the Accused was able to do so either, but that the Accused faced problems from extremists in his own ranks. Vitomir Žepinić, T. 33589 (13 February 2013).

⁹⁰⁸⁸ Vitomir Žepinić, T. 33603–33607, 33619–33620 (13 February 2013). Žepinić testified, however, that the Accused did in certain situations try to protect him from extremists in the SDS. When questioned about whether the Accused took a position that Bosnian Muslims and Croats should be expelled, he testified that if the Accused

2740. In May 1992, the Accused issued an announcement to Bosnian Muslims appealing for a cessation of hostilities and assured them that Muslims who remained in SerBiH and had laid down their arms had full protection and lived peacefully.⁹⁰⁸⁹ The Accused warned against the “crazy idea of an Islamic state” and that the West wanted Muslims to be “obliterated” but the Serbs wanted to reach an agreement with them.⁹⁰⁹⁰ He also assured Bosnian Muslims that they would be allowed to leave in the direction of their choice with the right to return when the war was over.⁹⁰⁹¹ Okun described this announcement as “thoroughly disingenuous” and noted that it was issued at the same time as the Bosnian Serb Assembly issued its war aims.⁹⁰⁹²

2741. On 2 June 1992, the Accused issued a decision which called for all citizens who had temporarily left the territory of the SerBiH to return and report to the Crisis Staff in their place of residence by 20 May 1992.⁹⁰⁹³ It also promised the right of return to “[p]ersons whose actions were not contrary to the interests of the [SerBiH]”.⁹⁰⁹⁴ It provided that persons who had left and did not return or did not explain their inability to return to the relevant municipal crisis staff, would be denied the right of citizenship of SerBiH and all acquired rights regarding employment, housing, health and retirement insurance would cease and their property would be used temporarily for the needs of defence of SerBiH.⁹⁰⁹⁵

2742. On 4 July 1992, at the 36th session of the Bosnian Serb Government, it was noted that the “question has been raised whether there are agreed criteria regarding the moving out of the Muslim population from the territory of the [SerBiH]. It has been concluded that the Government has not until now had a point of view on this matter. The Ministry of the Interior is entrusted with preparing information on this issue that the Government would consider and take the appropriate standpoint”.⁹⁰⁹⁶ This idea of ethnic separation was also supported and reinforced by municipal leaders such as Prstojević who said that “those who convert to Orthodox religion on the spot, they can stay”.⁹⁰⁹⁷

or the SDS had directly made such a statement he would have been arrested for such an unconstitutional decision. Vitomir Žepinić, T. 33619–33620 (13 February 2013), T. 33655–33656 (14 February 2013).

⁹⁰⁸⁹ D119 (Radovan Karadžić’s speech re cessation of hostilities, May 1992), pp. 1–2. *See also* Momčilo Mandić, T. 5183 (15 July 2010).

⁹⁰⁹⁰ D119 (Radovan Karadžić’s announcement re cessation of hostilities, May 1992), pp. 1–2.

⁹⁰⁹¹ D119 (Radovan Karadžić’s announcement re cessation of hostilities, May 1992), p. 2.

⁹⁰⁹² Herbert Okun, T. 1810–1811 (28 April 2010).

⁹⁰⁹³ P2617 (Radovan Karadžić Decisions, May–June 1992), pp. 2–3.

⁹⁰⁹⁴ P2617 (Radovan Karadžić Decisions, May–June 1992), p. 3.

⁹⁰⁹⁵ P2617 (Radovan Karadžić Decisions, May–June 1992), pp. 2–3.

⁹⁰⁹⁶ P1098 (Minutes of 36th session of SerBiH Government, 4 July 1992), pp. 4–5.

⁹⁰⁹⁷ P1086 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Nedeljko Prstojević and Milenko LNU; (ii) Nedeljko Prstojević and FNU Novaković, 14 May 1992), p. 3.

2743. At a meeting of the Bosnian Serb leadership on 10 July 1992, the Accused stated that unlike the Bosnian Muslims and Croats, the Bosnian Serbs were going to build a law-abiding state rather than an ethnically clean state. Other attendees expressed their agreement as to the stance to be taken in that regard.⁹⁰⁹⁸

2744. On 11 July 1992, at the 17th session of the Bosnian Serb Presidency, attended by the Accused, it was decided “that a decision be adopted on the signing of a proclamation on the moving out and retention of citizens from certain parts of the former [BiH], and on guarantees and safety, on condition that the people be disarmed, enemy activities halted and peace established”.⁹⁰⁹⁹ On the same date, the Presidency made an announcement to the citizens of RS stating that civilians living in areas affected by war must be allowed to leave those areas and that any emigration had to be voluntary and cannot be obstructed or encouraged.⁹¹⁰⁰ This same announcement indicated that Croats and Muslims in the RS were “guaranteed all rights granted by a legal state” and that the authorities were not forcibly detaining people in war zones, as that would make them hostages, or forcing them to emigrate as that would amount to “ethnic cleansing”.⁹¹⁰¹ The announcement also indicated that all refugees would be allowed to return.⁹¹⁰²

2745. Despite these public announcements, the Accused continued to advocate the division of BiH on ethnic lines.⁹¹⁰³ For example in July 1992, he spoke about the dangers of living in a unitary state where they could not control the Muslims. In this regard he said “[w]e know very well what the fundamentalism is and that we cannot live together, there’s no tolerance, they quadruple through the birth-rate, and we Serbs are not up to that”.⁹¹⁰⁴ The Accused also spoke about the Bosnian

⁹⁰⁹⁸ P1478 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 309, 313–314.

⁹⁰⁹⁹ D444 (Minutes of 17th session of Presidency of SerBiH, 11 July 1992, p. 1. See also Momčilo Mandić, T. 5131–5132 (14 July 2010).

⁹¹⁰⁰ D445 (SerBiH announcement to the public, 11 July 1992); Momčilo Mandić, T. 5133 (14 July 2010).

⁹¹⁰¹ D445 (SerBiH announcement to the public, 11 July 1992). See also D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), paras. 16, 18–18A, 46; Momir Bulatović, T. 34540–34541 (28 February 2013).

⁹¹⁰² D445 (SerBiH announcement to the public, 11 July 1992), p. 1. See also D112 (Radovan Karadžić’s Request to Serbian MUP, 1 September 1992); D113 (Radovan Karadžić’s Request to Montenegrin MUP, 1 September 1992) (both requests provided that all refugees regardless of religion or nationality were obliged to return to their place of residence in SerBiH).

⁹¹⁰³ D90 (Shorthand Record of 11th session of SerBiH Assembly, 18 March 1992), pp. 5, 10; P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), pp. 5, 9–10; P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 7; KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6751–6752 (under seal). See also P3474 (News report re meeting of Derventa SDS Executive Board, 13 February 1992), p. 1; D1591 (Radovan Karadžić’s interview from *Le Figaro*, 23 April 1991), p. 1.

⁹¹⁰⁴ D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 86. See also D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January 1993), p. 5. See also P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 18–19; P5828 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 November 1991), p. 1; Ronald Hatchett, T. 31958 (16 January 2013); D4686 (Article from SRNA entitled “Political platform for the survival of the Serbian People in BiH”, 12 June 1992), p. 1.

Muslims overwhelming the Bosnian Serbs “with their birth rate and their tricks. We cannot allow that to happen”.⁹¹⁰⁵

2746. In meetings with international observers, these sentiments were repeated by Bosnian Serb who kept emphasising that “they simply couldn’t live with the Muslims” and that Bosnian Muslims wanted all of BiH which they could achieve through their higher birth rate.⁹¹⁰⁶ The Accused continued to emphasise this issue and stated that in “all variants we must be cautious so that Muslims don’t wind up in our state” and cited to the example of Serbia as being unstable even though the population was 65% Serb.⁹¹⁰⁷ Other Bosnian Serb deputies also spoke about the danger faced by the Serb people due to the high birth-rate of Bosnian Muslims which would change the demographic percentages in BiH.⁹¹⁰⁸

2747. The SDS leadership also commissioned a number of studies on the changing demographics in BiH which showed the growth rate of the Muslim population and reflected the fears of the SDS leadership that Bosnian Muslims would soon become an absolute majority in an independent BiH and impact the position of the Serbs.⁹¹⁰⁹ This concern about demographics and the Bosnian Muslim birth rate continued to be emphasised by the Accused throughout the conflict. For example, at the 37th Bosnian Serb Assembly Session on 10 January 1994, the Accused stated that the Muslim population increases by 1% daily because “that is how it is with them”.⁹¹¹⁰

2748. Rajko Dukić in July 1992 delivered a speech at the Bosnian Serb Assembly in which he asked “why we expelled all Muslim judges from Vlasenica, Bratunac and Zvornik. Will we be accused then, I hope we will not [...] I would be ashamed and I would regret all the victims if I lived in a state in which Muslims and Muslim ideology would judge and where their justice is done”.⁹¹¹¹ Dukić also stated that there were 120,000 Muslims in the Birač region and he hoped that this number “has at least been halved”.⁹¹¹² In August 1992, at a Bosnian Serb Assembly session, Brdanin proposed that they “appoint only those judges who are of Serbian nationality. We cannot

⁹¹⁰⁵ P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies’ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 36.

⁹¹⁰⁶ Colm Doyle, T. 2668, 2670 (21 May 2010); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4163–4164, 4168–4169, 4220; Herbert Okun, T. 1487–1489 (22 April 2010); P1417 (Transcript of 55th session of RS Assembly, 22–23 October 1995), p. 60; P777 (Fourth notebook of Herbert Okun’s Vance Mission diary), e-court p. 21; P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 26.

⁹¹⁰⁷ P1485 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 9 January–21 March 1994), pp. 88–89.

⁹¹⁰⁸ D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 82.

⁹¹⁰⁹ Patrick Treanor, T. 14006–14007, 14009 (1 June 2011); P2541 (Report on demographic trends in BiH prepared by SDS, June 1991). The Chamber notes that Treanor’s testimony also included his own assessment about the objectives of the Bosnian Serb leadership and the meaning of certain speeches. The Chamber considers that this falls outside the scope of his expertise and does not rely on his evidence in this regard.

⁹¹¹⁰ P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 109.

⁹¹¹¹ D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), pp. 71–73.

⁹¹¹² D92 (Transcript of 17th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24–26 July 1992), p. 73.

say this to Europe or the rest of the world, but we can say it here between ourselves. Our people do not have the right to live, yet here we are, crying over those ones".⁹¹¹³

2749. On 2 September 1992, the Accused was among the Bosnian Serb political and military leaders who met in Bijeljina on 2 September 1992.⁹¹¹⁴ At this meeting, the Accused observed that "[w]e are close to the goal and we must run across it [...] the Serbian people will either create their own state [...] or we will be squeezed into a small area".⁹¹¹⁵ At this meeting it was observed that there was "no political position as to how to proceed with Muslims who have declared loyalty".⁹¹¹⁶ The Accused expressed his view that "we must have ethnic minorities in the state as well".⁹¹¹⁷ Krajišnik reminded those present that the VRS should not distance itself from the SDS. He also recalled that the aim of the Bosnian Serbs was to divide with the Muslims.⁹¹¹⁸ The Accused then noted that he had not heard a "single political difference".⁹¹¹⁹ At a meeting with the Bosnian Serb Presidency and VRS commanders in October 1992, the Accused stated that the Bosnian Serbs must insist on having a single Serbian community.⁹¹²⁰

2750. The Bosnian Serb leadership did envisage small enclaves in RS where Bosnian Muslims could live.⁹¹²¹ For example, the Accused said that while Bosnian Muslims could stay in the enclaves, "it is going to be our state".⁹¹²² At a meeting on 19 June 1993 in Pale with members of the Supreme Command with, *inter alios*, Krajišnik, Koljević, Lukić, Mladić, and Milovanović in attendance, the Accused stated that the Serbs and Croats should work together so that the Muslims get some territory in central BiH.⁹¹²³

2751. At the 34th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, Mladić stated that they had not allowed "any connection of the enclaves in Eastern Bosnia" and that his "aim was, and I am sure that if we establish Republika Srpska they could not wait to get out of the enclaves. However, if they don't

⁹¹¹³ D422 (Transcript of 19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), p. 12.

⁹¹¹⁴ P1479 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 131–132.

⁹¹¹⁵ P1479 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 132.

⁹¹¹⁶ P1479 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 134.

⁹¹¹⁷ P1479 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 156.

⁹¹¹⁸ P1479 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 131, 141, 143.

⁹¹¹⁹ P1479 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), p. 153.

⁹¹²⁰ P1481 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 5 October–27 December 1992), pp.48, 52.

⁹¹²¹ Herbert Okun, T. 1698–1699 (27 April 2010). KDZ026 testified that the Accused advocated and pursued a policy under which in Serb territory, 90% of the population would be Serb and 10% of Muslims would be allowed to remain. KDZ026, T. 10414 (18 January 2011) (closed session). However, it is unclear on what basis KDZ026 reached this conclusion. The Chamber therefore does not rely on his evidence in this regard.

⁹¹²² P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 149.

⁹¹²³ P1483 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), p. 212.

want to, we have to provide the conditions so that they could feel glad when we offer it to them”.⁹¹²⁴

2752. The Accused in meetings with international negotiators stated that “Serbs would never accept to be ruled by Muslims”, but that if Muslims gave up their claim to rule over all of BiH, “they could quite happily live alongside each other” but each with their own administrations and safeguards for minorities.⁹¹²⁵ In contrast, at a meeting on 8 September 1992, the Accused stated that there were no Serbs, except in Sarajevo, who wanted to live with the Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims in one state.⁹¹²⁶

2753. Later on, in meetings with international negotiators, the Bosnian Serb leadership indicated that they were prepared to accept changes in internal borders “to accommodate ethnic realities”.⁹¹²⁷ However, by the time these statements were made, there had already been a large forcible displacement of Bosnian Muslims from their homes and the Bosnian Serb leadership sought a peace deal on the basis of the large percentage of territory in BiH which they had already taken.⁹¹²⁸ Similarly, the Bosnian Serb leadership also suggested holding referenda in early 1993 to solve “controversial areas” but in reality by this time there were very few Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats who remained to vote.⁹¹²⁹

2754. In September 1992, the Accused continued to stress that their objective was to have a state and that its borders “towards the Muslims and Croats are to be thicker than our borders towards Serbia and Montenegro and the Serbian Krajina”.⁹¹³⁰ When the Accused discussed maps of BiH and issues of population and division of territories this also caused a feeling of fear, anxiety, insecurity and uncertainty amongst people who “saw themselves living in the territory of another people or another nation”.⁹¹³¹

⁹¹²⁴ P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 70.

⁹¹²⁵ P4216 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić, 20 November 1992), p. 3; P4203 (Witness statement of Pyers Tucker dated 12 May 2010), para. 69; Pyers Tucker, T. 23236–23237 (18 January 2012). See also D539 (UNPROFOR report re meeting with Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, 27 November 1992), p. 2.

⁹¹²⁶ P1479 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 167, 171.

⁹¹²⁷ P785 (Second notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 34, 44. Okun’s assessment was that the phrase “to accommodate ethnic realities” was a “very clear, not-so-subtle reference to the ethnic cleansing”. Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4215–4216.

⁹¹²⁸ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4215–4216, 4218–4219.

⁹¹²⁹ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4245; Herbert Okun, T. 1519, 1522–1524 (23 April 2010); P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 58; P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 40.

⁹¹³⁰ D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 55.

⁹¹³¹ KDZ310, T. 9177–9178 (29 November 2010).

2755. On 30 October 1992, the Accused delivered a speech at the 21st Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly in which he described

an artificial state in which we were forcefully held in an artificial creation that is Bosnia and Herzegovina together with our centuries-old foes. It all reminds me of the experiment in which a dog and cat are held in a box together against their will, or a bad marriage maintained by all sorts of forceful means. It transpired that a dog and cat can remain in the box together under only one condition, namely that they lose their natural characteristics and cease being a dog and a cat. We will remember that we could not be Serbs and live in such a box.⁹¹³²

2756. The Accused characterised the conflict in BiH as a “conflict among peoples” and stated that “Muslims cannot live with others. We must be clear on that. They couldn’t live with the Hindu, who are as peaceful as sheep. [...] They couldn’t live with the Greek on Cyprus, they couldn’t live in the Lebanon with Arabs of the same blood, same language, but of a different faith. There can be no discussion here [...] We are in power, and we should exercise that power”.⁹¹³³ In this regard the Accused noted that there was nothing new, and that in the case of India and Pakistan there had been a “huge resettlement of the people” and the separation was “covered in blood”.⁹¹³⁴

2757. At a gathering in January 1993 attended by UN personnel, the Accused emphasised that they could not live together anymore with the Bosnian Muslims, they would not allow the past to repeat itself, and that therefore the Bosnian Muslims would be transferred out of Bosnian Serb territory.⁹¹³⁵ The Bosnian Serb leaders who attended included Mladić, Krajišnik, and Plavšić, and they all agreed with what the Accused said in this regard.⁹¹³⁶ They spoke about “ethnic cleansing” as something which was necessary.⁹¹³⁷

2758. In January 1993, at a meeting attended by Bosnian Serb and Serbian leaders, Vladislav Jovanović spoke about the importance of ensuring the territory they got was “nationally homogeneous as soon as possible”.⁹¹³⁸ Jovanović stated that this was not to be achieved by “ethnic cleansing” but through the “exchange of inhabitants”, and stressed that where life in BiH becomes

⁹¹³² P939 (Video footage of Radovan Karadžić’s speech at the 21st Session of RS Assembly, 30 October 1992, with transcript), pp. 1, 3.

⁹¹³³ P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies’ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 36. See P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 153. See also P2493 (Anthony Banbury’s notes, 30 April 1995).

⁹¹³⁴ P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies’ Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 36; P12 (Extended session of Main and Executive Boards of the SDS, 14 February 1992), pp. 18–19.

⁹¹³⁵ P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), pp. 5–7.

⁹¹³⁶ P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), pp. 6–7, 11–12. See also P1154 (Witness statement of KDZ088 dated 27–29 April 2010), pp. 113–115, 120 (under seal).

⁹¹³⁷ P1258 (Witness statement of Hussein Ali Abdel-Razek dated 16 July 2002), p. 7.

⁹¹³⁸ P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 3; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4284–4285.

impossible everybody rushes off to their “original provinces”.⁹¹³⁹ This was described by Jovanović as a “strategic goal to which we should aspire, and which should be achieved”.⁹¹⁴⁰ Jovanović stated that they had to be conscious that there was attention on Serbs and they were trying to catch them on “anything that even resembles ethnic cleansing or linking” and that they would have to look out for these traps and try to ‘catch’ them where they are weak”.⁹¹⁴¹

2759. Jovanović also spoke of the need to ensure in an “indisputable way” a territorial link with Serbia and Montenegro.⁹¹⁴² Jovanović also cautioned against freedom of settlement which could result in the “mixing of the composition of the population to our disadvantage” and that what they had gained would “gradually erode”.⁹¹⁴³

2760. The Accused went on to say that “this which Jovanović is talking about, has already happened to a huge extent. There was fifty-fifty of us in Zvornik. The number of inhabitants of Zvornik is now the same, approximately 50,000, and they are all Serbs. More than 24,000 Serbs from Zenica and Central Bosnia have arrived and stopped in Zvornik.”⁹¹⁴⁴ The Accused also stated that there will not be a unitary BiH of the civic type or one in which the Muslim majority will come to the fore.⁹¹⁴⁵

⁹¹³⁹ P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 3. See also Herbert Okun, T. 1824–1825 (28 April 2010). Jovanović acknowledged that this meeting took place but that when he spoke about developing an area which would be as “nationally homogeneous” as soon as possible, this was to be achieved by allowing people to freely move to other cantonal units if they did not want to live in a particular canton. D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), paras. 53, 64; Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34318–34319 (26 February 2013). The Chamber notes however, that Jovanović’s testimony was marked by indicators of evasiveness and bias. In addition, the Chamber considers that he had an interest in characterising his own words in a favourable light. The Chamber therefore does not find his evidence to be reliable with respect to the voluntary nature of the movement of population which was envisaged.

⁹¹⁴⁰ P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p.3.

⁹¹⁴¹ P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 5; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4284–4287.

⁹¹⁴² P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 3.

⁹¹⁴³ P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 3.

⁹¹⁴⁴ P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), p. 4; See also Herbert Okun, T. 1823–1824 (28 April 2010); P4518 (Excerpts from Robert Đurđević’s diary, 7–25 September 1993), p. 2. Jovanović’s assessment was that the Accused had merely been pointing out undesirable and unavoidable consequences of any war, which was that the Serbs had been fleeing the Muslim-dominated and heading to the regions where the Serbs made up a majority. D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 53. The Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 9139 in concluding that it does not find Jovanović’s evidence to be reliable in this regard.

⁹¹⁴⁵ D4765 (Notes from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), p. 3.

2761. The Accused further stated that Serbs must fight for these territories to get a quality piece and said “we want some of our rich areas to belong to us”.⁹¹⁴⁶ The Accused also said that the Neretva was disputable and that they could live without it, but that they could not give up Podrinje and Posavina.⁹¹⁴⁷ Further, the Accused agreed with Slobodan Milošević and Kontić that they could not invoke the democratic principle if they abandoned the “ethnic criterion”.⁹¹⁴⁸ The Accused said that they would gladly exchange prisoners but would no longer make unilateral releases.⁹¹⁴⁹ Slobodan Milošević also expressed the view that had there not been the war, the changes on the ethnical basis would not have taken place, but that now they had the changes based on the ethnical principle.⁹¹⁵⁰

2762. Krajišnik said that what was important was not how big the territory was but the “quality of that territory” and that they had to seriously consider the issue of maps.⁹¹⁵¹ Krajišnik also stated that they had to “solve one part at a time – something through politics, something else through migration, and some things through settlement”.⁹¹⁵² He also emphasised that the continuity of the territory which they had was very important to allow for the unification of Serb territory in the RS and also spoke in favour of connection with their motherlands in Serbia and Montenegro.⁹¹⁵³ Koljević stated that they would have to “develop the activity of settlement homogenisation” while there was still time.⁹¹⁵⁴

2763. In 1993, Velibor Ostojić also referred to their goal of “ethnical – geographical continuity of Serb population” and that they were “building new demographic politics for the RS” and the need to have Serbs settle in areas which they held.⁹¹⁵⁵ Ostojić was responsible for the Commission for

⁹¹⁴⁶ D4765 (Notes from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), pp. 7–8.

⁹¹⁴⁷ P6164 (Excerpt from notes of enlarged session of Council for Coordinating Positions on State Policy, 9 January 1993), e-court p. 65.

⁹¹⁴⁸ D4765 (Notes from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), p. 43.

⁹¹⁴⁹ D4765 (Notes from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), p. 43.

⁹¹⁵⁰ P6164 (Excerpt from notes of enlarged session of Council for Coordinating Positions on State Policy, 9 January 1993), e-court p. 41.

⁹¹⁵¹ P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court pp. 5–6.

⁹¹⁵² P794 (Excerpt from expanded session of Council for Harmonising State Policy Positions, 21 January 1993), e-court p. 6.

⁹¹⁵³ P6164 (Excerpt from notes of enlarged session of Council for Coordinating Positions on State Policy, 9 January 1993), e-court p. 51.

⁹¹⁵⁴ P794 (Excerpt from the session of the Council for Coordinating Positions on the State Policy, 21 January 1993), e-court pp. 8–9; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4292 (testifying that in his assessment, this “settlement homogenisation” referred to “ethnic cleansing”).

⁹¹⁵⁵ P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), pp. 212–213. Vladimir Lukić testified that the Bosnian Serb Government sought the return of refugees regardless of ethnicity. D3563 (Witness statement of Vladimir Lukić dated 18 May 2013), paras. 33,

Refugees and Humanitarian Aid which organised this settlement of Serbs and did not provide for the return of Bosnian Muslims or Bosnian Croats.⁹¹⁵⁶ Ostojić was the Minister of Information and was trusted by, and had direct contact with, the Accused.⁹¹⁵⁷ This process of settling Serbs was done with a view to filling a particular area so Bosnian Muslims did not have a place to return to.⁹¹⁵⁸ This was in contrast with statements made at sessions of the Bosnian Serb Government in March and May 1993 where they emphasised the need to create conditions for the return of refugees who had left the RS during the conflict.⁹¹⁵⁹

2764. In April 1993, in discussions with international representatives, the Accused stated that he could not persuade Bosnian Serbs to remain in the Posavina and that they were asking for new land and territories.⁹¹⁶⁰ Mladić also spoke at this meeting and suggested that all sides sit down to resolve the problems.⁹¹⁶¹ The Accused also explained why the proposals at the time were absolutely unacceptable to the Serbs and questioned whether they could set up a regime to identify areas where they had to withdraw from and areas where they would have to resettle Bosnian Serbs.⁹¹⁶² In April 1993, Krajišnik also expressed his opposition to “any kind of joint state with the murderers of Serbian people, Muslims and Croats”.⁹¹⁶³ In August 1993, Krajišnik noted with respect to Banja Luka that the Muslims and Croats had asked for the municipality during negotiations, but he stressed that the Bosnian Serbs did not accept that “because we must have that territory clean”.⁹¹⁶⁴

46; Vladimir Lukić, T. 38787–38790 (28 May 2013). See also P3129 (Minutes of the 66th session of RS Government, 20 March 1993), p. 8. The Chamber finds that Vladimir’s Lukić’s testimony with respect to this issue was marked by evasiveness and indicators of insincerity particularly when confronted with the speeches made by Ostojić which suggested that the Bosnian Serb policy on refugees was connected with its goal of achieving ethnic geographic continuity of the Serb population and did not make provision for the return of Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats. The Chamber therefore does not find his evidence in this regard to be reliable.

⁹¹⁵⁶ P1388 (Transcript of 39th session of RS Assembly, 24–25 March 1994), pp. 168–169; D3588 (Minutes of 89th session of RS Government, 18 January 1994), p. 4. Radoslav Brdanin was tasked along with Velibor Ostojić with preparing a programme for the accommodation of refugees in the RS. D3588 (Minutes of 89th session of RS Government, 18 January 1994), p. 4; P1392 (Transcript of 41st session of RS Assembly, 31 May to 1 June 1994), p. 50.

⁹¹⁵⁷ P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), para. 10. See also D422 (19th session of SerBiH Assembly, 12 August 1992), p. 38.

⁹¹⁵⁸ P1419 (Transcript of 56th session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1995), pp. 94–95.

⁹¹⁵⁹ P3129 (Minutes of the 66th session of RS Government, 20 March 1993), p. 8; P3112 (Minutes of the 71st session of RS Government, 26–27 May 1993), pp. 10–11.

⁹¹⁶⁰ P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 46–48.

⁹¹⁶¹ P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 47.

⁹¹⁶² P792 (Ninth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court pp. 48–49.

⁹¹⁶³ P1367 (Transcript of 26th session of RS Assembly, 2 April 1993), p. 34.

⁹¹⁶⁴ P1379 (Transcript of 34th session of RS Assembly, 27–29 August, 9–11 September, 29 September to 1 October 1993), p. 48. See Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4293, 4295.

2765. The Accused also suggested that Krajina would “take on an appearance of a rotten apple” if their enemy was in Krajina.⁹¹⁶⁵ Similarly the Accused spoke about a “green stain” which had appeared on maps given that there were proposals for portions of territory to be allocated to Bosnian Muslims and that the Serbs in that area would not allow that to happen.⁹¹⁶⁶

2766. At the 37th session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 10 January 1994, Mladić addressed the assembly on the issue of lack of resources and material support for the VRS.⁹¹⁶⁷ He went on to describe how the Bosnian Serbs had an historical chance to create an “all Serbian state” with as little enemies as possible and that the Muslims and the Croats represented a danger.⁹¹⁶⁸ He thus recommended to keep on fighting as the enemy the Bosnian Serbs were facing was getting stronger and stated: “They started the war at first, they are heading this war, but that is not my concern. My concern is not that they will create the state. My concern is to have them vanish completely.”⁹¹⁶⁹

2767. At the same session, Krajišnik stated that “the biggest tragedy would be if the Muslims accepted to live with us now. [...] That is the only thing I would never accept, and I would rather accept that we get a smaller percentage of the territory than it is the case now, provided that we remain separated from the Muslims and that we have our country”.⁹¹⁷⁰ He also spoke about their goal being “to separate from the Croats and Muslims forever”.⁹¹⁷¹ Krajišnik continued to make similar statements and by 1995 spoke about their first Strategic Goal being to separate from the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats.⁹¹⁷²

2768. At the same Bosnian Serb Assembly session on 10 January 1994, the Accused noted that they were now a “state and what we hold is 100% ours”.⁹¹⁷³ The Accused also acknowledged that “[i]f we are going to divorce from the Muslims, we must give them something. It is impossible to make the Muslims vanish, and that we keep the entire territory”.⁹¹⁷⁴ The Accused also noted that

⁹¹⁶⁵ P1394 (Transcript of 42nd session of RS Assembly, 18–19 July 1994), e-court p. 12.

⁹¹⁶⁶ P6134 (Video footage of interview with Radovan Karadžić, with transcript), p. 2. See also Jose Cutileiro, T. 33964–33967 (19 February 2013).

⁹¹⁶⁷ P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 43.

⁹¹⁶⁸ P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 47.

⁹¹⁶⁹ P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), pp. 48–49.

⁹¹⁷⁰ P1385 (Transcript of 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), pp. 121, 124. See also P796 (Excerpt from 37th session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 2; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4298 (testifying that the comments of Krajišnik were consistent with what they heard during international negotiations about the position taken by the Bosnian Serb leadership with respect to ethnic purity and the creation of a Bosnian Serb state).

⁹¹⁷¹ P1477 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), p. 262; P1479 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 16 July–9 September 1992), pp. 140, 144.

⁹¹⁷² P1419 (Transcript of 56th session of RS Assembly, 17 December 1995), p. 104.

⁹¹⁷³ P1385 (Transcript of 37th Session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), pp. 107, 110.

⁹¹⁷⁴ P1385 (Transcript of 37th Session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 132.

they could not declare a ban on the return of refugees according to international law and that in principle they would say that all refugees could return on a reciprocal basis.⁹¹⁷⁵

2769. In April 1994, Mladić was quoted as encouraging VRS operations because “[t]he Turks must disappear from these areas”.⁹¹⁷⁶ Michael Rose testified that he and other international representatives had thought that the objective of the combat operations in Goradže was to move the Bosnian Muslims out of the right bank of the town and therefore he suspected the reference in the order to “[t]he Turks must disappear from these areas” to mean just that.⁹¹⁷⁷

2770. In July 1994, the Accused in an address before the Bosnian Serb Assembly, spoke about achieving

our primary strategic aim, which is to get rid of the enemies in our house, the Croats and Muslims, and not to be in the same state with them any more. Every divorce has a price, we have to give something up, but we are the winners, we have a majority of the territory now, not only under our control, but also in our ownership.⁹¹⁷⁸

2771. In August 1994, in video footage taken of Mladić and Milan Lešić, the founder of a Canadian charitable organisation called “Serbian Humanitarian Public Organisation”,⁹¹⁷⁹ in a car as they drove through Han Pijesak and Crna Rijeka, Mladić boasted that he “kicked the hell out of the Turks [...] who gives a fuck about them!” and commented that Lešić should film what they had done to the Turks and pointed to abandoned Bosnian Muslim houses.⁹¹⁸⁰

2772. At a Bosnian Serb Assembly session in November 1994, the Accused gave a speech in which he explained that “[w]e have created new realities” and that Zvornik used to be 60% Muslim but that Bosnian Serbs from Zenica arrived, occupied Kozluk and the Bosnian Muslims left.⁹¹⁸¹ He went on to say that they were requesting Zvornik “which comes out of a new reality. [...] This war has created the new reality, there are now the Serbs from Zenica here. [...] We request Zvornik according to this right”.⁹¹⁸² At this same session, Krajišnik stated that “the primary strategic goal of our people and this Parliament is partition and separation from Croats and Muslims. And the

⁹¹⁷⁵ P1385 (Transcript of 37th Session of RS Assembly, 10 January 1994), p. 132. The Chamber places no weight on Vladimir Lukić’s assessment about the meaning of this statement. Vladimir Lukić, T. 38794–38796 (28 May 2013). In doing so the Chamber refers to its credibility assessment in fn. 9155.

⁹¹⁷⁶ P1645 (Order of Višegrad Tactical Group, 11 April 1994).

⁹¹⁷⁷ Michael Rose, T. 7274–7275 (5 October 2010).

⁹¹⁷⁸ P1394 (Transcript of 42nd session of RS Assembly, 18–19 July 1994), e-court p. 76. See also P1387 (Transcript of 38th session of RS Assembly, 17 January 1994), p. 67.

⁹¹⁷⁹ Milan Lešić, T. 25010 (21 February 2012).

⁹¹⁸⁰ P4442 (Video footage depicting a conversation between Milan Lešić and Ratko Mladić, with transcript); Milan Lešić, T. 25030–25032 (22 February 2012).

⁹¹⁸¹ P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), p. 157.

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⁹¹⁷⁸ P1394 (Transcript of 42nd session of RS Assembly, 18–19 July 1994), e-court p. 76. See also P1387 (Transcript of 38th session of RS Assembly, 17 January 1994), p. 67.

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⁹¹⁸¹ P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), p. 157.

⁹¹⁸² P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), p. 157.

partition can only be made if they will have their state while we have our own. How big these states will be is another issue. We cannot get entire Bosnia".⁹¹⁸³ The Accused in 1995 confirmed this objective when he stated that if they were able to secure the territory they decided on and if it was "nearly 100% Serbian", they would be great victors and would have realised their ultimate dream, a Serbian State west of the Drina.⁹¹⁸⁴ The Accused also acknowledged that they had undertaken military operations to expand the territory but that after the Bosnian Muslims had been packed into small areas, "thus achieving their concentration", there was not much more that could be done.⁹¹⁸⁵

2773. At a meeting of the Supreme Command on 31 March 1995, the Accused made reference to the danger posed by Bosnian Muslims who remained in their territory and stated that "Muslims remaining there in any way is disastrous for us", and that their policy had been the "separation of peoples, of cultures, of worlds", based on the idea that "birds of a feather flock together".⁹¹⁸⁶ He also spoke about turning a blind eye to private agencies and arrangements through which Bosnian Muslims left for western Europe because in those situations "no one can accuse us", whereas if a state institution was involved they would be accused of "ethnic cleansing".⁹¹⁸⁷ Krajišnik stressed that freedom of movement was allowed in order to pull Serbs out of Muslim territory and "if the Muslims want to go from our territory, then we enable them to leave our area, without coercion, because we do not have the right to do that, nor should anyone take on himself their ethnic cleansing, but there would be no crying if they left from here".⁹¹⁸⁸

(b) Territorial claims and control

2774. On 23 December 1991, the Accused spoke about the plebiscite which had been conducted and stated that in principle, even if Serbs constituted only 5% of the population, "everywhere where Serbs live and where they have voted against secession, or to remain in Yugoslavia, no one can break away there. In other words, there remain only five municipalities that could separate from Yugoslavia".⁹¹⁸⁹ In a conversation with Koljević in December 1991, the Accused stated that there

⁹¹⁸³ P1403 (Transcript of First Part of 46th session of RS Assembly, 9–11 November 1994), p. 262.

⁹¹⁸⁴ P1417 (Transcript of 55th session of RS Assembly, 22–23 October 1995), p. 60. *See also* P5608 (Intercept of conversation between Todor Dutina and Radovan Karadžić, 29 June 1995), p. 2 (where the Accused continued to emphasise the importance of the Strategic Goals into 1995).

⁹¹⁸⁵ P988 (Transcript of 53rd session of RS Assembly, 28 August 1995), p. 64. *See also* D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), pp. 25, 27.

⁹¹⁸⁶ P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 65.

⁹¹⁸⁷ P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), pp. 65–66.

⁹¹⁸⁸ P3149 (Minutes of 14th session of Supreme Command, 31 March 1995), p. 28. *See also* D3565 (RS Government conclusion, 26 January 1993).

⁹¹⁸⁹ D4555 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Maristela Lučić, 23 December 1991), pp. 1–2; D86 (Shorthand Record of 4th session of SerBiH Assembly, 21 December 1991), pp. 37–38.

2778. On 23 April 1992, Mandić was informed that Višegrad had been taken.⁹¹⁹⁸ On 30 April 1992, the Bosnian Serb Government was informed about the situation in Foča and that Bosnian Serb authorities had control over “liberated areas”.⁹¹⁹⁹

2779. In meetings with international representatives in April 1992, the Accused showed maps on which the ethnic composition was marked, as was Bosnian Serb claimed or controlled territory; in total, this amounted to approximately 70% of BiH.⁹²⁰⁰ This was consistent with earlier speeches by the Accused where he stated that it would be impossible for Izetbegović to establish authority in 70% of the territory in BiH.⁹²⁰¹ Many of the areas which the Bosnian Serbs claimed included municipalities along the Drina River and in the Posavina area which had a majority Bosnian Muslim population but later became Bosnian Serb controlled areas with very few Bosnian Muslims remaining.⁹²⁰²

2780. The Accused had previously spoken about territorial issues. For example in an intercepted conversation in September 1991, the Accused spoke about negotiations regarding territories and the plan to free Bosanska Krajina, Semberija and Doboј and said that Eastern Herzegovina and Romanija were “clean”.⁹²⁰³ In November 1991, the Accused had a conversation about the situation in Novo Sarajevo and said that they would teach the SDA “the law pretty soon” given that they had blocked the work of the Municipal Assembly and that they would “probably carry out some kind of reorganisation of the city”.⁹²⁰⁴ The Accused then said, “[a]nd they can go to fucking hell”.⁹²⁰⁵ The Accused also asked where Bosnian Muslim settlements were in Novo Sarajevo and questioned how many Bosnian Muslims lived in specific areas and in the municipality generally.⁹²⁰⁶

2781. On 6 May 1992, Mladić was at a meeting where he was informed that “Foča has been finished”.⁹²⁰⁷ At the 16th Session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly on 12 May 1992 the Accused

⁹¹⁹⁸ P5701 (Intercept of conversation between Momčilo Mandić, Zorica and Traparić, 23 April 1992), p. 5.

⁹¹⁹⁹ P4986 (Report of SerBiH Government, 30 April 1992), p. 1. See also P2716 (Notebook of Radovan Karadžić), p. 28.

⁹²⁰⁰ [REDACTED]. See also P797 (TV Belgrade interview with Momčilo Krajišnik); Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4300–4301; Herbert Okun, T. 1477–1483, 1485–1486 (22 April 2010); P784 (First notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 45; P802 (Map of BiH marked by Herbert Okun); P788 (Fifth notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 29; P780 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun’s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 27.

⁹²⁰¹ P958 (Radovan Karadžić’s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 11.

⁹²⁰² Herbert Okun, T. 1487–1488 (22 April 2010), T. 1498–1499 (23 April 2010); P783 (Ethnic map of BiH).

⁹²⁰³ P5864 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), p. 1.

⁹²⁰⁴ P2574 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Žarko Đurović, 19 November 1991), p. 2.

⁹²⁰⁵ P2574 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Žarko Đurović, 19 November 1991), p. 2.

⁹²⁰⁶ P2574 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Žarko Đurović, 19 November 1991), pp. 2–3; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16641–16645.

⁹²⁰⁷ P1477 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), pp. 253, 255.

stated that the conflict in municipalities, including Foča, Zvornik, and Višegrad, had ended successfully.⁹²⁰⁸ On 19 May 1992, in an intercepted conversation, Mićo Stanišić said that Foča had fallen along with Višegrad and that all those who had left these municipalities were in Goražde.⁹²⁰⁹ Stanić reported to Mladić that in contrast to what it was before the conflict, the percentage of Serbs in Foča was 99%.⁹²¹⁰

2782. On 8 May 1992, the National Security Council tasked the Ministry of Justice with proposing the state borders of SerBiH.⁹²¹¹ On 24 May 1992, Prime Minister Branko Đerić wrote a letter in which he stated the Serbs in BiH were “not an invented people as we have been living on this land for thirteen centuries”. He also wrote that the Bosnian Serbs held title to 64% of the arable land, and that they used to be a majority in BiH before the genocide jointly carried out against Serbs by Muslims and Croats during World War II.⁹²¹²

2783. The Accused also stated “[w]e must prove to the international factor that [...] we hold no siege over Sarajevo. Basically, we are protecting our territories and here it is visible that Sarajevo sprung up in Serbian territory, as Serbian property, and the entire surrounding of Sarajevo is Serbian”.⁹²¹³ The Accused spoke about Serbian villages, towns, and settlements which were beyond dispute and that they should seek to solve issues where ethnic areas and maps overlap.⁹²¹⁴

2784. At a meeting of the Bosnian Serb leadership on 6 June 1992, Krajišnik stated that “we have to conquer what is ours and be prepared to defend our state” and that the goal was to form and unite the “Birač-Romanija area”.⁹²¹⁵

2785. After a meeting on 30 June 1992 when he received reports on the combat success of voluntary formations, the Accused stressed that the Bosnian Serbs had “by and large outlined their territory” and the most pressing tasks involved successfully establishing democratic civilian

⁹²⁰⁸ P956 (Transcript of 16th Session of Assembly of SerBiH, 12 May 1992), p. 12. See also D115 (Transcript of 25th session of RS Assembly, 19–20 January 1993), p. 51 (where a deputy in the Bosnian Serb Assembly referred to the struggle for Serbdom and the fighters in Foča who had liberated 98% of Serbian territories).

⁹²⁰⁹ P5671 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Janković, 19 May 1992), e-court pp. 8, 11–12.

⁹²¹⁰ P1480 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 10–30 September 1992), p. 66.

⁹²¹¹ P3078 (Minutes of meeting of the National Security Council and the SerBiH Government, 8 May 1992), p. 1.

⁹²¹² P1094 (Letter from Government of SerBiH to James Baker, 24 May 1992). See also D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), paras. 45, 51; D3026 (Article from Yugoslav Daily Survey entitled “Montenegrin President: Decisive Step towards Peace in Bosnia”, 21 June 1993), p. 1; Nedeljko Prstojević, T. 13639–13640 (17 March 2011); P5063 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadžić on “Ask the President”, undated, with transcript), pp. 5–7.

⁹²¹³ P2578 (Excerpt of transcript of movie entitled “Bosnia 1992-Serbian Epics”), p. 5.

⁹²¹⁴ P2578 (Excerpt of transcript of movie entitled “Bosnia 1992-Serbian Epics”), p. 5. See also Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16694–16698.

⁹²¹⁵ P1478 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 27 May–31 July 1992), pp. 93–94, 108–109.

3459. The Chamber therefore finds that Arkan and Šešelj both contributed to the common plan as envisaged by the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership by providing and training men who were involved in operations throughout the Municipalities during which there were forced expulsions of non-Serbs and other crimes were committed.

3460. With regard to the evidence presented in this case in relation to Slobodan Milošević and his membership in the JCE, the Chamber recalls that he shared and endorsed the political objective of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership to preserve Yugoslavia and to prevent the separation or independence of BiH and co-operated closely with the Accused during this time. The Chamber also recalls that Milošević provided assistance in the form of personnel, provisions, and arms to the Bosnian Serbs during the conflict.¹¹⁰²⁶ However, based on the evidence before the Chamber regarding the diverging interests that emerged between the Bosnian Serb and Serbian leaderships during the conflict and in particular, Milošević's repeated criticism and disapproval of the policies and decisions made by the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership,¹¹⁰²⁷ the Chamber is not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence presented in this case to find that Slobodan Milošević agreed with the common plan.

3461. Finally, with respect to Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović, head and deputy head of the SDB, respectively, the Chamber recalls that Arkan's men and the Red Berets were subordinated to them and that they sent units to BiH which were involved in take-over operations in the Municipalities during the conflict; Stanišić and Simatović were also involved in establishing and monitoring training camps for Bosnian Serbs.¹¹⁰²⁸ However, the Chamber is not satisfied that there was sufficient evidence presented in this case to find that Jovica Stanišić and Franko Simatović agreed with the common plan.

3462. The Chamber therefore finds beyond reasonable doubt that the Accused, Momčilo Krajišnik, Nikola Koljević, Biljana Plavšić, Ratko Mladić,¹¹⁰²⁹ Mićo Stanišić,¹¹⁰³⁰ Momčilo

to be reliable. In reaching that conclusion, the Chamber considered that Šešelj had a clear self-interest in testifying in this regard and his evidence was marked by political statements.

¹¹⁰²⁶ See paras. 3275–3288.

¹¹⁰²⁷ The Chamber notes that the relationship between Milošević and the Accused had deteriorated beginning in 1992; by 1994, they no longer agreed on a course of action to be taken. Furthermore, beginning as early as March 1992, there was apparent discord between the Accused and Milošević in meetings with international representatives, during which Milošević and other Serbian leaders openly criticised Bosnian Serb leaders of committing "crimes against humanity" and "ethnic cleansing" and the war for their own purposes. See paras. 3280, 3289–3297.

¹¹⁰²⁸ See paras. 3312, 3314–3315, 3317–3320.

¹¹⁰²⁹ The Chamber finds that Ratko Mladić was a member of the Overarching JCE from 12 May 1992.

¹¹⁰³⁰ The Chamber finds that Mićo Stanišić was a member of the Overarching JCE until the end of 1992.

(vii) developments in Krajina;¹⁰⁵²⁰ and (viii) issues pertaining to recognition of the independence of BiH.¹⁰⁵²¹

3276. The Chamber recalls that from 1990 and into mid-1991, the political objective of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership was to preserve Yugoslavia and to prevent the separation or independence of BiH, which would result in a separation of Bosnian Serbs from Serbia; the Chamber notes that Slobodan Milošević endorsed this objective and spoke against the independence of BiH.¹⁰⁵²²

3277. The Chamber found that based on a conversation between the Accused and Milošević on 24 October 1991, it was also clear that Slobodan Milošević was attempting to take a more cautious approach while the Accused was adamant that the goal of the Bosnian Serb leadership was to ensure that they would establish full authority in their territories and that they would announce their own Bosnian Serb Assembly.¹⁰⁵²³ The Chamber also found that while Milošević expressed reservations about excluding Bosnian Muslims, the Accused was adamant that there were not even 10% of Bosnian Muslims who supported Yugoslavia and that they could not take such a risk.¹⁰⁵²⁴

3278. The Chamber recalls that in December 1991, Milošević told the Accused that he should not give in to Izetbegović and that they had to stick to their line and that "if they want to fight, we'll fight" given that the Serbs were stronger.¹⁰⁵²⁵ They also spoke about the unconstitutional nature of the decision changing the status of BiH.¹⁰⁵²⁶

¹⁰⁵²⁰ P5866 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 18 September 1991), pp. 1–2; P5867 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), p. 1; P5864 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), p. 3; P5863 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 22 September 1991), p. 2; P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), p. 4; P5859 (Intercept of conversations between Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan Milošević and unidentified persons, 24 September 1991), p. 9; P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), pp. 1, 11; P5787 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 25 December 1991), p. 1; P5769 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 January 1992), p. 2; P5751 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 10 February 1992), pp. 1–2.

¹⁰⁵²¹ P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), p. 2; P5795 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 December 1991), p. 1; P5775 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 5 January 1992), p. 4; P5769 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 January 1992), p. 1; P5766 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 15 January 1992), p. 1.

¹⁰⁵²² See paras. 2644–2645, 2651.

¹⁰⁵²³ See para. 2710. See also P5782 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, 28 December 1991), pp. 1–2.

¹⁰⁵²⁴ See para. 2711.

¹⁰⁵²⁵ See para. 2691.

¹⁰⁵²⁶ See para. 2691.

everything to create a *de facto* situation [...] which they will break their teeth on, they simply have to break them, there is no way we will live in a country with them. No, no way at all, that's it".⁸⁹⁵¹

2684. Slobodan Milošević encouraged the Accused to speak to Izetbegović to explain the position of the Bosnian Serbs but the Accused responded that Izetbegović was a religious fanatic who could not be talked to.⁸⁹⁵² When Milošević asked whether he should speak to Izetbegović, the Accused responded that he could tell Izetbegović that "Karadžić and the others will not give up on establishing an Assembly and parallel organs of authority" and that the "Serbian Assembly" would decide on what was to be respected and not.⁸⁹⁵³ The Accused also suggested that Milošević tell Izetbegović "that the Serbs are moving on [...] that you can't exert influence over us to mellow things down. We are moving on. We will establish full authority over the Serbian territories in BiH [...]. He will not be able to exercise power. He will not have control over 65% of his territory. That is our goal".⁸⁹⁵⁴

2685. Milošević questioned whether it was wise to use "an illegitimate act in response to another illegitimate act" and questioned the legality of forming a Bosnian Serb Assembly. However, the Accused dismissed this and stressed the illegality of the measures taken by the Bosnian Muslims and the importance of the Bosnian Serb interests.⁸⁹⁵⁵ The Accused emphasised that they held power in 37 municipalities and had relative majority in about ten municipalities and that they would not implement "any of their decisions" given that they were leading them to secession from Yugoslavia.⁸⁹⁵⁶

2686. Milošević also suggested that they should not announce the Bosnian Serb Assembly but the Accused responded "[b]ut we have to announce it! There can be no discussion about it, this is an obligation of the Serbian people and the representatives of the Serbian people in [the] executive, because they will start arresting us, they'll start pacifying municipalities forcibly, forcibly, installing special forces, we will not allow that".⁸⁹⁵⁷ When Slobodan Milošević suggested that the

⁸⁹⁵⁰ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 1.

⁸⁹⁵¹ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 1.

⁸⁹⁵² P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), pp. 1–2, 6.

⁸⁹⁵³ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 6.

⁸⁹⁵⁴ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 7. See also P5620 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and an unidentified male, 21 January 1992), pp. 2–4; P5621 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Dobrica Ćosić, 25 January 1992), p. 8.

⁸⁹⁵⁵ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), pp. 4–5.

⁸⁹⁵⁶ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 5.

⁸⁹⁵⁷ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), pp. 5–6.

Accused not call it an assembly, the Accused insisted: "No [...] we can't do that to the people. The people [...] feel they have been robbed and destroyed".⁸⁹⁵⁸

2687. In this same conversation Slobodan Milošević expressed his reservations about how a Bosnian Serb Assembly could exclude the Muslims who were "for Yugoslavia", but the Accused replied: "There are none, President! Not even 10% [...] we can't take a risk for those 10%! That's out of the question! The Serbian people want a clear situation. We cannot go on pretending anymore. They've destroyed us, we have to respond. We can't just mobilise the people for nothing".⁸⁹⁵⁹

2688. The Accused also stated that "the army can no longer agree to cease-fires, it is out of the question. Tudman has to be militarily crushed, the military might of Croatia has to be destroyed. I guarantee you that after Friday 500,000 Serbs must rise again, there can be no more discussion about it, this is destroying, exhausting, crippling, dragging us into the winter and we will all be ruined".⁸⁹⁶⁰ When Slobodan Milošević suggested a more considered approach without getting excited, the Accused replied: "No, we're not excited at all. Our steps are calculated and we have to establish authority and control over our territories, so that he doesn't get his sovereign Bosnia. Croatia doesn't have control over 30% of its territory, and Bosnia will not have control over 60% of its territory!".⁸⁹⁶¹

2689. Despite these words of caution, Slobodan Milošević, in meetings with international representatives, did not accept the independence of BiH and spoke of the desire of all Serbian people to live together.⁸⁹⁶² In September 1991, Milošević told the Accused that they should "get mobilised, acquire the arms and get going".⁸⁹⁶³ In November 1991, when the Accused informed Milošević that Izetbegović did not want BiH to be in Yugoslavia, Milošević asked him to "take care of this and nothing else".⁸⁹⁶⁴ The Accused responded that he would but that they should "prepare a

⁸⁹⁵⁸ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 6. See also P5817 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Božidar Vučurović, 14 November 1991), p. 2 (in which the Accused said that if he stood up in the Assembly and said that they accepted the independence and sovereignty of BiH, the people would reject it and take up arms including against him). This conversation was referred to by the Accused in his final brief. Defence Final Brief, para. 266. The Chamber finds that in light of the weight of evidence, the Accused's observation was purely rhetorical and he had no intention of acknowledging the independence of BiH.

⁸⁹⁵⁹ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 7.

⁸⁹⁶⁰ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), p. 2.

⁸⁹⁶¹ P2546 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 October 1991), pp. 7–8.

⁸⁹⁶² KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6747 (under seal).

⁸⁹⁶³ P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), p. 5.

⁸⁹⁶⁴ P5897 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 14 November 1991), p. 3.

reserve variant” because he did not “know what will it be like tomorrow”.⁸⁹⁶⁵ In a conversation with General Uzelac on 2 November 1991, the Accused discussed the mobilisation of the Serb population in BiH, stating “I’ll call all the presidents of the municipalities [...] to deploy the army”.⁸⁹⁶⁶

2690. The Chamber recalls that a plebiscite was held in November 1991 to determine whether Serbs in BiH wished to remain in a joint state of Yugoslavia, and the overwhelming majority voted in favour.⁸⁹⁶⁷ The Accused delivered a speech connected with the plebiscite where he said if there was a sovereign BiH it would be “without our areas” unless there was an exchange of population.⁸⁹⁶⁸ The Accused in this speech said that he had openly told Izetbegović that “no Muslim foundation shall ever be laid in Serb areas and Serb villages whether or not you import Turks because we will instruct Serbs not to sell land to Muslims. [...] The first foundations that are laid will be blown up, and all foundations that are laid will be blown up”.⁸⁹⁶⁹ He also envisaged that there was a chance that they would fight, and they were prepared to “let the chips fall where they may” in the knowledge that the Serbs were better armed and that the war would be bloody.⁸⁹⁷⁰ He also emphasised that they would not give up on their territories and that it was “a fight to the finish, a battle for living space”.⁸⁹⁷¹

2691. In December 1991, Milošević told the Accused that he should not give in to Izetbegović and that they had to stick to their line and that “if they want to fight, we’ll fight” given that the Serbs were stronger.⁸⁹⁷² They also spoke about the unconstitutional nature of the decision changing the status of BiH.⁸⁹⁷³ In an intercepted conversation on 17 December 1991, the Accused affirmed his commitment to use force to ensure that the establishment of a sovereign and independent BiH did not result in the separation of Bosnian Serbs from other Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.⁸⁹⁷⁴ In relation to the possible secession of BiH, the Accused stated “we will completely defend the

⁸⁹⁶⁵ P5897 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 14 November 1991), p. 3.

⁸⁹⁶⁶ P5824 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and General Uzelac, 2 November 1991), pp. 1–2, 6–8.

⁸⁹⁶⁷ See para. 47. See also Robert Donia, T. 3107 (1 June 2010).

⁸⁹⁶⁸ P958 (Radovan Karadžić’s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 5.

⁸⁹⁶⁹ P958 (Radovan Karadžić’s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 6. See also Eset Muračević, T. 12673–12676, 12683 (1 March 2011); Eset Muračević, T. 12822 (2 March 2011).

⁸⁹⁷⁰ P958 (Radovan Karadžić’s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 6.

⁸⁹⁷¹ P958 (Radovan Karadžić’s speech at the Plebiscite of the Serb People, November 1991), p. 6.

⁸⁹⁷² P5790 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 20 December 1991), pp. 2–3.

⁸⁹⁷³ P5787 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 25 December 1991), pp. 2–3.

⁸⁹⁷⁴ P5794 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Branko Kostić, 17 December 1991), pp. 4–5 (wherein Kostić stated “nobody can make a decision on his own, er, each possible Bosnian request for

guarantee for the Serbs was to have a separate state in BiH.⁸⁹⁸³ The SDS under the leadership of the Accused withdrew from the session when no agreement could be reached and, following their withdrawal, the BiH Assembly supported a referendum being held between 29 February and 1 March regarding the sovereignty and independence of BiH.⁸⁹⁸⁴ On 19 February 1992, the Chairman of the SDS Executive Board ordered the municipal and regional boards of the SDS to hold immediate meetings and to draw up a plan of action to stop the referendum and to explain to “every adult Serb” that they should boycott the referendum which would be illegal after the adoption of the Constitution of the SerBiH.⁸⁹⁸⁵

2696. The Chamber recalls that on 23 February 1992, the Cutileiro Plan was proposed and called for an independent and geographically continuous BiH, comprised of the three constituent units that represented the Bosnian Muslims, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs.⁸⁹⁸⁶ The Cutileiro Plan included constitutional principles for BiH and proposed the structure of the Assembly and government of BiH.⁸⁹⁸⁷ The Accused decided to accept the Cutileiro Plan notwithstanding the fact that it contemplated BiH as an independent state, with cantons where ethnic minorities would remain, even though this was less than what the Bosnian Serb leadership had wished for, namely to remain in Yugoslavia.⁸⁹⁸⁸ In a conversation with Kuprešanin on 23 February 1992, the Accused expressed satisfaction with the recent international negotiations where the Cutileiro Plan was discussed, stating:

We achieved maximum success because we achieved that Bosnia cannot be a single state anymore and that it will be composed of three republics. In one paper they even called them states. [...] Our police on our territory. Our national guard on our territory. Our national guard, and we're pushing further: our army on our territory, one that is placed under a single command in case of an external enemy.⁸⁹⁸⁹

2697. On 25 February 1992, the Accused summarised the outcome of the talks at a session of the Bosnian Serb Assembly and stated that the Bosnian Serbs had agreed to the three main principles of the Cutileiro Plan which stated that BiH would (i) be an independent state, (ii) maintain its present

⁸⁹⁸³ P942 (ECMM report re the BiH Assembly meeting held on 24–25 January 1992), p. 1; Colm Doyle, T. 2825–2826 (27 May 2010).

⁸⁹⁸⁴ P942 (ECMM report re the BiH Assembly meeting held on 24–25 January 1992), p. 2; Colm Doyle, T. 2825–2826 (27 May 2010).

⁸⁹⁸⁵ P5475 (Letter from SDS Executive Board to SDS Municipal and Regional Boards BiH, 19 February 1992).

⁸⁹⁸⁶ See International Peace Negotiations Section, para. 14. The Chamber does not consider that Mandić's assertion that this plan demonstrated that the Bosnian Serb leadership did not intend to exchange populations in BiH to have a basis. Momčilo Mandić, T. 4895 (8 July 2010).

⁸⁹⁸⁷ See International Peace Negotiations Section, para. 14.

⁸⁹⁸⁸ D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), paras. 39, 50. See also D3645 (Witness statement of Nenad Kecmanović dated 27 May 2013), paras. 55–56; Milorad Dodik, T. 36849–36850 (9 April 2013).

borders; and (iii) consist of three constituent parts.⁸⁹⁹⁰ However, when war broke out the option of an independent BiH with cantons was dropped.⁸⁹⁹¹

2698. The Chamber recalls that the referendum on the question of SRBiH independence was held on 29 February and 1 March 1992 and resulted in a vote in favour of independence.⁸⁹⁹²

2699. In February 1992, Jovanović spoke with the Accused and Koljević about the Cutileiro Plan; they discussed internal borders in BiH and the establishment of cantonal units in BiH based on ethnic principles.⁸⁹⁹³ Jovanović explained to the Accused that his priorities should be to synchronise the negotiations in order to provide the maximum protections for the Serbian people and to form cantons which were both economically and geographically sustainable.⁸⁹⁹⁴ Jovanović warned the Accused that Europe could ask for a commitment towards an independent BiH, and told the Accused not to mention state borders.⁸⁹⁹⁵ The Accused spoke about having three entities in BiH as a confederation “based on the national territories where national communities make a majority and they have their organs plus common organs”.⁸⁹⁹⁶ Jovanović spoke with Koljević about maintaining the right to self-determination and to independently organise or integrate with “the mother country” but that in negotiations they did not have to mention directly integration with the mother countries.⁸⁹⁹⁷

2700. In February 1992, the Accused in meetings with international representatives expressed his view that the request of BiH for independence was a “very irresponsible move” and he had a tough time keeping Serbs quiet and that he was worried about deaths and disaster.⁸⁹⁹⁸ He also stated that

⁸⁹⁸⁹ P5745 (Intercept of conversation between (i) Radovan Karadžić and an unidentified male; (ii) Radovan Karadžić and Vojo Kuprešanić, 23 February 1992), p. 3.

⁸⁹⁹⁰ See para. 325; D88 (Shorthand Record of 8th session of SerBiH Assembly, 25 February 1992), pp. 11–12; P798 (Statement of Principles, Lisbon Agreement, 23 February 1992).

⁸⁹⁹¹ Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34300–34305 (26 February 2013); D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), paras. 38–39, 41.

⁸⁹⁹² See Adjudicated Fact 395; P5427 (Proclamation of the SDS Executive Board, undated); P5530 (Proclamation of the SDS Executive Board, 20 February 1992), p. 3.

⁸⁹⁹³ D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 49.

⁸⁹⁹⁴ D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 49; P5750 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić, Nikola Koljević, and Vladislav Jovanović, 12 February 1992), pp. 3–4.

⁸⁹⁹⁵ P5750 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić, Nikola Koljević, and Vladislav Jovanović, 12 February 1992), p. 6.

⁸⁹⁹⁶ P5750 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić, Nikola Koljević, and Vladislav Jovanović, 12 February 1992), pp. 4–5. See also D2149 (Aide mémoire of Manojlo Milovanović), p. 9; P5063 (Video footage depicting interview of Radovan Karadžić on “Ask the President”, undated, with transcript), p. 4; P3119 (Minutes of meeting of the Club of Deputies from the SDS and SPO, 23 January 1992), p. 1.

⁸⁹⁹⁷ P5750 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić, Nikola Koljević, and Vladislav Jovanović, 12 February 1992), p. 22.

⁸⁹⁹⁸ P778 (Fifth notebook of Herbert Okun’s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 41.

it was very hard to disarm the people in BiH because individuals held 500,000 weapons.⁸⁹⁹⁹ He emphasised that any moves towards the independence of BiH would imply a very cruel war.⁹⁰⁰⁰ The Accused was described by international representatives as "very radical" and they observed that it was important that the Accused's "illusions" were overcome.⁹⁰⁰¹ International representatives also identified that negotiations with the Accused, Koljević, and Krajišnik were the most difficult.⁹⁰⁰²

2701. The Accused also told international observers that Bosnian Serbs would not fight after the map of BiH was decided.⁹⁰⁰³ At an SDS Deputies' Club meeting on 28 February 1992, the Accused spoke about a confederal BiH with an "integral Serbian Bosnia and Herzegovina within it".⁹⁰⁰⁴ At this meeting the Accused also said:

Bosnia and Herzegovina will remain in Yugoslavia until we say it has left Yugoslavia. If Bosnia and Herzegovina is to leave Yugoslavia, then only three Bosnia and Herzegovinas will leave Yugoslavia. As Mr Krajišnik says, Muslims who used to be a religious sect, and have recently been given the status of a people, that's what I say, should now get their independence. For what? [...] If they want independence, then we want independence too!⁹⁰⁰⁵

2702. The Chamber recalls that the Cutileiro Plan was further refined through a Statement of Principles which was agreed upon by the parties to the conflict on 18 March 1992.⁹⁰⁰⁶ The Statement of Principles stated that BiH would be one state "composed of three constituent units, based on national principles and taking into account economic, geographic, and other criteria".⁹⁰⁰⁷ The Statement of Principles also provided for a working group to be established to define the territory of the constituent units.⁹⁰⁰⁸ Bosnian Serb negotiators reported back to the Bosnian Serb Assembly regarding this plan and noted that it aimed at a division of BiH into three constituent

⁸⁹⁹⁹ P778 (Fifth notebook of Herbert Okun's Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 41.

⁹⁰⁰⁰ KDZ240, P2935 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 6749–6750 (under seal).

⁹⁰⁰¹ P779 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun's Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 24. Skoko stated that the Accused always looked for reasons to accept international peace plans and to make concessions during negotiations with respect to other ethnicities. D3321 (Witness statement of Milorad Skoko dated 1 April 2013), para. 30. The Chamber noted that Skoko's testimony was marked by multiple contradictions, evasiveness and indicators of partiality and bias and therefore does not find his evidence to be reliable in this regard.

⁹⁰⁰² P779 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun's Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 56.

⁹⁰⁰³ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4177–4178. Okun's assessment was that this meant that the Bosnian Serbs would stop fighting only when they acquired the territory they wanted.

⁹⁰⁰⁴ P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies' Club meeting, 28 February 1992), pp. 33–34. Mandić testified that originally all three sides agreed that there should be three entities in BiH but the Croats and Muslims failed to adhere to this agreement. Momčilo Mandić, T. 5001 (13 July 2010).

⁹⁰⁰⁵ P938 (Minutes from SDS Deputies' Club meeting, 28 February 1992), p. 4.

⁹⁰⁰⁶ See para. 326.

⁹⁰⁰⁷ See para. 326.

⁹⁰⁰⁸ See para. 326.

units based not only on nationality, but also on economic and geographic considerations and would be marked as a "basis for further negotiations".⁹⁰⁰⁹

2703. In April 1992, the Accused in a meeting with international representatives agreed that all sides would lose if there was a conflict and complained about propaganda against the Serbs.⁹⁰¹⁰ He also said that they founded the TO because many troops were out of control.⁹⁰¹¹ Koljević at this meeting said that he and the Accused had agreed that they should divide Sarajevo.⁹⁰¹² During a discussion with international observers in September 1992, the Accused proposed constructing a wall in Sarajevo to separate the Serb controlled areas and the Muslim controlled areas.⁹⁰¹³

2704. Krajišnik wrote to Cutileiro on 3 April 1992, suggesting a continuation of negotiations based on the Statement of Principles.⁹⁰¹⁴ In June 1992, Izetbegović withdrew his agreement to the Cutileiro Plan.⁹⁰¹⁵ By July 1992, Izetbegović stated that he could not agree to certain elements of the Statement of Principles.⁹⁰¹⁶ The Accused stated that while he continued to agree with the Statement of Principles, the proposal of BiH being a unitary state was not satisfactory.⁹⁰¹⁷

2705. The Chamber recalls that during a meeting in September 1992, the Accused and Koljević stated that the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats would not accept a unitary BiH state; a state based on one-man, one-vote.⁹⁰¹⁸ Koljević also stated that the Bosnian Serbs would not accept the internal borders of BiH without some form of cantonisation.⁹⁰¹⁹ At international negotiations, the Accused also expressed the Bosnian Serb position that while they wanted a political resolution they would not abandon their sovereignty or accept a unitarian state or a "loss of national status on our land".⁹⁰²⁰ The Accused also called for three units for the three constituent peoples in BiH and emphasised the security of the Serb people who he presented as the "principal victims".⁹⁰²¹

⁹⁰⁰⁹ See para. 327.

⁹⁰¹⁰ P780 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun's Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 36.

⁹⁰¹¹ P780 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun's Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 36.

⁹⁰¹² P780 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun's Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 36.

⁹⁰¹³ Aernout van Lynden, T. 2563–2564 (20 May 2010).

⁹⁰¹⁴ See para. 328.

⁹⁰¹⁵ See para. 333.

⁹⁰¹⁶ See para. 340.

⁹⁰¹⁷ See para. 340.

⁹⁰¹⁸ See para. 357.

⁹⁰¹⁹ See para. 357.

⁹⁰²⁰ P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 9. See also P791 (Eighth notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court pp. 38–39.

⁹⁰²¹ P789 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court p. 45; P790 (Seventh notebook of Herbert Okun's ICFY diary), e-court pp. 10–11.

executed by the SRK and Mladić was informed of it.¹⁰⁴⁸⁹ In May 1992, Mladić was informed that "Foča has been finished" and later in September 1992, that the percentage of Serbs in Foča was 99%.¹⁰⁴⁹⁰ Furthermore, Batković camp was established in Bijeljina following an order from Mladić to set up a camp for "war prisoners" in June 1992.¹⁰⁴⁹¹ On 6 June 1992, Mladić issued an urgent directive to secure communications from Sarajevo to Zvornik and mop up or cleanse the zone of "remaining enemy groups", also stating that the maltreatment of the unarmed civilian population was prohibited.¹⁰⁴⁹² Mladić was also kept informed of events during the take-over in Vlasenica and was consulted during the armed conflict in Ilidža.¹⁰⁴⁹³

3270. On 1 July 1992, Mladić paid tribute to all members of the VRS for having successfully organised and implemented the co-ordinated "operation for breakthrough, expansion and cleansing of [the] corridor in Bosanska Posavina, between Eastern and Western Bosnia".¹⁰⁴⁹⁴ Mladić specifically congratulated the units of the Eastern Bosnia Corps and the 1st Krajina Corps for their unified efforts to support the position of the VRS Main Staff to realise its military and political goals for the "preservation of Serbianhood" in BiH.¹⁰⁴⁹⁵

3271. On 3 August 1992, Mladić ordered that *inter alia* Omarska, Trnopolje, and Manjača be prepared for upcoming visits from foreign journalists and members of the ICRC.¹⁰⁴⁹⁶ Furthermore, in a meeting with Jovi Banjac in September 1992, Mladić was informed that only 5,000 Bosnian Muslims remained in Ključ, and that another 1,500 were leaving on that same day.¹⁰⁴⁹⁷

3272. The Chamber also recalls that in meetings with international representatives, Mladić spoke about the genocide committed against Serbs in World War II in areas including Srebrenica and Sarajevo.¹⁰⁴⁹⁸ Furthermore, the Chamber recalls that Mladić agreed with the Accused when he said in January 1993 that they could not live together with Bosnian Muslims anymore and that therefore Bosnian Muslims would be transferred out of Bosnian Serb territory.¹⁰⁴⁹⁹ Mladić continued to make statements into 1994 about the necessity to fight against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian

¹⁰⁴⁸⁹ See para. 971.

¹⁰⁴⁹⁰ P1477 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 14 February–25 May 1992), p. 255; P1480 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 10–30 September 1992), p. 66. See also para. 2781.

¹⁰⁴⁹¹ See para. 642.

¹⁰⁴⁹² See para. 1278.

¹⁰⁴⁹³ See paras. 1112, 1124, 2133. See also para. 2785.

¹⁰⁴⁹⁴ P5509 (Letter from Ratko Mladić to all members of VRS, 1 July 1992), p. 1.

¹⁰⁴⁹⁵ P5509 (Letter from Ratko Mladić to all members of VRS, 1 July 1992), p. 1.

¹⁰⁴⁹⁶ See paras. 1404, 1784, 1849.

¹⁰⁴⁹⁷ See para. 1565.

¹⁰⁴⁹⁸ See paras. 2662, 2669.

¹⁰⁴⁹⁹ See para. 2757.

Croats to the end that they vanish completely or disappear.¹⁰⁵⁰⁰ Finally, the Chamber recalls the notice Mladić issued to the Main Staff in August 1995 in which, *inter alia*, he praised the VRS for thwarting “a planned and prepared genocide of the Serbian people, protecting the greater part of Serbian territories, and achieving victory after victory in the liberation of occupied historically and ethnically Serbian areas”.¹⁰⁵⁰¹

3273. The Chamber also recalls that Mladić was involved in defining, adopting, and carrying out the Strategic Goals.¹⁰⁵⁰² Mladić advocated that the actions of the Bosnian Serbs should remain secret and recommended the adoption of a common rhetoric towards the public.¹⁰⁵⁰³ He also stressed the importance of identifying a common enemy and that on this basis, “we must make our move and eliminate them, either temporarily or permanently”.¹⁰⁵⁰⁴ In relation to carrying out the Strategic Goals, the Chamber recalls that Mladić issued important military directives, such as Directive 4 in November 1992 and Directive 5 in June 1993.¹⁰⁵⁰⁵

(E) Slobodan Milošević

3274. Slobodan Milošević was the President of the Republic of Serbia.¹⁰⁵⁰⁶ Milan Babić described Milošević as “the president of all Serbs, not only those in Serbia”¹⁰⁵⁰⁷ and was referred to by Jovica Stanišić as the “main boss”.¹⁰⁵⁰⁸ He had control over the JNA.¹⁰⁵⁰⁹

3275. Beginning in November 1990, Milošević and the Accused had a close association and the Accused would visit him frequently in Belgrade.¹⁰⁵¹⁰ Other Bosnian Serb leaders such as Krajišnik also met with Milošević but their meetings were less frequent.¹⁰⁵¹¹ Prior to the start of the conflict and into 1992, Slobodan Milošević and the Accused were in constant communication with each

¹⁰⁵⁰⁰ See paras. 2766, 2769, 2771, 2806, 2832.

¹⁰⁵⁰¹ See para. 2815.

¹⁰⁵⁰² See paras. 2794, 2863–2864, 2868, 2874, 2876–2877. The Chamber notes that on 15 July 1994, Mladić complained that the Strategic Goals adopted by the Bosnian Serb Assembly had not been given the financial support needed and that on the contrary, political structures had hindered the VRS from carrying out certain operations which were directly within the purview of carrying out the set Strategic Goals. P1486 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 31 March–3 September 1994), pp. 209–210.

¹⁰⁵⁰³ See para. 2864.

¹⁰⁵⁰⁴ See para. 2864.

¹⁰⁵⁰⁵ See paras. 2876, 2879, 3155–3156.

¹⁰⁵⁰⁶ P3048 (Record of 21st session of FRY’s SDC, 7 June 1994), p. 1; Yasushi Akashi, T. 37705–37706 (24 April 2013).

¹⁰⁵⁰⁷ P754 (Milan Babić’s interview in NIN, 18 June 1991), p. 10; Milan Babić, P743 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Martić*), T. 1473.

¹⁰⁵⁰⁸ P5818 (Intercept of conversation between Ljiljana Karadžić and Jovica Stanišić, 12 November 1991).

¹⁰⁵⁰⁹ Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4147.

¹⁰⁵¹⁰ Milan Babić, P742 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 3397; Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16612, 16614–16615, 16768.

¹⁰⁵¹¹ Radomir Nešković, P2568 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 16616.

other to discuss and co-ordinate both political and military tactics in relation to developments in BiH and Croatia.¹⁰⁵¹² There was a close connection between the authorities in Pale and Belgrade, and the Bosnian Serb leadership consulted with Belgrade on developments in BiH.¹⁰⁵¹³ Points of

¹⁰⁵¹² D1282 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 May 1991), pp. 1-4; P5686 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 11 June 1991), pp. 1-2; P5687 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Ljiljana Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević and (ii) Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 12 June 1991), pp. 2-3, 5, 7-9; P5688 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 June 1991), pp. 1-3; P5893 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 June 1991), pp. 1-2; D3531 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 28 June 1991); P5890 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 July 1991), pp. 1-2; P5887 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 8 July 1991), pp. 2-5; P5883 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 July 1991), pp. 1-3; P5875 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 July 1991), pp. 1-3; P5881 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 31 July 1991), pp. 4-12; P5880 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 6 August 1991), pp. 1-5; P5877 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 4 September 1991), pp. 1-6; D365 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, undated); D4545 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 13 September 1991); P5866 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 18 September 1991); P5864 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), pp. 2-4; P5865 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 13 September 1991); P5863 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 22 September 1991); P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), pp. 2-7; P5853 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), pp. 3-6; P5859 (Intercept of conversations between Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan Milošević and unidentified persons, 24 September 1991), pp. 7-11; D4496 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and an unidentified female and Slobodan Milošević, 24 September 1991), pp. 4-8; D4497 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 September 1991); P5848 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 8 October 1991), pp. 2-6; P5847 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 October 1991), pp. 1-3; P5834 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 October 1991), pp. 1-6; P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), pp. 1-13; P5828 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 November 1991), pp. 1-9; P5897 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 14 November 1991), pp. 1-3; P5815 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 15 November 1991), pp. 1-2; P5813 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 18 November 1991), pp. 1-4; P5811 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 22 November 1991), pp. 1-4; P5809 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 November 1991), pp. 1-2; P5808 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 November 1991), pp. 2-3; P5796 (Intercept of conversation between Mirko Krajišnik and Mirče Radić, 16 December 1991); P5795 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 December 1991), pp. 1-3; P2224 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 September 1991) (the Chamber notes that while this intercepted conversation is dated 20 December 1991, it is clear from the context of the conversation that it should be dated 9 September 1991); P5790 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 20 December 1991), pp. 1-4; P5787 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 25 December 1991), pp. 1-4; P5780 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 30 December 1991), pp. 1-3; P5775 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 5 January 1992), pp. 2-5; P5769 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 January 1992); P5767 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 12 January 1992), pp. 2-6; P5766 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 15 January 1992), pp. 1-3; P5752 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 10 February 1992), p. 1; P5751 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 10 February 1992).

¹⁰⁵¹³ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 72, 199. See also P2926 (Official note of Serbia RDB, 27 June 1994); Milorad Davidović, T. 15830-15834 (1 July 2011). P2926 refers a group identified as the "Tajfun" group operating in Banja Luka and that the Serbian MUP would only accept the initiative of this group if the Accused and Mićo Stanišić gave their approval. However, Davidović was unable to give direct evidence about the nature of this group and measures taken in that regard.

discussion included (i) their opposition to the secession of BiH and the desire to remain part of Yugoslavia;¹⁰⁵¹⁴ (ii) opposition to the creation of an Islamic State;¹⁰⁵¹⁵ (iii) political negotiations;¹⁰⁵¹⁶ (iv) regionalisation;¹⁰⁵¹⁷ (v) developments in Croatia and Slovenia;¹⁰⁵¹⁸ (vi) military preparations including mobilisation of the Serb population and the provision of arms;¹⁰⁵¹⁹

¹⁰⁵¹⁴ D1282 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 May 1991), pp. 1, 3; P5687 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Ljiljana Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević and (ii) Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 12 June 1991), pp. 2–3; D3531 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 28 June 1991), pp. 3–4; P5880 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 6 August 1991), p. 1; D4545 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 13 September 1991), p. 2; P5834 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 October 1991), p. 1; P5828 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 November 1991), p. 6; P5897 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 14 November 1991), p. 3; P5787 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 25 December 1991), p. 4; P5775 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 5 January 1992), p. 3.

¹⁰⁵¹⁵ D1282 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 May 1991), p. 3; P5877 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 4 September 1991), pp. 2, 4–5; P5828 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 November 1991), pp. 1, 9; P5766 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 15 January 1992), p. 2.

¹⁰⁵¹⁶ P5687 (Intercepts of conversations between (i) Ljiljana Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević and (ii) Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 12 June 1991), pp. 3–5; P5688 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 June 1991), pp. 1–3; P5893 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 24 June 1991), p. 2; P5875 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 July 1991), p. 2; D365 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, undated), pp. 1–2; P5859 (Intercept of conversations between Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan Milošević and unidentified persons, 24 September 1991), p. 8; D4497 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 September 1991), p. 1; P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), p. 11; P5897 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 14 November 1991), pp. 2–3; P5813 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 18 November 1991), p. 2; P5808 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 26 November 1991), p. 2; P5790 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 20 December 1991), p. 1.

¹⁰⁵¹⁷ P5688 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 June 1991), p. 3; D365 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, undated), p. 2.

¹⁰⁵¹⁸ D3531 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 28 June 1991), p. 5; P5890 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 1 July 1991), p. 1; P5887 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 8 July 1991), pp. 3–5; P5875 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 July 1991), p. 3; P5880 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 6 August 1991), p. 2; P5877 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 4 September 1991), pp. 1, 4; P5867 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), pp. 1–2; P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), pp. 5–6; P5853 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), p. 6; P5848 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 8 October 1991), p. 5; P5811 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 22 November 1991), p. 3.

¹⁰⁵¹⁹ P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), p. 5; P5883 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 July 1991), pp. 1–2; P5887 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 8 July 1991), pp. 3–5; P5853 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), pp. 3–5; P5859 (Intercept of conversations between Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan Milošević and unidentified persons, 24 September 1991), p. 10; D4496 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and an unidentified female and Slobodan Milošević, 24 September 1991), p. 4.

(vii) developments in Krajina;¹⁰⁵²⁰ and (viii) issues pertaining to recognition of the independence of BiH.¹⁰⁵²¹

3276. The Chamber recalls that from 1990 and into mid-1991, the political objective of the Accused and the Bosnian Serb leadership was to preserve Yugoslavia and to prevent the separation or independence of BiH, which would result in a separation of Bosnian Serbs from Serbia; the Chamber notes that Slobodan Milošević endorsed this objective and spoke against the independence of BiH.¹⁰⁵²²

3277. The Chamber found that based on a conversation between the Accused and Milošević on 24 October 1991, it was also clear that Slobodan Milošević was attempting to take a more cautious approach while the Accused was adamant that the goal of the Bosnian Serb leadership was to ensure that they would establish full authority in their territories and that they would announce their own Bosnian Serb Assembly.¹⁰⁵²³ The Chamber also found that while Milošević expressed reservations about excluding Bosnian Muslims, the Accused was adamant that there were not even 10% of Bosnian Muslims who supported Yugoslavia and that they could not take such a risk.¹⁰⁵²⁴

3278. The Chamber recalls that in December 1991, Milošević told the Accused that he should not give in to Izetbegović and that they had to stick to their line and that “if they want to fight, we’ll fight” given that the Serbs were stronger.¹⁰⁵²⁵ They also spoke about the unconstitutional nature of the decision changing the status of BiH.¹⁰⁵²⁶

¹⁰⁵²⁰ P5866 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 18 September 1991), pp. 1–2; P5867 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), p. 1; P5864 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 19 September 1991), p. 3; P5863 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 22 September 1991), p. 2; P5861 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 23 September 1991), p. 4; P5859 (Intercept of conversations between Radovan Karadžić, Slobodan Milošević and unidentified persons, 24 September 1991), p. 9; P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), pp. 1, 11; P5787 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 25 December 1991), p. 1; P5769 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 January 1992), p. 2; P5751 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 10 February 1992), pp. 1–2.

¹⁰⁵²¹ P5832 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 29 October 1991), p. 2; P5795 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 17 December 1991), p. 1; P5775 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 5 January 1992), p. 4; P5769 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 January 1992), p. 1; P5766 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 15 January 1992), p. 1.

¹⁰⁵²² See paras. 2644–2645, 2651.

¹⁰⁵²³ See para. 2710. See also P5782 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, 28 December 1991), pp. 1–2.

¹⁰⁵²⁴ See para. 2711.

¹⁰⁵²⁵ See para. 2691.

¹⁰⁵²⁶ See para. 2691.

3279. On 26 December 1991, the Accused and Krajišnik spoke about their political strategies and the issues of sovereignty in BiH, regionalisation, and their mutual disappointment with Slobodan Milošević.¹⁰⁵²⁷ The Accused in this regard stated that they would have to pursue their own policy even if it meant “splitting with Milošević”.¹⁰⁵²⁸ In January 1992, Milošević told the Accused in an intercepted phone conversation that he would not describe the Accused as one of his “satellites”.¹⁰⁵²⁹

3280. In March 1992, in a meeting with international representatives, Slobodan Milošević described the situation in BiH as similar to “dynamite”, and if anyone favoured one of the parties, there would be hell but he had called the Accused and told him to “cool it”.¹⁰⁵³⁰ Milošević also said that Yugoslavia hoped for intensive links with BiH.¹⁰⁵³¹ Later in the war, in meetings with international representatives, Milošević also made assurances that he would speak to the Bosnian Serbs, that he continued to condemn “ethnic cleansing” but that the world was “satanizing” the Serbs without condemning actions by the other parties.¹⁰⁵³²

3281. Beginning in 1992, Slobodan Milošević was informed by international representatives about the expulsion of Muslims in BiH; he responded that everything that would happen in BiH would be horrendous and the responsibility for these acts remained with those who decided to separate BiH and that he had no authority as far as the Bosnian Serbs were concerned.¹⁰⁵³³ In September 1992, in meetings with international representatives, leaders of the FRY expressed the view that the international representatives were justified in asking them to pressure the Accused.¹⁰⁵³⁴

3282. The Accused in September 1992 acknowledged the support given by “leading figures both in Serbia and in Yugoslavia” who strongly supported the Bosnian Serbs in achieving their goal, even if it was temporarily within BiH, but on the condition that the Bosnian Serbs defined “the borders towards the Muslims and Croats”.¹⁰⁵³⁵ By January 1993, deputies in the Bosnian Serb

¹⁰⁵²⁷ P5785 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, 26 December 1991), pp. 3–7.

¹⁰⁵²⁸ P5785 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Momčilo Krajišnik, 26 December 1991), p. 7.

¹⁰⁵²⁹ P5769 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Slobodan Milošević, 9 January 1992), p. 6.

¹⁰⁵³⁰ P779 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun’s Vance Mission Diary), e-court pp. 36–37.

¹⁰⁵³¹ P779 (Sixth notebook of Herbert Okun’s Vance Mission Diary), e-court p. 36.

¹⁰⁵³² D1140 (Letter to UN Secretary General, 2 February 1993) (under seal), p. 4; P4246 (UNPROFOR report re meetings with Slobodan Milošević, 25 March 1993), p. 2. See also D3054 (Notes of session of Council for Coordinating Positions on State Policy, 18 August 1992), pp. 10–12.

¹⁰⁵³³ [REDACTED].

¹⁰⁵³⁴ P784 (First notebook of Herbert Okun’s ICFY diary), e-court p. 53.

¹⁰⁵³⁵ D456 (Transcript of 20th session of RS Assembly, 14–15 September 1992), p. 16.

Assembly called on Slobodan Milošević and the Serbian people to do more to help their brothers in the RS.¹⁰⁵³⁶

3283. In May 1993, Slobodan Milošević addressed the Bosnian Serb Assembly and confirmed the solidarity of Serbia with the Bosnian Serbs but stressed that the assembly should accept the Vance-Owen Plan to avoid the disastrous consequences of the war continuing.¹⁰⁵³⁷ He acknowledged that the war had been imposed on the Serbs who simply defended themselves.¹⁰⁵³⁸ On this point, the Accused disagreed and stated that he felt deceived by Milošević and explained that the Vance-Owen Plan was catastrophic for the Serbs, that they would live in enclaves and areas like Zvornik would be "Turkish", and that there was a danger that they would be bombed whether or not they signed.¹⁰⁵³⁹

3284. At a meeting on 24 September 1993 with Slobodan Milošević and Mladić, Perišić discussed the danger of war in the Krajina and stated that help in manpower, combat equipment, and financial resources was needed.¹⁰⁵⁴⁰ Milošević stated that with respect to the "final verification of RS" it required political co-ordination with the Accused, economic co-ordination, military co-ordination with one Main Staff, as well as liaising regarding intelligence and security functions.¹⁰⁵⁴¹ Milošević further declared that crime needed to be fought decisively.¹⁰⁵⁴²

3285. In October 1993, Perišić discussed personnel issues related to officers from the FRY who had been engaged in the VRS and there was discussion of whether the FRY should pull out their personnel from the RS.¹⁰⁵⁴³ At this meeting, Slobodan Milošević said that "Mladić needs to come here so that we can hear what he has to say".¹⁰⁵⁴⁴

3286. The Chamber recalls that Slobodan Milošević attended a meeting held at the Presidency of Serbia on 8 November 1993, with among others, the Accused, Krajišnik, Martić, Mladić, and Perišić, where the following common objectives were discussed: (i) unconditionally strengthen the

¹⁰⁵³⁶ P921 (Transcript of 24th session of RS Assembly, 8 January 1993), pp. 55–56.

¹⁰⁵³⁷ P1371 (Transcript of 30th session of RS Assembly, 5–6 May 1993), pp. 29–30, 157–160; Herbert Okun, P776 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 4235; Herbert Okun, T. 1828 (28 April 2010).

¹⁰⁵³⁸ P1371 (Transcript of 30th session of RS Assembly, 5–6 May 1993), p. 161.

¹⁰⁵³⁹ P1373 (Transcript of 31st session of RS Assembly, 9 May 1993), p. 18.

¹⁰⁵⁴⁰ P1483 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), pp. 339–340.

¹⁰⁵⁴¹ P1483 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), pp. 341, 343–344.

¹⁰⁵⁴² P1483 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 2 April–24 October 1993), p. 345.

¹⁰⁵⁴³ P6162 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 14th session, 11 October 1993), e-court pp. 1, 5, 7.

¹⁰⁵⁴⁴ P6162 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 14th session, 11 October 1993), e-court, p. 7. See also P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 47.

integrity of Serbia, (ii) set up the RS as a completely independent state; and (iii) ensure Serbs have complete power in the Krajina.¹⁰⁵⁴⁵

3287. At a meeting in December 1993, with Slobodan Milošević, Jovica Stanišić and others, the Accused stated that the end of the conflict was close and that the Bosnian Serbs were holding 75% of the territory; he acknowledged that some of this territory would have to be returned as the international community would not allow it.¹⁰⁵⁴⁶ The Accused listed the Strategic Goals at this meeting.¹⁰⁵⁴⁷ This meeting was convened to improve the "operational and tactical position" of the Bosnian Serbs and to discuss help from Serbia.¹⁰⁵⁴⁸ Milošević agreed with a proposal from Mladić and suggested that "the operation" should be planned and the forces prepared but only following negotiations in Brussels.¹⁰⁵⁴⁹ He also promised to provide fuel supplies from the state reserves for the operations.¹⁰⁵⁵⁰ Milošević offered further assistance, stating that Perišić will "give everything that does not jeopardise combat readiness of units" in Serbia.¹⁰⁵⁵¹ Perišić further stated that they would help with weapons while Jovica Stanišić spoke about a special combat group which could be deployed;¹⁰⁵⁵² these units included the Red Berets and Arkan's men.¹⁰⁵⁵³ The following day, continuing the meeting, Stanišić and Perišić confirmed that they would provide manpower of a few hundred men.¹⁰⁵⁵⁴

3288. At a meeting in Belgrade on 15 March 1994 attended by Jovica Stanišić, Martić, Mladić, and the Accused, Slobodan Milošević stated that "[a]ll members of other nations and ethnicities must be protected" and that "[t]he national interest of the Serbs is not discrimination".¹⁰⁵⁵⁵

¹⁰⁵⁴⁵ See para. 2883.

¹⁰⁵⁴⁶ See para. 2886.

¹⁰⁵⁴⁷ See para. 2886.

¹⁰⁵⁴⁸ P1484 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 53.

¹⁰⁵⁴⁹ P1484 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), pp. 57–58.

¹⁰⁵⁵⁰ P1484 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 58. See also P3048 (Record of 21st session of FRY's SDC, 7 June 1994), p. 5; P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 55.

¹⁰⁵⁵¹ P1484 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 57.

¹⁰⁵⁵² P1484 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), pp. 59–61; P1473 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 27 January–5 September 1995), p. 80. See also KDZ446, P29 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. S. Milošević*), T. 21025–21027; P31 (List of names referred to during testimony of KDZ446) (under seal); KDZ555, T. 17248–17258 (16 August 2011) (private session) (pertaining to the distribution of weapons); D1412 (Report of Republic of Serbia MUP, 8 August 1992), p. 10.

¹⁰⁵⁵³ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 80, 112–113, 166. See also P6210 (Report of Eastern Bosnian Corps, 20 September 1995).

¹⁰⁵⁵⁴ P1484 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 28 October 1993–15 January 1994), p. 61. Later, in June 1994, Perišić spoke about requests Serbia had received for assistance in the war from the RS and the assistance they had provided with respect to financing and material assistance for combat operations and the strain this was placing on their own resources. P3048 (Record of 21st session of FRY's SDC, 7 June 1994), pp. 5–8.

¹⁰⁵⁵⁵ P1485 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 9 January–21 March 1994), p. 169.

3289. International observers noted that Milošević had a dominant influence over the Bosnian Serb leadership and played a role in convincing them to accept certain proposals during international negotiations.¹⁰⁵⁵⁶ However, by July 1994, there were rifts in the relationship between the RS and Serbia, and Slobodan Milošević complained about criticisms directed against Serbia.¹⁰⁵⁵⁷ In private meetings, Milošević was extremely angry at the Bosnian Serb leadership for rejecting the Vance-Owen Plan and he cursed the Accused.¹⁰⁵⁵⁸

3290. The Chamber notes that while originally Milošević had similar interests to those as the Bosnian Serbs, when their interests diverged, his influence over the Bosnian Serb leaders also reduced.¹⁰⁵⁵⁹ Milošević also questioned whether the world would accept that the Bosnian Serbs who represented only one third of the population of BiH would get more than 50% of the territory and he encouraged a political agreement.¹⁰⁵⁶⁰ He stated that the Serbs had won the war, and that there were “hardly any” Bosnian Muslims in RS.¹⁰⁵⁶¹ By August 1994, leaders in Serbia criticised Bosnian Serb leaders of committing “crimes against humanity” and continuing “ethnic cleansing” and the war for their own purposes.¹⁰⁵⁶²

3291. At a meeting held on 22 August 1994 between Slobodan Milošević and Akashi, it was clear to Akashi that Milošević’s break with the Accused was “serious” and stemmed from differences that arose over a long period of time.¹⁰⁵⁶³ Milošević gave the impression that he was “a politician who is more in command of the overall situation” while the Accused was “a local leader wrapped up in the emotions of an ongoing civil war”.¹⁰⁵⁶⁴ At the meeting, Milošević made it clear that there

¹⁰⁵⁵⁶ Yasushi Akashi, T. 37705–37706 (24 April 2013). *See also* P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 277–280.

¹⁰⁵⁵⁷ P1486 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 31 March 1994–3 September 1994), p. 216. *See also* P820 (Witness statement of David Harland dated 4 September 2009), paras. 280–281; P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), paras. 52–53, 161; P2457 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 28 August 1994), p. 3; Anthony Banbury, T. 13336–13337 (15 March 2011); Vojislav Šešelj, T. 39564 (10 June 2013).

¹⁰⁵⁵⁸ P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), paras. 188–190. *See also* John Zametica, T. 42468–42469 (29 October 2013) (testifying that Milošević tried to have the Accused removed after the Vance-Owen Plan); D3665 (Witness statement of Vojislav Šešelj dated 1 June 2013), para. 41; D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 42; Momir Bulatović, T. 34532–34533 (28 February 2013). The Chamber does not rely on Zametica’s general opinion that there was no joint criminal enterprise between the Accused and Milošević or that Milošević was not interested in a Greater Serbia.

¹⁰⁵⁵⁹ P2451 (Witness statement of Anthony Banbury dated 19 May 2009), para. 54.

¹⁰⁵⁶⁰ P1486 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 31 March 1994–3 September 1994), pp. 219, 221, 228. *See also* P3863 (UNPROFOR report, 18 May 1995), p. 1.

¹⁰⁵⁶¹ P1486 (Ratko Mladić’s notebook, 31 March 1994–3 September 1994), pp. 219–220.

¹⁰⁵⁶² P2457 (UNPROFOR Weekly BiH Political Assessment, 28 August 1994), p. 3. *See also* D1140 (Letter to UN Secretary General, 2 February 1993) (under seal), p. 4.

¹⁰⁵⁶³ P3861 (UNPROFOR report, 23 August 1994), pp. 1, 3 (noting that among others, Sergio de Mello and Kirudja were also present at the meeting). *See* P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 135.

¹⁰⁵⁶⁴ P3861 (UNPROFOR report, 23 August 1994), p. 1.

was a difference of views emerging in the Bosnian Serb leadership on the execution of the war.¹⁰⁵⁶⁵ Specifically, Milošević stated that Krajina Serbs were well aware that a solution based on negotiations was the only way out and this is why they had not accepted the Accused's suggestion to merge with the RS.¹⁰⁵⁶⁶

3292. Given the difference of opinion between the Bosnian Serb and the Serbian leaderships, in 1993 and 1994, the FRY reduced its support for the RS and encouraged the Bosnian Serbs to accept peace proposals.¹⁰⁵⁶⁷ In this regard the FRY leadership was on notice about some of the extreme views held by the Bosnian Serb leadership and they could not support those views, including with respect to ethnic cleansing.¹⁰⁵⁶⁸

3293. During a meeting held on 20 September 1994 with Mladić, Perišić, and others, Milošević stressed that there had been a break between Pale and Serbia and reminded them that Serbian policy was defined in Belgrade, not Pale.¹⁰⁵⁶⁹ He declared that the war must end and that the Bosnian Serbs' biggest mistake was to want a complete defeat of the Bosnian Muslims.¹⁰⁵⁷⁰ During the course of this meeting, Milošević further expressed his disapproval of the Bosnian Serb leadership's disunity from the Bosnian Serbs in Krajina, stating that "the crazy doctor may think that Serbia must toady up to him—it's not going to happen".¹⁰⁵⁷¹

3294. By November 1994, Perišić noted that the Bosnian Serbs accounted for 20% of the population but held more than 70% of the territory which, in his view, was unsustainable; however, according to Perišić, the Bosnian Serbs wanted "to preserve this at all cost", but loss of territory was inevitable.¹⁰⁵⁷² Slobodan Milošević referred to the Accused's belief that they could "wage an infinite war and they won't give up on anything".¹⁰⁵⁷³ Milošević noted however that "our biggest advantage is that the territories, which are to be allocated to Serbs by the peace plan, are already in the Serbian hands so that nobody has to be removed from them".¹⁰⁵⁷⁴ He also explained that when they tried to convince the Accused and Krajišnik that they would be forced to do certain things,

¹⁰⁵⁶⁵ P3861 (UNPROFOR report, 23 August 1994), p. 1.

¹⁰⁵⁶⁶ P3861 (UNPROFOR report, 23 August 1994), p. 3.

¹⁰⁵⁶⁷ D3051 (Witness statement of Momir Bulatović dated 25 February 2013), para. 43.

¹⁰⁵⁶⁸ Momir Bulatović, T. 34543–34546, 34549–34550 (1 March 2013); P6161 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 8th session, 12 March 1993), e-court pp. 1–2; P6162 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 14th session, 11 October 1993), e-court, p. 3.

¹⁰⁵⁶⁹ P1487 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 4 September 1994–29 January 1995), pp. 16–17, 21.

¹⁰⁵⁷⁰ P1487 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 4 September 1994–29 January 1995), pp. 23–24.

¹⁰⁵⁷¹ P1487 (Ratko Mladić's notebook, 4 September 1994–29 January 1995), p. 26.

¹⁰⁵⁷² P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 7; Momir Bulatović, T. 34552–34553 (1 March 2013).

¹⁰⁵⁷³ P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 25.

¹⁰⁵⁷⁴ P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), pp. 25–26.

they replied that it was better to be forced than to accept.¹⁰⁵⁷⁵ Milošević noted that the Bosnian Serb political leadership would “sacrifice many lives in order to preserve their vanity and to prove that they are not the ones who accepted the peace plan because a half of BiH is too little for them”.¹⁰⁵⁷⁶ He spoke about the Bosnian Serbs wanting to take even more territory by force even while they already controlled half of BiH and described this as “complete madness”.¹⁰⁵⁷⁷

3295. Milošević tried to reason with the Bosnian Serbs saying that he understood their concerns, but that it was most important to end the war and that they would achieve any objectives denied them by the plan when peace talks resumed.¹⁰⁵⁷⁸ When the RS did not accept this plan, Milošević imposed a blockade on the Drina River and suspended political and economic relations with the Bosnian Serb leadership; Milošević even wanted to remove the leaders from Pale and have them replaced by exerting influence on the deputies and the Bosnian Assembly.¹⁰⁵⁷⁹

3296. By May 1995, it appeared to international representatives that the split between Slobodan Milošević and the Accused was complete.¹⁰⁵⁸⁰ At a 3 May 1995 meeting with Milošević, Milinović, Akashi, Banbury, and Kirudja, among others, Milošević stated: “I have good personal relations with Mladić. However, as long as Karadžić and Krajišnik are there, they will not accept a peaceful solution.”¹⁰⁵⁸¹ Kirudja observed that Slobodan Milošević still exerted influence over officials in the RS and RSK, including Mladić.¹⁰⁵⁸² This influence appeared to vary over time, but Kirudja was under the impression that Milošević considered Mladić to be loyal to him even after

¹⁰⁵⁷⁵ P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 26.

¹⁰⁵⁷⁶ P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 26.

¹⁰⁵⁷⁷ P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), pp. 33–34. *See also* P3049 (Record of 31st session of FRY's SDC, 18 January 1995), e-court pp. 1–2. Milošević also acknowledged that Koljević was in favour of signing a peace plan, but the Accused and Krajišnik did not ask for his opinion. P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY's SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 41.

¹⁰⁵⁷⁸ D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 66.

¹⁰⁵⁷⁹ D3015 (Witness statement of Vladislav Jovanović dated 22 February 2013), para. 66; Vladislav Jovanović, T. 34273–34276 (26 February 2013) (further characterising the relationship between the Accused and Milošević as a “marriage out of necessity” given their opposing political and ideological views, and it moved from a cordial relationship to a point where Milošević imposed a blockade against the Bosnian Serbs); D3027 (Report re humanitarian activity, 17 August 1994) (under seal), p. 1.

¹⁰⁵⁸⁰ P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 144–147. *See also* P2567 (Note from FRY's SDC 42nd session, 23 August 1995), p. 2 (during which Milošević expressed his reticence to meet with the Accused due to the Accused and his team having demonstrated fickleness and disloyalty; Milošević also showed Mladić a confidential letter from the Accused which showed the Accused's intention to “blame Serbia and the FRY for any debacle ensuing from the disastrous policies of the RS leadership”).

¹⁰⁵⁸¹ P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 145. The Chamber notes that from the context of the conversation, Milošević is referring to the Bosnian Serbs when he said “they”.

¹⁰⁵⁸² P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 133, 147. In his role as Delegate of the Special Representative of the Secretary General to the FRY from August 1994 to June 1995, Kirudja dealt with all matters involving UNPROFOR's relations with the FRY that were not military in nature. P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 2, 131.

the relations between Belgrade and Pale deteriorated.¹⁰⁵⁸³ Milošević also criticised Martić, and Kirudja noted that the Accused and Martić were aligned at the time.¹⁰⁵⁸⁴ According to Kirudja, Milošević seemed to be “playing his usual game of switching his support for RSK leaders as the situation best suited his aims at the moment” and that Milošević’s control over RSK or RS officials seemed to vary with time, depending on events in the region.¹⁰⁵⁸⁵ When Martić aligned himself with the Accused, both Martić and the Accused fell out of favour with Milošević.¹⁰⁵⁸⁶

3297. In November 1995, Slobodan Milošević addressed the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY, spoke about the leadership in Pale being the biggest obstacle to solving the problems in BiH, and criticised them for rejecting plans for the territorial division of BiH.¹⁰⁵⁸⁷ Milošević told the Bosnian Serb leadership that they were not entitled to have more than half the territory in BiH, stating that

there is no way that more than that could belong to us! Because, we represent one third of the population. [...] We are not entitled to in excess of half of the territory – you must not snatch away something that belongs to someone else! [...] How can you imagine two thirds of the population being crammed into 30% of the territory, while 50% is too little for you?! Is it humane, is it fair?!

(F) Mićo Stanišić

3298. Mićo Stanišić was a member of the Preparatory Committee that established the SDS.¹⁰⁵⁸⁹ He was also a member of the Council of Ministers and the SNB.¹⁰⁵⁹⁰ On 24 March 1992, Mićo Stanišić was appointed Minister of the MUP.¹⁰⁵⁹¹ Stanišić served in this position until the end of December 1992 when he was relieved of his duties by the Bosnian Serb leadership, specifically at

¹⁰⁵⁸³ P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 147. *See also* P2567 (Note from FRY’s SDC 42nd session, 23 August 1995), p. 2.

¹⁰⁵⁸⁴ P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 146, 148 (stating further that in February 1995, he referenced the fact that Milošević would influence Martić over what was going on in the Bihać pocket, but not the Accused). *See* P3868 (UNPROFOR report, 16 February 1995), p. 4.

¹⁰⁵⁸⁵ P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), paras. 146–147.

¹⁰⁵⁸⁶ P3804 (Witness statement of Charles Kirudja dated 17 November 2010), para. 147 (stating further that based on comments made by Milošević, it appeared that Mladić remained loyal to him even when Milošević closed the border between the FRY and BiH).

¹⁰⁵⁸⁷ P2604 (Minutes of 47th session of SDC, 28 November 1995), pp. 6–7.

¹⁰⁵⁸⁸ P2604 (Minutes of 47th session of SDC, 28 November 1995), p. 9. *See also* P6163 (Excerpt from notes of FRY’s SDC 28th session, 2 November 1994), p. 32.

¹⁰⁵⁸⁹ P1383 (Transcript of 36th session of RS Assembly, 30–31 December 1993), p. 57.

¹⁰⁵⁹⁰ P3111 (Minutes of the 2nd meeting of the Ministerial Council of SerBiH Assembly, 17 January 1992), p. 1; Mićo Stanišić, T. 46341 (3 February 2014); P3050 (Minutes of joint meeting of SNB and SerBiH Government, 15 April 1992), p. 1.

¹⁰⁵⁹¹ Mićo Stanišić, T. 46327, 46353 (3 February 2014), T. 46440 (4 February 2014); P1354 (Minutes of 13th session of SerBiH Assembly, 24 March 1992), p. 7. *See also* Adjudicated Fact 2146; para. 3158.

the request of Plavšić and Koljević.¹⁰⁵⁹² Stanišić went to Belgrade until he was appointed by the Accused again as Minister of the Bosnian Serb MUP during an interim six month period between January and July 1994.¹⁰⁵⁹³

3299. Mićo Stanišić was considered to be in the top leadership of the RS and had a very close relationship with the Accused, as well as his support.¹⁰⁵⁹⁴ According to Branko Đerić, Mićo Stanišić and Mandić were the "President's men" and Stanišić took orders directly from the Accused.¹⁰⁵⁹⁵ Stanišić also reported to the Accused.¹⁰⁵⁹⁶

3300. The Chamber refers to Section IV.A.3.a.ii.C regarding the split in the MUP and the creation of a Bosnian Serb MUP and Mićo Stanišić's involvement therein.¹⁰⁵⁹⁷ It recalls that the ultimate split in the MUP structures was precipitated by a decision by the Bosnian Serb leadership which formed part of their decision to create a separate Bosnian Serb state with parallel structures. Mićo Stanišić was involved in the decision making and promulgation of this idea from as early as February 1992, where he spoke of the need to work towards organising a Bosnian Serb MUP starting at the municipal and regional levels and moving towards a Serb ministry.¹⁰⁵⁹⁸ The Chamber also found that the creation of a separate Bosnian Serb MUP was a means of undermining the proposed independence of BiH. Finally, the Chamber found that the directives with respect to the division of the MUP structures and the creation of the Bosnian Serb MUP were communicated to and implemented at a municipal level and were a crucial step in the take-over of the

¹⁰⁵⁹² Mićo Stanišić, T. 46327, 46353 (3 February 2014); T. 46437-46438 (4 February 2014); P1383 (Transcript of 36th session of RS Assembly, 30-31 December 1993), pp. 51, 59; Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 9267-9270 (testifying that Krajišnik informed Mandić and Stanišić of the decision from the Bosnian Serb leadership, specifically at the request of Plavšić and Koljević, to send them to Belgrade and terminate their positions). See Branko Đerić, T. 27947-27948, 27983 (24 April 2012) (testifying, however, that the Accused did not accept to have Mićo Stanišić and Mandić removed from their positions).

¹⁰⁵⁹³ Mićo Stanišić, T. 46327, 46353 (3 February 2014); T. 46437-46439 (4 February 2014) (testifying that in the interim period he was in Belgrade, he did not work, but the Accused issued a decision appointing Stanišić as a "republican advisor" in order to protect Stanišić from being mobilised into the army during this time); Momčilo Mandić, C2 (Transcript from *Prosecutor v. Krajišnik*), T. 9267-9270.

¹⁰⁵⁹⁴ P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 14, 20-22 (stating that with regard to Mićo Stanišić and Mandić, they kept visiting the Accused and failed to attend government's sessions as they felt that "the government could be pushed aside" and "thought of themselves as belonging to the top leadership"); P1105 (Transcript of 22nd session of RS Assembly, 23-24 November 1992), p. 12. See P5646 (Intercept of conversation between Radovan Karadžić and Mićo Stanišić, 21 June 1992); P6624 (Intercept of conversation between Mićo Stanišić and Radovan Karadžić, 12 June 1991). See also P2848 (Witness statement of Milorad Davidović dated 22 June 2011), para. 47.

¹⁰⁵⁹⁵ P4982 (Witness Statement of Branko Đerić dated 5 April 2012), paras. 21-22. See paras. 2932, 3161.

¹⁰⁵⁹⁶ See paras. 3164-3167.

¹⁰⁵⁹⁷ For example, as early as September 1991, Mićo Stanišić was informed that the Bosnian Serbs wanted to split the police structures in Vogošća given the disputes they were facing, but Stanišić said that "it needs some more time. One should act with his head cool". P2219 (Intercept of conversation between Jovan Tintor and Mićo Stanišić, 12 September 1991), pp. 2-5.

¹⁰⁵⁹⁸ See para. 2973. See also D4271 (Video footage of Mićo Stanišić's speech, 30 March 1992, with transcript).

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KARADZIC · JOEGOSLAVIE · GENOCIDE · REPUBLIKA SRPSKA · MILOSEVIC · CARLA DEL PONTE ·
OORLOGSMISDADEN · BOSNISCHE SERVIERERS · RATKO MLADIC · IZETBEGOVIC · RAMUSH HARADINAJ ·
VOJISLAV SESELJ · SERGE BRAMMERTZ · SREBRENICA · NAVO · SARAJEVO · ETNISCHE ZUIVERING ·
MYTHE · UCK · BALKAN · PROPAGANDA · PROCES · RECHTSpraak · BILJANA PLAVSIC · »»Joegoslavië-tribunaal pleit Milosevic vrij, NAVO plundert
door

zat 6 aug 2016 21:38



Nu wijlen Slobodan Milosevic is vrijgepleit door het Joegoslavië-tribunaal, wordt eens te meer duidelijk dat we uitspraken van de NAVO over 'officiële vijanden' niet met een korreltje, maar met een hele vrachtlading zout moeten nemen. Dat schrijft de Britse journalist en blogger Neil Clark. De afgelopen 20 jaar is ons steeds verteld dat Milosevic, een democratisch gekozen leider, een kwaadaardige dictator was die verantwoordelijk kon worden

gehouden voor alle sterfgevallen in de Balkan...

Karadzic wil nieuw proces voor Joegoslavië-tribunaal

din 14 aug 2012 14:33



Radovan Karadzic, de vroegere politieke leider van de Bosnische Serviërs, wil een nieuw proces. Volgens hem verloopt het huidige proces voor het Joegoslavië-tribunaal (ICTY) niet eerlijk. Dat maakte het hof in Den Haag maandag bekend. Karadzic, 67 jaar, zegt dat het bureau van de aanklager documenten à décharge en enkele getuigenverklaringen niet op tijd zou vrijgegeven hebben.

In een verzoekschrift, dat door het hof publiek werd gemaakt, klaagt Karadzic dat hij zich daardoor niet goed...

De massamoord in Srebrenica is politieke oplichting

zon 5 jun 2011 08:43

Zowel de omvang het aantal slachtoffers van Srebrenica als wel de context van de juli 1995 moorden zijn verkeerd weergegeven in de officiële rapporten van gouvernementele en niet-gouvernementele organisaties evenals in de mainstream media. Hoge VN militaire en civiele ambtenaren, NAVO-intelligence officers en onafhankelijke analisten betwisten de officiële kwalificatie door het Joegoslavië-tribunaal van de val van Srebrenica en de evacuatie van deze "veilige zone" als een unieke gruweldaad...

Mladic en de farce van het Joegoslavië-tribunaal

zat 4 jun 2011 13:56



De arrestatie van Ratko Mladic, de voormalige leider van het Bosnisch-Servische leger, is door de media met gejuich begroet. Mladic, bijgenaamd 'de beul van Bosnië', moet zich voor het Joegoslavië-tribunaal in Den Haag verantwoorden voor de dood van duizenden mensen tijdens de Bosnië-oorlog van 1992-1995. Mladic' arrestatie gaf de media de gelegenheid om het officiële verhaal over de oorlogen in het voormalige Joegoslavië opnieuw in omloop te brengen. Joegoslavië zou...

Joegoslavië-tribunaal pleit Milosevic vrij, NAVO plundert door

Karadzic wil nieuw proces voor Joegoslavië-tribunaal

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The Scorpions - A Home Movie (2007)

Karadzic mag niet in beroep

'Radovan is een minzaam man'

De totale ontmaskering van het Joegoslavië-tribunaal komt dichterbij

Proces tegen Kroaat Gotovina begonnen in Den Haag

Karadzic wil dwangbevel aan Bosnië om wapens

'Onschuldige' Seselj wil liefst de doodstraf

Officiële website van DUTCHBAT3 - Een wezenlijk andere kijk op Srebrenica

'Karadzic gaat Srebrenica-mythe vernietigen'

>>

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De mythe van de genocide in Srebrenica

zon 29 mei 2011 18:54

 alija_izmetbegovic-with-el-

Vandaag wederom een artikel van de onvolprezen Max op herhaling omdat het actueel is. Feiten en details over de Balkanoorlog, een genocide die er nooit was en de leugens die u in de krant las en op het Journaal zag. Ga d'r maar weer even voor zitten om dit artikel van 1 maart 2010 tot u door te laten dringen: WIST U DAT? In een interview met De Standaard in 1995 verklaarde Karadzic: "Ik ben helemaal niet zo gek op politiek. Ik was een erg gelukkig man voor ik in de politiek kwam. Het...

The Balkans Chronicles: Srebrenica Mythe

zal 28 mei 2011 20:34



Mladic verdient respect dat hij itt de moslim troepen de Bosnische vrouwen en kinderen spaarde, in vrijheid, terwijl de Servische kinderen, vrouwen rond Srebrenica werden gedood/1300!!/ door monster Naser Oric en jihadstrijders. Deze actie heeft tot doel terroristen uit te schakelen en is niet gericht tegen burgers of VN-troepen, schreef Mladic tijdens de aanval op Srebrenica aan de Britse commandant Rupert Smith. Op deze foto is mooi om te zien: volwassen mannen en niet alleen vrouwen en...

Karadzic mag niet in beroep

zon 29 nov 2009 21:28



Karadzic mag niet in beroep Radovan Karadzic mag niet in beroep gaan tegen het besluit van de rechters van het Joegoslavië-tribunaal om hem een advocaat toe te wijzen. Volgens de rechters zorgt het beroep voor vertraging. Dat hebben de rechters gisteren besloten. Volgens de procedure van het VN-hot bepalen rechters in dit soort gevallen of een kwestie wordt voorgedragen aan de beroepsrechters. Om de impasse in het Karadzic-proces te doorbreken, besloten de rechters deze maand om een...

'Radovan is een minzaam man'

maa 26 okt 2009 00:30



'Radovan is een minzaam man' MAANDAG BEGINT PROCES TEGEN KARADZIC — Meer dan vijftien maanden na zijn arrestatie in een buitenwijk van Belgrado begint maandag het proces tegen Radovan Karadzic, hoofdrolspeler uit de Balkanoorlog bij het begin van de jaren negentig. Zijn dossier is meer dan 938.000 pagina's dik. Bijna 500 getuigen zijn opgespoord, batterijen juristen werden gemobiliseerd. Juridische salvo's over en weer trokken een rookgordijn op dat ons de kijk op de realiteit ontnemt....

De totale ontmaskering van het Joegoslavië-tribunaal komt dichterbij

din 13 okt 2009 22:03

November 2004 Iedereen die de geschiedenis van het zogenaamde 'proces' tegen Milosevic heeft gevolgd, weet welke dreunen Milosevic de afgelopen jaren heeft uitgedeeld aan het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal'. Historie Voor een goed begrip van de recente ontwikkelingen inzake het 'Joegoslavië-tribunaal' nog even terug naar de dagen dat de NAVO bommen deed regenen op Joegoslavië. De verwoestingen waren groot en het aantal slachtoffers was hoog. De protesten tegen deze naakte agressie...



Karadzic wil dwangbevel aan Bosnië om wapens

zon 6 sep 2009 11:11

donnerdag 1 september 2016



Het onschuldig verklaren van een man die werd beschuldigd van de ergste misdaad, genocide, heeft de krantenkoppen niet gehaald. Noch de BBC noch CNN brachten er verslag van uit. The Guardian beperkte zich tot een korte commentaar. Een dergelijke zeldzame officiële bekentenis werd begraven of onderdrukt. Begrijpelijk. Het zou immers te veel vertellen over hoe de leiders van deze wereld over ons heersen.

Het Internationale Joegoslaviëtribunaal (ICTY) in Den Haag heeft in alle stilte voormalig Servisch president, wijlen Slobodan Milošević ('Milosjević'), vrijgesproken van oorlogsmisdaden tijdens de Bosnische Oorlog van 1992-95, ook van de slachting in Srebrenica.

Verre van samen te spannen met de wel door het ICTY-Tribunaal in Den Haag veroordeelde Bosnische Servier Radovan Karadžić ('Karadzjitsj') heeft Milošević de "ethnische zuiveringen in Bosnie veroordeeld", heeft hij zich gekant tegen Karadžić en heeft hij geprobeerd de oorlog die Joegoslavië verscheurde stop te zetten. Diep begraven ergens op het einde van het 2590 pagina's tellend vonnis van het ICTY-Tribunaal over Karadžić afgelopen februari 2016, breekt deze waarheid de propaganda verder af die de illegale Navo-aanval op Servie van 1999 rechtvaardigde.

Milošević overleed aan een hartaanval in 2006, alleen in zijn cel in Den Haag, tijdens een showproces door een in de VS verzonnen "internationaal strafhof". Een hartoperatie die zijn leven zou kunnen hebben gered werd hem geweigerd, zijn toestand verslechterde terwijl die werd gevolgd en geheim gehouden door Amerikaanse functionarissen, zoals Wikileaks ondertussen heeft geopenbaard.



Diep verborgen in het vonnis dat Radovan Karadžić schuldig verklaarde aan genocide staat dat Slobodan Milošević onschuldig is, tien jaar nadat hij in Den Haag aan een niet verzorgde hartkwaal is overleden. Hij heeft geen genocide georganiseerd, noch in Bosnië, noch in Kosovo, meer nog, hij heeft zich blijkbaar verzet tegen de slachtingen onder leiding van Karadžić ...

Milošević was het slachtoffer van oorlogspropaganda die ook vandaag van ons scherm en onze kranten druipet en die ons in groot gevaar brengt. Hij was het prototype van de duivel, afgeschilderd door de Westerse media als "de slachter van de Balkan", verantwoordelijk voor "genocide", vooral in de afvallige Joegoslavische provincie Kosovo. Brits eerste minister Tony Blair heeft hem zo omschreven, haalde de Holocaust erbij en eiste een optreden tegen "deze

nieuwe Hitler". David Scheffer, toenmalig Amerikaanse speciaal ambassadeur voor oorlogsmisdaden (sic), verklaarde dat tot "225.000 etnisch Albanese mannen tussen 14 en 59 jaar in 1999 zouden zijn gedood door de troepen van Milošević".

Dit was de ultieme rechtvaardiging voor de NAVO-bombardementen op Servië en op Servische stellingen in Kosovo, geleid door Amerikaans president Bill Clinton en Brits eerste minister Blair. Deze NAVO-bombardementen doodden honderden burgers in ziekenhuizen, scholen, kerken, parken en televisiestudio's en vernietigden de Servische economische infrastructuur. Dit was een uitdrukkelijk ideologische beslissing.

Op de beruchte "vredesconferentie" in het Franse Rambouillet werd Milošević geconfronteerd door Madeleine Albright, Amerikaans minister van buitenlandse zaken, die berucht werd met haar uitspraak dat de dood van een half miljoen Iraakse kinderen (tijdens de door de VS en Groot-Brittannië opgelegde economische boycot) "het waard was".

Albright overhandigde toen een "voorstel" aan Milošević dat geen enkele nationale leider kon aanvaarden, tenzij hij instemde met een volledige militaire bezetting van zijn land door een bezettingsmacht die (volgens de termen van het voorstel) boven de wet zou staan en bovendien het opleggen van de neoliberale "vrije markt" inhield. Als hij dit niet aanvaardde zou Servië worden gebombardeerd.

Dit stond beschreven in "Appendix B" van het akkoord van Rambouillet die de media hebben nagelaten te lezen of hebben verzwegen. Het doel van dit opgelegde akkoord was Europa's laatste onafhankelijke "socialistische" staat te vernietigen.

Van zodra de NAVO begon te bombarderen kwam een stroom van Kosovaarse vluchtelingen op gang, "op de vlucht voor een Holocaust". Van zodra de NAVO-aanval over was, streken in Kosovo talrijke internationale politieteams neer om de slachtoffers van de "holocaust" op te graven. De Amerikaanse inlichtingendienst FBI slaagde er niet in ook maar één massagraf te vinden en trok zonder resultaten huiswaarts.

Een Spaans forensische team deed hetzelfde, terwijl de teamleider de "semantische pirouette van de oorlogspropagandamachines" aanklaagde. De finale som van de doden in Kosovo was niet 225.000 maar 2788. Daar zaten zowel strijders tussen van beide zijden als burgers, naast Albanese Kosovaren waren dat Servische Kosovaren en Roma-Kosovaren die vermoord werden door het pro-NAVO Kosovaarse Bevrijdingsfront UCK. Er was nooit een genocide gepleegd. De NAVO-aanval was zowel bedrog als een oorlogsmisdad

Op een klein aantal na troffen al de zo geprezen Amerikaanse "precisiebommen" niet militaire, maar burgerdoelwitten, waaronder de nieuwsstudio's van Radio Televisie Servië in de Servische hoofdstad Belgrado. Zestien mensen stierven toen, waaronder cameramensen, producers en een schminkster. Blair omschreef de doden krenkend als leden van de Servische "command and control". In 2008 onthulde Carla Del Ponte, aanklaagster van het Internationale Joegoslaviëtribunaal, dat ze onder druk was gezet om de oorlogsmisdaden van de NAVO in Joegoslavië niet te onderzoeken en zich uitsluitend te beperken tot de misdaden van de Servische strijdkrachten en milities.

Dit werd voor Washington het propaganda-model voor de daaropvolgende invasies van Afghanistan, Irak, Libië en meer verborgen ook Syrië. Al deze invasies kunnen volgens de normen van de oorlogsprocessen in Nuremberg (1945-1946) als grove misdaden worden bestempeld. Allen steunen ze op mediapropaganda.

Terwijl de boulevardpers haar traditionele rol speelde, was het de ernstige, geloofwaardige, vaak progressieve journalistiek die het meest effectief was – de vererende uitstalling van Blair en zijn oorlogen door The Guardian, de onophoudelijke leugens over Iraaks president Saddam Hoesseins onbestaande massavernietigingswapens in The Observer en The New York Times en het foutloze tromgeroffel van de overheidspropaganda door de BBC in hun verzuimend stilzwijgen.

Tijdens het hoogtepunt van de NAVO-bombardementen interviewde BBC-journalist Kirsty Wark NAVO-bevelhebber generaal Wesley Clark. Boven de Servische stad Niš ('nisj') had het net Amerikaanse clusterbommen geregend op een open markt en in een ziekenhuis die vrouwen, ouderen en kinderen doodde. Wark stelde hier geen enkele vraag over, noch over eender welke andere burgerslachtoffers.

Andere journalisten waren stoutmoediger. In februari 2003, de dag nadat Blair en Bush Irak in vuur en vlam hadden gezet, stond Andrew Marr, politiek redacteur van de BBC, in Downing Street en hield wat als een overwinningsspeech mocht beschouwd worden. Opgewonden vertelde hij zijn kijkers dat Blair had voorspeld dat "ze Bagdad zullen kunnen innemen zonder een bloedbad en dat de Irakezen uiteindelijk zouden vieren. Op beide punten werd ontegensprekelijk zijn gelijk bewezen." Vandaag, met een miljoen doden en een samenleving in puin, worden Marr's toenmalige BBC-interviews aanbevolen als bronnenmateriaal door de Amerikaanse ambassade in Londen.

Marr's collega's stonden in rij om Blair "vrij van elke verdenking" te verklaren. Matt Frei, BBC-correspondent in Washington, zei dat "er geen twijfel over bestond dat het verlangen om het goede te verspreiden, om Amerikaanse waarden naar de rest van de wereld te brengen, en in het bijzonder naar het Midden-Oosten... nu steeds meer verbonden is met militaire macht."

Het zorgt er voor dat de huidige catastrofe in Syrië exclusief wordt geweten aan Syrisch president Bashar al-Assad. Voor zijn val zweren het Westen en Israël al lang samen, niet om enige humanitaire bekommernis, maar om Israëls agressieve macht in de regio te consolideren.

Deze onderdanigheid aan de VS en hun bondgenoten als een goedaardige macht die "het goede verspreidt" is een dogma dat diep geworteld zit in de Westerse gevestigde journalistiek.

De jihadistische krachten die werden ontketend en bewapend door de VS, Groot-Brittannië, Frankrijk, Turkije en hun "proxy-coalition" dienen dit doel. Zij zijn het die de propaganda en video's verspreiden die nieuws worden in de VS en Europa en die toegang verschaffen aan journalisten en een eenzijdige "berichtgeving" over Syrië verzekeren.

De Syrische stad Aleppo is nu in het nieuws. De meeste lezers en kijkers zullen in de mainstream media niet vernemen dat de meerderheid van de bevolking van Aleppo in het door de overheid gecontroleerde westelijke deel van de stad leeft. Dat zij daar onder dagelijkse bombardementen van de door het Westen gesponsorde Al-Qaeda lijden is geen nieuws. Op 21 juli vielen Franse en Amerikaanse bommenwerpers een door de Syrische overheid gecontroleerd dorp aan in de provincie Aleppo, waarbij tot 125 burgers omkwamen. Hierover werd bericht op pagina 22 van de Guardian. Er waren geen foto's bij.

Na het jihadisme in Afghanistan in de jaren 1980 te hebben gecreëerd en onderschreven als Operatie Cycloon – het wapen om de Sovjet-Unie die toen Afghanistan bezette te vernietigen – doet de VS iets gelijkaardigs in Syrië. Net zoals de Afghaanse moedjaheden zijn de Syrische "rebellens" in Syrië het voetvolk van de VS en Groot-Brittannië. Velen vechten voor Al-Qaeda en zijn varianten. Sommige van die groeperingen, zoals het Nusra-Front, hebben zichzelf omgedoopt om zich te schikken naar de Amerikaanse gevoeligheden.

over 9/11. De CIA leidt ze met enige moeite, zoals het jihadisten leidt over de hele wereld.

Het onmiddellijke doel van de operatie in Syrië is de regering in Damascus te vernietigen die, volgens de meest geloofwaardige peilingen (YouGovSiraj) nog steeds door de meerderheid van de Syriërs wordt gesteund, of bij wie ze op zijn minst bescherming zoeken, ongeacht de barbaarsheden die ook onder dat regime gebeuren. Het doel op lange termijn is Rusland een sleutelpartner in het Midden-Oosten te ontzeggen als onderdeel van een uitputtingsoorlog door de NAVO tegen de Russische Federatie met als doel Rusland uiteindelijk te vernietigen.

Het risico op een kernoorlog is daarbij duidelijk aanwezig, hoewel dat wordt onderdrukt in de media van "de vrije wereld". De redacteuren van The Washington Post, die de fictie van de massavernietigingswapens in Irak hadden gepromoot, eisen nu dat Obama Syrië zou aanvallen. Democratisch presidentskandidaat Hillary Clinton, die als toenmalig minister van buitenlandse zaken openlijk juichte over de vernietiging van Libië, heeft herhaaldelijk aangegeven dat ze, als president, "verder zal gaan" dan Obama.

Gareth Porter, een alternatief onderzoeksjournalist die bericht vanuit Washington, heeft onlangs de namen onthuld van zij die wellicht de regeringsploeg van Clinton zullen vormen en een aanval op Syrië plannen. Allen hebben zij een oorlogsverleden uit de Koude Oorlog. De voormalige CIA-directeur Leon Panetta (2009-2011) zei al dat "de volgende president zal moeten overwegen om bijkomende Special Forces op het (Syrische) terrein te sturen".

Wat het meest opmerkelijk is aan deze stroom van oorlogspropaganda is zijn duidelijke absurditeit en vertrouwde herkenbaarheid. Ik heb archiefbeelden uit het Washington van de jaren 1950 doorlopen toen tegen diplomaten, ambtenaren en journalisten een heksenjacht werd georganiseerd en die werden geruïneerd omdat ze de toenmalige leugens en de paranoia over de Sovjet-Unie en China in vraag stelden. Zoals een terugkerende kanker is de anti-Rusland cultus terug van weggeweest.

In Groot-Brittannië leidt journalist Luke Harding van The Guardian de Rusland-haters in een stroom van journalistieke parodieën die Vladimir Poetin verantwoordelijk stellen voor elk mogelijk onrecht op aarde. Toen het lek van de Panama Papers werd gepubliceerd zei de voorpagina "Poetin" en stond een foto van Poetin bij. Het deed er niet toe dat Poetin nergens in die lekken werd vermeld.

Zoals Milošević toen is Poetin vandaag duivel nummer één. Hij was het die een Maleisisch passagiersvliegtuig boven Oekraïne heeft neergehaald. Krantenkop: "Wat mij betreft heeft Poetin mijn zoon vermoord." Bewijs is niet vereist. Poetin was ook verantwoordelijk voor de door Washington ondersteunde en betaalde omverwerping van de verkozen regering in Kiev in 2014. De daaropvolgende terreurcampagne door fascistische milities tegen de Russisch-sprekende bevolking van Oekraïne was het resultaat van Poetins "agressie".

Verhindert dat de Krim een NAVO-raketbasis zou worden en het beschermen van de grotendeels Russische bevolking daar, die in een referendum had gekozen om zich terug bij Rusland te voegen – waarvan het was afgescheiden in 1954 – waren eveneens voorbeelden van Poetins agressie. Laster door de media wordt onvermijdelijk oorlog door de media. Als er een oorlog uitbreekt met Rusland, bewust of per ongeluk, zullen journalisten daar een groot deel van de verantwoordelijkheid voor dragen.

In de VS is de anti-Rusland campagne uitgegroeid tot een virtual reality show. Paul Krugman, columnist bij de New York Times en Nobelprijswinnaar economie, heeft Donald Trump de Siberian Candidate genoemd omdat Trump Poetins man

zou zijn. Trump heeft in een zeldzaam helder moment immers durven te verklaren dat oorlog met Rusland misschien een slecht idee zou zijn. In feite ging hij nog verder en haalde Amerikaanse wapenleveringen aan Oekraïne uit het Republikeinse kiesprogramma. "Zou het niet fantastisch zijn als we goed opschoten met Rusland", zei hij.

Bill en Hilary Clintons geschiedenis van racisme en extremisme kunnen trouwens Trump om het even wanneer overtreffen. (Deze week is het de twintigste verjaardag van Clintons "hervorming van de welvaartstaat" die een oorlog ontketende tegen de Afro-Amerikanen).

Dit is dan ook de reden dat Amerika's oorlogszuchtige liberale establishment hem haat. Trumps racisme en demagogische tirades hebben daar niets mee te maken.

Wat Obama betreft, terwijl de Amerikaanse politie zijn mede-Afro-Amerikanen neerkogelt heeft de "grote hoop in het Witte Huis" niets gedaan om hen te beschermen, niets gedaan om hun verarming tegen te gaan, maar heeft hij wel vier roofzuchtige oorlogen en een nooit geziene moordcampagne (met drones), gevoerd.

De Amerikaanse buitenlandse inlichtingendienst CIA heeft geëist dat Trump niet wordt verkozen. Generaals van het Pentagon hebben geëist dat hij niet wordt verkozen. De pro-oorlog krant New York Times neemt even een pauze van haar niet aflatende laag-bij-de-grondse lastercampagne tegen Poetin en eist eveneens dat hij niet wordt verkozen. Er is met andere woorden iets gaande.

Deze propagandisten van een "permanente oorlog" zijn als de dood dat de miljardenbusiness van de oorlogen waarmee de VS hun dominantie over de wereld behouden zal worden ondermijnd als president Trump een deal zou sluiten met Poetin en daarna met China's Xi Jinping. Hun paniek over de mogelijkheid dat de grote wereldmacht op aarde over vrede zou gaan spreken – hoe onwaarschijnlijk ook – zou slechts een macabere grap zijn, ware het niet dat deze kwesties zo onheilspellend zijn.

"Trump zou Stalin geweldig hebben gevonden!" loeide vice-president Joe Biden tijdens een kiesmeeting voor Hilary Clinton. Terwijl Clinton knikte schreeuwde hij: "Wij buigen nooit. Wij plooiën nooit. Wij knielen nooit. Wij geven nooit toe. De finishlijn is van ons. Dat is wie we zijn. Wij zijn Amerika!"

In Groot-Brittannië heeft ook Labourvoorzitter Jeremy Corbyn hysterie uitgelokt bij de oorlogsstokers binnen Labour en bij de media, die zich er toe inzetten om hem voortdurend te bekladden. Lord West, voormalig admiraal en Labour-minister, heeft dat goed uitgedrukt. Corbyn nam volgens hem een "ongehoorde" anti-oorlogspositie in "omdat dat de gedachteloze massa voor hem doet stemmen".

In een debat met Owen Smith, zijn uitdager voor het leiderschap van de partij, kreeg Corbyn van de moderator de vraag: "Hoe zou u reageren op een schending door Vladimir Poetin van een NAVO-staat?" Corbyn antwoordde: "Je zou moeten voorkomen dat zoiets in de eerste plaats gebeurt. Je zou moeten een goede dialoog met Rusland opstarten... Wij zouden proberen een demilitarisering door te voeren van de grenzen tussen Rusland, Oekraïne en andere landen op de grens tussen Rusland en Oost-Europa. Wat we niet kunnen toelaten is een rampzalige opbouw van troepen aan beide zijden die enkel tot een groot gevaar kan leiden."

Met aandrang gevraagd of hij toestemming zou geven voor een oorlog tegen Rusland "indien hij moest", antwoordde Corbyn: "Ik wens niet ten oorlog te trekken – wat ik wil is een wereld opbouwen waarin het niet nodig is ten oorlog te trekken."

Het soort vragen dat hier wordt gesteld heeft in grote mate bijgedragen tot de opkomst van de Britse 'liberale' oorlogsvoerders. Labour en de media hebben

hen lange tijd carrièremogelijkheden geboden. Een tijdlang heeft de morele tsunami van de grote misdaad in Irak hen doen spartelen, hun omkering van de waarheid werd slechts een tijdelijke verlegenheid. Ongeacht de bevindingen van de onderzoekscommissie Chilcot over de manier waarop Tony Blair zijn land in de aanval op Irak meesleurde en de berg belastende feiten blijft Blair voor hen een inspiratiebron omdat hij een "winnaar" was.

Andersdenkende journalistiek en wetenschap zijn sindsdien systematisch gebannen of toegeëigend, democratische ideeën worden ontdaan van elke betekenis en vervuld met "identity politics". Die verwart gender met feminisme en publieke angst met bevrijding. Die negeert bewust het staatsgeweld en de wapenbusiness die talloze levens verwoesten in verafgelegen plaatsen zoals Jemen en Syrië. Die kunnen ook een kernoorlog uitlokken in Europa en over de hele wereld.

De nieuwe beweging van mensen van alle leeftijden rond de spectaculaire opkomst van Jeremy Corbyn gaat tot op zekere hoogte in tegen deze tendens. Corbyn heeft zijn hele leven gewijd aan het aanklagen en openbaar maken van de gruwel van de oorlog.

Het probleem voor Corbyn en zijn aanhangers is de Labour partij. In de VS is het probleem voor de duizenden aanhangers van Bernie Sanders de Democratische partij, om nog maar te zwijgen van het ultieme verraad door hun grote witte hoop (Sanders). In de VS, thuisbasis van de grote burgerrechten- en vredesbewegingen, zijn het de bewegingen Black Lives Matter en Codepink¹ die de basis leggen voor een hedendaagse moderne versie van de burgerbewegingen. Want alleen een beweging die aanzwelt in alle straten en over alle grenzen heen en die niet opgeeft kan de oorlogsstokers stoppen.

In 1917 zal het een eeuw geleden zijn dat Wilfred Owen² (foto) het volgende gedicht schreef. Ieder journalist zou het moeten lezen en onthouden...



- If you could hear, at every jolt, the blood
- Come gargling from the froth-corrupted lungs,
- Obscene as cancer, bitter as the cud
- Of vile, incurable sores on innocent tongues,
- My friend, you would not tell with such high zest
- To children ardent for some desperate glory,
- The old lie: Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.

(Vrij samengevat: Als je de horror van oorlog zou zien en voelen, zou je niet met zoveel ijver de oude leugen vertellen: "Zoet en eervol is het te sterven voor het vaderland")

John Pilger, 23 augustus 2016

Provoking nuclear war by media werd gepubliceerd door John Pilger op zijn website en vertaald uit het Engels door Karel Lietaert.

¹ BlackLivesMatter begon als hashtag in 2013 na een zoveelste moord op een Afrikaan-Amerikaan door een politieagent en werd een beweging. CodePink.

voluit CodePinkWomenForPeace is een vredesbeweging in de VS, opgericht in 2002.

2 De Britse soldaat Wilfred Owen stierf op 25-jarige leeftijd in de Franse loopgraven, één week voor de wapenstilstand. Hij schreef dit gedicht in een brief aan zijn moeder in 1917. Het werd gepubliceerd in 1920.

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